25 THE KOREAN ADVENTURE
On October 19, 1950, in accordance with Stalin's wishes, Mao sent the Chinese army to assist the North Korean communists, who several months earlier had invaded South Korea, an ally of the United States. Mao's decision had great significance for Stalin, and the Chairman certainly knew this. He would often say later that only after the PRC entered the Korean War on the side of the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung did Stalin remove the label of “suspected Titoist” from him and come to believe that “the Chinese communists are not pro-American, and the Chinese revolution is not an example of ‘nationalist communism.'”1 This was confirmed by China's foreign minister Chen Yi, who said that Stalin shed tears on hearing of Mao's decision to send troops. “The Chinese comrades are so good!” the aged dictator said twice.2 Mao's entry into the Korean War appears at least in part to have been a conscious demonstration of the PRC leaders' devotion to the Kremlin boss.
This bloody war was unleashed by the North Korean communists on June 25, 1950. The Chinese entered at the critical moment when the Korean communists were on the verge of defeat. Kim's army encountered resistance not only from South Korean soldiers, but also from the armed forces of the UN that had been sent by the Security Council to stop the aggressor. The main contingent of UN forces was made up of Americans, who also exercised overall command in the person of General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the Allied army.
An agreement between Kim Il Sung and Stalin had preceded the beginning of the war, which Stalin provoked by supporting Kim's adventurist plan that envisioned seizing the south in no more than twenty-seven days.3 Without approval from the Kremlin dictator, the North Korean leader would never have crossed the 38th parallel, which divided the two Koreas. The Kremlin boss deliberately dragged the Americans into this war. On the eve of the decisive vote in the Security Council regarding North Korea's aggression, Stalin ignored First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's request that Stalin instruct the Soviet representative, Yacov Malik, to participate in the Security Council session in order to veto any resolutions it might adopt.n57 The USSR had been boycotting sessions of the Security Council since January 1950 on the pretext that the council had refused to recognize the PRC's lawful rights to UN membership. To Gromyko's suggestion that Malik return to the council in order to block any resolution harmful to North Korea or the Soviet Union, Stalin categorically asserted, “In my opinion, the Soviet representative must not take part in the Security Council meeting.” Gromyko tried to object, explaining that the absence of a Soviet representative would enable the Security Council to dispatch UN troops to South Korea, but Stalin remained implacable. He even personally dictated instructions to Gromyko forbidding Malik's presence at the Security Council session.4
Stalin thereby abandoned the opportunity to veto the resolution adopted by the council, even though “[o]n the very day the war began, it became clear that the United States would intervene.”5 This enabled the United States and its allies to condemn the North Koreans on June 25. (In the absence of the representative from the USSR, the resolution censuring North Korea was adopted by a vote of 9–0 with Yugoslavia abstaining.) Two days later, on June 27, the Security Council, with Malik still absent, sanctioned the use of international force against the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), and soon fifteen countries joined in repelling the aggressor. (Fifty-three states approved the use of force.)6
In explaining his reasoning to his associates, Stalin was completely cynical about why he dragged the “imperialists” into the war in Korea. Here is what he wrote to the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Mikhail A. Silin, on August 27, 1950, for transmission to Czechoslovakian president Klement Gottwald:
We temporarily absented ourselves from the Security Council for four reasons: First to demonstrate the Soviet Union's solidarity with New China; second to emphasize the stupidity and idiocy of U.S. policy which recognizes the Guomindang scarecrow as the representative of China in the Security Council; third to render the decisions of the Security Council illegal in the absence of representatives of two great powers [in addition to the USSR, Stalin had the PRC in mind]; fourth to untie the hands of the American government and provide it an opportunity, using its majority in the Security Council, to commit new stupidities so that public opinion can view the true face of the American government.
I think we have succeeded in achieving all of these objectives.
After our departure from the Security Council America has gotten mixed up in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and its moral authority. Can any honest person now doubt that in military terms it is not as strong as it claims to be? Moreover, it is clear that the United States of America has been distracted from Europe to the Far East. Does this help us out in terms of the balance of world power? Absolutely it does.
Let us suppose that the American government will become even more bogged down in the Far East and that China will be dragged into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and for its own independence. What might come out of this? First, America, like any other state, will be unable to cope with China which has at the ready large military forces. Probably, America will be weighted down by this conflict. Second, because of its being weighted down, in the short term America will be unable to fight a Third World War. Probably, a Third World War will be put off to some indefinite future; this will ensure us the time needed to strengthen socialism in Europe. I am not even addressing the fact that a struggle between America and China will bring about revolution throughout Far Eastern Asia. Does this help us out in terms of the balance of world forces? Absolutely it does.
As you can see, the question of whether or not the Soviet Union participates in the Security Council is not such a simple question as it may appear at first glance.7
From the very beginning, Stalin intended to use the Korean War to weaken the United States by involving it in a conflict not only with North Korea, but also with China. “One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin,” Khrushchev would later say to Mao Zedong. “It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea.”8 In other words, for Stalin the Korean War seemed to be only an element in a new global plan for world revolution. Lenin's “Great Pupil” had never renounced the idea of a world socialist takeover, although unlike Lenin, who would not have hesitated to sacrifice Russia for the world revolution, he considered the world revolution a means to spread Russian hegemony. Now in the early 1950s it seemed that a new chance had appeared—the last one, as it happened—to achieve this ambitious goal. Stalin had possessed nuclear weapons since August 1949. Half of Europe lay at his feet. The red flag flew over China, Mongolia, and North Korea. In Indochina, Moscow's satellites were waging war against French imperialists supported by the United States. The victory of the world revolution seemed not far distant.
Mao's position in this regard, however, was not a simple one. Prior to the conflict he apparently fully supported Kim Il Sung and Stalin. He had learned of Kim's plans a year before the invasion, from North Korean representatives who had visited him in Shuangqing. He had unequivocally promised his neighbors help, including troops, but only after the end of the civil war with Chiang Kai-shek.9 In late January 1950, during one of their talks, Stalin himself had raised the question of the “need and possibility of providing help to the DPRK [North Korea] in order to augment its military potential and strengthen its defenses.”10 However, he said nothing to Mao about a possible North Korean invasion of South Korea. This omission was yet another slight to his guest.11 Mao kept mum, although he was offended by Stalin's mistrust. Instead of a vague discussion about “providing help to the DPRK,” “the Great Leader” might have told Mao directly what he wanted. But Stalin thought it possible to discuss the planned invasion only with Kim Il Sung. He made Kim promise not to reveal the plan for now, whether to the “Chinese comrades” or even to other North Korean leaders. “This is dictated by the need to keep the enemy in darkness,” he wrote to Kim.12
Nonetheless, even without Stalin's explanations, Mao understood: the idea had long since been mooted. By this time Stalin had already made his decision, but Mao's agreement was indispensable and was forthcoming. The Chairman promised to help the DPRK “strengthen its defenses,” not only because the guest did not want to contradict the host, but because Mao himself desired a united Korea that was building socialism. Perhaps he understood that Stalin was preparing him for the role of “shock force” in the world revolution. In any case, he was unafraid of the Americans; he was convinced that “the Americans would not become engaged in a Third World War for such a small territory [as Korea].”13
After talking with Mao, on January 30, 1950, Stalin telegraphed the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, Terentii Shtykov: “He [Kim Il Sung] must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs considerable preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be ready to receive him and discuss with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter.”14
On March 30 a jubilant Kim left for Moscow, where he met with Stalin secretly three times during April. Stalin confirmed that, “[i]n case of emergency, the PRC will send troops.” He added a reservation calculated to calm Kim: “We must be absolutely certain that Washington will not get involved in the fight.” Stalin seemed to be informing his guest that the Soviet Union would do everything possible to prevent American intervention. In reality, as we have seen, Stalin wanted to draw the Americans into the conflict.
The bedazzled Kim was apparently blind to the double game his teacher was playing. In the presence of the “Great” Stalin, this former captain in the Soviet Army lost his capacity for critical thought. He happily assured his host that “the Americans will not risk getting entangled in a large war because of the Soviet-Chinese alliance.” He did not understand Stalin's geopolitical plans, and so remarked, “The Koreans prefer to rely on their own strength in uniting the country and we believe we will succeed.” Stalin, however, again counseled, “You must rely upon Mao who has an excellent grasp of Asian affairs.”15
Kim needed Mao's help but did not want to become too dependent upon the Chinese. He was not only a communist but a Korean nationalist, and he was wary of China. For too many centuries his country had endured the imperial hegemony of its large neighbor. Kim wanted to avoid such a fate. Moreover, he really was certain of victory. The armed forces of North Korea were clearly superior to the army of South Korean president Syngman Rhee. Kim had twice as many troops and artillery pieces, seven times as many machine guns, thirteen times as many automatic rifles, six and a half times as many tanks, and six times as many planes.16 It was impossible to disobey Stalin, but Kim played his hand shrewdly.
After returning to Pyongyang, he sent a chief aide to Beijing to inform Mao, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai of the results of his talks with the “Father of Nations” and tell the “Chinese brothers” that he would like to receive from them only the three Korean divisions in the PLA. The CCP had formed these units, each ten thousand strong, from local Koreans in Manchuria during the civil war. Kim's was a clever gambit. Mao, pretending that he did not fully understand the real meaning of the request, not only indicated his approval to Kim's emissary, but also amicably added, “In case of need we can also throw in Chinese soldiers; they are all black [this is how it is written in the text; obviously, it should be “yellow”] [and] nobody will be able to tell the difference.”17 Mao immediately informed Kovalev of this conversation and the latter reported everything to Stalin.
On May 13, Mao received Kim Il Sung, who arrived in Beijing on a Soviet airplane. The following day Stalin belatedly informed Mao of his secret meetings with the North Korean leader:
Comr[ade] Mao-Tse-Tung [Mao Zedong]! In a conversation with the Korean comrades Filippov [Stalin] and his friends expressed the opinion, that, in light of the changed international situation, they agree with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward reunification. In this regard a qualification was made, that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion. The Korean comrades can tell you the details of the conversation. Filippov.18
Stalin sent this telegram only after Mao, piqued that talks between Stalin and Kim Il Sung had taken place in the Kremlin without his knowledge, had requested on May 13 “personal clarifications” from the Boss regarding the understanding he had come to with Kim.19 From the Chairman's perspective this was no more than a formality, since he had long since understood Stalin's intentions to start a war in Korea, but he still resented Stalin's failure to level with him in January.
Nevertheless, Mao again gave his full agreement to support the unification of Korea by military means. Kim Il Sung acquainted Mao with his overall plan of operation, and the Chairman fully approved it. Of course he did—the basic contours of the plan had already been coordinated in Moscow. On parting, however, Mao remarked to Kim that “the Americans might still get involved in the fighting,” but as before Mao was not particularly anxious on this score. “If the Americans take part in military actions, then China will provide troops to North Korea,” he summed up.20
Just like Kim Il Sung, however, Mao miscalculated. Stalin alone came out a winner. From the outset everything went just as he had supposed. The Americans rushed to defend South Korea. By the time they first landed on June 29, however, the North Korean People's Army had succeeded in routing the main force South Korean divisions and had occupied the capital city of Seoul just three days after the war began. Soon, however, the UN troops reversed the situation and the North Korean armies all but disintegrated. Trying to avoid encirclement, they quickly retreated toward the Chinese border.21 By the end of September, South Korean forces were approaching the 38th parallel; encountering no resistance, they crossed it on October 1. That same day General MacArthur demanded that the NKPA high command surrender immediately and unconditionally. The time for Mao Zedong to act had arrived. This was the moment Stalin had been awaiting. Soon the world revolution would begin.
On October 1, Stalin, who was then in Sochi, on the Black Sea coast, sent Mao and Zhou Enlai an urgent secret telegram:
I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five–six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.22
Stalin was certain that Mao was merely waiting for his order. He knew from Ambassador Roshchin that the Chinese had deployed three armies with 120,000 troops in the vicinity of Shenyang in case UN troops crossed the 38th parallel.
Now that the decision point was at hand, the Chairman suddenly hesitated. Weighing all the reasons for and against intervening, he now realized that he had underestimated America. China was not prepared for a full-scale war with the United States. His country lay in ruins; the people were tired of fighting. Moreover, the Americans ruled the skies over Korea, and Stalin had made no promises to provide air cover for a Chinese offensive. The PRC had no air force of its own. Would it be an act of folly to throw oneself on the altar of world revolution for Moscow's benefit? On October 1 and 2, Mao discussed the situation in Korea with his closest associates; the majority of the leaders of the PRC, with Zhou Enlai being the most outspoken, opposed sending troops. Many military men, including Lin Biao, likewise did not support intervention. “It is better not to fight this war except as a last resort,” they asserted.23
The Chinese were also offended by Kim Il Sung's behavior. He had neither requested their armed intervention nor even considered it necessary to inform them about how the resistance was going. Kim was obviously revealing his mistrust of the CCP leaders and preferred to beg Stalin for assistance. Zhou, evidently at Mao's request, had repeatedly complained about this to the Soviet ambassador. Stalin also considered this behavior “abnormal,” but Kim persisted. Even at the end of September, in response to a Chinese offer to help, he merely replied that “the Korean people are prepared for a protracted war.”24 Soviet ambassador Shtykov reported to Gromyko on September 22, 1950 (the coded telegram was intended for Stalin):
On September 21, 1950 the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, [Aleksei Ivanovich] Hegai, a Soviet Korean, paid me a visit.
At the outset of the discussion, Hegai asserted that he wanted to inform me about a session of the Political Council of the party that had taken place on September 21.
For two and a half hours there was a discussion about how to reply to the Chinese comrades in regard to ZHOU ENLAI'S inquiry about the Chinese government's proposal to the Korean government on the developing situation…… Those who spoke …… came to the same conclusion, that the situation was difficult and that obviously they could not cope with the Americans on their own. Therefore, they concluded it was necessary to ask the Chinese government to send troops to Korea.
After this KIM IL SUNG spoke, saying that What then? We had figured that with so many people we could manage with our own forces. The Soviet Union gave us as much armaments as we requested. On what basis can we request aid from the Chinese.
Then KIM IL SUNG raised the question of what consequences might follow if the Chinese entered the war on the side of the Koreans. Might this not lead to a Third World War……
He proposed for now to defer a decision about asking the Chinese government for help, instead to write a letter to Comrade STALIN and ask his advice as to whether to request that the Chinese send troops. In this connection, he allegedly emphasized that the Soviet Union might be offended on the grounds that its assistance in the form of advisers and armaments was insufficient.
Further, KIM IL SUNG declared that if we had time, we would expedite the formation of new units, then it would not be necessary to turn to the Chinese. But they were afraid this was not to be.
No decisions were taken as a result of the discussions.25
After heated debates, on September 28 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party finally decided to send a letter to Beijing, which contained only “a hint of aid.”26 The North Koreans still placed their primary hopes “personally on Comrade Stalin,” to whom they sent a letter on September 29 imploring him to intervene directly in the conflict.27 To this the “Leader and Teacher” irritably replied that the best solution for the Korean question would be entry of Chinese troops onto Korean territory, and he advised the leaders of the DPRK to begin consultations with the Chinese as soon as possible.28 After this Kim could no longer ignore reality. Late on the night of October 1, he asked the Chinese ambassador to transmit to Mao immediately his request to send Chinese troops to Korea. Furthermore, he sent a parallel telegram to Beijing through his own channels.29
On October 2, however, Mao sent a message to Stalin via Soviet ambassador Roshchin, which Stalin received the following day:
We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.
However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.
In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.
In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large. Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.
Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).
Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.
Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to guerrilla war.
We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.
We await your reply.
MAO ZEDONG
2.10.5030
Of course, it was dangerous to quarrel with Stalin, but Mao thought he could persuade the Boss on the basis of objective difficulties. In any case, on the same day, October 2, he drafted a completely different telegram to Stalin in which he said, “We [the Central Committee of the CCP] have decided to send a detachment of troops under the name of the Volunteer Army to Korea.”31 For now he held on to this telegram,32 after deciding first to probe Stalin's frame of mind. Who could tell—perhaps Stalin might buy his argument?
On the afternoon of October 4, Mao convened an enlarged meeting of the Politburo attended by “the main comrades from various bureaus of the CC.” He asked those attending the meeting “to list the disadvantages involved in dispatching troops to Korea.” At the same time, he added, “We'd feel bad if we stood idly by.”33 A discussion ensued during which a majority of the leaders again voiced their opposition to intervention.
But then Mao received Stalin's reply, which revealed the Boss's extreme irritation over Mao's telegram. Stalin now bluntly explained that an open clash between China and America was precisely what he was aiming for. The text of his coded telegram, sent to Beijing in reply to Mao Zedong's message of October 2, bristled with sinister candor:
Of course, I took into account …… [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.34
Juxtaposing this top-secret coded telegram with Stalin's telegram cited above to the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia on August 27, 1950, leaves no doubt about Stalin's true geopolitical intentions. For the sake of world revolution he was ready to provoke World War III. All of his earlier peace-loving talk was simply a pretense.
On October 5, a crestfallen Mao convened another enlarged plenum of the Politburo at which he called on Peng Dehuai, a strong advocate of intervention. Peng implored the assembled to “send troops to help Korea,” emphasizing that if this were not done, the United States might next attack China from two bases, from Taiwan and from Korea. “The tiger wanted to eat human beings,” he asserted, “when it would do so would depend on its appetite.”35 Peng's impassioned speech broke the impasse, and the plenum took the decision that Stalin required. Then Mao appointed Peng commander of the Volunteer Army, which had yet to be established. (At first Mao had wanted to give this position to Lin Biao, but Lin turned down the assignment, pleading illness.)36 Then the Chairman telegraphed Stalin to “express solidarity with the fundamental positions” discussed in Stalin's telegram and, trying to mollify the Boss, said he would “send to Korea nine, not six, divisions.” He explained that he would “send them not now, but after some time” and he requested that Stalin “receive his representatives and discuss some details of the mission with them.”37
Stalin agreed to this proposal, and Mao dispatched Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, both opponents of the war, to Sochi on October 8. He waited impatiently for word on what the Boss would say. Meanwhile, trying to ingratiate himself with Stalin, Mao ordered Peng Dehuai and the chairman of the Northeast regional government, Gao Gang, who was concurrently commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region, to reorganize the troops deployed in Manchuria into the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. He requested that the CPVA promptly enter Korea.38 On October 8, Mao informed Kim Il Sung of his order,39 although he understood that neither Peng Dehuai nor Gao Gang could “act quickly,” despite the fact that they were both proponents of intervention. They needed time to reorganize the army.
On October 10, at 7 P.M., Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao met with Stalin in Sochi. The talks, in which other members of the Soviet leadership—Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, Lavrentii Beria, Lazar Kaganovich, Nikolai Bulganin, and Anastas Mikoyan—also participated, were difficult. As always, Zhou was calm and collected, but toward the end, after hours of debate, even he felt tired. Lin looked just like a corpse, according to Shi Zhe. At 5 A.M., when Stalin suggested they celebrate the conclusion of the talks with a banquet, Lin was horrified. Unlike Zhou Enlai, who could outdrink anyone, Lin was a teetotaler, but he could not refuse to attend. Thus, despite their fatigue the guests accepted the invitation. What exactly, however, was there to celebrate? Stalin had not agreed to provide air cover to the CPVA, saying that the Soviet Air Force was not yet ready. He promised to send airplanes only after two or two and a half months. He wrote the same thing to Mao after the talks.40 He demanded self-sacrifice from the Chinese, but he was in no hurry to send his airplanes.
Meanwhile, the fighting on the Korean peninsula continued. Then, on October 12, Mao, disheartened, again informed Stalin that he could not send troops to Korea. That same day he countermanded his order to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to take the field, and he summoned them back to Beijing for consultations.41
Here was an insurrection. The specter of Chinese “Titoism” once more loomed before Stalin. Infuriated with Mao as well as with Kim, about whose ambiguous behavior Zhou and Lin had had much to say, that same day Stalin ordered the North Korean leader to withdraw the remnants of his armies from North Korea: “The Chinese have again refused to send troops. In this connection you must evacuate North Korea and withdraw Korean troops to the north.”42 On October 13, he reiterated: “We believe that continued resistance is hopeless. The Chinese comrades are refusing to take part in military action. In these circumstances, you must prepare to evacuate completely into China and/or the USSR…… The potential to engage the enemy in the future must be preserved.”43 Then he said to his entourage, “Well, what of it? We didn't send our troops in there, and so now the Americans will be our neighbors on our Far Eastern border, that's all.”44 The world revolution had ended before it began.
Then suddenly a miracle occurred. On the same day Stalin told Kim Il Sung he considered Kim's struggle “hopeless,” October 13, Mao unexpectedly informed Ambassador Roshchin that “the CC CCP [actually it was the Central Committee Politburo] discussed the situation again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops.”45 He sent the same message to Zhou Enlai, who was still in Moscow. Both Roshchin and Zhou quickly informed the Soviet leadership.46 Ultimately Mao was unable to oppose Stalin and retreated at the final moment, even though the “Leader and Teacher” refused to provide air cover. Stalin's influence upon him was too great: the shadow of the all-powerful Kremlin dictator continued to hang over Zhongnanhai.
Receiving this good news from Roshchin, Stalin immediately ordered Kim Il Sung to “postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of the Korean troops to the north.”47 He did not bother to conceal his joy. Everything was again going according to plan.
Six days later, four field armies and three artillery divisions of the PLA, under the overall command of Peng Dehuai, finally intervened in the Korean conflict. UN troops faltered and then started rolling south, but soon the situation stabilized. The South Koreans and the Americans began to put up stiff resistance, which led Peng Dehuai to halt the offensive. The front lines stretched out in the general vicinity of the 38th parallel.
The initial successes of the Chinese Army had inspired Mao, who even began to think that the war might end in victory if, like his own earlier war in China, it became protracted. He wrote to Stalin to this effect on March 1, 1951. Stalin for his part insisted that “there is no need to accelerate the war, since in the first place a protracted war will provide an opportunity for Chinese troops to learn modern warfare under field conditions and, second, it will shake Truman's regime in America and discredit the military prestige of Anglo-American forces.”48
In February 1951, Stalin, via the CCP, had instructed the Indonesian communist party (PKI) to launch a struggle to seize power by armed force as well. “The fundamental task of the Communist Party of Indonesia in the near future,” he emphasized in a telegram to Liu Shaoqi intended for the Central Committee of the PKI, is not “‘to create the broadest possible united national front' against the imperialists to ‘achieve the genuine independence of Indonesia,' but to eliminate feudal property on land and the transfer of land to the peasants.”49 The world conflagration continued to rage.
Neither Stalin nor Mao was concerned about the numerous victims of war. In this same letter of March 1, Mao informed the “Teacher” that Chinese forces had already suffered 100,000 dead and wounded and that during this and the following year battle losses were projected at 300,000. “Thus,” Mao concluded, “we will need another 300,000 to fill the ranks.”50 That's all he had to say. It is as if he were speaking not of people, but of inanimate statistical units.
As time passed, however, the war began to seem hopeless. The Chinese People's Volunteers, whose numbers swelled to one million men (another one million men took part in transporting supplies to Korea), poured out its lifeblood, and Mao finally began to think about how to extricate them from Korea. In early summer 1951, insistently but cautiously, he began to broach this thought in his correspondence with Stalin.51 Stalin, however, would not give his blessing to ending the conflict. He still needed the war. On the Korean peninsula Chinese and North Korean troops were attending the school of contemporary warfare, preparing themselves for new battles and, moreover, “bringing about revolution throughout Far Eastern Asia” and “strengthening socialism in Europe.”
By the summer of 1951, however, the North Koreans also began to realize that the war had to be ended. On June 10, with Mao's consent, Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang flew to Moscow, where they were joined by Lin Biao, who was in the Soviet Union for medical treatment. The three of them succeeded in convincing Stalin to agree to talks with the enemy. However, the Kremlin dictator did not grant Kim and Mao the power to conclude peace in Korea. The armistice talks, begun on July 10, 1951, moved slowly while the flames of war continued to burn.
Mao then began to complain to Stalin about the economic difficulties caused by the war. On November 14, 1951, for example, he wrote:
In the current year, in view of our assistance to Korea and the struggle against American imperialism, the Chinese government's budget has increased by 60 percent over last year's. Thirty-two percent of the overall budget goes directly to the Korean military theater (the military credits supplied to us by the Soviet Government are not included in this calculation). Thus, if we do not now practice economy, next year the budget will grow even more which will inevitably influence our financial situation and lead to a large increase in commodity prices which, in turn, will create problems at the front as well as in economic reconstruction in the rear. Achieving peace through negotiations would surely benefit us.52
In January 1952, news reached Moscow that 10 percent of the population in North Korea was suffering from hunger, and that by April or May a majority of peasants would be in the grip of famine. Mao decided to help the Koreans by shipping them grain, despite the fact that the food situation in the PRC itself was far from ideal. Stalin, it seems, deliberately took no notice. During his meeting in the Kremlin on August 20, 1952, with Zhou and other members of the Chinese delegation, he was adamant:
This war is getting on America's nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties…… Americans understand that this war is not advantageous and they will have to end it, especially after it becomes clear that our troops will remain in China. Endurance and patience is needed here…… The war in Korea has shown America's weakness…… [A]mericans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean war…… America cannot defeat little Korea …… [and] they have lost the capability to wage a large-scale war. They are pinning their hopes on the atom bomb and air power. But one cannot win a war with that. One needs infantry, and they don't have much infantry; the infantry they do have is weak. They are fighting with little Korea, and already people are weeping in the USA. What will happen if they start a large-scale war? Then, perhaps, everyone will weep.53
Mao was able to extricate himself “with honor” from this difficult situation only after Stalin died in 1953. In the meantime the war on the Korean peninsula was a colossal burden for China. The PLA could no longer wage such a costly war. Kim Il Sung was also happy to end it. On March 11, 1953, six days after the dictator's death, Zhou Enlai, who had arrived in Moscow for the funeral, conveyed to Soviet leaders Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev an urgent request from the PRC to accelerate the armistice negotiations. The new Soviet leaders also favored ending the war.54 On March 19, the Council of Ministers of the USSR resolved to change Stalin's line and seek a way out of Korea.55 A special representative was dispatched from Moscow to Pyongyang to convey the new Soviet instructions to Kim Il Sung.
At 10 A.M. on July 27, 1953, representatives of North Korea and the PRC on one side and the UN command on the other signed a cease-fire agreement. The Chinese People's Volunteers remained in Korea until October 1958, when, under pressure from Kim Il Sung, they returned home.56
In this war, according to official data, China lost 148,000 killed and more than 300,000 wounded, POWs, and MIA. (According to other sources, the number of deaths was 152,000 or even 183,000 while the overall number of casualties reached 900,000.)57 At the same time the North Korean People's Army lost 520,000 dead, the South Koreans 415,000, and the Americans 142,000 killed and wounded, including 36,516 KIA. The Soviet Union lost 299 men, including 138 officers and 161 sergeants and soldiers. The greatest number of victims were peaceful Korean citizens; according to various data between three and four million of them died.58
Among those killed was Mao Zedong's eldest son, Mao Anying. In the summer of 1950, when the war in Korea began he applied to join the army. Again, as he had during the war against fascism, he rushed to the front. Perhaps he wanted to show his father, who was still cool to him, that he was worth something. In any case, he went to Korea, where he was assigned to the General Staff of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Commander in Chief Peng Dehuai tried to keep him by his side, but was unable to protect Anying from harm. On November 25, 1950, Anying died during an American air raid on Peng Dehuai's headquarters. He was only twenty-eight years old. That same day Peng wrote to Mao, but Ye Zilong, the Chairman's secretary, with the approval of Zhou Enlai, withheld the telegram from Mao. Only after several days did Mao learn the bitter truth.
According to those in his entourage, Mao shed no tears. “He …… did not express his feelings at all,” Ye Zilong recalled, “but his face looked very pinched. He waved his hand and said, ‘In such a war there have been and always will be sacrifices. This is nothing.'”59 He repeated the same thing to Peng Dehuai when they next met. “Chairman,” Peng said to him, “I did not safeguard Anying, it is my fault. I request that you punish me!” But Mao merely closed his eyes. “There can be no revolutionary war without sacrifices…… A simple soldier died, and one need not make a big deal out of this just because he was my son.”60 It was obvious, however, that he was taking the loss hard. For several days he ate almost nothing and was unable to sleep. He sat alone in his armchair and smoked one cigarette after another.
By then he had lost many family members. His youngest brother, Zetan, fell in battle with the Nationalists in western Fujian in 1935. His middle brother, Zemin, suffered a cruel death in 1943 in Xinjiang, where he had gone to work in 1940 for the militarist Sheng Shicai. For quite some time Sheng passed himself off as a friend of Stalin and had even applied for membership in the Soviet Communist Party. But in 1942 he severed his relations with the Soviet Union, suspecting, apparently with good reason, that the Comintern and the CCP were plotting to overthrow him. Sheng seized Mao Zemin and other leaders of the Xinjiang branch of the CCP and threw them in prison. They were interrogated and tortured for several months, and on September 27, 1943, they were executed. They were first beaten with truncheons, then suffocated, and their bodies were stuffed into sacks and buried on a remote mountainside. Mao Zedong later heard rumors that three days later Sheng supposedly ordered the bodies to be dug up and photographed, and had the photos sent to Song Meiling to give to Chiang Kai-shek.61
In August 1929, Mao's foster sister, Zejian, died at the hands of the Nationalists, just a year and three months before Kaihui's death. In June 1946, nineteen-year-old Mao Chuxiong, one of his nephews and the only son of his brother Zetan, was killed. In Changsha in 1930, Kaihui's cousin Kaiming was shot, and in 1935, during the Long March, Mao lost another brother-in-law, He Meiren, the younger brother of Zizhen. He was killed by Tibetans for defiling a Lamaist temple.
Of the families of Mao's two brothers, only the children of Zemin were alive: Yuanzhi, his daughter from his first marriage, who was a year older than the deceased Anying, and his son, Yuanxin. The latter had been born on February 14, 1941, in Xinjiang soon after the lustful Zemin left his second wife, Xijun, and married his new passion. His third wife, Zhu Danhua, was also an actress, like Jiang Qing. In February 1943, she was arrested and imprisoned along with her young son. She was not released until May 1946; in July she and Yuanxin arrived in Yan'an, where Mao greeted them. He showed great warmth and even sentimentality toward his small nephew, who was just half a year younger than his daughter Li Na. He may have felt it his duty to be more concerned about him than he was about his own children. He also paid attention to his niece Yuanzhi, but she was already grown up. She had married in 1945 and a year later gave birth to a son, so Mao began to feel like a grandfather. From 1951 on Yuanxin grew up under the supervision of Mao. Zhu Danhua remarried and lived and worked with her new husband in Nanchang, leaving her son at Mao and Jiang Qing's request to live in Zhongnanhai.
Mao's grief at the death of Anying, however, did not pass, and neither his daughter nor his younger son nor his beloved nephew could deaden it. It was as if something between him and his fallen son had not been resolved and periodically tormented him.
Anying's death was particularly troubling for Anqing. More than just brothers, they had been bound by grief over their dead mother, memories of their hunger-ridden childhood and their adventurous journey from Hong Kong to Moscow, their sojourn in the International Orphanage, and their lives together with Mama He. Anqing was a very nervous young man, prone to anxiety, and with an unbalanced psychology. The terrible blow to the head that the soldier had dealt him when his mother had been arrested had left its mark. The death of his brother pushed him over the edge. He lost sleep, began to wander about the house, and talked to himself. Soon the doctors delivered the terrible diagnosis of schizophrenia. Anqing was no longer able to work. Mao sent Anqing to the Soviet Union for treatment, but he was beyond help. Returning to China, he was taken to a military sanatorium in Dalian, where he lived under medical supervision. His brother's widow, Liu Songlin, and her younger sister Shao Hua were very solicitous toward him. The latter even moved to Dalian to look after the sick man. In 1960 Anqing and Shao Hua were married. Two years later they returned to Beijing. Anqing began to feel better, but he never fully recovered.62
Mao, of course, was very upset by the illness of his son, but he was even more disappointed. “Shall I be deprived of descendants …… (one son was killed, one went mad),” he said bitterly.63 To be sure, as usual he had little time for emotions. Power and politics displaced his paternal feelings.
1 See notes of Mao's conversation with Khrushchev's ambassador Pavel Fedorovich Yudin, March 31, 1956, and July 22, 1958, and with a delegation from the Yugoslavian Communist Union in September 1956 and the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Gromyko, on November 19, 1957, published or cited in “Mao Tszedun o kitaiskoi politike Kominterna i Stalina” (Mao Zedong on the China Policy of the Comintern and of Stalin), 107; Mao, Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, 252, 253; “Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation,” 148–49; Kulik, Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol, 95. See also Westad, Brothers in Arms, 201, 350.
2 Quoted from Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 195.
3 From 1948 to 1950, Kim sent forty-eight telegrams to Stalin on this subject. See Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 3 (1993): 14, 15–16.
4 A. A. Gromyko, Pamiatnoe (Remembered), book 1, 2nd, enlarged ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), 248–49. “Indeed, the decision [to ignore the session of the UN Security Council at the time of voting on Korea] was taken at the Politburo level,” write Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, referring to an eyewitness. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 161, 334.
5 “Stalin knew that the lack of the Soviet representation on the Security Council would ensure both North Korea's being branded the aggressor and the UN's endorsement of U.S. actions in Korea,” write Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, referring to a former Soviet military adviser in North Korea. Ibid., 161, 334.
6 The Korean War, vol. 1 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 244–73; Gordon F. Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950–1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 117–24.
7 “Telegramma Filippova sovetskomu poslu v Chekhoslovakii dlia Klementa Gotval'da” (Telegram from Filippov [J. V. Stalin] to the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia [Mikhail Alexandrovich Silin] for [the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic] Klement Gottwald, August 27, 1950), RGASPI, collection 558, inventory 11, file 62, sheets 71–72. Emphasis added. The telegram was first published by A. M. Ledovsky in his “Stalin, Mao Zedong i koreiskaia voina 1950–1953 godov” (Stalin, Mao Zedong, and the Korean War of 1950–1953), Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (Modern and contemporary history) 5 (2005): 96–97, and the first English translation, made by Gary Goldberg, appeared in the Cold War International History Project [hereafter CWIHP] virtual archives.
8 Zubok, The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 265.
9 See Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 35–36, 51, 52, 59.
10 Ibid., 56. See also Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, 425–26; Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vremia, Liudi, Vlast': Vospominaniia (Time, People, Power: Reminiscences) (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), 164, 434; and the memoirs of Mao's interpreter Shi Zhe, cited in Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 87–88.
11 See “Mao Tszedun o kitaiskoi politike Kominterna i Stalina” (Mao Zedong on the China Policy of the Comintern and of Stalin), 101–10.
12 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 56.
13 Ibid., 67. See also Weathersby, “New Findings of the Korean War,” 16.
14 Ciphered Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, January 20, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, no. 5 (1995): 9. Translated for CWIHP by Kathryn Weathersby. In exchange for his promise to support Kim Il Sung's plan, Stalin demanded that the North Koreans annually supply the USSR with 25,000 tons of graphite.
15 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 58, 59.
16 See Weathersby, “New Findings of the Korean War,” 16.
17 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 62.
18 Ciphered telegram from Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Tse-Tung (Mao Zedong), May 14, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, no. 4 (1994): 61. Translated for CWIHP by Vladislav Zubok.
19 CWIHP Bulletin, no. 4 (1994): 61.
20 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 70.
21 See Weathersby, “New Findings of the Korean War,” 16.
22 Ciphered Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, October 1, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 114; Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 113.
23 Quoted from Nie, Inside the Red Star, 634.
24 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 108–9. See also RGASPI, collection of unsorted documents; Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, 177; CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 8–9 (1996/1997): 239, 242.
25 “Telegramma posla SSSR v KNDR T. F. Shtykova l-mu zamestiteliu ministra innostrannykh del SSSR A. A. Gromyko dlia instantsii, 22 sentiabria 1950 goda” (A Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, T. F. Shtykov, to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, for the Higher Authority, September 22, 1950), RGASPI, collection of unsorted documents.
26 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 90. See also “New Evidence on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 111; Shen Zhihua, “Sino–North Korean Conflict and Its Resolution during the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 14–15 (2003/2004): 11.
27 See “New Evidence on the Korean War,” 111–12; Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 92–93.
28 See Shen, “Sino–North Korean Conflict and Its Resolution during the Korean War,” 11.
29 See Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 113.
30 Letter from Mao Zedong to Stalin on October 2, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 114–15. Emphasis added.
31 Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Founding of the PRC) [hereafter cited as Mao's Manuscripts], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 539. For a photocopy of the first page of the draft manuscript of this letter, see Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 116.
32 See Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong wenji (Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 6 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), 99; Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 116–18. See also CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 8–9 (1996/1997): 239.
33 Quoted from Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, 472.
34 “Letter from Stalin to Mao Zedong, October 2, 1950,” CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 116; Torkunov, Zagodochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 116. Emphasis added.
35 Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, 473.
36 See Nie, Inside the Red Star, 636. See also Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 118–19; Li and Ma, Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) (Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 84.
37 “New Evidence on the Korean War,” 116; Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 117.
38 See Mao, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao's Manuscripts), vol. 1, 543–44.
39 Ibid., 545.
40 See Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, 197–200; Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 188–92. See also the memoirs of the interpreter Shi Zhe, who took part in the talks. Shi, Zai lishi juren shenbian (At the Side of Historical Titans), 496–99. The compilers of Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) (Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai [1949–1976]), however, give a different date for the talks, namely, October 11, which is evidently according to the Chinese time zone (vol. 1, 85).
41 See Mao, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao's Manuscripts), vol. 1, 552–53. See also Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 121.
42 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 117.
43 Ibid., 97.
44 Quoted from Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 2, 426.
45 “Ciphered telegram from Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung [via Shtykov], October 13, 1950,” CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 119. Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 117–18.
46 See Mao, Mao Zedong wenji (Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 6, 103–4; Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) (Biography of Mao Zedong [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 121–22; Li and Ma, Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) (Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 85–86.
47 “New Evidence on the Korean War,” 119; Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 118–19.
48 RGASPI, collection of unsorted documents. This document was first published by Torkunov in his book, 163–64.
49 RGASPI, collection of unsorted documents.
50 Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 44.
51 Ibid., 162.
52 Ibid., 248.
53 CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (1995/1996): 12–13. See also “Zapis' besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s Zhou Enlaem 20 avgusta 1952 goda” (Record of a Conversation Between Comrade Stalin and Zhou Enlai, August 20, 1952), RGASPI, collection 558, inventory 11, file 329, sheets 66–68. See also Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 252, 259–60.
54 See Li and Ma, Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) (Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai [1949–1976]), vol. 1, 289; Weathersby, “New Findings of the Korean War,” 16.
55 “New Evidence on the Korean War,” 80; Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina (The Enigmatic War), 272–73.
56 See Weathersby, “New Findings of the Korean War,” 16, 17.
57 See Xu Yan, “Chaoxian zhanzheng zhong jiaozhan gefang sunshi duoshao junren” (What Are the Casualties of All Sides During the Korean War ), Wenshi cankao (History reference), no. 12 (June 2010); Shu Guang Zhang, Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 247. The number 900,000 was estimated by the UN. See Rottman, Korean War, 212.
58 See Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 172; G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie (The Stamp of Secrecy Is Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Battles, and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Analysis) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), 395; Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 329; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean Conflict (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 15, 43.
59 Ye, Ye Zilong huiyilu (Memoirs of Ye Zilong), 197. See also the reminiscences of Mao's bodyguard, Li Yingqiao, in Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong. Man, Not God (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1992), 43.
60 Li, Moi otets Mao Tszedun (My Father Mao Zedong), 145, 146.
61 Ibid., 117–19; Lichnoe delo Mao Tszeminia (Personal File of Mao Zemin), 2; “Mao Zemin,” 71–75; Ma, Hongse diyi jiazu (The First Red Family), 281.
62 See Lichnoe delo Yun Shu (Personal File of Yong Shu), 31–35, 37; Ma, Hongse diyi jiazu (The First Red Family), 155–56, 181–91, 273–89, 301–3; Liao, Mao Zedong baike quanshu (Encyclopedia of Mao Zedong), vol. 1, 26–39.
63 Stuart R. Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters: 1956–1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 143.
n57 At this time the Security Council consisted of eleven members, including the five permanent members possessing the right of the veto. These five were the United States, the USSR, Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China, Great Britain, and France.