2 The Japanese in the War
第二章 战争中的日本人
IN EVERY cultural tradition there are orthodoxies of war and certain of these are shared in all Western nations, no matter what the specific differences. There are certain clarion calls to all-out war effort, certain forms of reassurance in case of local defeats, certain regularities in the proportion of fatalities to surrenders, and certain rules of behavior for prisoners of war which are predictable in wars between Western nations just because they have a great shared cultural tradition which covers even warfare.
战争中的日本人任何文化传统中，都有战争的通用法则。对西方各国来说，尽管多少有其特殊差异，但都有某些共同的战时惯例。比如，号召人们一切为了战争而来采用的某些方法、遭到局部失败时稳定人心的某些形式、战死者与投降者的比率在某种程度上的规律性、俘虏应遵守的某些守则等。凡此种种，在西方各国间的战争中，开始时就能够预测，这是由于这些国家有着共同的伟大文化传统，而这种传统也包括战争在内。
All the ways in which the Japanese departed from Western conventions of war were data on their view of life and on their convictions of the whole duty of man. For the purposes of a systematic study of Japanese culture and behavior it did not matter whether or not their deviations from our orthodoxies were crucial in a military sense; any of them might be important because they raised questions about the character of the Japanese to which we needed answers.
日本人违反西方战时惯例的所有作为，已成为了解他们的人生观和信念的资料。我们的目的在于系统地研究日本人的文化和行动，一些违反我们常规的行为，军事上的意义重要与否姑且不论。不管哪一种行为，都提出了我们要回答的关于日本人性格这一问题，因此都是重要的。
The very premises which Japan used to justify her war were the opposite of America's. She defined the international situation differently. America laid the war to the aggressions of the Axis. Japan, Italy, and Germany had unrighteously offended against international peace by their acts of conquest. Whether the Axis had seized power in Manchukuo or in Ethiopia or in Poland, it proved that they had embarked on an evil course of oppressing weak peoples. They had sinned against an international code of ‘live and let live' or at least of ‘open doors' for free enterprise.
日本使其战争合法化的前提与美国完全相反。日本是以不同的观点来看待国际形势的。美国认为轴心国的侵略行径导致了这场战争，日本、意大利、德国三国的征服行为非法且危害了世界和平。在轴心国统治区，不管是在满洲国、埃塞俄比亚，还是在波兰，已经证明他们走上了压迫弱小民族的罪恶道路。他们对“共存共荣”，至少对自由企业“门户开放”的国际准则犯下了罪行。
Japan saw the cause of the war in another light. There was anarchy in the world as long as every nation had absolute sovereignty; it was necessary for her to fight to establish a hierarchy—under Japan, of course, since she alone represented a nation truly hierarchal from top to bottom and hence understood the necessity of taking ‘one's proper place.' Japan, having attained unification and peace in her homeland, having put down banditry and built up roads and electric power and steel industries, having, according to her official figures, educated 99.5 per cent of her rising generation in her public schools, should, according to Japanese premises of hierarchy, raise her backward younger brother China. Being of the same race as Greater East Asia, she should eliminate the United States, and after her Britain and Russia, from that part of the world and ‘take her proper place.' All nations were to be one world, fixed in an international hierarchy.
关于战争原因，日本持有不同的看法，它认为各国拥有绝对的主权时，世界上就会存在无政府状态。日本必须为建立等级秩序而斗争，而这种秩序的领袖——理所当然是日本。因为日本是从上到下真正按等级组织起来的惟一国家，对各得其“所”的必要性理解得最深刻。日本国内实现了统一与和平，镇压了暴徒；修筑了道路，建立了电力、钢铁产业；根据公布的数字，百分之九十九点五的青少年在公立学校接受教育，因此，必须帮助中国这个落后的兄弟之邦。日本与“大东亚”各国为同一人种，因此必须先把美国，然后将英国和俄国从这一地区赶出去，“我得其所”。世界各国应该在国际等级组织中，各自占得一定的位置，统一成一个世界。
In the next chapter we shall examine what this high value placed on hierarchy meant in Japanese culture. It was an appropriate fantasy for Japan to create. Unfortunately for her the countries she occupied did not see it in the same light. Nevertheless not even defeat has drawn from her moral repudiation of her Greater East Asia ideals, and even her prisoners of war who were least jingoistic rarely went so far as to arraign the purposes of Japan on the continent and in the Southwest Pacific. For a long, long time Japan will necessarily keep some of her inbred attitudes and one of the most important of these is her faith and confidence in hierarchy. It is alien to equality-loving Americans but it is nevertheless necessary for us to understand what Japan meant by hierarchy and what advantages she has learned to connect with it.
我们将在下一章中，对这种受到日本人自己高度评价的等级制度在日本文化中的意义作一探讨。确实只有日本才能创造出这种幻想。对于日本来说，不幸的是，日本占领下的各国对这一理想的看法并未与日本相同。尽管如此，即使战败后，日本也并未考虑“大东亚”的理想在道德上应是被否定的东西；而且在日本俘虏中，连主战论色彩最淡薄者也很少有人谴责日本在大陆及西南太平洋的政策。今后在很长一段时间里，日本一定还会将这种天生态度中的某些东西保持下去。在这些态度中，最重要的就是对等级制度的信仰与信赖，这对爱好平等的美国人来说是水火不相容的。尽管如此，我们还是有必要了解等级制度对日本来说意味着什么，他们是如何认识这种制度的长处的。
Japan likewise put her hopes of victory on a different basis from that prevalent in the United States. She would win, she cried, a victory of spirit over matter. America was big, her armaments were superior, but what did that matter? All this, they said, had been foreseen and discounted. ‘If we had been afraid of mathematical figures,' the Japanese read in their great newspaper, the Mainichi Shimbun, ‘the war would not have started. The enemy's great resources were not created by this war.'
日本把胜利的希望也建立在与美国截然不同的基础之上。日本人叫喊精神力量一定能战胜物质力量，他们说，美国的确是一个大国，军事力量也超过我们，但是这又怎样呢？所有这些，大家从开始就已预想到了，我们一直没有把它当成一回事。当时，日本人在日本的一家大报《每日新闻》上刊登有这么一段话：“如果我们害怕数字，也许战争不会发生。敌人的丰富资源并不是这次战争创造出来的。”
Even when she was winning, her civilian statesmen, her High Command, and her soldiers repeated that this was no contest between armaments; it was a pitting of our faith in things against their faith in spirit. When we were winning they repeated over and over that in such a contest material power must necessarily fail. This dogma became, no doubt, a convenient alibi about the time of the defeats at Saipan and Iwo Jima, but it was not manufactured as an alibi for defeats. It was a clarion call during all the months of Japanese victories, and it had been an accepted slogan long before Pearl Harbor. In the nineteen-thirties General Araki, fanatical militarist and one-time Minister of War, wrote in a pamphlet addressed ‘To the whole Japanese Race' that ‘the true mission' of Japan was ‘to spread and glorify the Imperial way to the end of the Four Seas. Inadequacy of strength is not our worry. Why should we worry about that which is material?'
即便在日本胜利时，日本的政治家、大本营、军人们也总是反复强调，这场战争不是军事力量之间的较量，而是日本人对精神的信仰与美国人对物质的信仰之间的较量。我们胜利时，他们也反复强调，像这样的战斗，物质力量是注定要失败的。这一信条在塞班岛、硫黄岛失败时，的确成为失败的很好托词；但是这一信条并不是作为失败的托词捏造出来的，它曾扮演过日军引以自豪的几个月间连战皆胜的进军号角的角色，这是早在奇袭珍珠港以前就已公认的口号。二十世纪三十年代，狂热的军国主义者、曾任陆军大臣的荒木大将，在《告日本民族》一书中写道，日本“真正的使命是将皇道弘扬四海。力量不足我们并不介意，为什么要对物质的东西费神呢”。
Of course, like any other nation preparing for war, they did worry. All through the nineteen-thirties the proportion of their national income which was devoted to armament grew astronomically. By the time of their attack on Pearl Harbor very nearly half the entire national income was going to military and naval purposes, and of the total expenditures of the government only 17 per cent were available for financing anything having to do with civilian administration. The difference between Japan and Western nations was not that Japan was careless about material armament. But ships and guns were just the outward show of the undying Japanese Spirit. They were symbols much as the sword of the samurai had been the symbol of his virtue.
实际上他们并不例外，也在大力进行战争准备。二十世纪三十年代，年度收入总额中用于军备的比例一直在猛增。奇袭珍珠港时，陆海军的费用占国民总收入的近一半；而军事以外的一般行政费用，仅占政府总支出额的百分之十七。日本与西方各国不同的是，日本并非对物质的军备不关心，只是他们认为军舰大炮只不过是不灭的“日本精神”的外表而已，是一种象征，如同武士的刀是勇气的象征一样。
Japan was as completely consistent in playing up nonmaterial resources as the United States was in its commitment to bigness. Japan had to campaign for all-out production just as the United States did, but her campaigns were based on her own premises. The spirit, she said, was all and was everlasting; material things were necessary, of course, but they were subordinate and fell by the way. ‘There are limits to material resources,' the Japanese radio would cry: ‘it stands to reason that material things cannot last a thousand years.' And this reliance on spirit was taken literally in the routine of war; their war catechisms used the slogan—and it was a traditional one, not made to order for this war —‘To match our training against their numbers and our flesh against their steel.' Their war manuals began with the bold-type line, ‘Read this and the war is won.' Their pilots who flew their midget planes in a suicidal crash into our warships were an endless text for the superiority of the spiritual over the material. They named them the Kamikaze Corps, for the kamikaze was the divine wind which had saved Japan from Genghis Khan's invasion in the thirteenth century by scattering and overturning his transports.
日本在利用非物质手段这一点上始终是一致的，如同美国始终致力于物质建设一样。日本同美国一样也开展增产运动，但是这种运动是建立在日本独特的前提之上的。据他们说，精神就是一切，是永不泯灭的东西；物质的东西固然需要，但它是第二位的，不能永存。日本广播电台经常广播“物质资源是有限的，物质的东西不能永存是明了的”。这种对精神的信赖完全被用于战斗行动中。在他们的军用问答书中有“胜利靠训练，钢铁用肉搏”的口号，这样的标语并不是为这次战争特意设计的，而是传统的东西。在军事教科书的扉页上用黑体字印有“必读必胜”的语句。那些采取自杀行动驾驶着小得可怜的飞机撞击我们军舰的飞行员们，被作为精神优于物质的永久的样板。这些飞行员被命名为“神风特攻队”。“神风”是指十三世纪蒙古人入侵日本时，刮翻敌人的运兵船而拯救了日本的台风。
Even in civilian situations Japanese authorities took literally the dominance of spirit over material circumstances. Were people fatigued by twelve-hour work in the factories and all-night bombings? ‘The heavier our bodies, the higher our will, our spirit, rises above them.' ‘The wearier we are, the more splendid the training.' Were people cold in the bomb shelters in winter? On the radio the Dai Nippon Physical Culture Society prescribed body-warming calisthenics which would not only be a substitute for heating facilities and bedding, but, better still, would substitute for food no longer available to keep up people's normal strength. ‘Of course some may say that with the present food shortages we cannot think of doing calisthenics. No! The more shortage of food there is, the more we must raise our physical strength by other means.' That is, we must increase our physical strength by expending still more of it. The American's view of bodily energy which always reckons how much strength he has to use by whether he had eight or five hours of sleep last night, whether he has eaten his regular meals, whether he has been cold, is here confronted with a calculus that does not rely on storing up energy. That would be materialistic.
日本政府把精神优于物质这一信条也运用到了一般人的生活中。例如，国民由于二十四小时在工厂劳动和美机的彻夜轰炸已经精疲力竭，但是还宣扬“我们的身体越劳累，我们的意志、精神就会越昂扬”、“越疲劳，训练效果越好”。冬天，国民在冰冷的防空壕里冻得发抖，大日本体育会却通过广播电台命令大家做防寒体操。这种体操不仅要代替取暖设备、被褥，甚至还要代替当时已不足以维持国民正常生活的粮食。“肯定有人会说，现在缺粮还让做广播体操真是岂有此理。然而决非如此，越是缺粮，就越要用其他的方法来增强我们的体力。”就是说由于我们体力消耗过大，必须要增强它。在计算体力方面，美国人始终认为，要根据睡眠、饮食、寒冷程度来计算使用多少体力才好；而日本人的计算方法则完全不同，对养精蓄锐之事不屑一顾，认为是一种物质主义的做法。
Japanese broadcasts went even farther during the war. In battle, spirit surmounted even the physical fact of death. One broadcast described a hero-pilot and the miracle of his conquest of death:
战争中，日本广播电台更是走向了极端，竞相广播战斗中的精神甚至战死这一自然法则。某广播电台广播的英雄飞行员战胜死亡的报道，全文如下：
After the air battles were over, the Japanese planes returned to their base in small formations of three or four. A Captain was in one of the first planes to return. After alighting from his plane, he stood on the ground and gazed into the sky through binoculars. As his men returned, he counted. He looked rather pale, but he was quite steady. After the last plane returned he made out a report and proceeded to Headquarters. At Headquarters he made his report to the Commanding Officer. As soon as he had finished his report, however, he suddenly dropped to the ground. The officers on the spot rushed to give assistance but alas! he was dead. On examining his body it was found that it was already cold, and he had a bullet wound in his chest, which had proved fatal. It is impossible for the body of a newly-dead person to be cold. Nevertheless the body of the dead captain was as cold as ice. The Captain must have been dead long before, and it was his spirit that made the report. Such a miraculous fact must have been achieved by the strict sense of responsibility that the dead Captain possessed.
空战结束，日本飞机三四架为一单位，编成小编队返回基地。最初着陆的几架飞机中有一架是载有大尉的飞机，大尉走下飞机，威然地站在地上用望远镜瞭望天空，他是在查点部属是否全部返回。他脸色虽有些发青，但显得刚毅坚定。当最后一架飞机着陆后，他做好飞行报告，向司令部走去。到达司令部后，向司令官报告了情况。就在他报告完的那一刹那，猝然倒地。在场的军官们赶忙向前抢救，但这时的大尉已经死去。经检查，身体已经变冷，胸前中了一发致死的枪弹。如果刚刚死去，身体不会已经变冷，而大尉的身体已经冰冷，肯定在这以前就已死去，当时是他的灵魂在报告。由于战死的大尉具有强烈的责任感，才创造出了这一奇迹。
To Americans, of course, this is an outrageous yarn but educated Japanese did not laugh at this broadcast. They felt sure it would not be taken as a tall tale by listeners in Japan. First they pointed out that the broadcaster had truthfully said that the captain's feat was ‘a miraculous fact.' But why not? The soul could be trained; obviously the captain was a past-master of self-discipline. If all Japan knew that ‘a composed spirit could last a thousand years,' could it not last a few hours in the body of an air-force captain who had made ‘responsibility' the central law of his whole life? The Japanese believed that technical disciplines could be used to enable a man to make his spirit supreme. The captain had learned and profited.
当然在美国人看来，这是一种骗人的鬼话，但对受过教育的日本人来说并非一笑置之。他们认为，日本听众决不会认可这种广播里荒唐的无稽之谈。首先他们强调，正如广播所说，这位大尉的英雄行为完全是一种“奇迹”。为什么会发生这一奇迹呢？这是因为灵魂可以锤炼，而这位大尉确实是很有修养的人。如果像日本人皆知的“泰然自若的精神死后还能永存”，那么精神在这位将“责任”视为生活中最高准则的大尉肉体中只存留几小时是一件轻而易举的事情。日本人相信，人通过特殊的修行能将精神变为至高无上的东西。这位大尉正是修成正果的典型。
As Americans we can completely discount these Japanese excesses as the alibis of a poor nation or the childishness of a deluded one. If we did, however, we would be, by that much, the less able to deal with them in war or in peace. Their tenets have been bred into the Japanese by certain taboos and refusals, by certain methods of training and discipline, and these tenets are not mere isolated oddities. Only if Americans have recognized them can we realize what they are saying when, in defeat, they acknowledge that spirit was not enough and that defending positions ‘with bamboo spears' was a fantasy. It is still more important that we be able to appreciate their acknowledgment that their spirit was insufficient and that it was matched in battle and in the factory by the spirit of the American people. As they said after their defeat: during the war they had ‘engaged in subjectivity.'
按照美国人的观点，我们会把日本人这种越轨言行视为贫穷落后国家掩盖自己的一种托词，受骗的国民孩子似的妄想，完全可以不予理睬。然而这样的话，无论是在战争时期还是在和平时期，都将相应地失去处理日本人问题的能力。他们的信条是通过一定的禁忌和拒绝，一定的训育和锻炼方法培养成的，已铭记在日本人心中，并不只是一种孤立的奇习怪俗。只有开始承认这些信条，美国才能理解日本人战败时自己认识到的单凭精神力量不行，用“竹矛”守卫阵地完全是一种妄想这些话的真正含义。更重要的是理解他们认识到的因日本人的精神力量不够，才无论在战场还是工厂都输给了美国人。正如战后他们所说，战争中他们“完全凭主观愿望进行战斗”。
Japanese ways of saying all kinds of things during the war, not only about the necessity of hierarchy and the supremacy of spirit, were revealing to a student of comparative cultures. They talked constantly about security and morale being only a matter of being forewarned. No matter what the catastrophe, whether it was civilian bombing or defeat at Saipan or their failure to defend the Philippines, the Japanese line to their people was that this was foreknown and that there was therefore nothing to worry about. The radio went to great lengths, obviously counting on the reassurance it gave to the Japanese people to be told that they were living still in a thoroughly known world. ‘The American occupation of Kiska brings Japan within the radius of American bombers. But we were well aware of this contingency and have made the necessary preparations.' ‘The enemy doubtless will make an offensive against us by combined land, sea and air operations, but this has been taken account of by us in our plans.' Prisoners of war, even those who hoped for Japan's early defeat in a hopeless war, were sure that bombing would not weaken Japanese on the home front ‘because they were forewarned.' When Americans began bombing Japanese cities, the vice-president of the Aviation Manufacturer's Association broadcast: ‘Enemy planes finally have come over our very heads. However, we who are engaged in the aircraft production industry and who had always expected this to happen had made complete preparations to cope with this. Therefore, there is nothing to worry about.' Only granted all was foreknown, all was fully planned, could the Japanese go on to make the claim so necessary to them that everything had been actively willed by themselves alone; nobody had put anything over on them. ‘We should not think that we have been passively attacked but that we have actively pulled the enemy toward us.' ‘Enemy, come if you wish. Instead of saying, “Finally what was to come has come,” we will say rather, “That which we were waiting for has come. We are glad it has come.”' The Navy Minister quoted in the Diet the teachings of the great warrior of the eighteen-seventies, Takamori Saigo, ‘There are two kinds of opportunities: one which we chance upon, the other which we create. In time of great difficulty, one must not fail to create his opportunity.' And General Yamashito, when American troops marched into Manila, ‘remarked with a broad smile,' the radio said, ‘that now the enemy is in our bosom…… ' ‘The rapid fall of Manila, shortly after the enemy landings in Lingayen Bay, was only possible as a result of General Yamashito's tactics and in accordance with his plans. General Yamashito's operations are now making continuous progress.' In other words, nothing succeeds like defeat.
不仅仅是在“等级制度”和“精神力量第一”这些方面，战争中日本人对各种事物的态度都已成为学者们了解日本人的绝好材料。他们经常说，安全和士气概括起来只不过是个觉悟问题。不管面临何种败局，城市遭轰炸也好，塞班岛失败也好，防守菲律宾失利也好，日本政府对国民的说法总是：这个早在预料之中，丝毫不用担心。广播电台仍在长篇累牍地宣传，显然是想依靠这些宣传使日本人民确信，他们仍然生活在一个完全可预计的世界中。 “美军占领基斯卡岛后，日本就在美国轰炸机的作战半径以内了，但是对这种情况我们早就清楚，必要的措施已完全制定好了。”“敌人肯定要对我们实行陆、海、空三军联合进攻，这早已在我们的作战预案中。”日本俘虏们，甚至连认为日本打不赢这场战争希望早日投降的人也深信，轰炸不可能使国内人们士气沮丧，“因为他们已经觉悟”。美军开始轰炸日本城市时，日本的飞机制造业协会副会长曾在广播电台发表广播讲话：“敌人终于飞临我们头顶。我们从事飞机制造的人们早就料到这一事态的来临。对此，我们已经作好了万无一失的准备，所以毫不担忧。”日本人用一切都建立在预料之中，计划之中，充分做好了准备这些假设之上的方法；一直能够持续坚持对他们来说不可缺少的主张，即他们一切都是主动的，决不是被动的。“我们不能认为是被动地遭到攻击，而要认为是积极地将敌人调遣到我们身边来的。”“敌人！来就来吧。我们与其说‘他们终于来了’，不如说‘盼望已久的好时机到了，我们为这一好时机的到来感到高兴’。”海军大臣在国会演讲中，引用了十九世纪七十年代的伟大武士西乡隆盛的遗训：“机会有两种，一种是偶然的，另一种是我们创造的。非常艰难之际，必须自己去创造机会。”另外，据电台广播，美军攻入马尼拉市时，山下将军“微笑着说，敌人已在我腹中……”“敌人在仁牙因湾登陆后不久就攻陷马尼拉，这完全是山下将军的战术，是按照将军的计划行事的。山下将军的作战行动目前仍在进行中。”换言之，越是失败，事态越向好的方面发展。
Americans went as far in the opposite direction as the Japanese in theirs. Americans threw themselves into the war effort because this fight had been forced upon us. We had been attacked, therefore let the enemy beware. No spokesman, planning how he could reassure the rank and file of Americans, said of Pearl Harbor or of Bataan, ‘These were fully taken account of by us in our plans.' Our officials said instead, ‘The enemy asked for it. We will show them what we can do.' Americans gear all their living to a constantly challenging world—and are prepared to accept the challenge. Japanese reassurances are based rather on a way of life that is planned and charted beforehand and where the greatest threat comes from the unforeseen.
美国人同日本人比较起来也不逊色，也曾走过极端，但是其方向与日本人完全相反。美国总是以为这场战争是强加在头上的，以此为由投身于战争。我们是被攻击的一方，因此必须教训敌人。为了使一般美国人能够安心，新闻发言人绝不会将珍珠港和巴丹半岛的失败说成是：“这早已在我们的计划之中。”对此，我们的官方人士会说：“敌人肆无忌惮地向我们发难，让他们尝尝我们拳头的厉害！”美国人在生活中，总是接受对方的挑战，并时刻作好取胜的准备。而日本人只能在事先规定好的生活模式中生活才能安心，最大的威胁是尚未预见到的事情。
Another constant theme in Japanese conduct of the war was also revealing about Japanese life. They continually spoke of how ‘the eyes of the world were upon them.' Therefore they must show to the full the spirit of Japan. Americans landed on Guadalcanal, and Japanese orders to troops were that now they were under direct observation ‘by the world' and should show what they were made of. Japanese seamen were warned that in case they were torpedoed and the order given to abandon ship, they should man the lifeboats with the utmost decorum or ‘the world will laugh at you. The Americans will take movies of you and show them in New York.' It mattered what account they gave of themselves to the world. And their concern with this point also was a concern deeply imbedded in Japanese culture.
日本人在战争中反复强调的另一主题也充分反映了日本人的生活。他们经常使用的一个口头禅是“全世界都在注视着我们的一举一动”，因此，日本人必须充分发扬日本精神。美军在瓜达尔卡纳尔岛登陆时，日本人向部队发出的命令里，说现在他们已经直接成为“世界”众目睽睽之的，要充分施展自己的本领。日本海军官兵们，在舰艇遭到鱼雷攻击，舰长发出离舰命令后，都力戒自己尽可能从容不迫地转移到救生艇上去；否则“全世界的人会嘲笑你，美国人会将你的丑态拍成电影在纽约公开放映”！注重自己的行动在世界人们心目中留下的印象，他们对这方面的担忧，也是日本文化中固有的一种表现。
The most famous question about Japanese attitudes concerned His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor. What was the hold of the Emperor on his subjects? Some American authorities pointed out that through all Japan's seven feudal centuries the Emperor was a shadowy figurehead. Every man's immediate loyalty was due to his lord, the daimyo, and, beyond that, to the military Generalissimo, the Shogun. Fealty to the Emperor was hardly an issue. He was kept secluded in an isolated court whose ceremonies and activities were rigorously circumscribed by the Shogun's regulations. It was treason even for a great feudal lord to pay his respects to the Emperor, and for the people of Japan he hardly existed. Japan could only be understood by its history, these American analysts insisted; how could an Emperor who had been brought out from obscurity within the memory of still living people be the real rallying point of a conservative nation like Japan? The Japanese publicists who again and again reiterated the undying hold of the Emperor upon his subjects were over-protesting, they said, and their insistence only proved the weakness of their case. There was no reason, therefore, that American policy during the war should draw on kid gloves in dealing with the Emperor. There was every reason rather why we should direct our strongest attacks against this evil Fuehrer concept that Japan had recently concocted. It was the very heart of its modern nationalistic Shinto religion and if we undermined and challenged the sanctity of the Emperor, the whole structure of enemy Japan would fall in ruins.
在日本人的态度中，最有名的是对天皇陛下的态度。天皇对其臣民拥有什么样的统治权呢？据美国某些权威人士指出，日本在历时七百年的整个封建时代，天皇形同偶像，只不过是名义上的元首。人们直接效忠的对象是君主、大名，再往上是相当于大元帅的将军，基本上不存在效忠天皇。天皇被幽禁在与世隔绝的宫廷中，宫廷的礼仪庆典受到将军制定的规章制度的严格限制。就连身份高贵的封建君主向天皇表示敬意都被视为是一种叛逆。对日本一般民众来说，天皇如同不存在一样。这些美国的日本问题专家认为，只有了解日本历史才能了解日本。现在仍健在的一些人还记忆犹新，只是到了近代，天皇才被捧了出来，成为日本这种保守国民真正的崇拜对象。日本的政治评论家们经常宣扬天皇对其臣民永恒的统治力量，但这是一种夸张。他们拼命宣扬的本身就证明其根据是不充分的。因此，美国的战时政策，在处理天皇时，不但没有丝毫理由要保留天皇，而且有充足的理由对这一到了近代才捏造出来的邪恶领袖观念进行最猛烈的抨击。只有天皇才是日本当代国家神道的心脏。如果我们从根本上推翻天皇的神圣性，向其挑战，作为敌对国家的日本，整个国家机器就会像抽掉顶梁柱的房屋一样，顷刻瓦解。
Many capable Americans who knew Japan and who saw the reports from the front lines and from Japanese sources were of the opposite persuasion. Those who had lived in Japan well knew that nothing stung the Japanese people to bitterness and whipped up their morale like any depredatory word against the Emperor or any outright attack on him. They did not believe that in attacking the Emperor we would in the eyes of the Japanese be attacking militarism. They had seen that reverence for the Emperor had been equally strong in those years after the First World War when ‘de-mok-ra-sie' was the great watchword and militarism was so discredited that army men prudently changed to mufti before they went out on the streets of Tokyo. The reverence of the Japanese for their Imperial chief could not be compared, these old Japanese residents insisted, with Heil-Hitler veneration which was a barometer of the fortunes of the Nazi party and bound up with all the evils of a fascist program.
但是了解日本、能看到来自前线和日本方面报道的许多聪明的美国人，其意思是相反的。在日本生活过的人们十分清楚，再没有比侮辱和攻击天皇更能刺激日本人的感情，煽起敌对情绪的了。这些人相信，当我们攻击天皇时，日本人决不认为是在攻击军国主义。他们看到并了解，第一次世界大战后，到处都在讲“民主”作者专门以日本人的口气写为“demokrasie”。，军国主义声名狼藉，聪明的军人到东京市内去甚至要换便衣的时代，人们对天皇的崇敬之情同样是热烈的。这些在日本生活过的美国人主张，不能把日本人对天皇的尊崇与德国人崇拜希特勒两者相提并论。
Certainly the testimony of Japanese prisoners of war bore them out. Unlike Western soldiers, these prisoners had not been instructed about what to say and what to keep silent about when captured and their responses on all subjects were strikingly unregimented. This failure to indoctrinate was of course due to Japan's no-surrender policy. It was not remedied until the last months of the war, and even then only in certain armies or local units. The prisoners' testimony was worth paying attention to for they represented a cross-section of opinion in the Japanese Army. They were not troops whose low morale had caused them to surrender—and who might therefore be atypical. All but a few were wounded and unconscious soldiers unable to resist when captured.
日本战犯的供词也的确证实了这一点。与西方士兵相反，日军被俘后不知道该讲什么和不该讲什么，因为没有受过这方面的教导。他们对各种问题的回答，口径是非常不一致的。没有进行这方面教育的基本原因无疑是日本的不投降主义。这种情况，直到战争最后的几个月都没有改变，虽然只是在某些军团和地方部队的范围内。战犯们的供词之所以值得关注，是因为它们是全体日军意思的一个缩影。他们决不是贪生怕死而投降的士兵，也就是说是有代表性的士兵。除极少数人外，被俘时全都负伤、失去知觉，从而丧失了抵抗能力。
Japanese prisoners of war who were out-and-out bitter-enders imputed their extreme militarism to the Emperor and were ‘carrying out his will,' ‘setting his mind at rest,' ‘dying at the Emperor's command.' ‘The Emperor led the people into war and it was my duty to obey.' But those who rejected this present war and future Japanese plans of conquest just as regularly ascribed their peaceful persuasions to the Emperor. He was all things to all men. The war-weary spoke of him as ‘his peace-loving Majesty'; they insisted that he ‘had always been liberal and against the war.' ‘He had been deceived by Tojo.' ‘During the Manchurian Incident he showed that he was against the military.' ‘The war was started without the Emperor's knowledge or permission. The Emperor does not like war and would not have permitted his people to be dragged into it. The Emperor does not know how badly treated his soldiers are.' These were not statements like those of German prisoners of war who, however much they complained that Hitler had been betrayed by his generals or his high command, nevertheless ascribed war and the preparations for war to Hitler as supreme inciter. The Japanese prisoner of war was quite explicit that the reverence given the Imperial Household was separable from militarism and aggressive war policies.
顽抗到底的日本战犯，其极端的军国主义思想源于天皇。他们“奉行圣志”，不断“安奉圣虑”，“为天皇之命而舍身命”。他们说：“天皇指引国民投身战争，服从是我的义务。”对这场战争及今后日本的征服计划持否定态度的人们似乎也异口同声地说，其和平主义信念也源于天皇。对所有的人来说，天皇就是一切。厌倦战争的人们也说天皇是“爱好和平的陛下”、“陛下始终是自由主义者，反对战争”、“陛下被东条欺骗了”。“满洲事变中，陛下向军部表明了反对的意向。”“战争是在天皇不知道，并未经天皇许可的情况下开始的。天皇反对战争，不会允许把国民卷入战争。天皇不知道其士兵受到如此暴虐。”这些陈述与德国俘虏的陈述是不同的。德国俘虏们尽管对希特勒麾下的将军们及最高司令部背叛希特勒非常不满，但是希特勒作为战争的最高教唆者，必须负战争和战争准备的责任。日本战犯断言，对皇室的崇敬可以与军国主义及其侵略战争政策分开。
The Emperor was to them, however, inseparable from Japan. ‘A Japan without the Emperor is not Japan.' ‘Japan without the Emperor cannot be imagined.' ‘The Japanese Emperor is the symbol of the Japanese people, the center of their religious lives. He is a super-religious object.' Nor would he be blamed for the defeat if Japan lost the war. ‘The people did not consider the Emperor responsible for the war.' ‘In the event of defeat the Cabinet and the military leaders would take the blame, not the Emperor.' ‘Even if Japan lost the war ten out of ten Japanese would still revere the Emperor.'
对他们来说，天皇与日本是不能分离的。“没有天皇的日本是不可想象的。”“日本的天皇是日本国民的象征，国民宗教生活的中心。天皇是超宗教的对象。”日本战败，责任不在天皇。“国民不认为天皇应负战争责任。”“万一战败，责任在内阁及军部领导人，天皇没有责任。”“即使日本战败，日本所有的人仍将继续崇拜天皇。”
All this unanimity in reckoning the Emperor above criticism appeared phoney to Americans who are accustomed to exempt no human man from skeptical scrutiny and criticism. But there was no question that it was the voice of Japan even in defeat. Those most experienced in interrogating the prisoners gave it as their verdict that it was unnecessary to enter on each interview sheet: ‘Refuses to speak against the Emperor'; all prisoners refused, even those who co-operated with the Allies and broadcast for us to the Japanese troops. Out of all the collected interviews of prisoners of war, only three were even mildly anti-Emperor and only one went so far as to say: ‘It would be a mistake to leave the Emperor on the throne.' A second said the Emperor was ‘a feeble-minded person, nothing more than a puppet.' And the third got no farther than supposing that the Emperor might abdicate in favor of his son and that if the monarchy were abolished young Japanese women would hope to get a freedom they envied in the women of America.
这种一致认为天皇是凌驾于一切批判之上的言论，在美国人看来是虚伪的，因为在美国人看来，只要是人就不可避免地要被怀疑和批判。然而即便在战败时，它也毫无疑问地成为日本人的呼声。最有经验的审俘人员也认为，没有必要一一在审问书上面写上“拒绝诽谤天皇”。所有的俘虏都拒绝诽谤天皇，就连帮助盟军担任对日广播的日本人也是如此。在大量的俘虏供词中，包括善意的批语在内，反天皇的仅有三份。而在这三份中，仅有一份认为“原封不动地保留天皇制是错误”。第二份认为天皇是“意志薄弱者，只不过是被人操纵的木偶而已”。第三份只是臆测，认为也许天皇让位于皇太子，或者假如废除君主制，日本年轻的妇女们就可以获得像她们向往的美国妇女们那样的自由。
Japanese commanders, therefore, were playing on an all but unanimous Japanese veneration when they distributed cigarettes to the troops ‘from the Emperor,' or led them on his birthday in bowing three times to the east and shouting ‘Banzai'; when they chanted with all their troops morning and evening, ‘even though the unit was subjected to day and night bombardment,' the ‘sacred words' the Emperor himself had given to the armed forces in the Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors while ‘the sound of chanting echoed through the forest.' The militarists used the appeal of loyalty to the Emperor in every possible way. They called on their men to ‘fulfill the wishes of His Imperial Majesty,' to ‘dispel all the anxieties of your Emperor,' to ‘demonstrate your respect for His Imperial benevolence,' to ‘die for the Emperor.' But this obedience to his will could cut both ways. As many prisoners said, the Japanese ‘will fight unhesitatingly, even with nothing more than bamboo poles, if the Emperor so decrees. They would stop just as quickly if he so decreed'; ‘Japan would throw down arms tomorrow if the Emperor should issue such an order'; ‘Even the Kwan-tung Army in Manchuria'—most militant and jingoistic—‘would lay down their arms'; ‘only his words can make the Japanese people accept a defeat and be reconciled to live for reconstruction.'
正因为如此，日军指挥官们为了利用日本人几乎一致支持崇拜天皇这一点，向部下分赠“恩赐”香烟。“天长节”那天，指挥部下令面东三叩头，高呼“万岁”，而且“即使在部队昼夜不停地遭受轰炸时”，也朝夕与部下全体人员同声朗读天皇亲自赐予军队的“军人敕谕”中的“神圣御言”，“其恭唱之声响彻森林各处”。军国主义者们利用一切办法，提倡向天皇效忠，并加以利用。他们号召部下“要禀承陛下御旨，安奉宸虑”，“要表示出大家对陛下仁慈的尊敬之情”。“要为天皇去死”。但是这种遵奉天皇的意志具有两重性，正像许多俘虏说的那样，日本人“只要天皇有令，哪怕只有竹矛一根，别无其他任何武器，也会毫不犹豫地去战斗；同样，只要是天皇的命令，也会迅速停止战斗”。“如果天皇真的那样下令，日本明天就会迅速放下武器。”“甚至连满洲关东军——最好战的强硬派也会放下武器。”“只要有天皇御旨，就能使日本国民承认战败，同意为了重建日本生存下去。”
This unconditional and unrestricted loyalty to the Emperor was conspicuously at odds with criticisms of all other persons and groups. Whether in Japanese newspapers and magazines or in war prisoners' testimony, there was criticism of the government and of military leaders. Prisoners of war were free with their denunciation of their local commanders, especially those who had not shared the dangers and hardships of their soldiers. They were especially critical of those who had evacuated by plane and left their troops behind to fight it out. Usually they praised some officers and bitterly criticized others; there was no sign that they lacked the will to discriminate the good from the bad in things Japanese. Even in the home islands newspapers and magazines criticized ‘the government.' They called for more leadership and greater co-ordination of effort and noted that they were not getting from the government what was necessary. They even criticized the restrictions on freedom of speech. A report on a panel of editors, former members of the Diet and directors of Japan's totalitarian party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, printed in a Tokyo paper in July, 1944, is a good example. One speaker said: ‘I think there are various ways to arouse the Japanese people but the most important one is freedom of speech. In these few years, the people have not been able to say frankly what they think. They have been afraid that they might be blamed if they spoke certain matters. They hesitated, and tried to patch up the surface, so the public mind has really become timid. We can never develop the total power of the people in this way.' Another speaker expanded the same theme: ‘I have held symposiums almost every night with the people of the electoral districts and asked them about many things, but they were all afraid to speak. Freedom of speech has been denied. This is certainly not a proper way to stimulate their will to fight. The people are so badly restricted by the so-called Special Penal Law of War Time and the National Security Law that they have become as timid as the people in the feudalistic period. Therefore the fighting power which could have been developed remains undeveloped now.'
这种对天皇绝对、无限的忠诚与对天皇以外的任何人及集团的各种批判，形成了鲜明的对照。无论是从日本的报刊上，还是从俘虏的供词中都可看到对政府和军队领导人的批评。俘虏们痛骂他们的指挥官，尤其是痛恨那些不与部属患难与共的人。他们强烈谴责那些命令部下战斗到底而自己丢弃部下乘飞机临阵脱逃的指挥官们。平常，他们对军官们或褒或贬，对日本的一些事情，完全具有鉴别善与恶的能力。在日本国内，报刊也谴责“政府”。他们要求领导更加坚强有力，战争协作更加密切无间；指出政府对此做得不够；甚至还敢于谴责限制言论自由。一九四四年七月，东京某报纸发表的有新闻记者、原国会议员、日本全体主义政党大政翼赞会领导人参与座谈会的消息，就是一个很好的例子。某发言人说：“要使日本国民奋起有各种方法，其中最重要的是言论自由。这些年来，国民不能坦率地发表自己的意思，害怕被追咎。他们提心吊胆，表面上在竭力伪装自己。因此，人们的心理状态完全变得谨小慎微。这样，无论如何是不能发挥整体威力的。”另一发言人在讲述了同一意思后说：“我几乎每天晚上都与选区的人们举行会谈，倾听人们的各种呼声。但是大家都心有余悸，不敢开口，否认有言论自由。这确实不是保持旺盛斗志的正确方法。国民受到所谓战时特别刑法和治安维持法的严格限制，简直就像封建时代的人们那样，变得胆小怕事。所以，该发挥出的威力，时至今日也未发挥出来。”
Even during the war, therefore, the Japanese criticized the government, the High Command, and their immediate superiors. They did not unquestioningly acknowledge the virtues of the whole hierarchy. But the Emperor was exempt. How could this be when his primacy was so recent? What quirk of Japanese character made it possible that he should so attain a sacrosanct position? Were Japanese prisoners of war right in claiming that just as the people would fight to the death ‘with bamboo spears' as long as he so ordered, they would peaceably accept defeat and occupation if that was his command? Was this nonsense meant to mislead us? Or was it, possibly, the truth?
就这样，即使是在战争中，日本人对政府、大本营以及各自的顶头上司都进行了批评。他们不是无条件地承认等级制度。唯有天皇免于批评。尽管天皇至高无上的地位只是近年来才形成的，但是为什么会发生这样的事情？在日本人的性格中，是什么奇特的东西使天皇确保这种神圣不可侵犯的地位？只要是天皇的命令，日本人就“挥舞竹矛”拼命到底；同样，如果是敕命，他们就可以老老实实地承认战败和甘愿被占领。俘虏的这种主张是真的，还是为了欺骗我们故意编造出来的？
All these crucial questions about Japanese behavior in the war, from their anti-materialistic bias to their attitudes toward the Emperor concerned the homeland Japan as well as the fighting fronts. There were other attitudes which had to do more specifically with the Japanese Army. One of these concerned the expendability of their fighting forces. The Japanese radio put well the contrast with the American attitudes when it described with shocked incredulity the Navy's decoration of Admiral George S. McCain, commander of a task force off Formosa.
战争中有关日本人从反物质主义的偏见到对天皇的态度这些重要问题，在前线和国内都有表现。此外，还有几种态度与日军关系密切。一是日军对兵员损耗的态度。日本广播电台对美国海军授予台湾海域舰队司令乔治·S麦克凯恩海军上将勋章一事的报道简直令人难以置信，充分表现出了日本人与美国人的态度是何等的不同。广播说：
The official reason for the decoration was not that Commander John S. McCain was able to put the Japanese to flight, though we don't see why not since that is what the Nimitz communiqué claimed…… Well, the reason given for Admiral McCain's decoration was that he was able successfully to rescue two damaged American warships and escort them safely to their home base. What makes this bit of information important is not that it is a fiction but that it is the truth…… So we are not questioning the veracity of Admiral McCain's rescuing two ships, but the point we want you to see is the curious fact that the rescuing of damaged ships merits decoration in the United States.
约翰名字与前出不同，可能是日本方面的误传，造成以误传误。——译注·S麦克凯恩获勋的官方理由并不是他击败了日本军队，虽然我们并不明白为什么尼米兹公报宣称，是击败了日本军队……作为麦克凯恩海军上将获勋的理由，能列举出的事实是他指挥抢救了两艘受创的美国军舰，保护它们安全返回基地。这篇报道的可贵之处就在于它说出了事实……我们并不怀疑麦克凯恩海军上将抢救两艘军舰的真实性，我们希望国民知道这一事实，即在美国抢救破船也能获得勋章。
Americans thrill to all rescue, all aid to those pressed to the wall. A valiant deed is all the more a hero's act if it saves the ‘damaged.' Japanese valor repudiates such salvaging. Even the safety devices installed in our B-29's and fighter planes raised their cry of ‘Cowardice.' The press and the radio returned to the theme over and over again. There was virtue only in accepting life and death risks; precautions were unworthy. This attitude found expression also in the case of the wounded and of malarial patients. Such soldiers were damaged goods and the medical services provided were utterly inadequate even for reasonable effectiveness of the fighting force. As time went on, supply difficulties of all kinds aggravated this lack of medical care, but that was not the whole story. Japanese scorn of materialism played a part in it; her soldiers were taught that death itself was a victory of the spirit and our kind of care of the sick was an interference with heroism—like safety devices in bombing planes. Nor are the Japanese used to such reliance on physicians and surgeons in civilian life as Americans are. Preoccupation with mercy toward the damaged rather than with other welfare measures is especially high in the United States, and is often commented on even by visitors from some European countries in peacetime. It is certainly alien to the Japanese. At all events, during the war the Japanese army had no trained rescue teams to remove the wounded under fire and to give first aid; it had no medical system of front line, behind-the-lines and distant recuperative hospitals. Its attention to medical supplies was lamentable. In certain emergencies the hospitalized were simply killed. Especially in New Guinea and the Philippines, the Japanese often had to retreat from a position where there was a hospital There was no routine of evacuating the sick and wounded while there was still opportunity; only when the ‘planned withdrawal' of the battalion was actually taking place or the enemy was occupying was anything done. Then, the medical officer in charge often shot the inmates of the hospital before he left or they killed themselves with hand grenades.
美国人对所有救助，对一切陷入困境的人们的援助都会为之感动。如果救助“受伤”的人，其勇敢行为，更堪称英雄。而日本人认可的勇气中排斥了这种救助。甚至连我们的B29轰炸机和战斗机上备有救生器材也被日本人诽谤为“卑怯”，报纸和广播电台也以此为话题反复宣扬。只有将生死置之度外才是值得佩服的，而对危险采取预防措施要受到鄙视。这也表现在对待伤员和疟疾病患者的态度上，负伤和患有疟疾的士兵已是所谓破损的废物。而且医疗设施也很不齐全，连勉强维持战斗力都达不到。随着时间的推移，一切补给都很困难，医疗设备更是严重不足。但这并未使日本人屈服，更使他们蔑视物质主义。日本士兵受到的教育是，死是精神的胜利，像我们美国人那样细心照看病人，同轰炸机上备有救生器材一样，是有损英雄形象的。第一，日常生活中，日本人不习惯像美国人那样频繁地询医看病。第二，在美国，怜悯伤病员较之其他福利手段更受重视，连平时访美的欧洲客人也经常议论此事。这种情形在日本人中是看不到的。据说，战争中日军没有设立受过专门训练的战地救护班，而且也没有像前线临时收容所、后方野战医院、大后方使伤病员康复的大型医院这种有组织的医疗体系。医疗品的补给也很可怜，有时，眼睁睁地看着入院的伤病员死去。特别是在新几内亚和菲律宾，日军被迫不断地从有医院的地区退却，而时局允许时又没有事先将伤病员送往后方的惯例；所以在部队不断“有计划地撤退”，敌人已迅速占领时，才开始对伤病员采取一些措施；而其处置常常是主任军医撤退前，枪杀入院伤病员或者让伤病员用手榴弹自杀。
If this attitude of the Japanese toward damaged goods was fundamental in their treatment of their own countrymen, it was equally important in their treatment of American prisoners of war. According to our standards the Japanese were guilty of atrocities to their own men as well as to their prisoners. The former chief medical officer of the Philippines, Colonel Harold W. Glattly, said after his three years' internment as a prisoner of war on Formosa that ‘the American prisoners got better medical treatment than the Japanese soldiers. Allied medical officers in the prison camps were able to take care of their men while the Japanese didn't have any doctors. For a while the only medical personnel they had for their own men was a corporal and later on a sergeant.' He saw a Japanese medical officer only once or twice a year.*
如果把日本人这种对待伤病员的态度作为处理自己同胞做法的一种基调，那么它在处理美国俘虏的做法上同样起了重要作用。按照我们的标准来看，日本人不仅对俘虏，对他们的同胞也犯有虐待罪。前菲律宾军医官哈劳鲁特·W古拉特里上校，曾作为俘虏被关押在台湾达三年，事后他说：“美国俘虏的待遇优于日本兵。我们在俘虏营能得到同为俘虏的盟国军医的治疗，而日本方面没有一名医生。很长一段时间里，给日本兵治病的惟一医务人员是一名伍长，以后是一名军曹。”上校每年看到日本军医只有一两次。引自《华盛顿邮报》，1945年10月15日。
The furthest extreme to which this Japanese theory of expendability could be pushed was their no-surrender policy. Any Occidental army which has done its best and finds itself facing hopeless odds surrenders to the enemy. They still regard themselves as honorable soldiers and by international agreement their names are sent back to their countries so that their families may know that they are alive. They are not disgraced either as soldiers or as citizens or in their own families. But the Japanese defined the situation differently. Honor was bound up with fighting to the death. In a hopeless situation a Japanese soldier should kill himself with his last hand grenade or charge weaponless against the enemy in a mass suicide attack. But he should not surrender. Even if he were taken prisoner when he was wounded and unconscious, he ‘could not hold up his head in Japan' again; he was disgraced; he was ‘dead' to his former life.
他们的不投降主义把日本人的兵员消耗理论推向了极端。西方军队在竭尽全力后，知道寡不敌众时，便向敌军投降。他们认为投降后仍是一位光荣的军人。这是为了将自己还活在世上的消息告诉家人，他们把自己的名字通报给本国。无论是作为军人、国民，还是在自己的家庭中他们都不会受到歧视。而日本人则不同，所谓名誉即战斗到死。在无生存希望的绝境中，日本士兵应该用最后一颗手榴弹自杀，或者赤手空拳冲入敌阵集体自杀，而绝不能投降。万一负伤、失去知觉被俘，“返回日本，也低人三分”；已经失去名誉，与以前的他相比，已是一个“死人”。
There were Army orders to this effect, of course, but there was apparently no need of special official indoctrination at the front. The Army lived up to the code to such an extent that in the North Burma campaign the proportion of the captured to the dead was 142 to 17,166. That was a ratio of 1:120. And of the 142 in the prison camps, all except a small minority were wounded or unconscious when taken; only a very few had ‘surrendered' singly or in groups of two or three. In the armies of Occidental nations it is almost a truism that troops cannot stand the death of one-fourth to one-third of their strength without giving up; surrenders run about 4:1. When for the first time in Hollandia, however, any appreciable number of Japanese troops surrendered, the proportion was 1:5 and that was a tremendous advance over the 1:120 of North Burma.
诚然军事纪律禁止投降，但是似乎没有必要在前线特意进行正式教育。日军忠实地执行了这一军事纪律。例如在缅甸会战时，俘虏与战死者的比例是一百四十二人比一万七千一百六十六人，比率是一比一百二十。俘虏营收容的一百四十二人中，除少数人外，被俘时全都负伤或失去知觉。单独或两三人一起“投降”者极少。在西方各国军队中，战死者达全员的四分之一至三分之一时，部队感到抵抗无望，举手投降几乎是不讲自明的道理，投降者与战死者的比例大体是四比一。在霍兰迪亚，日军才开始有相当数量的投降者，但是其比例也只是一比五；这与北缅甸的一比一百二十相比，已是非常大的进步。
To the Japanese therefore Americans who had become prisoners of war were disgraced by the mere fact of surrender. They were ‘damaged goods' even when wounds or malaria or dysentery had not also put them outside the category of ‘complete men.' Many Americans have described how dangerous a thing American laughter was in the prison camps and how it stung their warders. In Japanese eyes they had suffered ignominy and it was bitter to them that the Americans did not know it. Many of the orders which American prisoners had to obey, too, were those which had also been required of their Japanese keepers by their own Japanese officers; the forced marches and the close-packed transshipments were commonplaces to them. Americans tell, too, of how rigorously sentries required that the prisoners should cover up evasions of rules; the great crime was to evade openly. In camps where the prisoners worked off-bounds on roads or installations during the day the rule that no food be brought back with them from the countryside was sometimes a dead letter—if the fruit and vegetables were covered up. If they could be seen, it was a flagrant offense which meant that the Americans had flouted the sentry's authority. Open challenging of authority was terribly punished even if it were mere ‘answering back.' Japanese rules are very strict against a man's answering back even in civilian life and their own army practices penalized it heavily. It is no exoneration of the atrocities and wanton cruelties that did occur in the prison camps to distinguish between these and those acts which were the consequences of cultural habituations.
在日本人看来，美国俘虏单凭投降一事就已羞得无地自容。他们因负伤、患疟疾和赤痢，虽未从“完人”中除名，但也已是“废物”。许多美国人述说，在俘虏营笑是非常危险的，这会异乎寻常地刺激看守。在日本人看来，当俘虏已够可耻的了，美国人竟恬不知耻，对此，他们是难以容忍的。美国俘虏遵守的命令，很多是日本看守也被指挥他们的日本军官命令遵守的。日本兵对急行军和用运输船像运牲畜一样地运送这一类的事，毫不为奇。美国人讲述，哨兵是如何唠唠叨叨地让俘虏隐瞒违法行为。不公开违犯纪律构不成大罪。有的俘虏营，俘虏白天到外面筑路或从事其他劳动，按规定不准把食物带进俘虏营内，然而这种规定有时会成为一纸空文。悄悄地将水果、蔬菜带进去是不会发生麻烦的，但是如果公开让外面看见，将是重大罪过，这是因为美国人侮辱了哨兵的权威。公开向权威挑战，哪怕仅仅是“顶嘴”，也将受到严厉的处罚。日本人在日常生活中也严禁顶嘴。顶嘴要受到严厉处罚已成为日军的习惯。不过他们在俘虏营犯下的种种罪行和肆虐妄为也是事实。我们要将这种非人道行为与文化习性的必然结果所招致的行为加以区别，绝非是饶恕残暴行为。
Especially in the earlier stages of the conflict the shame of capture was reinforced by a very real belief among the Japanese that the enemy tortured and killed any prisoners. One rumor of tanks that had been driven across the bodies of those captured on Guadalcanal spread through almost all areas. Some Japanese who tried to give themselves up, too, were regarded with so much suspicion by our troops that they were killed as a precaution, and this suspicion was often justified. A Japanese for whom there was nothing left but death was often proud that he could take an enemy with him when he died; he might do it even after he was captured. Having determined, as one of them put it, ‘to be burned on the altar of victory, it would be a disgrace to die with no heroic deed achieved.' Such possibilities put our Army on its guard and diminished the number of surrenders.
特别是在战争初期，投降者不多。其原因除虐囚的耻辱外，更重要的是因为日本人过分相信他们的敌人会将俘虏折磨后杀掉。在瓜达尔卡纳尔被俘的伙伴们被坦克压死的谣言几乎传遍所有地区。某些自己投降的日本兵受到怀疑，美军为防不测，把他们杀掉了。但是这种怀疑最终通常都被证实并非枉杀。认为只有死路一条的日本人常常为能把敌人置于死地而引以自豪，即使成为俘虏也很可能铤而走险。像一名俘虏所说：“一旦决心成为牺牲品，无功而死去是一种耻辱。”由于这种恐惧心理作怪，对我军存有戒心，投降者就更少了。
The shame of surrender was burned deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese. They accepted as a matter of course a behavior which was alien to our conventions of warfare. And ours was just as alien to them. They spoke with shocked disparagement of American prisoners of war who asked to have their names reported to their government so that their families would know they were alive. The rank and file, at least, were quite unprepared for the surrender of American troops at Bataan for they had assumed that they would fight it out the Japanese way. And they could not accept the fact that Americans had no shame in being prisoners of war.
投降的耻辱在日本人的意识中根深蒂固。他们认为采取与我们的战争惯例不同的行动理所当然，因此，我们的行动对他们来说同样是不可理解的。美国俘虏向本国政府通报自己的名字，要求政府将自己生存的消息告诉家人，日本人则认为这是最傻、最卑鄙的事情。美军在巴丹半岛投降一事，至少对一般日本士兵来说是个意外。他们认为美军也应像日军一样战斗到底，并对美国人成为俘虏后毫不感到耻辱困惑不解。
The most melodramatic difference in behavior between Western soldiers and the Japanese was undoubtedly the cooperation the latter gave to the Allied forces as prisoners of war. They knew no rules of life which applied in this new situation; they were dishonored and their life as Japanese was ended. Only in the last months of the war did more than a handful imagine any return to their homeland, no matter how the war ended. Some men asked to be killed, ‘but if your customs do not permit this, I will be a model prisoner.' They were better than model prisoners. Old Army hands and long-time extreme nationalists located ammunition dumps, carefully explained the disposition of Japanese forces, wrote our propaganda and flew with our bombing pilots to guide them to military targets. It was as if they had turned over a new page; what was written on the new page was the opposite of what was written on the old, but they spoke the lines with the same faithfulness.
的确，西方士兵与日本士兵最显著的不同是后者作为俘虏还协助了盟军。他们不知道适应这一新境遇的生活规则。他们是失去名誉的人，作为日本人的生命已告结束。为数不多的日本俘虏，不管战争的结局如何，慢慢开始考虑回国问题。这只不过是在战争结束前几个月的事情。有的俘虏乞求杀死自己。“不过，贵方的习惯不允许这样做的话，我要做一名模范俘虏。”这些日本朋友的行为超过了模范俘虏。正是这些有着多年的军旅生涯，长期受极端国家主义影响的俘虏，告诉我们日军弹药库的位置，详尽地诉说日军的兵力部署；为我们写传单，与我军同乘一架飞机引导军事目标，如同揭开了人生新的一页。今天的行动与昨天的行为判若两人，他们以同样的忠实实践了以上这些行动。
This is of course not a description of all prisoners of war. Some few were irreconcilable. And in any case certain favorable conditions had to be set up before such behavior was possible. American Army commanders were very understandably hesitant to accept Japanese assistance at face value and there were camps where no attempt was made to use any services they might have given. In camps where this was done, however, the original suspicion had to be withdrawn and more and more dependence was placed on the good faith of the Japanese prisoners.
当然并不是所有的俘虏都能这样做，其中也有少数人顽抗到底。要使俘虏成为新人，能为我们服务，必须要具备合适的条件。美军指挥官们对日本人能否协助自己，深感困惑。有的部队根本不利用俘虏为自己服务。利用他们为自己服务的部队，都打消了最初的疑虑，对日本俘虏以诚相待。
Americans had not expected this right-about-face from prisoners of war. It was not according to our code. But the Japanese behaved as if, having put everything they had into one line of conduct and failed at it, they naturally took up a different line. Was it a way of acting which we could count on in post-war days or was it behavior peculiar to soldiers who had been individually captured? Like the other peculiarities of Japanese behavior which obtruded themselves upon us during the war, it raised questions about the whole way of life to which they were conditioned, the way their institutions functioned and the habits of thought and action they had learned.
日本俘虏这种一百八十度的转变，美国人确实没有料到，这与我们的惯例是不符的。然而日本人的行动好像是对某一行动方针全力以赴但遭到失败后，认为采取其他行动方针也是理所当然的。这是我们在战后也希望出现的一种好的行动方式呢，还是个别成为俘虏的士兵特有的行动呢？这与战争中我们所看到的其他日本人的行动所具有的特异性是同样的。这也向我们提出了有关造就日本人这种行动的整个生活方式、各种制度的机能以及他们业已形成的思想与行为的常规等问题。