War, Money, and the Nation-State

四　战争、金钱和民族国家

Let us now summarize the chief conclusions of this chapter. The post-1450 waging of war was intimately connected with “the birth of the nation-state. ”88 Between the late fifteenth and the late seventeenth centuries, most European countries witnessed a centralization of political and military authority, usually under the monarch (but in some places under the local prince or a mercantile oligarchy), accompanied by increased powers and methods of state taxation, and carried out by a much more elaborate bureaucratic machinery than had existed when kings were supposed to “live of their own” and national armies were provided by a feudal levy.

现在让我们概括一下本章的结论。1450年后进行的战争与“民族国家的诞生”密切相关。15世纪后期到17世纪后期这段时间，大多数欧洲国家经历了政治和军事权力实现中央集权的过程，通常在君主之下（但在有些地方是当地王公或一个商业寡头政体之下），伴随着国家税收权力增加和方法增多，收税的官僚机器也复杂多了，不像过去那样，国王们是“自己过自己的”，国家的军队则靠封建征募。

There were various causes for this evolution of the European nation-state. Economic change had already undermined much of the old feudal order, and different social groups had to relate to each other through newer forms of contract and obligation. The Reformation, in dividing Christendom on the basis cuius regio, eius religio, that is, of the rulers’ religious preferences, merged civil and religious authority, and thus extended secularism on a national basis. The decline of Latin and the growing use of vernacular language by politicians, lawyers, bureaucrats, and poets accentuated this secular trend. Improved means of communication, the more widespread exchange of goods, the invention of printing, and the oceanic discoveries made man more aware not only of other peoples but also of differences in language, taste, cultural habits, and religion. In such circumstances, it was no wonder that many philosophers and other writers of the time held the nation-state to be the natural and best form of civic society, that its powers should be enhanced and its interests defended, and that its rulers and ruled needed—whatever the specific constitutional form they enjoyed—to work harmoniously for the common, national good. 89

欧洲民族国家的这种发展有各种各样的原因。经济变化已经破坏了不少旧的封建秩序，不同的社会集团不得不通过新形式的合同和义务来互相联系。宗教改革把基督教社会按统治者的宗教偏爱而划分，把世俗和宗教权威合到一起，因而把世俗制度扩大至整个民族。拉丁语衰落了，政治家、律师、官僚和诗人越来越多地使用地方语言，也推动了这股世俗的潮流。交通工具的改善，更为广泛的物资交换，印刷术的发明，超越大洋的地理发现等等，使人们不仅知道有其他种族的人民，而且也知道有各种不同的语言、趣味、文化习惯和宗教。在这种环境下，无怪乎当时的许多哲学家和其他作家把民族国家当作公民社会的自然的也是最好的形式，认为民族国家的权力应该加强，它的利益应该保卫，统治者和被统治者，不管他们享受的是哪种宪法形式，都应该为共同的民族的利益而和谐地工作。

But it was war, and the consequences of war, that provided a much more urgent and continuous pressure toward “nation-building” than these philosophical considerations and slowly evolving social tendencies. Military power permitted many of Europe’s dynasties to keep above the great magnates of their land, and to secure political uniformity and authority (albeit often by concessions to the nobility). Military factors—or better, geostrategical factors—helped to shape the territorial boundaries of these new nation-states, while the frequent wars induced national consciousness, in a negative fashion at least, in that Englishmen learned to hate Spaniards, Swedes to hate Danes, Dutch rebels to hate their former Habsburg overlords. Above all, it was war—and especially the new techniques which favored the growth of infantry armies and expensive fortifications and fleets—which impelled belligerent states to spend more money than ever before, and to seek out a corresponding amount in revenues. All remarks about the general rise in government spending, or about new organizations for revenue-collecting, or about the changing relationship between kings and estates in early-modern Europe, remain abstract until the central importance of military conflict is recalled. 90 In the last few years of Elizabeth’s England, or in Philip IPs Spain, as much as threequarters of all government expenditures was devoted to war or to debt repayments for previous wars. Military and naval endeavors may not always have been the raison d’être of the new nation-states, but it certainly was their most expensive and pressing activity.

但是，战争以及战争的结果推动“民族建设”的紧迫而持续的压力，远远超过这些哲学思考和缓慢进化的社会潮流，军事实力使得许多欧洲王朝可以镇住他们本国的大亨，保证政治一致性和权威（虽然经常要向贵族妥协）。军事因素，或者确切地说，地理战略因素，有助于形成这些新的民族国家的地理边界，同时频繁的战争诱导民族意识——至少是以消极的形式——也就是说让英国人学会恨西班牙人，瑞典人恨丹麦人，荷兰反叛者恨他们从前的主子哈布斯堡家族。最重要的是，战争，特别是有利于步兵的那些费钱的防御工事和舰队发展的那些新技术，迫使参战国家花费比以前更多的费用，在收入中找出相应的数目。所有关于早期近代欧洲政治花费的普遍增加，关于新的税收组织，关于国王与各集团之间的关系在改变的议论，不提到军事冲突的核心作用就只是抽象的空论。在伊丽莎白的英格兰或者费利普二世的西班牙的最后几年里，政府全部开销的3/4用于战争，或者用于偿还上次战争欠下的债务。陆军和海军行动并不一定总是新的民族国家存在的原因，但肯定是这些国家最费钱最紧迫的行动。

Yet it would be wrong to assume that the functions of raising revenues, supporting armies, equipping fleets, sending instructions, and directing military campaigns in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were carried out in the manner which characterized, say, the Normandy invasion of 1944. As the preceding analysis should have demonstrated, the military machines of early-modern Europe were cumbersome and inefficient. Raising and controlling an army in this period was a frighteningly difficult enterprise: ragtag troops, potentially disloyal mercenaries, inadequate supplies, transport problems, unstandardized weapons, were the despair of most commanders. Even when sufficient monies were allocated to military purposes, corruption and waste took their toll.

不过要是假定在16和17世纪，征收赋税、支持军队、装备舰队、发布命令、指挥军事战役这类行动，比如说，就像1944年诺曼底登陆那样进行，那就错了。正如前面的分析已经说明的，早期近代欧洲的军事机器是笨拙低效率的。在这个期间征集和控制一支军队是一桩困难之极的事业；衣衫褴褛的部队，运输问题，不标准化的武器，这些都是令大多数指挥官感到绝望的问题。即使有足够的款项用于军事目的，贪污和浪费又要拿走一部分。

Armed forces were not, therefore, predictable and reliable instruments of state. Time and again, large bands of men drifted out of control because of supply shortages or, more serious, lack of pay. The Army of Flanders mutinied no less than forty-six times between 1572 and 1607; but so also, if less frequently, did equally formidable forces, like the Swedes in Germany or Cromwell’s New Model Army. It was Richelieu who sourly observed, in his Testament Politique:

因而武装力量并不是一个国家的可预知的和可靠的工具。大队人马由于后勤供给短缺，或更严重的是缺乏薪饷而失去控制，是屡见不鲜的。佛兰德军在1572年到1607年之间至少发生了46次哗变，同样的，其他劲旅亦然，虽然不那么频繁，例如，在德意志的瑞典军队和克伦威尔的新军，黎塞留曾在他的“政治宣言”中憎恶地评论道：

History knows many more armies ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of their enemies; and I have witnessed how all the enterprises which were embarked on in my day were lacking for that reason alone. 91

历史上由于匮乏和混乱而自我毁掉的军队，比毁于敌人之手的多得多；我已亲眼看见了，在我的任期内开始进行的所有行动，都因为这个原因而不能完成。

This problem of pay and supply affected military performance in all sorts of ways: one historian has demonstrated that Gustavus Adolphus’s stunningly mobile campaigns in Germany, rather than being dictated by military-strategic planning in the Clausewitzian sense, reflected a simple but compelling search for food and fodder for his enormous force. 92 Well before Napoleon’s aphorism, commanders knew that an army marched upon its stomach.

这个薪饷和供给的问题从所有方面影响军事行动。有位历史学家证明古斯塔夫·阿道弗斯在德意志的惊人机动性，并不是像克劳塞维茨所说的那种意义上的军事战略计划的要求，而是反映了他只是在被迫为他们的庞大军队寻找食品和饲料。早在拿破仑的那句名言之前，指挥官们就已知道，一支军队吃饱了肚子才能前进。

But these physical restrictions applied at the national level, too, especially in raising funds for war. No state in this period, however prosperous, could pay immediately for the costs of a prolonged conflict; no matter what fresh taxes were raised, there was always a gap between governmental income and expenditure which could only be closed by loans—either from private bankers like the Fuggers or, later, through a formally organized money market dealing in government bonds. Again and again, however, the spiraling costs of war forced monarchs to default upon debt repayments, to debase the coinage, or to attempt some other measure of despair, which brought short-term relief but long-term disadvantage. Like their commanders frantically seeking to keep troops in order and horses fed, earlymodern governments were engaged in a precarious hand-to-mouth living. Badgering estates to grant further extraordinary taxes, pressing rich men and the churches for “benevolences,” haggling with bankers and munitions suppliers, seizing foreign treasure ships, and keeping at arm’s length one’s many creditors were more or less permanent activities forced upon rulers and their officials in these years.

但是这些物质条件的限制也适用于国家政权，特别是在为战争筹款的问题上。这个时期的国家不管多么繁荣，没有一个国家能够为这场漫长冲突的费用立即付款；不管征了什么样的新税，政府的收入和支出之间总有一个差距，只能靠贷款来弥补上，或者从私人银行家如富杰尔斯那里去借，或者像后来那样，从一个经营政府债券的正式组织的金融市场去借。不过，螺旋式上升的费用迫使君主拒付债务，贬值货币，或者试图采取它不得已的措施，结果带来急功近利，但造成长期损害，这样的事例亦是屡见不鲜的。正如他们的指挥官拼命想办法维持军队秩序，喂饱战马。早期近代的那些政府也是过着不安定的入不敷出的日子。纠缠着要议会批准更多的额外赋税、强迫富人和教会“捐赠”、与银行家和军火商讨价还价、劫掠外国财宝货船、回避众多的债权人等等，这就是那些年代里统治者和他们的官僚被迫从事的差不多是经常性的活动。

The argument in this chapter is not, therefore, that the Habsburgs failed utterly to do what other powers achieved so brilliantly. There are no stunning contrasts in evidence here; success and failure are to be measured by very narrow differences. 93

因此，本章的论点并不是说，哈布斯堡家族完全没有做出其他大国干得很漂亮的事情。这里并没有出现惊人的对照，成功和失败仅仅是用很小的差别来决定的。

All states, even the United Provinces, were placed under severe strain by the constant drain of resources for military and naval campaigns. All states experienced financial difficulties, mutinies of troops, inadequacies of supply, domestic opposition to higher taxes. As in the First World War, these years also witnessed struggles of endurance, driving the belligerents closer and closer to exhaustion. By the final decade of the Thirty Years War, it was noticeable that neither alliance could field armies as large as those commanded by Gustavus and Wallenstein, for each side was, literally, running out of men and money. The victory of the anti-Habsburg forces was, then, a marginal and relative one. They had managed, but only just, to maintain the balance between their material base and their military power better than their Habsburg opponents. At least some of the victors had seen that the sources of national wealth needed to be exploited carefully, and not recklessly, during a lengthy conflict. They may also have admitted, however reluctantly, that the trader and the manufacturer and the farmer were as important as the cavalry officer and the pikeman. But the margin of their appreciation, and of their better handling of the economic elements, was slight. It had been, to borrow the later words of the Duke of Wellington, a “damned close-run thing. ” Most great contests are.

所有的国家，包括联合省，都由于军事和海军战役造成的不断的资源损耗而处于严重压力之下。所有的国家都经历了财政困难、军队哗变、供给不足、国内反对增税。就像第一次世界大战期间，这些年代经受的不如说是耐受力的斗争，把参战国逼得越来越接近财穷力竭。到了“三十年战争”的最后10年，很明显，双方都不能拿出古斯塔夫和华伦斯坦指挥的那样规模的军队，因为各方都确确实实用光了人力和物力。因此，反哈布斯堡的胜利只是模糊的、相对的。他们在维持物质基础与军事实力的平衡上，干得恰好比对手哈布斯堡强了一点点。至少有些胜利者看到了在一场长期斗争中，国家的财富资源应该小心使用，而不是乱用。他们也可能承认，不管是多么勉强地承认，商人、制造商、农夫与骑兵军官以及枪兵对他们来说一样重要。但是，他们对此的理解超过哈布斯堡的程度是很小的。借用惠灵顿公爵后来的话说，这是一个“要命的势均力敌的事”。大多数大型斗争都是如此。

* As a rough figure, this would mean about 25 million out of the total European population of 105 million in 1600.

【注】

* My colleague Prof. Robert Ashton warns me that any stated figures of English (and presumably other) state revenues and expenditures in this entire period must be regarded as nominal; the amounts deducted by officeholders, bribery, corruption, and inefficient bookkeeping drastically reduced the stated “allocations” to the army and navy. In much the same way, only a portion of the king’s “income” ever reached the monarch. The statistics given here are, therefore, indicative and not authoritative.

［1］《比利牛斯和约》即结束法国和西班牙战争（1635—1695年）的条约。——译者注。

［2］大约占1600年欧洲10 500万人口中的2 500万。

［3］星法院（Star Chamber），英国15—17世纪设在威斯敏斯特宫内的法庭，以滥刑专断著称于世。——审校者注

［4］我的同事罗伯特·阿史顿教授提醒我说，在这整个时期里任何公布的英国（或许还有其他国家）政府收入和支出都只能看做名义上的；官吏减去的数目，贿赂、贪污、记账混乱等使公布的给陆军和海军的“分配额”大大降低。同样，国王的“收入”也只有一部分能到达君主手里。因此这里提供的统计数字是示意性的，而并非权威性的。

［5］华隆人，居住在比利时南部、东南部及附近的法国境内。——审校者注