13 The Japanese Since VJ-Day
第十三章 投降后的日本人
AMERICANS have good reason to be proud of their part in the administration of Japan since VJ-Day. The policy of the United States was laid down in the State-War-Navy directive which was transmitted by radio on August 29, and it has been administered with skill by General MacArthur. The excellent grounds for such pride have often been obscured by partisan praise and criticism in the American press and on the radio, and few people have known enough about Japanese culture to be sure whether a given policy was desirable or undesirable.
美国人自战胜日本以来，有充分理由为他们在管理日本上所起的作用自豪。美国的政策是根据八月二十九日广播的国务院、陆军部和海军部三部的联合指令制定的，是由麦克阿瑟元帅巧妙地实施的。但是，作为这种自豪的根据，经常被美国报刊上出现的、电台里广播的以党派为中心的赞赏和指责搅得褒贬不一。而且，几乎没有人对日本文化有充分了解，不能确定既定政策是否受欢迎。
The great issue at the time of Japan's surrender was the nature of the occupation. Were the victors to use the existing government, even the Emperor, or was it to be liquidated? Was there to be a town-by-town, province-by-province administration, with Military Government officers of the United States in command? The pattern in Italy and Germany had been to set up local A.M.G. headquarters as integral parts of the combat forces, and to place authority for local domestic matters in the hands of the Allied administrators. On VJ-Day, those in charge of A.M.G. in the Pacific still expected to institute such a rule in Japan. The Japanese also did not know what responsibility for their own affairs they would be allowed to retain. The Potsdam Proclamation had stated only that ‘points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the basic objectives we are here setting forth,' and that there must be eliminated for all time ‘the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest.'
日本投降当时的严重问题是应该实行什么性质的占领。战胜国对于现存的政府，包括天皇在内是利用还是废弃？是否在美国军政府官员的指导下由市町村、各地方实施行政管理？他们在意大利和德国的做法是，在各地设立作为战斗部队必不可少的要素的AMG（联合国军政府）总部，由盟国行政官负责掌握地方行政权。战胜日本时，太平洋地区的AMG负责人依然期望在日本建立那样的统治体制。日本国民也不知道，行政上的职权究竟能允许保留到何种程度。波茨坦宣言里只是规定：“为确保我们在此发布的基本目标的实现，对联合国指定的日本国领域内的各地必须实行占领。”同时，必须永远消除“欺骗本国人民、引其犯下企图称霸世界罪恶的权力及势力”。
The State-War-Navy directive to General MacArthur embodied a great decision on these matters, a decision which General MacArthur's Headquarters fully supported. The Japanese were to be responsible for the administration and reconstruction of their country. ‘The Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese government will be permitted, under his instructions (General MacArthur's), to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration.' General MacArthur's administration of Japan is, therefore, quite unlike that of Germany or Italy. It is exclusively a headquarters organization, utilizing Japanese officialdom from top to bottom. It addresses its communications to the Imperial Japanese Government, not to the Japanese people or to the residents of some town or province. Its business is to state goals for the Japanese government to work toward. If a Japanese Minister believes them impossible, he can offer to resign, but, if his case is good, he may get the directive modified.
国务院、陆军部和海军部给麦克阿瑟元帅的联合指令对有关这些问题作出重大决定。指出日本国民应该对本国的行政及重建负责。“最高司令部在满意地促进美利坚合众国目的的限度内，将通过日本国政府机构及包括天皇在内的诸机关，行使其权力。日本国政府将在最高司令官（麦克阿瑟元帅）的指令下，对内政行使其正常的政府机能。”这一决定得到了麦克阿瑟元帅司令部的全面支持。因此，麦克阿瑟对日本的管理，同对德国和意大利的管理性质完全不同。它只不过是从上至下利用日本官吏的一个司令部组织。它的通牒是发给日本政府的，而不是针对日本国民或者某个町、某个地方的居民的。其任务是决定日本国政府工作的目标。倘若某一日本大臣不相信这一目标能够实现，他可以提出辞呈，如果他的申述正确，指令也可以修改。
This kind of administration was a bold move. The advantages of this policy from the point of view of the United States are clear enough. As General Hilldring said at the time:
这种对日管理方式是一项大胆的措施。从美国的立场看这一政策带来的利益也是显而易见的。正如当时赫尔德林格将军指出的：
The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national government are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of seventy million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own house-cleaning, but we are providing the specifications.
利用日本国政府得到的利益是巨大的。倘若不利用日本国政府，这个拥有七千万国民的国家的一切必要的复杂机构，就要由我们亲手去管理。日本人与我们不论语言和习惯，还是态度都不相同。通过净化和利用日本国政府的机构，我们节省了时间、人力和财力。换句话说，我们要求日本人自己去管理自己的国家，然而每个指示是由我们下达的。
When this directive was being drawn up in Washington, however, there were still many Americans who feared that the Japanese would be sullen and hostile, a nation of watchful avengers who might sabotage any peaceful program. These fears did not prove to be justified. And the reasons lay in the curious culture of Japan more than in any universal truths about defeated nations or politics or economics. Probably among no other peoples would a policy of good faith have paid off as well as it did in Japan. In Japanese eyes it removed from the stark fact of defeat the symbols of humiliation and challenged them to put into effect a new national policy, acceptance of which was possible precisely because of the culturally conditioned character of the Japanese.
第十三章投降后的日本人在华盛顿拟制这一指令的当时，不少美国人担心日本人会表现出不服从或敌对的态度。因为他们既然是那样虎视眈眈窥伺复仇机会的国民，就有可能抵制一切和平计划。从后来的事实看，这种担心显然是没有根据的。而且，其原因与其说来源于战败国国民以及战败国政府经济的普遍真理，莫如说，存在于日本特殊的文化之中。假如是日本之外的其他国民，这种基于仁义的政策，恐怕不能收到如此巨大的成功。在日本人眼里，这一政策是从战败这一严峻的事实中除掉屈辱的表象，促使他们实施新国策的政策。而且，他们能够接受这一新的政策，正是由于特异的文化形成了日本人特异的性格。
In the United States we have argued endlessly about hard and soft peace terms. The real issue is not between hard and soft. The problem is to use that amount of hardness, no more and no less, which will break up old and dangerous patterns of aggressiveness and set new goals. The means to be chosen depend on the character of the people and upon the traditional social order of the nation in question. Prussian authoritarianism, embedded as it is in the family and in the daily civic life, makes necessary certain kinds of peace terms for Germany. Wise peace directives would differ from those for Japan. Germans do not regard themselves, like the Japanese, as debtors to the world and to the ages. They strive, not to repay an incalculable debt, but to avoid being victims. The father is an authoritarian figure, and, like any other person who has superior status, it is he who, as the phrase is, ‘enforces respect.' It is he who feels himself threatened if he dpes not get it. In German life each generation of sons revolt in adolescence against their authoritarian fathers and then regard themselves as surrendering finally at adulthood to a drab and unexciting life which they identify as that of their parents. The high point of existence remains, for life, those years of the Sturm und Drang of adolescent rebellion.
在美国，对于应不应该严格执行媾和条件，我们反复进行过无休止的争论。真正的问题，并不在于严格还是宽大。问题是如何严格到既不多也不少，对于打破过去危险的侵略性质的形式、确立新的目标恰到好处。选择何种手段要根据该国国民的性质以及该国的传统社会秩序来决定。在德国，无情的强权主义已经在家庭生活或日常市民的生活中深深扎根，这就需要适合德国的媾和条件。在日本，贤明的和平政策将规定与此不同的其他的条件。德国人不像日本人那样，认为自己对社会和祖先负有责任。他们的努力不是为了偿还无止境的负债，而是为了避免成为牺牲者。父亲是一位高压式的人物，正如一切地位居人之上的人那样，“强迫人尊敬的”——德国人是这样说的——是父亲，不受人尊敬便感到不安的是父亲。在德国人的生活中，代代儿子在青春期都要造高压的父亲的反。而且，在长大成人之后，最终还要屈服于与父母们的生活没有什么两样的，单调乏味的生活。在整个一生中，最富有勇气的生活，只有青春时期造反狂飙运动的几年。
The problem in Japanese culture is not crass authoritarianism. The father is a person who treats his young children with a respect and fondness which has seemed to almost all Western observers to be exceptional in Occidental experience. Because the Japanese child takes for granted certain kinds of real comradeship with his father and is overtly proud of him, the father's simple change of voice can make the child carry out his wishes. But the father is no martinet to his young children, and adolescence is not a period of revolt against parental authority. Rather it is a period when children become the responsible and obedient representatives of their family before the judging eyes of the world. They show respect to their fathers, as the Japanese say, ‘for the practice,' ‘for the training,' that is, as a respect-object he is a depersonalized symbol of hierarchy and of the proper conduct of life.
在日本的文化上，严重的强权主义不算什么问题。父亲几乎像所有西方观察家所认为的那样，都怀着在西方经验中少见的关怀和钟爱对待孩子。因此日本的孩子同父亲之间，自然保持着某种真正的友爱关系。而且，他们公然将父亲作为骄傲的本钱，只要父亲声音一变，就可以让孩子按自己的愿望行动。但是，父亲对幼儿绝不是进行严格教育的人，而青春期也绝不是反抗父母权力的时期。相反，它是孩子作为尊重家庭责任的服从的代表，站立在社会裁判面前的时期。他们正如日本人所说的，“为了练习”、“为了训练”，向父亲表示敬意。就是说，父亲是脱离了现实人格的等级制与正确处世态度的象征。
This attitude which is learned by the child in his earliest experiences with his father becomes a pattern throughout Japanese society. Men who are accorded the highest marks of respect because of their hierarchal position do not characteristically themselves wield arbitrary power. The officials who head the hierarchy do not typically exercise the actual authority. From the Emperor down, advisers and hidden forces work in the background. One of the most accurate descriptions of this aspect of Japanese society was given by the leader of one of the super-patriotic societies of the type of the Black Dragon to a Tokyo English-newspaper reporter in the early 1930s. ‘Society,' he said, meaning of course Japan, ‘is a triangle controlled by a pin in one corner.'* The triangle, in other words, lies on the table for all to see. The pin is invisible. Sometimes the triangle lies to the right, sometimes to the left. It swings on a pivot which never avows itself. Everything is done, as Westerners so often say, ‘with mirrors.' Every effort is made to minimize the appearance of arbitrary authority, and to make every act appear to be a gesture of loyalty to the status-symbol who is so constantly divorced from real exercise of power. When the Japanese do identify a source of unmasked power, they regard it, as they have always regarded the moneylender and the narikin, as exploitive and as unworthy of their system.
子女在幼儿期通过与父亲的接触，学到的这种态度，是与日本社会的一切方向相联系的一个形式。由于等级制地位的缘故，赢得最高尊敬的人们，并不亲自随心所欲地挥舞权力；居于等级制首脑地位的官吏，并不行使实权，这是日本的特殊性。从天皇到最下层，背后都有顾问和隐蔽的势力操纵。最能确切地说明日本社会这一现实的是，黑龙会式的超国粹团体的一位领导人在一九二○年代初期，向东京一家英文报纸的记者发表的如下一段话：“社会（这里当然是指日本）是用大头钉固定住一个角的三角形。”引自阿普顿·克劳斯：《在日本表面的背后》，1942年，第136页。换句话说，三角形钉在桌子上，所有的人都可以看到，但是大头钉看不到。三角形时而偏右，时而偏左。但是都以不露原形的轴为中心摆动。一切活动借用西方人常用的话来说，都是“使用镜子”来完成的。为了极力防止专制的权力出面，使一切行为看起来都是在向象征性地位表示忠诚，倾注了一切努力，而这种象征性地位通常不行使实际权力。尽管如此，一旦查明剥掉假面具的权力的根源，日本人就像经常对待高利贷者和“暴发户”那样，认为他是谋求私利的，是违反他们的制度的。
The Japanese, viewing their world in this way, can stage revolts against exploitation and injustice without ever becoming revolutionists. They do not offer to tear the fabric of their world in pieces. They can institute the most thoroughgoing changes, as they did in the Meiji era, without casting any aspersion upon the system. They called it a Restoration, a ‘dipping back' into the past. They are not revolutionists, and Western writers who have based their hopes upon ideological mass movements in Japan, who during the war magnified the Japanese underground and looked to it for leadership in capitulation, and who since VJ-Day have prophesied the triumph of radical policies at the polls, have gravely misunderstood the situation. They have been wrong in the prophecies they have made. The conservative Premier, Baron Shidehara, spoke more accurately for the Japanese when he formed his cabinet in October, 1945:
由于日本人这样看待他们的世界，所以他们反抗权利和邪恶，但决不是革命者。他们不想将他们的社会组织打得粉碎。他们可以像过去明治时代进行的那样，毫不谴责制度本身就能实现最彻底的改革。他们称此为复古，即“恢复到过去”。他们不是革命家。那些寄希望于出现日本意识形态群众运动的西方的学者们，那些战争期间曾过高地评价日本的地下努力，期望他们在日本投降时掌握领导权的学者们，以及自从战胜日本以来，曾预言在选举中激进的政策将取得胜利的著作家们，都严重地误判了事态的发展。他们的预言没有应验。保守派的首相币原男爵在一九四五年十月组阁时发表的如下言论，准确地反映了日本人的真实形象。
The Government of the new Japan has a democratic form which respects the will of the people. . . . In our country from olden days the Emperor made his will the will of the people. This is the spirit of Emperor Meiji's Constitution, and the democratic government I am speaking of can be considered truly a manifestation of this spirit.
新日本政府将采取尊重全体国民意志的民主主义的形态……在我国自古以来天皇是国民意志的代表。这就是明治天皇宪法的精神，我在这里谈到的民主政治，可以认为正是这种精神的体现。
Such a phrasing of democracy seems less than nothing to American readers, but there is no doubt that Japan can more readily extend the area of civil liberties and build up the welfare of her people on the basis of such an identification than on the basis of Occidental ideology.
这种对民主主义的解释，在美国读者看来，简直没有意义，可以说谈不上有任何意义。但是，日本与其立足于西方式的意识形态上，倒不如站在与过去相同的基础上，更易于扩大市民的自由范围，建立起国民的福利，这是毫无疑问的。
Japan will, of course, experiment with Western political mechanics of democracy, but the Western arrangements will not be trusted tools with which to fashion a better world, as they are in the United States. Popular elections and the legislative authority of elected persons will create as many difficulties as they solve. When such difficulties develop, Japan will modify the methods upon which we rely to achieve democracy. Then American voices will be raised to say that the war has been fought in vain. We believe in the rightness of our tools. At best, however, popular elections will be peripheral to Japanese reconstruction as a peaceful nation for a long time to come. Japan has not changed so fundamentally since the 1890s, when she first experimented with elections, that some of the old difficulties Lafcadio Hearn described then will not be likely to recur:
当然，日本将进行西方式民主政治机构的尝试。但是，这种西方式的制度不会像在美国那样，能够成为可以赖以建立更美好的世界的工具。普通选举以及由选出的人组成的立法机关的权威，将解决许多困难，然而另一方面又会带来许多新的困难。当这种困难发展的时候，日本人便会改变我们赖以实现民主政治的方法。这样美国人就会吵嚷，抱怨不知为什么目的进行了这场战争。但是，即使在最好的情况下，将来普通选举也不可能永远在重建日本为和平国家时占特别重要的地位。日本自从一八九○年代开始选举以来，没有发生任何根本变化。因此，像当时拉弗卡迪奥·汉所描述的那些旧时困难中的某些内容，不能说不会重新出现。
There was really no personal animosity in those furious election contests which cost so many lives; there was scarcely any personal antagonism in those parliamentary debates of which the violence astonished strangers. The political struggles were not really between individuals but between clan interests or party interests; and the devoted followers of each clan or party understood the new politics only as a new kind of war—a war of loyalty to be fought for the leader's sake.*
在牺牲许多生活进行激烈竞争的大选中，实际上丝毫没有个人的憎恶。而且，即使在经常动手使外来人震惊的议会激烈辩论中，几乎也看不到个人反目的影子。政治斗争，实际上并不是个人之间的斗争，而是藩阀或党派相互间的利害之争。而且，各藩或各党派的狂热的追随者，视新的政治不过是一种新的类型的斗争，即为领导者的利益而战的忠诚的斗争。引自《日本——一种解释》，1904年，第453页。
In more recent elections in the nineteen-twenties, villagers used to say before they cast their ballots, ‘My neck is washed clean for the sword,' a phrase which identified the contest with the old attacks of the privileged samurai upon the common people. All the connotations of elections in Japan will differ even today from those in the United States, and this will be true quite apart from whether Japan is or is not pursuing dangerous aggressive policies.
即使在比较近期的二十世纪二十年代的选举中，乡村的人们投票之前也常说：“我已做好准备，洗净脖子让人砍头。”这句话说明他们将大选与古时拥有特权的武士对庶民的攻击，看成了一个东西。在日本选举中所包含的种种意义至今仍与美国不同。而且，它与日本是否在推行危险的侵略政策，完全没有关系。
Japan's real strength which she can use in remaking herself into a peaceful nation lies in her ability to say of a course of action, ‘That failed,' and then to throw her energies into other channels. The Japanese have an ethic of alternatives. They tried to achieve their ‘proper place' in war, and they lost. That course, now, they can discard, because their whole training has conditioned them to possible changes of direction. Nations with a more absolutist ethic must convince themselves that they are fighting for principles. When they surrender to the victors, they say, ‘Right was lost when we were defeated,' and their self-respect demands that they work to make this ‘right' win next time. Or they can beat their breasts and confess their guilt. The Japanese need do neither. Five days after VJ-Day, before an American had landed on Japan, the great Tokyo paper, the Mainichi Shimbun, could speak of defeat and of the political changes it would bring, and say, ‘But it was all to the good for the ultimate salvation of Japan.' The editorial stressed that no one should forget for a moment that they had been completely defeated. Because their effort to build up a Japan based on sheer might had met with utter failure, they must henceforth tread the path of a peaceful nation. The Asahi, another great Tokyo newspaper, that same week characterized Japan's late ‘excessive faith in military force' as ‘a serious error' in its national and international policy. ‘The old attitude, from which we could gain so little and suffered so much, should be discarded for a new one which is rooted in international co-operation and love of peace.'
日本在作为和平国家复兴时，可以利用的日本的真正长处在于，一旦说某一行动方针“失败了，”便能全力投入到其他方针中去。日本的伦理是非彼即此的伦理。他们妄图依靠战争得到“适合的位置”，结果失败了，现在他们可以抛弃这一方针。这是因为迄今受到的一切训练，将他们造就成为审时度势的人。如果是更具有绝对主义伦理的国民，必然会有我们是在为主义而战的信念。他们在向胜利者投降时，会说：“正义随着我们的失败丧失了。”而且他们的自尊心要求他们为在下一次使这一“正义”获胜的机会而努力。否则，他们便会痛心疾首忏悔自己的罪过。日本人都不认为有这样做的必要。战胜日本后第五天，在美军尚未派一兵一卒在日本登陆时，东京权威的报纸《每日新闻》在评论战败以及由此而带来的政治变化时，谈道：“然而，这一切归根结蒂都有利于拯救日本。”这一评论强调任何时候也不可忘记日本完全失败了。既然企图单纯依靠武力建设日本的努力彻底归于失败，那么今后日本人就必须走上建设和平国家的道路。另一家权威的东京报纸《朝日新闻》也在同一周里评论说：近年来日本“过分相信军事力量”，是日本国内政策及国际政策的“严格错误”，“必须抛弃原来那种得不偿失的态度，换之以立足于国际合作和热爱和平的新态度。”
The Westerner observes this shift in what he regards as principles and suspects it. It is, however, an integral part of the conduct of life in Japan, whether in personal or in international relations. The Japanese sees that he has made an ‘error' in embarking on a course of action which does not achieve its goal. When it fails, he discards it as a lost cause, for he is not conditioned to pursue lost causes. ‘It is no use,' he says, ‘biting one's navel.' Militarism was in the nineteen-thirties the accepted means by which they thought to gain the admiration of the world—an admiration to be based on their armed might—and they accepted all the sacrifices such a program required. On August 14, 1945, the Emperor, the sanctioned voice of Japan, told them that they had lost. They accepted all that such a fact implied. It meant the presence of American troops, so they welcomed them. It meant the failure of their dynastic enterprise, so they were willing to consider a Constitution which outlawed war. Ten days after VJ-Day, their newspaper, the Yomiuri-Hochi, could write about the ‘Beginning of a New Art and New Culture,' and could say, ‘There must be a firm conviction in our hearts that military defeat has nothing to do with the value of a nation's culture. Military defeat should serve as an impetus . . . (for) it has taken no less than national defeat for the Japanese people to lift their minds truly to the world, to see things objectively as they really are. Every irrationality that has warped Japanese thinking must be eliminated by frank analysis. . . . It takes courage to look this defeat in the face as a stark fact, (but we must) put our faith in Nippon's culture of tomorrow.' They had tried one course of action and been defeated. Today they would try the peaceful arts of life. ‘Japan,' their editorials repeated, ‘must be respected among the nations of the world,' and it was the duty of the Japanese to deserve this respect on a new basis.
西方人看到这种在他们眼里只能认为是主义信仰改变的变化，会感到疑惑。但是，不论从个人关系还是国际关系，这都是日本人处世法则的不可缺少的一大要素。当日本人采取一定的行动方针不能达到目标时，便认为犯了“错误”，一个行动如果以失败告终，就要当做失败的主张被抛弃掉。他们的性格决定了他们不会永远执拗主权丧失的主张。日本人说：“后悔是徒劳无功的”。三十年代他们自以为通过军国主义一般容许的手段会得到世界的称赞——用他们的武力赢得称赞，并且付出了实现这一计划所要求的一切牺牲。一九四五年八月十四日，作为日本最高权威的天皇向他们宣布战争失败了。他们接受了战败这一事实所意味着的一切。因此，他们主动考虑着手拟制放弃战争的宪法。战败十天之后，日本一家报纸《读赏教知》发表了题为《新的艺术与新的文化的开端》的社论，其中谈道：“我们必须在心里树立起军事上的失败与一个国家文明的价值没有任何关系这一坚定的信念。必须以军事上的失败作为一个新的转机发挥作用……为了使日本国民真正能放眼世界，按事物的本来面貌客观地观察事物，需要做出甚至国家失败这种严峻的牺牲。迄今歪曲日本人思想的一切不合理的东西都必须通过直率的分析将其扫除干净。……要正视战败这一严酷的事实需要勇气，（但是我们）必须对明天的日本文化抱有信心。”这就是说，我们试验了一种行动方针失败了，从今天起再实行一种和平的处世之道。日本各报的评论者反复论证“日本必须在世界各国之间成为受尊敬的一员”，而日本国民的义务则是要成为立足于这一新的基础之上的受人尊敬的人。
These newspaper editorials were not just the voice of a few intellectuals; the common people on a Tokyo street and in a remote village make the same right-about-face. It has been incredible to American occupying troops that these friendly people are the ones who had vowed to fight to the death with bamboo spears. The Japanese ethic contains much which Americans repudiate, but American experiences during the occupation of Japan have been an excellent demonstration of how many favorable aspects a strange ethic can have.
这些报纸的社论不只反映了少数知识阶层的声音。东京街头或偏远地区山村的一般群众也来了个同样的大转变。占领日本的美军官兵不相信有这样友好的国民，他们过去竟是手拿竹矛誓死战斗到底的国民。在日本人的伦理中包含着许多美国人无法接受的因素，但是，美国人在完成他们占领日本的任务中所得到的种种经验也确已充分证明，包含在不同的伦理之中的好的因素是何其之多。
American administration of Japan under General MacArthur has accepted this Japanese ability to sail a new course. It has not impeded that course by insisting on using techniques of humiliation. It would have been culturally acceptable according to Western ethics if we had done so. For it is a tenet of Occidental ethics that humiliation and punishment are socially effective means to bring about a wrongdoer's conviction of sin. Such admission of sin is then a first step in his rehabilitation. The Japanese, as we have seen, state the issue in another way. Their ethic makes a man responsible for all the implications of his acts, and the natural consequences of an error should convince him of its undesirability. These natural consequences may even be defeat in an all-out war. But these are not situations which the Japanese must resent as humiliating. In the Japanese lexicon, a person or a nation humiliates another by detraction, ridicule, contempt, belittling, and insisting on symbols of dishonor. When the Japanese believe themselves humiliated, revenge is a virtue. No matter how strongly Western ethics condemn such a tenet, the effectiveness of American occupation of Japan depends on American self-restraint on this point. For the Japanese separate ridicule, which they terribly resent, from ‘natural consequences,' which according to the terms of their surrender include such things as demilitarization and even Spartan imposition of indemnities.
在麦克阿瑟将军指挥下实行的美国对日本的管理，承认了日本人这种向新的方向转换的能力。没有使用给日本人屈辱的强制手段阻碍他们的进程。如果按照西方各国的伦理，即使我们强制实行了这种手段，在文化上也是无可非议的。因为，按照西方伦理的信条，侮辱和刑罚是使做坏事的人认识到罪恶的社会性的有效手段。承认自己有罪恶，是他悔过自新的第一步。但是，如前所述，日本人对此有不同的想法。按照他们的伦理，人们必须对自己行为的结果产生的一切事态负责。而且通过某一过失的明显后果，认识到其行为的错误。在这些自然的结果之中甚至包含着举国战争失败这类严重的事态。但是，这种自然的结果并不足使日本人感到屈辱而愤慨。在日本人的词典里，个人或国家给其他个人或国家的耻辱，是通过诽谤、嘲笑、侮辱、轻蔑以及强加给不光彩的征服造成的。当日本人自以为受到侮辱时，就要报仇。尽管西方的伦理强烈谴责这一信条，但是，美国对日本的占领成效如何，取决于美国在这一点上能否谨慎克制。因为，日本人将他们非常气愤的嘲笑同按照投降条件要在剥夺一切军备的基础上承担更苛刻的赔偿义务这一“自然的结果”，截然地区别了开来。
Japan, in her one great victory over a major power, showed that even as a victor she could carefully avoid humiliating a defeated enemy when it finally capitulated and when she did not consider that that nation had sneered at her. There is a famous photograph of the surrender of the Russian Army at Port Arthur in 1905 which is known to every Japanese. It shows the Russians wearing their swords. The victors and the vanquished can be distinguished only by their uniforms for the Russians were not stripped of their arms. The well-known Japanese account of that surrender tells that when General Stoessel, the Russian commander, signified his willingness to receive Japanese propositions of surrender, a Japanese captain and interpreter went to his headquarters taking food. ‘All the horses except General Stoessel's own had been killed and eaten so that the present of fifty chickens and a hundred fresh eggs which the Japanese brought with them was welcome indeed.' The meeting of General Stoessel and General Nogi was arranged for the following day. ‘The two generals clasped hands. Stoessel expressed his admiration for the courage of the Japanese and . . . General Nogi praised the long and brave defense of the Russians. Stoessel expressed his sympathy with Nogi for the loss of his two sons in the campaign. . . . Stoessel presented his fine white Arab horse to General Nogi, but Nogi said that, much as he would like to receive it as his own from the General's hands, it must first be presented to the Emperor. He promised, however, that if it came back to him, as he had every reason to believe it would, he would take care of it as if it had always been his.'* Everyone in Japan knew the stable which General Nogi built for General Stoessel's horse in his front yard—a stable often described as more pretentious than Nogi's own house, and after General Nogi's death a part of the Nogi national shrine.
日本曾战胜了一个强国。在敌人最终投降而且日本认为它并未嘲笑过日本时，日本显示出了作为战胜国的小心谨慎，不给战败国以侮辱。日本人谁都知道有一张一九○五年俄国军队在旅顺投降时的照片。在那张照片上，俄国人是佩带着剑的。由于俄国军人未被剥夺武器，所以胜败双方只有通过军服才能勉强区分开来。根据日本人流传的那个尽人皆知的故事，在俄军司令官斯特富赛尔将军表示同意接受日方提出的投降条件后，一名日军上尉和翻译曾带着粮食去过斯特富赛尔将军的司令部。“因为当时除了斯特富赛尔将军的马之外，其余全部杀吃了，所以日本人带去的五十只鸡和一百个鸡蛋受到了由衷地欢迎。”斯特富赛尔将军和乃木将军的会见决定在第二天进行。“两位将军握手后，斯特富赛尔将军称赞日军勇敢……乃木将军赞扬俄军进行了长期卓绝的防御战。斯特富赛尔将军对乃木将军在这场战争中失去了两个儿子深表同情……斯特富赛尔将军将自己阿拉伯种的漂亮的马赠送给乃木将军。乃木将军说，我十分喜爱阁下馈赠的这匹马，不过，首先要奉献给天皇陛下。相信陛下会再赏马给我，我一定爱之如我本人已有的爱马。”引自阿普顿·克劳斯：《在日本表面的背后》，1942年，第294页。这个俄军投降的故事是否真实也许值得怀疑，但是并不妨碍它在文化上具有重要价值。日本人都知道，乃木将军在他家前院里为斯特富赛尔赠送的这匹马，修逢了舍，这个舍比乃木将军自己的家还漂亮，在乃木死后，成了乃木神社的一部分。
It has been said that the Japanese have changed between that day of the Russian surrender and the years of their occupation of the Philippines, for instance, when their wanton destructiveness and cruelty were known to all the world. To a people with the extreme situational ethics of the Japanese, however, this is not the necessary conclusion. In the first place, the enemy did not capitulate after Bataan; there was only a local surrender. Even when the Japanese, in their turn, surrendered in the Philippines, Japan was still fighting. In the second place, the Japanese never considered that the Russians had ‘insulted' them in the early years of this century, whereas every Japanese was reared in the nineteen-twenties and -thirties to regard United States policy as ‘taking Japan cheap,' or in their phrase, ‘making her as faeces.' This had been Japan's reaction to the Exclusion Act, to the part the United States played in the Treaty of Portsmouth and in the Naval Parity agreements. The Japanese had been encouraged to regard in the same way the growing economic r?le of the United States in the Far East and our racial attitudes toward the non-white peoples of the world. The victory over Russia and the victory over the United States in the Philippines, therefore, illustrate Japanese behavior in its two most opposed aspects: when insults are involved and when they are not.
有人说，日本人从俄国投降起到占领菲律宾数年间，恣意进行举世闻名的疯狂破坏和残杀，性格发生了完全的变化。但是，对于像日本人这样具有极端的社会主义伦理的国民来说，这一结论未必是必然的。第一，日本的敌人在巴塔安半岛之后也没有投降，只在局部地区投降了。其后，日军直到在菲律宾投降时，一直进行着战斗。第二，日本人绝不认为在二十世纪初，俄国人“侮辱”了他们，与此相反，在二十年代及三十年代，日本所有的人都认为美国的政策是“瞧不起日本”。用他们的话来说，是“把日本看得粪土不如”。这是日本对于排日移民法以及美国在《朴茨茅斯条约》与第二次裁军条约中扮演的角色的反应。日本人对美国在远东经济影响的扩大以及对世界上有色人种的种族偏见，也持有同样的看法。因此，在战胜俄国和战胜驻菲律宾美军问题上最清楚不过地表明了日本人在有无侮辱时所采取的截然不同的两种倾向。
The final victory of the United States again changed the situation for the Japanese. Their ultimate defeat brought about, as is usual in Japanese life, the abandonment of the course they had been pursuing. The peculiar ethic of the Japanese allowed them to wipe the slate clean. United States policy and General MacArthur's administration have avoided writing fresh symbols of humiliation upon that washed slate, and have held simply to insisting on those things which in Japanese eyes are ‘natural consequences' of defeat. It has worked.
随着美国取得最后胜利，对日本来说，事态再次发生了变化。日本人在遭到最终失败的同时，根据他们的生活习惯，放弃了以往采取的方针。正是因为他们具有这种独特的伦理，所以日本人得以从账簿上把一切夙怨的记录抹掉。为了避免在那本好不容易才一笔勾销的账簿上再留下新的屈辱的标记，美国的政策及麦克阿瑟将军的占领管理，采取了只是停留在履行日本人看来无非是战败的“必然的结果”的事务的态度。这种做法奏效了。
The retention of the Emperor has been of great importance. It has been handled well. It was the Emperor who called first upon General MacArthur, not MacArthur upon him, and this was an object lesson to the Japanese the force of which it is hard for Westerners to appreciate. It is said that when it was suggested to the Emperor that he disavow his divinity, he protested that it would be a personal embarrassment to strip himself of something he did not have. The Japanese, he said truthfully, did not consider him a god in the Western sense. MacArthur's Headquarters, however, urged upon him that the Occidental idea of his claim to divinity was bad for Japan's international repute, and the Emperor agreed to accept the embarrassment the disavowal would cost him. He spoke on New Year's Day, and asked to have all comments on his message translated for him from the world press. When he had read them, he sent a message to General MacArthur's Headquarters saying that he was satisfied. Foreigners had obviously not understood before, and he was glad he had spoken.
保留天皇制，具有非常重大的意义。这件事处理得非常巧妙。最初是天皇拜访麦克阿瑟将军，而不是麦克阿瑟将军拜访他。这对日本人来说，是一次事实教育，收到了西方人难以想象的巨大效果。据说，在劝告天皇否认神格时，天皇说，让我放弃本来就不存在的东西，不好办，提出了异议。天皇说，日本人并不认为天皇是西方人所想象的那种意义上的神，事实正是如此。但是，麦克阿瑟司令部劝说天皇，西方人至今仍认为天皇主张神格，这有损于日本在国际上的声望。于是，天皇答应发表一个否认神格的声明。在元旦这天，天皇发表了声明。他要求将世界各国对他声明的疑问评论全部翻译下来送他过目。天皇在读了这些评论后写信给麦克阿瑟司令部表示满意。外国人在此之前果真没有理解，天皇对自己发表声明一事感到高兴。
The policy of the United States has also allowed the Japanese certain gratifications. The State-Army-Navy directive specifies that ‘encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis.' Japanese labor has organized in many industries, and the old farmers' unions which were active in the 1920s and 1930s are asserting themselves again. To many Japanese this initiative which they can now take to better their condition is a proof that Japan has won something as a consequence of this war. One American correspondent tells of a striker in Tokyo who looked up at a G.I. and said, beaming broadly, ‘Japan win, no?' Strikes in Japan today have many parallels to the old Peasants' Revolts where the farmers' plea was always that the taxes and corvées to which they were subject interfered with adequate production. They were not class warfare in the Western sense, and they were not an attempt to change the system itself. Throughout Japan today strikes do not slow up production. The favorite form is for the workers ‘to occupy the plant, continue work and make management lose face by increasing production. Strikers at a Mitsui-owned coal mine barred all management personnel from the pits and stepped daily output up from 250 tons to 620. Workers at Ashio copper mines operated during a “strike,” increased production, and doubled their own wages.'*
美国的政策还容许给日本人以某种满足。国务院、陆军部和海军部联合指令明确表示：“对于在民主基础上组织起来的劳动、工业及农业诸团体的发展给予奖励和帮助。”日本工人在许多产业里组织起来了。曾在二十年代及三十年代风靡一时的昔日的农民组织也再次东山再起。许多日本人认为，他们今天能这样依靠自身的努力，改善自己的生活状况，是作为此次战争的结果，日本得到了某种利益的佐证。美国的一名特派员报导过这样一件事。东京一位罢工参加者，仰望着一个英国士兵的面孔说：“日本，胜了，你不这样认为吗？”今天日本的罢工与昔日的农民暴动有许多类似之处。暴动的农民经常哀叹强加在他们身上的年贡和赋役严重阻碍了生产。农民暴动并不是西方意义上的阶级斗争，也不是企图变革制度本身。今天在日本各地进行的罢工同样也没有降低生产速度。他们喜欢采取的形式是工人“占领工厂，继续工作，通过增加生产使经营者丧失面子。三井系统中的一家煤矿参加罢工的工人们，将负责经营管理的职员全部从矿上赶走，日产由二百五十吨提高到六百二十吨。足尾铜矿在‘罢工’中也提高了生产，使自己的工资翻了一番”。引自《时代周刊》，1946年2月18日。
The administration of any defeated county is, of course, difficult, no matter how much good sense the accepted policy shows. In Japan the problems of food and shelter and reconversion are inevitably acute. They would be at least equally acute under an administration which did not make use of Japanese governmental personnel. The problem of demobilized soldiers, which was so much dreaded by American administrators before the war ended, is certainly less threatening than it would have been if Japanese officials had not been retained. But it is not easily solved. The Japanese are aware of the difficulty and their newspapers spoke feelingly last fall about how bitter the brew of defeat was to the soldiers who had suffered and lost, and it begged them not to let this interfere with their ‘judgment.' The repatriated army has in general shown remarkable ‘judgment,' but unemployment and defeat throw some soldiers into the old pattern of secret societies for nationalistic goals. They can easily resent their present status. The Japanese no longer accord them their old privileged position. The wounded soldier used to be clothed all in white and people bowed to him on the street. Even a peacetime Army recruit was given a send-off party and a welcome-home party by his hamlet. There were drinks and refreshments and dancing and costumes, and he sat in the place of honor. Now the repatriated soldier gets no such attentions. His family makes a place for him, but that is all. In many cities and towns he is cold-shouldered. It is easy, knowing how bitterly the Japanese take such a change of behavior, to imagine his satisfaction in joining up with his old comrades to bring back the old days when the glory of Japan was entrusted to soldiers' hands. Some of his war comrades will tell him, too, how luckier Japanese soldiers are already fighting with the Allies in Java and in Shansi and in Manchuria; why should he despair? He too will fight again, they will tell him. Nationalistic secret societies are old, old institutions in Japan; they ‘cleared the name' of Japan. Men conditioned to feel that ‘the world tips' so long as anything is left undone to even scores were always possible candidates for such undercover societies. The violence which these societies, such as the Black Dragon and the Black Ocean, espoused is the violence which Japanese ethics allows as giri to one's name, and the long effort of the Japanese Government to emphasize gimu at the expense of giri to one's name will have to be continued in the coming years if this violence is to be eliminated.
当然，不论任何国家战败国的行政总是困难重重的。即使允诺的政策经过深思熟虑的也没有两样。在日本，粮食、住宅、国民再教育等问题也同样遇到了不可避免的严重问题。假如不利用日本政府的官员，问题势必同样尖锐，至少在严重程度上也不会有什么两样。复员军人问题，在战争结束前，是美国当权者们非常担心的问题。的确，如果不将日本的官吏留在原位上，威胁要小一些。但是，解决这一问题也并不是轻而易举的。日本人了解这一困难，去年秋天（一九四五年即昭和二十年）日本报纸在设身处地地谈到了战败的苦果，对于拼尽千辛万苦最终打了败仗的军人来说，是何等的痛苦，垦切希望他们对此不应做出错误的“判断”。复员军人在此之前，大都做出了正确的“判断”。但是，其中多少也有些人由于失业和战败而投身追求国家主义目标的旧式的秘密结社之中。他们容易对自己现在的地位感到气愤。日本人再也不给他们昔日的特权地位了。以前，伤兵身穿白衣走在街上，过往的行人要向他们鞠躬致敬。就连平常有人去当兵，村民们也要举行欢送会，备下美酒佳肴，有盛装的美女陪酒，而且，他要在上位就坐。如今，复员军人根本得不到这样隆重的待遇。当然，他的家庭会高高兴兴欢迎他，然而，在许多城市和村镇，他们却遭到冷遇。假如你知道，日本人对这种态度的改变如何感到痛苦，你就会很容易地推测出，为了恢复昔日日本的名誉握在军人手中的时代，他会从与以前的战友结党中得到何等的满足。同时，他的战友中还会有人告诉他，运气好的日本军人已经在爪哇、山西、满州等与联合国军交战。他们会对他说：用不着绝望！不久的将来你也会重新投入战斗！国家主义的秘密结社在日本由来已久，这些社团想要“洗刷日本的污名”。他们仿佛感到，为了实现彻底的复仇还有些事尚未做完，具有这种性格的人经常有可能成为这种秘密结社的志愿参加者。这种社团，比如黑龙会、玄洋社等使用暴力，是日本伦理容许的作为维护名声“义理”的暴力。因此，要排除这种暴力，日本政府就必须在今后许多年里努力压制维护名声的义理，而强调“义务”。
It will require more than an appeal to ‘judgment.' It will require a reconstruction of Japanese economy which will give a livelihood and ‘proper place' to men who are now in their twenties and thirties. It will require improvement in the lot of the farmer. The Japanese return, whenever there is economic distress, to their old farm villages, and the tiny farms, encumbered with debts and in many places with rents, cannot feed many more mouths. Industry too must be set going, for the strong feeling against dividing the inheritance with younger sons eventually sends all but the eldest out to seek their fortune in the city.
为此，仅仅依靠“判断”是无济于事的。必须重建日本的经济，给现在二十几岁或三十几岁的人以生活出路和“适当的位置”。而且，还需要改善农民的生活状况。日本人每当经济陷入困境时，总要回到出生的故乡农村去。然而，许多地方债台高筑，田地狭小，地租高昂很难养活更多的人口。工业也必须开始发展。因为根深蒂固的传统感情反对将财产分给长子以下的子女，所以留在村子里的只有长子，其他全要到城市去寻求成功的机会。
The Japanese have a long hard road before them, no doubt, but if rearmament is not provided for in the State budget they have an opportunity to raise their national standard of living. A nation like Japan which spent half its national income on armament and the armed forces for a decade before Pearl Harbor can lay the foundation of a healthy economy if it outlaws such expenditures and progressively reduces its requisitions from the farmers. As we have seen, the Japanese formula for division of farm products was 60 per cent for the cultivator; 40 per cent he paid out in taxes and rents. This is in great contrast to rice countries like Burma and Siam where 90 per cent was the traditional proportion left to the cultivator. This huge requisition upon the cultivator in Japan was what ultimately made possible the financing of the national war machine.
的确，日本人必须走一段漫长而艰难的路程。但是，倘若不再拨出国家预算去进行重新武装，他们就有机会提高国民的生活水平。日本在珍珠港之前大约十年里，为了扩充军备，维持军队，要耗费岁入的一半。像日本这样的国家，如能废除这种支出，逐渐减轻从农民身上征收的租税，便能建立起健全的经济基础。如前所述，日本农产品的分配方式是，百分之六十归耕种者，百分之四十为租税及地租。这与同样盛产大米的国家缅甸和暹罗一带相比，有很大的不同。在这些国家里传统的比例是百分之九十留给耕种者。正是从日本耕种者身上征收的这一庞大的税金，才使日本军事机构的巨大开支变为可能。
Any European or Asiatic country which is not arming during the next decade will have a potential advantage over the countries which are arming, for its wealth can be used to build a healthy and prosperous economy. In the United States we hardly take this situation into account in our Asiatic and European policies, for we know that we would not be impoverished in this country by expensive programs of national defense. Our country was not devastated. We are not primarily an agricultural country. Our crucial problem is industrial overproduction. We have perfected mass production and mechanical equipment until our population cannot find employment unless we set in motion great programs of armament or of luxury production or of welfare and research services. The need for profitable investment of capital is also acute. This situation is quite different outside the United States. It is different even in Western Europe. In spite of all demands for reparations, a Germany which is not allowed to rearm could in a decade or so have laid the foundations of a sound and prosperous economy which would be impossible in France if her policy is to build up great military power. Japan could make the most of a similar advantage over China. Militarization is a current goal in China and her ambitions are supported by the United States. Japan, if she does not include militarization in her budget, can, if she will, provide for her own prosperity before many years, and she could make herself indispensable in the commerce of the East. She could base her economy on the profits of peace and raise the standard of living of her people. Such a peaceful Japan could attain a place of honor among the nations of the world, and the United States could be of great assistance if it continued to use its influence in support of such a program.
不论欧洲或亚洲的任何一个国家，今后十年间，凡不扩充军备的国家都有可能凌驾在扩充军备的国家之上。因为这些国家将国家的财富留在了建立健全而繁荣的经济上。在美国，我们在推行我们的亚洲和欧洲政策时，几乎没有考虑到这种情况。因为我们知道，即使在我国实行需要庞大费用的国防计划，国家也不至于因此而陷入贫困。我们国家没有饱受战祸，也不是以农业为中心的国家，我们的严重问题是工业生产的过程。我们使大批生产与机械设备达到了完善的地步，结果使得我们如不实施大规范的军备及奢侈品生产，在实施福利及调查研究事业的计划时，国民就无法谋到职业。在美国以外的其他国家，情况则完全不同。甚至西方也概莫能外。面对着大量的赔偿要求，但不准它重新武装的德国，今后十年左右，可以建立起在法国不可能实现的健全而又富足的经济基础。倘若法国的政策是建立强大的军事力量的话。日本对中国同样也将充分发挥它的长处。因为中国当前的目标是军国化。而且，中国的经济得到了美国的支持。日本如果在其目标中不包括军国化这一内容，而且，假如它有意这样去做，不久的将来就可以为自身的繁荣做好准备。并且在东方通商贸易上，还会成为举足轻重的国家。它的经济将立足于和平的利益之上，国民的生活水准也会得到提高。成为和平国家的日本将在世界各国之间获得光荣的地位。而且，今后美国如继续利用其势力支持这样的计划，大概会给予巨大的援助。
What the United States cannot do—what no outside nation could do—is to create by fiat a free, democratic Japan. It has never worked in any dominated country. No foreigner can decree, for a people who have not his habits and assumptions, a manner of life after his own image. The Japanese cannot be legislated into accepting the authority of elected persons and ignoring ‘proper station' as it is set up in their hierarchal system. They cannot be legislated into adopting the free and easy human contacts to which we are accustomed in the United States, the imperative demand to be independent, the passion each individual has to choose his own mate, his own job, the house he will live in and the obligations he will assume. The Japanese themselves, however, are quite articulate about changes in this direction which they regard as necessary. Their public men have said since VJ-Day that Japan must encourage its men and women to live their own lives and to trust their own consciences. They do not say so, of course, but any Japanese understands that they are questioning the role of ‘shame' (haji) in Japan, and that they hope for a new growth of freedom among their countrymen: freedom from fear of the criticism and ostracism of ‘the world.'
依靠命令建立自由民主的日本，不仅美国，任何外部的国家都是无法办到的。这样的方法在任何被统治的国家里，也从未取得过成功。任何外国人都无法命令与他习惯和假定不同的国民按照他所设想的方式生活。不能依靠法律的力量让日本人承认通过选举选出的人们的权威，让他们无视他们的等级制度所规定的“相应的位置”。不能依靠法律的力量让他们采用我们美国人所习惯的毫不客气地与人接触的态度、自由独立的迫切心情以及每个人都具有的自主择友、择业、择居和承担义务的热情。然而，日本人本身明确承认他们有必要朝着这一方向变化。战胜日本以来，他们的公务人员说，日本必须鼓励国民不分男女各自享受自己的生活，信赖自己的良心。虽然没明说，但是，每一个日本人都理解，他们对“耻辱”在日本的作用产生了疑问。他们希望在国民中间有一种新的自由，一种在担心“社会”的责难和被“社会”摈弃的恐怖中生长起来的自由。
For social pressures in Japan, no matter how voluntarily embraced, ask too much of the individual. They require him to conceal his emotions, to give up his desires, and to stand as the exposed representative of a family, an organization or a nation. The Japanese have shown that they can take all the self-discipline such a course requires. But the weight upon them is extremely heavy. They have to repress too much for their own good. Fearing to venture upon a life which is less costly to their psyches, they have been led by-militarists upon a course where the costs pile up interminably. Having paid so high a price, they became self-righteous and have been contemptuous of people with a less demanding ethic.
这是因为在日本，社会压力对个人的要求太多了。无论日本人是否愿意主动承受，这些压力都要求他们抵制住感情，抛掉欲望，作为家族、团体或国民的代表面对社会。事实证明日本人有能够经受住这一方针所要求的一切自我修养。但是，他们身上的负担是异常沉重的。他们必须过度地抑制自己，因而终究无法得到自己的幸福。他们没有勇气毅然决然地投入不要求他们的精神作出更多牺牲的生活中去，于是便在军国主义者主流的引导下，走上了接连不断地无休止地付出牺牲的道路。由于付出了如此高昂的代价，因此他们独善其身，蔑视具有比较宽容的伦理的人们。
The Japanese have taken the first great step toward social change by identifying aggressive warfare as an ‘error' and a lost cause. They hope to buy their passage back to a respected place among peaceful nations. It will have to be a peaceful world. If Russia and the United States spend the coming years in arming for attack, Japan will use her knowhow to fight in that war. But to admit that certainly does not call in question the inherent possibility of a peaceful Japan. Japan's motivations are situational. She will seek her place within a world at peace if circumstances permit. If not, within a world organized as an armed camp.
日本人由于认为侵略战争是“谬误”，是失败的主张，因而向社会的变革迈出了最初的一步。他们渴望千方百计在和平的国家之间重新恢复受尊敬的地位。但是，为此必须实现世界和平。假如俄国和美国，今后数年在旨在进行攻击的军备扩充中度过，日本将利用其军事知识参加到这一战争中去。我承认确实存在着这种可能性，但是我决不怀疑日本本来就有可能成为和平国家。日本行动的动机是机会主义的。假如情况允许，日本会在和平的世界上寻求它的位置。否则，它就会在新武装的阵营组织起来的世界上寻求其位置。
At present the Japanese know militarism as a light that failed. They will watch to see whether it has also failed in other nations of the world. If it has not, Japan can relight her own warlike ardor and show how well she can contribute. If it has failed elsewhere, Japan can set herself to prove how well she has learned the lesson that imperialistic dynastic enterprises are no road to honor.
现在日本人认识到曾经作为指路明灯的军国主义已经失败。军国主义在这个世界的其他国家是否也会失败，他们将拭目以待。假如没有失败，日本就要重新燃起自己好战的热情，表示自己能够为战争做出卓越的贡献。假如在其他国家也遭到了失败，日本就将证明自己是如何地亲身体会了帝国主义的侵略企图决不是通向荣誉之路的这一教训。