20 THE XI'AN INCIDENT

As Mao's forces linked up with Liu Zhidan's in Shaanxi, Zhang Guotao was wandering around in northwest Sichuan. After forty days he managed to extricate his forces from the marshy bogs. On October 5 he established a new “CCP Central Committee,” a new “Central Government,” and a new “Central Revolutionary Military Committee,” and “expelled” Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Luo Fu from the party.¹ It would be hard to imagine anything more stupid. He also cruelly punished and even shot those commanders and commissars in his column who opposed these actions.²

By now the Politburo had settled down in northern Shaanxi. In mid-December 1935, Mao and other leaders relocated to Wayaobao, the only district center, in Braun's words, that was “firmly in the hands of the Red Army …… We noted that a poor, partially calcified land lay before us,” he recalled.³ Dozens of hamlets and villages lay in ruins; the fertile land was deserted. The sparse rural population eked out a miserable existence. Years of warlord campaigns, horrific banditry, and terrible harvests and epidemics had catastrophically undermined the local economy. Between 1928 and 1933, several years prior to the arrival of Mao's forces, more than half of the local population had died of famine. In many villages all of the children below age ten had died. Northern Shaanxi was almost depopulated.⁴ As was the case everywhere in northern China, there was no distinction here between Hakka and bendi, but the terrible poverty of the people, who teetered on the edge of death by starvation, created exceptionally favorable conditions for growth of the CCP, just as in “Hakka country.”

Endless narrow ravines and yellow plains scarred with deep canyons stretched in all directions. Lifeless loess hills, in which the survivors of war and famine lived in caves, towered sullenly above this landscape. Practically anyone could dig a cave home in the soft loess soil. The leaders of the CCP, including Mao Zedong and He Zizhen, took up residence in such caves. The dull northern landscape was conducive to melancholy, but Mao was not swayed by emotions. Zunyi and, especially, the rupture with Zhang Guotao had placed him in a position where everyone viewed him as their authoritative leader.

Throughout the fall and winter he was busy establishing organs of power in the new district, devoting most of his attention to strengthening his military forces. After incorporating the local guerrillas, the Red Army numbered 10,410 fighters.⁵ In early November, Mao reorganized his forces, restoring the old name of the First Front Army. In Zhu De's absence—Zhu De was still with Zhang Guotao—the position of commander was filled by Peng Dehuai. Mao occupied the position of political commissar. The Northwest Revolutionary Military Council was established to exercise supreme control over the soviet area. Mao became its chairman and Zhou Enlai, who had recovered from his illness, and, in formal terms, Zhu De, became his two deputies. (Mao forgave “Old Zhu,” understanding that the professional warrior was accustomed to subordinating himself to party leadership and was therefore unable to stand up to Zhang Guotao.) A government, basically concerned with economic matters, was established called the Northwest Office of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Mao's brother Zemin was appointed minister of economy and foreign trade, while Bo Gu was given the lofty position of chairman. Mao knew how to repair relations with people he needed, including former enemies. The tested principle of “Treat the illness to save the patient” continued to bear fruit. The grateful Bo Gu was happy to serve Mao.

Only with the refractory Zhang was he unable to patch up relations for a whole year. In late November 1936, Zhang, accompanied by Zhu De, showed up in northern Shaanxi seeking reconciliation.⁶ By then Zhang had almost entirely lost his army in the swamps and mountains of Sichuan, Xikang, and southern Gansu, where he was engaged in constant battles. Mao greeted him magnanimously. Zhang had “lost face” and was, therefore, no longer dangerous. A loser, no one would have followed him even had he chosen to continue his “anti-party” activity. “We all spoke and congratulated each other,” wrote Zhang Guotao. “At that time, we discussed our future, not our past.”⁷ Mao made Zhang one of his deputies in the Revolutionary Military Council and appointed him general political commissar of the Red Army—Zhu De remained as commander—and appointed him deputy chairman of the government. The split had been overcome. Zhang's capitulation meant that not only the remnants of his Fourth Front Army entered into Mao's forces, but also the troops of the Second Front Army of He Long and Ren Bishi that, in June 1936, after completing their trek to Xikang from the old base area on the Hunan-Hubei border, had joined up with Zhang's forces.

The future began to look bright for the communists. Escalating Japanese aggression fueled the patriotic upsurge of the Chinese people. In December 1935, a wave of powerful anti-Japanese student demonstrations rolled through the country (the so-called December Ninth Movement). Dissatisfaction with the government's policy of appeasement toward Japan arose even in the Guomindang army. Thus the CCP's anti-Japanese stance began to resonate with Chinese public opinion.

Mao continued his anti-Japanese rhetoric, realizing that only by giving voice to strong patriotic sentiments could the communists secure wide popular support. Of course, Mao had no intention of renouncing class struggle, but it was to his tactical advantage to tone down the radical rhetoric. The division of property on the model of bandits had thus far led only to defeat. Although Chiang Kai-shek remained the main enemy, from then on appeals to Chinese patriotism became an increasingly important element in the communist struggle.

Luckily, his new policy was completely in line with that of the Comintern. In the summer of 1935, Stalin, fearing German and Japanese aggression against the USSR, sharply altered his policy. Communists were directed henceforth not to seek the overthrow of the ruling classes, but rather to organize a new united front with them—in the West an antifascist united front and in the East an anti-Japanese united front. In his private calculations, Stalin was not reconsidering the strategic goals of the communist movement, namely, establishing world domination.⁸ He was simply maneuvering to attract to his side and, correspondingly, to the side of various communist parties, as many allies as possible. These decisions were taken in Moscow in July–August 1935, at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. There, on August 1, Wang Ming, speaking in the name of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the CCP, published a declaration calling upon his fellow countrymen to stop fighting and unite in struggle against Japan. From the circle of “fellow countrymen,” however, Chiang Kai-shek and his cabinet members were excluded.⁹

Lacking a link with Moscow, Mao and other Politburo leaders were unaware of these changes and so they acted at their own risk. None of them knew that Moscow was striving to reestablish its severed links with the Chinese communists. Moscow already knew about the Zunyi Conference and wholly supported the decisions taken there. Chen Yun, one of those who had taken part in the conference, conveyed its essential points to Comintern officials after he arrived in Moscow in late September 1935, shortly after the conclusion of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. Since he did not have a copy of the Zunyi resolution his information could not be verified by documents. Moscow received the text of the resolution later, sometime in 1936. The text of the resolution itself was of no particular importance, however, since Moscow was already positively inclined toward the CCP Politburo's decisions.¹⁰

By September 1935, the Comintern had already initiated the true cult of personality of Mao. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern it had pronounced him one of the “standard-bearers” of the world communist movement, along with the general secretary of the ECCI, the Bulgarian communist Georgii Dimitrov.¹¹ This was done through the lips of the CCP representative Teng Daiyuan, but without the sanction of the Moscow leadership Teng would not have said what he did. The Seventh Congress devoted special attention to elevating the authority of Communist Party leaders. At a specially convened meeting of the CCP delegation to the Comintern in late August 1935, Wang Ming, the delegation leader, said: “Whose authority should be elevated? Of course, that of the members of the Politburo …… Who first? The authority of comrades Mao Zedong and Zhu De.”¹²

Wang Ming was not at all devoted to Mao Zedong and fancied himself as leader of the party. Soon afterward Guo Zhaotang (alias Afanasii Gavrilovich Krymov), an official on his staff, with Wang Ming's direct assistance, drafted a special note about Mao Zedong to the Comintern aimed at undermining the positive impression that Stalin was forming about the guerrilla leader. It said,

Social background—small landowner [someone who read the note placed a question mark in red pencil above this]. No systematic mistakes. A very hard worker, efficient agitator, and organizer, knows how to penetrate into the thick of the masses, a good leader of mass work. Has rich experience in the peasant movement and guerrilla warfare. Can work in hard and very difficult conditions. He is very active and gets the work done well. Personal characteristics—likes to mingle with the masses, do propaganda work, is selfless. In addition to the aforementioned positives are shortcomings, namely, insufficient theoretical preparation; therefore, is inclined to make individual political mistakes, however, easily and quickly corrects his mistakes under correct and firm party leadership. [A large part of the last phrase was underlined by someone in red pencil, bracketed on the side, and a question mark placed in the margin.]¹³

A number of members and former members of the CCP delegation to the Comintern, including Li Lisan and Zhao Yimin, informed higher authorities that Wang Ming was “undermining the authority of Mao Zedong among Chinese comrades in the USSR.” In conversation with ECCI officials on February 17, 1940, Li Lisan said:

It seems to me that the main source for spreading the idea that Mao Zedong was not a political leader was Wang Ming. He told me, Xiao Ai [Zhao Yimin], and others that Mao Zedong was a very good person, but very weak when it came to theory. In conversation with me and with Xiao Ai, whom he trusted more, Wang Ming, speaking of Mao Zedong's report to the Second Congress of Soviets, said there were many weak points in the report, but that he had corrected them and now the report was better. Other documents received from China were similarly corrected, thus, many of these corrected documents were different from their versions in China.¹⁴

So it was most likely under pressure from the leadership of the Comintern that Wang Ming was forced to elevate the authority of his rival. As before, none of the Chinese communists could dispute these decisions, because the CCP's financial dependence upon the USSR had not eased. Enormous sums of Soviet money continued to flow to the Central Committee of the CCP. On June 8, 1934, the Political Commission of the Political Secretariat of the ECCI decided to send 100,000 rubles from unspent funds of the Chinese Communist Party and 100,000 rubles from a reserve fund.¹⁵ On July 1, 1934, it was decided in Moscow that in 1934 the Chinese Communist Party would receive 7,418 gold dollars monthly.¹⁶

Following the Seventh Congress a full-blown campaign to exalt Mao Zedong commenced in the USSR. In early December 1935, Communist International, the theoretical and political organ of the Comintern, published a long panegyric sketch titled “Mao Zedong—leader of the Chinese working people.”¹⁷ The unsigned article was written by Aleksandr Moiseevich Khamadan, deputy director of the Foreign Department of Pravda.ⁿ⁴¹ Soon after, on December 13, 1935, the same author's article about Mao was published in Pravda.¹⁸ His biographical sketch, along with biographies he wrote about Zhu De and Fang Zhimin, commander of CCP troops in Fujian, who died in 1935, was later published in a brochure titled “Leaders and Heroes of the Chinese People,” issued by the State Social-Economic Publishers.¹⁹

It was not until mid-November 1935, when an emissary from the CCP delegation to the Comintern, an old Chinese communist named Lin Yuying, a cousin of Lin Biao's whom Mao had long known, arrived in northern Shaanxi, that Mao learned of the resolutions of the Seventh Congress, including, apparently, the praise directed at him.²⁰ After discussing the materials of the Seventh Congress for several days, the leaders of the CCP concluded that to align with Stalin's new policy, they had to alter their basic political direction. Luo Fu asserted the need to change party policy toward funong (rich peasants) and distinguish between them and the dizhu (landlords). Lin Yuying agreed. Mao, however, did not want to transform his relationship to the peasantry, although he acknowledged that a fundamental resolution of the class question in the countryside was not imminent. On December 1, he sent Luo Fu a letter setting forth his view. “I basically agree with changing the tactics toward the rich peasants,” he wrote,

but …… when …… the poor and middle peasants demand the equal distribution of the land of the rich peasants, the Party should support this request. The rich peasants may get land of the same kind as the poor and middle peasants …… [T]here should be some difference between the policy toward the rich peasants and that toward the middle peasants …… We must point out that when the struggle deepens, the rich peasants are sure to join the ranks of the landlords. This is a peculiarity of the semifeudal rich peasant class in China.²¹

Mao's propositions were only “basically” accepted. Luo Fu disagreed with Mao's main thesis, which was to support the poor and middle peasants if “in the course of struggle” they advocated the equal division of the land of the wealthy peasants. Mao's position sharply contrasted with the Comintern's united front policy. On December 6, while Mao was away with the troops, an enlarged plenum of the Politburo approved Luo Fu's resolution “On Changing Tactics toward the Kulaks.”²² Nine days later, wishing to avoid conflict, Mao issued a corresponding directive in the name of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic.²³ However, he did not alter his own views on the problems of the “rich peasants.”

Two days later, in Wayaobao, Luo Fu convened a new enlarged meeting of the Politburo that examined general political and military questions connected to the Comintern's new course. This meeting laid the foundations for the CCP's new line, namely, to “unite the civil war with the national” and direct it against both the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek via the formation of a “revolutionary national united front” of all patriotic forces, including the Guomindang. In keeping with the spirit of the August First Declaration to unite to fight Japan, only Chiang Kai-shek and his closest associates would be excluded.²⁴ Mao emphasized, “[W]hen the national crisis reaches a crucial moment, splits will occur in the Guomindang camp …… Such situations …… are favorable to the revolution …… We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts, and contradictions in the enemy camp and use them against our present main enemy [i.e., the Japanese].”²⁵

The leaders of the CCP began working toward this end even before the conference. In late November 1935, Mao first addressed a proposal for a truce and joint action against the Japanese to an officer of one of the Guomindang armies deployed in Shaanxi.²⁶ This was essentially a goodwill gesture toward Zhang Xueliang, the most prominent military figure in the Northwest. Marshal Zhang, the former Manchurian warlord, whose troops had retreated from Manchuria under Japanese pressure and were now based in south and central Shaanxi, played an important role in China's balance of power. The headquarters of his 200,000-man Northeast Army was in Xi'an, the provincial capital. The Young Marshal—in 1936 he was just thirty-five years old and because of his youth he was called Young Marshal in Chinese political and journalistic circles—was reputed to be a fierce Japanophobe. He had a special score to settle with the Japanese. In 1928, the Japanese intelligence service had assassinated his father, Marshal Zhang Zuolin, for pursuing an independent policy in Manchuria. In 1931, Japan's Kwantung Army, after provoking the Mukden Incident, occupied all the patrimony of Zhang Xueliang, forcing him to flee to Shaanxi. From there he tried to establish good relations with anyone he thought might help him drive the Japanese from Manchuria.

The naive marshal, who was sympathetic toward the fascists, invested particular hope in Il Duce, believing that only an ironlike totalitarian dictatorship like Mussolini's could rescue China from the crisis. He also counted on help from the Duce's daughter, Edda, the wife of the Italian consul general in Shanghai and future Italian minister of foreign affairs, Count Ciano. Zhang was a ladies' man. Good-looking, youthful, and dark-haired with a bristling mustache, he adored nightclubs and cabarets, was a splendid dancer, and courted women elegantly. The passionate Italian lady could not resist the handsome marshal, whose personal fortune, incidentally, amounted to some $50 million. It is hard to blame her, particularly since Count Ciano slighted her and preferred to linger in Shanghai's bars and houses of prostitution. Edda's romance with Zhang Xueliang continued for only a short time. In 1932 Edda and her husband returned to Rome.

In April 1933, Zhang Xueliang also left for Italy. Mussolini's daughter, although smitten by him, was unable to offer assistance. Her father would not condemn militarist Japan. Disenchanted with Il Duce, Marshal Zhang retained his faith in totalitarianism. He traveled to Germany, where he met with Hitler and Goering, but also got nothing from them. Then he went to France, where he encountered Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet people's commissar for foreign affairs. Hoping he might receive help from the communists, he asked Litvinov to arrange a trip to Moscow for him, but Stalin, not wishing to complicate his relations with Japan, rebuffed him.²⁷

Zhang Xueliang, finally understanding he would get no help from abroad, returned to China in January 1934. His chance to take revenge against the Japanese surfaced in November 1935 when Mao proposed a truce to one of his commanders. On April 9, 1936, Zhang began direct negotiations with representatives of the CCP, among them Zhou Enlai, which culminated in Zhang Xueliang agreeing to halt military actions against the communists and even to help supply them with weapons.

This arrangement eased the situation on the borders of the soviet area, but only to a certain degree. In June 1936, Gao Shuangcheng, the commander of the Eighty-Sixth Division of the Guomindang army, on Chiang Kai-shek's order, attacked the communists and seized their capital Wayaobao, forcing Mao, Luo Fu, and the others to flee to Baoan, more than ninety miles west of Wayaobao. Baoan was a tiny, half-abandoned town with just four hundred inhabitants and almost all of its houses in ruins.²⁸

Nevertheless, the CCP's policy of creating a united front remained unchanged. Mao asserted this unambiguously to Edgar Snow, who had arrived in Baoan to meet with him. In their first interview, on July 15, 1936, Mao emphasized, “The fundamental issue before the Chinese people today is the struggle against Japanese imperialism.”²⁹

Mao had good reason for optimism. The loss of Wayaobao had no effect on the strategic situation. The Red Army had steadily grown to twenty-five thousand warriors, and the anti-Japanese front was gradually taking shape. The courtship of Zhang Xueliang was going so well that the communist leaders even began thinking about secretly admitting him to the CCP. (Zhang had expressed the desire to become a communist.)³⁰ In late June to early July a radio link with Moscow had been reestablished, and in his very first telegram Mao asked Stalin to increase aid to the Communist Party to $2 million Mexican dollars per month. He also requested that Moscow send airplanes, heavy artillery, missiles, infantry weapons, antiaircraft artillery, and pontoons. At the same time, he informed Stalin about Zhang Guotao's “opportunist errors.”³¹

Mao would soon receive aid. Stalin would send him two million rubles and, several months later, US $500,000 and 1,166 tons of fuel, military supplies, and other strategic goods.³² Even earlier, on August 15, he would send a directive in the name of the Secretariat of the ECCI in which he “basically” approved Mao's policies.

The August 15 telegram proposed expansion of the united front. Stalin advised Mao to jettison his negative attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and “set a course on ceasing military operations” between the Red Army and the Guomindang as a whole, not just with Zhang Xueliang, whose admission into the party, incidentally, he forbade. “We think it is incorrect to place Chiang Kai-shek on the same level as the Japanese aggressors,” he indicated, “ …… for Japanese imperialism is the main enemy of the Chinese people, and at the present stage everything should be subordinated to the struggle against it.”³³ Stalin's position is easily understood since beginning in 1934, he was regularly receiving information from the Foreign Department of the OGPU (Soviet security police that was the forerunner of the KGB) and from military intelligence about a probable Japanese attack against the USSR. Mao, of course, knew nothing of these secret Soviet intelligence reports, but in any case he raised no objections to Stalin. Ten days later he dutifully sent a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang proposing to end the civil war and begin negotiations.³⁴ “The core of our policy is to work with Chiang [Kai-shek] to resist Japan,” he declared subsequently to the Chinese communists.³⁵

But Chiang Kai-shek, not the communists, remained the main player on the Chinese political stage. The Soviet consul in China, Dmitrii Bogomolov, reported Chiang would agree to an alliance with the communists “only on the eve …… of war with Japan and in connection with an agreement with the Soviet Union.”³⁶ Meanwhile, Chiang was preparing for a new, sixth, campaign against the communists to strengthen his authority as the national leader on the eve of the inevitable large-scale conflict with Japan.

Chiang Kai-shek knew about the negotiations between Zhang Xueliang and the communists and repeatedly warned the Young Marshal that the communists were untrustworthy. But in vain. Therefore, in early December 1936, Chiang decided to meet with Zhang in person, confident that he could make the blundering young man see reason. On December 4, 1936, he flew from his field headquarters in Luoyang to Xi'an. He lodged in the ancient residence of the Tang emperor Xuanzong, located in the picturesque town of Huaqingchi, enclosed by hills and famed for its mineral hot springs. In the past, the emperor's enchanting and ambitious concubine, Yang Guifei, loved to take the waters here.

Chiang settled into a gloomy one-story pavilion named Wujianting (Five-room pavilion), in the southeast corner of the park complex. There he met Zhang Xueliang, who was accompanied by the commander of the Seventeenth Field Army, General Yang Hucheng, a confederate of the Young Marshal. Zhang Xueliang insisted on the need to unite with the communists in the struggle against the Japanese. Chiang objected, arguing that the destruction of the CCP was the key to successful resistance against foreign aggression. The discussion soon reached an impasse.

On Wednesday, December 9, the atmosphere became even tenser. Responding to new threats against China by Japan's minister of war, more than ten thousand students in Xi'an organized a demonstration. It coincided with the first anniversary of the nationwide anti-Japanese December Ninth Movement of 1935. Students demanded an end to the civil war and the unification of all forces against Japan. Along the road from Xi'an to the district city of Lintong, located not far from Chiang Kai-shek's residence, the students were met by police, who opened fire and wounded two of them. By a twist of fate, the wounded students happened to be the children of a Northeast Army officer.³⁷

Zhang Xueliang snapped. At 10 P.M. on Friday, December 11, he issued an order to the top officers of the Northeast Army to arrest Chiang Kai-shek. On December 12 at 5 A.M., a two-hundred-man detachment of troops led by the commander of Zhang Xueliang's personal guard, twenty-eight-year-old captain Sun Mingjiu, attacked the residence of Chiang Kai-shek. Hearing shots, Chiang jumped out of his bedroom window and hid in a narrow crevice in the surrounding snow-covered hills. He was discovered two hours later, barefoot and in a robe thrown over his nightshirt, shivering terribly and initially unable to utter a word. In his haste, he had forgotten his false teeth. The captain addressed Chiang Kai-shek in accordance with military regulations. Finally, with some difficulty Chiang said, “If you are my comrades, shoot me now and finish it all.”

“We will not shoot!” Sun replied. “We only ask you to lead our country against Japan. Then we shall be the first to cheer our generalissimo.” (Chiang had been the generalissimo of China's armed forces since 1928.)

“Call Marshal Chang [Zhang] here, and I will come down,” said Chiang Kai-shek.

“Marshal Chang is not here. The troops are rising in the city; we came to protect you.”

At these words, the generalissimo apparently calmed down and requested that they bring him a horse so he could come down from the mountain.

“There is no horse here,” Sun replied, “but I will carry you down the mountain on my back.”

And he knelt down before Chiang Kai-shek. Taking his time, the generalissimo scrambled up on the captain's broad back. Having carried the generalissimo to a car, Zhang Xueliang's chief guard finally said to him, “The past is the past. From now on there must be a new policy for China.”

“I am sure,” said Chiang Kai-shek dryly, “that Marshal Chang has an excellent policy for China.”

“This is a time of national crisis,” parried Sun. “We hope that the generalissimo will receive the demands of the people.”

“I am always ready to consider the demands of Marshal Chang,” Chiang declared.

“The one urgent task for China is to resist Japan. This is the united demand of the men of the Northwest. Why do you not fight Japan, but instead give the order to fight the Red Army?”

“I have never said that I would not fight Japan,” replied Chiang indignantly.

“But the Tungpei [Northeast] army demands that you fight Japan as soon as possible, for their homes have been seized by the enemy, and all of China suffers because of their loss.”

“I am the leader of the Chinese people,” Chiang suddenly burst out. “I represent the nation. I think that my policy is right, not wrong.”

“If you represent the Chinese people,” said Sun, “why do you not resist Japan? This is the demand of the whole Chinese nation. How can you claim to represent them when you do not carry out their demands?”

“I am a revolutionary,” the generalissimo said, terminating the dispute. “I am always ready to sacrifice myself. I have never changed my views; and even though you hold me prisoner, my spirit will never submit to another's.”³⁸

Chiang Kai-shek was transported to Xi'an where Zhang Xueliang, excusing himself for the necessary inconvenience, again demanded that Chiang stop the war against the communists and lead the nationwide resistance to Japan. Meanwhile, Shao Lizi, the civilian governor of Shaanxi who had issued the order to disperse the student demonstration on December 9, was also arrested, along with more than ten persons in Chiang Kai-shek's retinue.³⁹

News of Chiang Kai-shek's arrest reached communist headquarters in Baoan on the morning of December 12. Mao Zedong and the other CCP leaders were elated. Mao's secretary recalled:

Early on the morning of December 12, I was awakened by the duty radio officer. He said that Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng had sent a radiogram to Mao Zedong from Xi'an; it was marked “Extremely Urgent.” The radiogram, written in semi-colloquial language, was brief. I remember little of it apart from the two characters “bing” (soldiers) and “jian” (admonish). I quickly delivered the radiogram to Mao Zedong who had still not gone to bed. After reading it, [he] joyfully exclaimed, “How about that! Time for bed. Tomorrow there will be good news!”⁴⁰

What the two characters signified was Zhang Xueliang's decision to use force to “admonish” Chiang Kai-shek. This is what the Young Marshal transmitted to Mao Zedong. When Mao awoke the entire city was extremely excited. Otto Braun, who lived adjacent to the compound of the Central Committee of the CCP, was also struck by the unusual animation that gripped Baoan. He noted that Mao arose early in the morning, which was very unusual for him since, as a rule, he worked nights, and therefore woke up late. In Mao's cave the field telephone, which connected Mao with other leaders of the party and the government and with army commanders, was ringing continuously. “The news spread with lightning speed throughout the entire place,” Otto Braun recalls.

It produced a genuine rapture, for Chiang Kai-shek was the most hated man in the CCP and the Chinese Red Army …… [T]here was an open air meeting …… of all Party members, Army men, and soviet functionaries in Pao-an [Baoan] and its vicinity …… Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong] spoke first …… The gist of the speeches was …… that the time had come to settle accounts with Chiang Kai-shek as a traitor to China's national interests and to bring him before a people's court …… The entire nation and all its armed forces should be mobilized for the war against Japan and its accomplices in the KMT [Guomindang].⁴¹

A huge meeting adopted a resolution to “demand a ‘mass trial' of Chiang Kai-shek as a traitor, and there was wild jubilation in the town.”⁴² At a meeting of the Politburo on the morning of December 13, a very excited Mao described the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek as a revolutionary, anti-Japanese, progressive event.⁴³ Almost unanimously the Politburo resolved that Chiang Kai-shek should be tried and sentenced to death.⁴⁴ Afterward Mao personally informed the Comintern about what had transpired.⁴⁵

News of the events in Xi'an, which reached Moscow that same day, December 13, likewise amazed the Comintern chiefs. Dimitrov was in seventh heaven. “Optimistic, favorable assessment regarding Zhang Xueliang. The Sov[iet] Union needs to be restrained and to respond skillfully to the anti-Soviet campaign in connection with the events in Xi'an,” he wrote in his diary.⁴⁶ The next day he convened a meeting to discuss Chinese affairs with his most trusted associates. Only afterward did he contact Stalin.

What he heard astonished him. As usual the Boss was laconic: “Advise them [the Chinese Communists] to adopt an independent position, to come out against internal internecine strife, to insist on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, on agreement and joint actions, on a democratic platform for all parties and groups standing for the integrity and independence of China, emphasizing the position adopted by the party in its letter to the Guomindang and in the interview [with] Mao Zedong.”⁴⁷ Now here was something that no one would have expected. Stalin was demanding that the communists free Chiang Kai-shek. How else could the conflict be resolved peacefully?

Several hours later, at midnight, Stalin suddenly phoned Dimitrov and, without concealing his irritation, asked, “Who is this Wang Ming of yours? A provocateur? He wanted to file a telegram to have Chiang Kai-shek killed.”

The flabbergasted Dimitrov answered that he had not heard anything of the sort.

“I'll find you that telegram,” said Stalin, throwing down the receiver.⁴⁸

In fact, he did not look for the telegram. Most likely, there simply hadn't been any such thing, and someone had incorrectly informed Stalin. It is also possible that Stalin wanted to frighten Dimitrov, knowing that he was ready to issue an order to have Chiang Kai-shek executed. In any case, the Boss was dissatisfied and did not hide his irritation.

Soon after Molotov phoned.

“Come to Com[rade] St[alin]'s office tomorrow at 3:30; we'll discuss Ch[inese] affairs. Only you and Man[uilsky], nobody else!”⁴⁹

What was discussed in Stalin's office is unknown. One may suppose that the Boss expressed his dissatisfaction with the political nearsightedness of Dimitrov, Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, and officials of the Comintern and the CCP Central Committee. Naturally, Molotov said yes to everything. Stalin's point was that the arrest and execution of Chiang Kai-shek would inevitably deepen the split in Chinese society and make things increasingly difficult for Stalin. In November 1936, just a month prior to the Xi'an Incident, Nazi Germany had concluded an Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan that was aimed at the Soviet Union. Thus, for Stalin, converting Chiang Kai-shek into an ally was a matter of life and death. He knew that emergency meetings of the Standing Committee of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and of its Political Council, which had convened on December 12, simultaneously adopted resolutions to crush Zhang Xueliang's mutiny by force. He Yingqin, the war minister, who was devoted body and soul to Chiang Kai-shek, was already prepared to give the order to bomb Xi'an and dispatch a punitive expedition there. Guomindang planes had already begun to bomb various populated points in Shaanxi province.

On December 15, the day after his meeting with Stalin, Dimitrov transmitted the Boss's directive about peacefully resolving the incident to officials of the ECCI. The next day he was back in the Kremlin, discussing the text of the Comintern directive to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party with Stalin and his top lieutenants. The directive urged the CCP to stand “decisively for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.”⁵⁰

It is easy to imagine Mao Zedong's reaction upon receipt of this instruction. Humiliation. Shame. Disappointment. Most likely, all three. In Edgar Snow's words, Mao “flew into a rage when the order came from Moscow to release Chiang. Mao swore and stamped his feet.” An eyewitness whom Snow called “X” informed him of Mao's reaction.⁵¹

Most humiliating was that Moscow's order came when Mao himself understood the need to resolve the conflict peacefully. For technical reasons Dimitrov's telegram, sent on December 16, did not arrive in Baoan until the morning of the 17th or the 18th, and part of it failed to transmit. Not until December 20 was Mao able to read the full text of Moscow's directive.⁵² By then he already knew the Comintern's position from Soviet media reports. Moreover, Mao had received the text of Zhang Xueliang's “Appeal to the Nation” clarifying that Zhang did not seek Chiang Kai-shek's death. The Young Marshal's objective was to force Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. Arriving in Xi'an on December 17, Zhou Enlai began negotiations with Zhang and General Yang Hucheng. Chiang Kai-shek refused to meet with them or to discuss Zhang's proposals. “Both for your own sake and for the sake of the nation, the only thing for you to do is to repent at once and send me back to Nanking [Nanjing],” he said to Zhang. “You must not fall into the trap set by the Communists. Repent before it is too late.”⁵³

The situation was growing tenser. By December 19, Mao realized that the incident had to be settled. Extremely upset, he was unable to control himself at the Politburo meeting that day. Acknowledging that “the issue of the day is mainly that of resisting Japan, not the question of relations with Chiang Kai-shek,” he suddenly interjected, “The Japanese say that the arrest [of Chiang Kai-shek] was arranged by the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union says it was contrived by the Japanese. Both sides are distorting the essence of the matter.”⁵⁴ The Politburo adopted a resolution aimed at a peaceful outcome to the conflict. Moscow's directive, which had been transmitted by Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai at 8 P.M. on December 20, changed nothing. From the outside, however, it looked as if Mao had been forced to accept Stalin's orders. Mao needed to report on the implementation of the Comintern's directive, but he did not want to lose face in front of his own party comrades. Therefore, despite the objective circumstances and while formally approving Moscow's directive, Mao went slow on concluding an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek regarding the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front. Chiang, too, was in no hurry to form an alliance with the CCP, even though the British and American military attachés who arrived in Xi'an as mediators requested him to do so.

On December 22, Song Ziwen, who was Chiang's brother-in-law, and the generalissimo's wife, Song Meiling, flew into Xi'an. Only then did the crisis end. Zhang Xueliang, the gallant cavalier, could not resist the charming Song Meiling. On Christmas Day he presented her with a gift: he declared that he himself would escort her and her husband to Nanjing. He was terribly naive.

After flying into Nanjing, Chiang immediately handed the rebellious marshal over to a military tribunal, which sentenced him to ten years in prison. In July 1937, however, with the start of the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, he was amnestied along with all other political prisoners. But Chiang never forgave him. Zhang was put under house arrest, where he languished for many years. When he fled China in 1949, Chiang took Zhang to Taiwan with him, where his prisoner remained under guard long after Chiang's death in 1975. It was not until 1990 that Zhang Xueliang regained his freedom, at the age of eighty-nine.

Meanwhile, Chiang continued preparations for the sixth anticommunist campaign. At the end of December, new military forces began to assemble along the borders of the soviet area in northern Shaanxi. At this point, on January 6, 1937, Mao could not restrain himself. In a telegram he and Luo Fu sent to Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu, he asserted that it was necessary “to prepare boldly for war” against the Guomindang.⁵⁵ This warlike mood in Baoan, however, inevitably drew a swift reaction from the Comintern. On January 16, 1937, Dimitrov gave Stalin the draft of a new directive to the CCP Central Committee. Three days later, on January 19, Dimitrov and Soviet Politburo members Molotov, Andrei Andreev, Andrei Zhdanov, and Nikolai Yezhov gathered in Stalin's office to discuss the situation. The tone of the telegram was rather sharp:

We attach exceptional importance to a peaceful resolution of the events in Xi'an. However, this outcome could be ruined not only by the machinations of the Japanese imperialists and their agents who are trying by every means to ignite civil war, but also as a result of mistaken policies of your party.

Now it is clearer than ever that the party's previous policy was incorrect, namely, to seek to achieve a united front by excluding Chiang Kai-shek and overthrowing the Nanjing government …… The party's main task at present is to achieve an effective end to the civil war …… [T]he party must openly declare and firmly conduct a policy of supporting all measures of the Guomindang and the Nanjing government that are directed toward …… uniting all forces of the Chinese people to defend the integrity and independence of China against Japanese aggression.⁵⁶

At Stalin's urging, on January 20 Dimitrov sent Mao a separate letter on the need to change the direction of work in China. In the name of the Secretariat of the ECCI, Dimitrov asked Mao to consider “switch[ing] from the soviet system to a system of people's revolutionary rule on democratic foundations,” while preserving “soviets only in urban centers and not as organs of power but as mass organizations.”⁵⁷

The categorical tone of Moscow's January 19 telegram convinced Mao of the need once more to reassure the Kremlin of his complete loyalty. Several days later, seeking Dimitrov's advice, he sent him the draft of a CCP Central Committee telegram addressed to the Third Plenum of the Fifth Guomindang Central Executive Committee, due to convene in Nanjing on February 15. Dimitrov forwarded the telegram along with his draft response to the Soviet Politburo, which approved the proposed text with several revisions. On February 5, Dimitrov informed Mao and several days later the CCP Politburo Standing Committee dispatched a telegram to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang CEC reading in part:

Our party sincerely hopes that the Third Plenum of the Guomindang will adopt the following principles as government policy:

1. Complete cessation of the civil war, and the concentration of national forces for unified resistance to external aggression;

2. Freedom of speech, assembly and organization, amnesty for all political prisoners;

3. Convening a conference of representatives of all parties, groups, social strata, and armies, concentration of all the capable persons in the country for joint salvation of the motherland;

4. Rapid and full completion of all preparatory work for the war of resistance to Japan;

5. Improvement of the lives of the people.

The CCP Central Committee promised to terminate its policy of armed uprisings aimed at overthrowing the National government on a nationwide basis. It also expressed its readiness to rename the soviet government the government of the Special Region of the Chinese Republic and to rename the Red Army the National Revolutionary Army, which would be directly subordinated to the Central Government of the Guomindang and the Military Council in Nanjing. Moreover, it agreed to introduce a democratic system of general elections in the Special Region and to stop confiscating landlords' land.⁵⁸

Mao had turned forty-four. He had acquired an enormous reputation as a political figure on the national stage and his influence in the party was virtually unchallenged. His dependence on Moscow, however, had not diminished; nor had the CCP's position of subordination to the Comintern. Although the Moscow leadership's conception of the Chinese revolution often changed, as before the Chinese Communist Party remained closely tied to the ECCI and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Soviet ideological influence on the Chinese communists remained overwhelming. The Xi'an Incident served only to strengthen it. Although Mao began storing up insults and dissatisfaction in his inner self, he still remained an obedient pupil of the great Stalin.

Early in 1937, Zizhen gave birth to their fifth child, a girl. Zhou Enlai's wife, Deng Yingchao, called the baby Jiaojiao (“Beauty”). Later, when his daughter turned thirteen, in accordance with Chinese tradition Mao gave her a new, grown-up name, Min (“Prompt”). He took the Chinese character min from a saying of Confucius, “A gentleman should be slow to speak and prompt to act” (junzi yu na yu yan er min yu xing). At the same time, he changed her family name from Mao to Li, the character he used in his favorite pseudonym, Li Desheng, meaning “Retreat in the Name of Victory.”⁵⁹

Meanwhile, on January 13, 1937, soon after his daughter's birth, and pursuant to an agreement with Zhang Xueliang reached prior to the arrest of the Young Marshal, the Central Committee of the CCP moved from the caves of Baoan sixty miles south to Yan'an, the largest city in northern Shaanxi. Before departing, holding his swaddled baby girl in his arms, Mao said to her, “My Beauty, you are in step with the times. We are going to live in the city.”⁶⁰

¹ See Pang, Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893–1949 (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949), vol. 1, 478.

² See Wagner, “Spravka o Chzhan Gotao i sobytiiakh 1935–1936 gg.” (Information About Zhang Guotao and the Events of 1935–1936), 77–78.

³ Braun, A Comintern Agent in China 1932–1939, 143, 146.

⁴ See Agnes Smedley, China Fights Back: An American Woman with the Eighth Route Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1938), 8–9, 19–20; Janice R. MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 183.

⁵ See Wu, Mao Zedong guanghui licheng dituji (Atlas of Mao Zedong's Glorious Historical Path), 62.

⁶ See Pang, Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893–1949 (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949), vol. 1, 617.

⁷ Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2, 474.

⁸ Molotov's reminiscences are particularly frank in this regard. See Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev, trans. Albert Resis (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993).

⁹ Wang Ming, Sobraniie sochinenii (Collected Works), vol. 3 (Moscow: IDV AN SSSR, 1985), 364.

¹⁰ See Titarenko, VKP(b), Komintern i Kitai: Dokumenty (The CPSU, the Comintern and China: Documents), vol. 3, 49.

¹¹ See Qing Shi (Yang Kuisong), Gongchan guoji yazhi Mao Zedong le ma Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enen yuanyuan (Did the Comintern Suppress Mao Zedong Concord and Discord in the Relations Between Mao Zedong and Moscow), Bainian chao (Century tides), no. 4 (1997): 33.

¹² Quoted from Titov, Materialy k politicheskoi biografii Mao Tsze-duna (Materials for a Political Biography of Mao Zedong), vol. 2, 137.

¹³ Lichnoe delo Mao Tszeduna (Personal File of Mao Zedong), RGASPI, collection 495, inventory 225, file 71, vol. 1, sheets 242–43.

¹⁴ Lichnoe delo Van Mina (Personal File of Wang Ming), RGASPI, collection 495, inventory 225, file 6, vol. 1, sheets 62, 63.

¹⁵ See Titov, Materialy k politicheskoi biografii Mao Tsze-duna (Materials for a Political Biography of Mao Zedong), vol. 2, 613.

¹⁶ Ibid., 619.

¹⁷ See Kommunisticheskii Internatsional (Communist International), no. 33–34 (1935): 83–88.

¹⁸ A. Khamadan, “Vozhd' kitaiskogo naroda—Mao Tszedun” (The Leader of the Chinese People—Mao Zedong), Pravda (Truth), December 13, 1935.

¹⁹ See A. Khamadan, Vozhdi i geroi kitaiskogo naroda (Leaders and Heroes of the Chinese People) (Moscow: Ogiz-Sotsekgiz, 1936).

²⁰ See Lichnoe delo Chzhan Khao (Li Fushen) (Personal File of Zhang Hao [Li Fusheng]), RGASPI, collection 495, inventory 225, file 2850; Wang Xingfu, Linshi sanxiongdi: Lin Yuying, Lin Yunan, Lin Biao (The Three Lin Brothers: Lin Yuying, Lin Yunan, Lin Biao) (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 2004), 73–75.

²¹ Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 5, 66–67.

²² See Zhang, Zhang Wentian xuanji (Selected Works of Zhang Wentian), 66–70; Zhang Peisen, ed., Zhang Wentian nianpu (Chronological Biography of Zhang Wentian), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 278–79, 286–87.

²³ See Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 3, 73–74.

²⁴ See Zhang, Zhang Wentian xuanji (Selected Works of Zhang Wentian), 71–79; Mao, Mao Zedong wenji (Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 1, 376–82; Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 3, 86–102.

²⁵ Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 3, 89, 91.

²⁶ See Mao, Mao Zedong wenji (Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 1, 490.

²⁷ James Bertram, Crisis in China: The Story of the Sian Mutin y (London: Macmillan & Co., 1937), 108; Harriet Sergeant, Shanghai (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 5.

²⁸ See Li, Moi otets Mao Tszedun (My Father Mao Zedong), 2; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2, 474–75.

²⁹ Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 5, 249.

³⁰ See Titarenko, VKP(b), Komintern i Kitai: Dokumenty (The CPSU, the Comintern and China: Documents), vol. 4, 1068; Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek, 279.

³¹ See Titarenko, VKP(b), Komintern i Kitai: Dokumenty (The CPSU, the Comintern and China: Documents), vol. 4, 1055–58.

³² See Georgi Dimitrov, Dnevnik 9 mart 1933–6 fevruari 1949 (Diary, March 9, 1933–February 6, 1949) (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski,” 1997), 117.

³³ Titarenko, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskaiia revoliutsiia (The Communist International and the Chinese Revolution), 266–69.

³⁴ See Schram, Mao's Road to Power, vol. 5, 323–32.

³⁵ Ibid., 334.

³⁶ Dimitrov, Dnevnik (Diary), 117.

³⁷ Snow, Red Star Over China, 409.

³⁸ Bertram, Crisis in China, 134–37; see also Snow, Red Star Over China, 412.

³⁹ See Tang Peiji, ed., Zhongguo lishi da nianbiao: Xiandaishi juan (Chronology of Chinese Historical Events: Contemporary History Volume) (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1997), 320; see also Chiang Kai-shek, “The Day I Was Kidnapped,” in Li, The Road to Communism, 135–41.

⁴⁰ Ye Zilong, Ye Zilong huiyilu (Memoirs of Ye Zilong) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 38–39.

⁴¹ Braun, A Comintern Agent in China 1932–1939, 183.

⁴² Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China (1936–1945) (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1957), 1.

⁴³ Pang, Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893–1949 (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949), vol. 1, 621.

⁴⁴ Short, Mao, 347.

⁴⁵ Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2, 481.

⁴⁶ Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949, trans. Jane T. Hedges et al. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 41. See also RGASPI, collection 146, inventory 2, file 3, sheet 29.

⁴⁷ Banac, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 41–42. See also RGASPI, collection 146, inventory 2, file 3, sheets 29–30.

⁴⁸ Banac, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 42. See also RGASPI, collection 146, inventory 2, file 3, sheet 30.

⁴⁹ Banac, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 42. See also RGASPI, collection 146, inventory 2, file 3, sheet 30. Dmitrii Manuilsky at the time was secretary of the ECCI.

⁵⁰ Titarenko, Kommunisticheskii internatsional i kitaiskaiia revoliutsiia (The Communist International and the Chinese Revolution), 270.

⁵¹ Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 2.

⁵² Short, Mao, 719–20; Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1893–1949) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1893–1949]), 433.

⁵³ Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 79.

⁵⁴ Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1893–1949) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1893–1949]), 431, 432.

⁵⁵ Pang, Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893–1949 (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949), vol. 1, 639.

⁵⁶ Titarenko, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskaiia revoliutsiia (The Communist International and the Chinese Revolution), 270–71.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 272; Dimitrov, Dnevnik (Diary), 122.

⁵⁸ Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian zhinan (Directives of the Anti-Japanese National United Front), vol. 1 (n.p., n.d.), 79–81.

⁵⁹ Li, Moi otets Mao Tszedun (My Father Mao Zedong), 1, 5, 39–40, 259.

⁶⁰ Quoted from Ye, Ye Zilong huiyilu (Memoirs of Ye Zilong), 40.

ⁿ⁴¹ A. M. Khamadan (real name Faingar) was a Jew born in Derbent in 1908. After working at Pravda, he moved to Novy mir (New world), where he was deputy to the editor in chief. At the beginning of World War II he was a TASS correspondent. In 1942 he was taken prisoner by the Nazis in Sevastopol, Crimea. He conducted underground work in the POW camp under the Russian name of Mikhailov, and was put into prison and then executed in May 1943.