STRATEGY & ECONOMICS IN THE INDUSTRIAL ERA
4 Industrialization and the Shifting Global Balances, 1815–1885
第四章 工业化与力量对比（1815～1885）
国际力量对比逐渐变得不利于旧有的一流强国，而有利于那些既有资源，又善于组织利用新生产工具和新技术的国家。
The international system which developed in the half-century and more following Napoleon’s downfall possessed an unusual set of characteristics, some merely temporary, while others became permanent features of the modern age.
拿破仑垮台以后半个多世纪发展起来的国际体制，具有一整套不寻常的特点，这些特点有的不过是暂时性的，而另一些则成了近代的长期特征。
The first was the steady and then (after the 1840s) spectacular growth of an integrated global economy, which drew ever more regions into a transoceanic and transcontinental trading and financial network centered upon western Europe, and in particular upon Great Britain. These decades of British economic hegemony were accompanied by large-scale improvements in transport and communications, by the increasingly rapid transfer of industrial technology from one region to another, and by an immense spurt in manufacturing output, which in turn stimulated the opening of new areas of agricultural land and raw-materials sources. The erosion of tariff barriers and other mercantilist devices, together with the widespread propagation of ideas about free trade and international harmony, suggested that a new international order had arisen, quite different from the eighteenth-century world of repeated Great Power conflict. The turbulence and costs of the 1793–1815 struggle —known to the nineteenth century as “the Great War”—caused conservatives and liberals alike to opt as far as possible for peace and stability, underpinned by devices as varied as the Concert of Europe or free-trade treaties. These conditions naturally encouraged long-term commercial and industrial investment, thereby stimulating the growth of a global economy.
第一个特点是，一个整体的全球经济先是稳定地，然后（19世纪40年代）是引人注目地发展，这一发展吸引了比以往更多的区域加入以西欧——特别是以英国——为中心的跨洋、跨大陆的贸易和金融网络。在英国取得经济霸权的几十年中，同时出现了交通运输的大规模改善，工业技术从一个区域向另一个区域日益加速转移，产品产量骤然激增（这又反过来推动了对农业土地和原料新产地的开发）。关税壁垒的削弱和其他重商主义的措施，再加上关于自由贸易和国际和谐的种种思想的广泛传播，说明一种新的国际秩序已经出现，这种秩序与18世纪再三出现大国冲突的世界迥然不同。1793～1815年战争——在19世纪以“大战争”著称——的动乱和付出的代价，促使保守主义者和自由主义者同样尽可能去选择和平与稳定，这种形势由于有了欧洲协调制或签订自由贸易条约等措施而得到了巩固。这些情况自然鼓励了长期的工商业投资，从而促进了全球经济的发展。
Secondly, this absence of prolonged Great Power wars did not mean that all interstate conflict came to an end. If anything, the European and North American wars of conquest against less developed peoples intensified, and were in many ways the military concomitant to the economic penetration of the overseas world and to the swift decline in its share of manufacturing output. In addition, there still were regional and individual conflicts among the European powers, especially over questions of nationality and territorial borders; but, as we shall see, open struggles such as the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 or the wars of German unification in the 1860s were limited both in duration and area, and even the Crimean War could hardly be called a major conflict. Only the American Civil War was an exception to this rule, and deserves to be examined as such.
第二个特点是，旷日持久的大国战争的消失并不意味着一切国与国之间的冲突就此结束。如果还有冲突的话，那就是欧洲和北美对较不发达的民族的征服战争加剧了，这些战争在许多方面是向海外经济渗透和制造业产量份额锐减的军事伴随物。此外，在欧洲大国中仍存在区域的和个别国家间的冲突，特别是民族问题和领土边界问题方面的冲突。但是，后面将要谈到，像1859年的法奥战争或19世纪60年代德意志统一战争那样的公开冲突，不论在持续的时间方面，还是在地区方面，都受到了限制，甚至克里米亚战争也很难说是一场大冲突，只有美国的南北战争可以说是个例外，应该作为大冲突来加以考察。
Thirdly, technology deriving from the Industrial Revolution began to make its impact upon military and naval warfare. But the changes were much slower than has sometimes been represented, and it was only in the second half of the century that railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, steam propulsion, and armored warships really became decisive indicators of military strength. While the new technology increased the lead in firepower and mobility which the Great Powers enjoyed in the overseas world, it was going to be many decades before military and naval commanders revised their ideas of how to fight a European war. Nevertheless, the twin forces of technical change and industrial development were steadily having an impact, on land and at sea, and also affecting the relative strengths of the Powers.
第三个特点是，产生于工业革命的技术，开始对军事和海战产生影响。但是，变化要比常人有时所描述的缓慢得多，只是到了那个世纪的下半叶，铁路、电报、速射武器、蒸汽动力、装甲战舰，才真正成为军事力量的决定性的标志。虽然新技术加强了列强在海外享有的火力和机动性方面的领先地位，但经过好几十年陆海军将领才修正了他们如何打一场欧洲战争的思想。可是，技术变化和产业革命的双重力量正在陆地和海上稳步地产生影响，同时还在影响着列强相对的力量。
Although it is difficult to generalize, the shifts in the Great Power balances caused by the uneven pattern of industrial and technological change probably affected the outcome of mid-nineteenth-century wars more than did finance and credit. This was partly because the massive expansion of national and international banking in the nineteenth century and the growth of governmental bureaucracies (treasuries, inspectors, tax collectors) made it easier for most regimes to raise funds from the money markets, unless their credit rating was appallingly bad or there was a temporary liquidity crisis in the international banking system. But it was chiefly due to the fact that most of the wars which occurred were relatively short, so that the emphasis was upon a speedy victory in the field using existing military strength, rather than the long-term mobilization of national resources and the raising of fresh revenues. No amount of newly available funds could, for example, have saved Austria after its battlefield defeats of 1859 and 1866, or a very wealthy France after its armies had been crushed in the war of 1870. It was true that superior finances aided the North in its Civil War victory over the South, and that Britain and France were better able to afford the Crimean War than a near-bankrupt Russia—but that reflected the general superiority of their economies rather than the singular advantage they had in respect of credit and finance. For this reason, there is less to say about the role of war finance in the nineteenth century than there was about the previous period.
虽然现在还难以做出概括，但由不平衡的工业和技术变化类型引起的大国均势的转移，可能比财政和信贷更影响着19世纪中期几场战争的结局。这部分地区是因为19世纪国家的和国际的银行业务以及政府官僚和机构（国库、稽查员和税吏）使得大部分政权能够更方便地从货币市场筹措经费，除非它们的信用等级特别低劣，或者它们在国际银行体制中存在暂时的偿付危机。均势转移主要是由于以下的事实：发生的战争相对来说是短暂的，所以各方都注意利用现有的军事力量在战场上迅速取得胜利，而不是长期地动员国家资源和筹措新的收入。例如，不论有多少新取得的资金，都不能使奥地利逃过1859年和1866年战场上的失败，也不能在法国的军队于1870年的战争中被击溃后把富裕的法国拯救出来。的确，在南北战争中，占优势的财政使北方战胜了南方，英国和法国比濒于破产的俄国更有财力进行克里米亚战争，但这反映的是它们经济上总的优势，而不是在信用和财政这一方面胜过俄国。因此，关于19世纪的战时财政的作用，就不像前一时期那样值得一谈。
This cluster of factors—the growth of the international economy, the productive forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, the relative stability of Europe, the modernization of military and naval technology over time, and the occurrence of merely localized and short-term wars—naturally favored some of the Great Powers more than others. Indeed, one of those countries, Britain, benefited so much from the general economic and geopolitical trends of the post-1815 era that it became a different type of Power from the rest. All the other countries were affected, often very seriously, in their relative strength. By the 1860s, however, the further spread of industrialization was beginning to change the balance of world forces once again.
这种种因素——国际经济的成长、工业革命激发的生产力、欧洲的相对稳定、在此期间军制和海军战法的现代化、仅仅爆发局部的和短期的战争的事实——对某些大国当然比对其他国家更加有利。尤其是对英国，它得益于1815年以后经济和地缘政治的总趋势是如此之多，以致它成了不同于其他国家的另一个类型的强国。其他国家在其相对力量方面往往严重地受到影响。可是到了19世纪60年代，工业化的进一步扩大又一次开始改变世界的力量对比。
One further feature of this period is worth mentioning. From the early nineteenth century onward, historical statistics (especially of economic indicators) help to trace the shifts in the power balances and to measure more accurately the dynamics of the system. It is important to realize, however, that many of the data are very approximate, particularly for countries lacking an adequate bureaucracy; that certain of the calculations (e. g. , shares of world manufacturing output) are merely estimates made by statisticians many years later; and that—the most important caveat of all—economic wealth did not immediately, or always, translate into military power. All that the statistics can do is give rough indications of a country’s material potential and of its position in the relative rankings of the leading states.
这一时期的又一个特征值得一提。从19世纪初期起，历史的统计材料（特别是表示经济的数字）有助于探究力量对比的转化和更精确地衡量这个制度的动力。但是，了解以下的事实很重要：许多数据是很不精确的，特别是那些缺乏有效的官僚机构的国家的数据更是如此；某些计算（例如世界产品产量的份额）不过是多年后统计学者做出的估计数；最重要的一点说明是，经济财富并不直接或经常转化为军事力量。统计学者所能做到的，是提供表示一个国家物质潜力的大致的材料，以及它在领先国家的各个方面相对排列的地位。
The “Industrial Revolution,” most economic historians are at pains to stress, did not happen overnight. It was, compared with the political “revolutions” of 1776, 1789, and 1917, a gradual, slow-moving process; it affected only certain manufactures and certain means of production; and it occurred region by region, rather than involving an entire country. 1 Yet all these caveats cannot avoid the fact that a fundamentally important transformation in man’s economic circumstances began to occur sometime around 1780—not less significant, in the view of one authority, than the (admittedly far slower) transformation of savage Paleolithic hunting man to domesticated Neolithic farming man. 2 What industrialization, and in particular the steam engine, did was to substitute inanimate for animate sources of power; by converting heat into work through the use of machines—“rapid, regular, precise, tireless” machines3—mankind was thus able to exploit vast new sources of energy. The consequences of introducing this novel machinery were simply stupendous: by the 1820s someone operating several power-driven looms could produce twenty times the output of a hand worker, while a power-driven “mule” (or spinning machine) had two hundred times the capacity of a spinning wheel. A single railway engine could transport goods which would have required hundreds of packhorses, and do it far more quickly. To be sure, there were many other important aspects to the Industrial Revolution—the factory system, for example, or the division of labor. But the vital point for our purposes was the massive increase in productivity, especially in the textile industries, which in turn stimulated a demand for more machines, more raw materials (above all, cotton), more iron, more shipping, better communications, and so on.
大部分经济史学者竭力强调，“工业革命”并不是一夜之间出现的。与1776年、1789年和1917年的几次政治“革命”相比，它是一个逐步的、缓慢进行的过程；它只影响某些制造业和某些生产资料；它一个区域一个区域地发生，而不席卷全国。可是，这一切说明不能回避一个事实，即人类经济环境的一个十分重要的转变在1780年前后开始出现。有权威人士认为，其重要性不亚于野蛮的旧石器猎人向驯化的务农者的转变（这当然要缓慢得多）。工业化（特别是蒸汽机）所做的是以无生命的动力源代替有生命的动力源；通过利用机器——“迅速、有规律、精确、不知疲劳”的机器——变热为功，人类就能利用大量新能源。引用这种新机器的结果简直是惊人的：到19世纪20年代，操纵动力织机的人，其产量20倍于一个手工工人，而一台动力驱动的“骡”（即纺纱机）具有200台手纺车的能力。一个火车头能运输需要数百匹马才能运输的货物，而且速度要快得多。的确，产业革命还有其他许多重要的方面——例如工厂制度，或分工。但是，本文讨论的要点是生产力的急剧增长，特别是在纺织业方面，这又转过来促进了对更多的机器、原料（尤其是棉花）、铁、航运和更优质的交通等方面的需求。
Moreover, as Professor Landes has observed, this unprecedented increase in man’s productivity was self-sustaining:
此外，正如兰德斯教授已经注意到的那样，人类生产力的这种空前的提高是自给的：
Where previously an amelioration of the conditions of existence, hence of survival, and an increase in economic opportunity had always been followed by a rise in population that eventually consumed the gains achieved, now for the first time in history, both the economy and the knowledge were growing fast enough to generate a continuing flow of investment and technological innovation, a flow that lifted beyond visible limits the ceiling of Malthus’s positive checks. 4
在以往，生活条件（进而是生存条件）改善和经济机会增加以后总是紧跟着人口的增长，这样最后就把取得的收益消耗殆尽；现在，这些地方的经济和知识第一次在历史上迅速成长，其速度足以不断地产生投资和技术更新，这种情况把马尔萨斯明确控制的上限提高到任何可见的限度之上。
The latter remark is also vitally important. From the eighteenth century onward, the growth in world population had begun to accelerate: Europe’s numbers rose from 140 million in 1750 to 187 million in 1800 to 266 million in 1850; Asia’s exploded from over 400 million in 1750 to around 700 million a century later. 5 Whatever the reasons—better climatic conditions, improved fecundity, decline in diseases—increases of that size were alarming; and although agricultural output both in Europe and Asia also expanded in the eighteenth century and was in fact another general reason for the rise in population, the sheer number of new heads (and stomachs) threatened over time to cancel out the benefits of all such additions in agricultural output. Pressure upon marginal lands, rural unemployment, and a vast drift of families into the already overcrowded cities of Europe in the late eighteenth century were but some of the symptoms of this population surge. 6
上述的最后一句话非常重要。从18世纪起，世界人口的增长开始加快：欧洲的人口从1750年的1.4亿增加到1.87亿（1800年），又增加到2.66亿（1850年）；亚洲的人口从1750年的4亿多，猛增到一个世纪以后的7亿左右。不论原因——较好的气候条件、生育力的提高、疾病减少——是什么，这样规模的增长是惊人的；虽然18世纪欧洲和亚洲的农业产量也增加了，并且实际上是人口增长的另一个总的原因，但这个新增人口（和需要吃粮的肚子）的纯数字，在此期间有使农业产量增长的一切好处化为乌有的危险。在18世纪后期，贫瘠土地承受的压力、农村的失业、大批家庭向已经拥挤不堪的欧洲城市流动等情况，不过是这种人口猛增浪潮的几个征兆而已。
What the Industrial Revolution in Britain did (in very crude macro-economic terms) was to so increase productivity on a sustained basis that the consequent expansion both in national wealth and in the population’s purchasing power constantly outweighed the rise in numbers. While the country’s population rose from 10. 5 million in 1801 to 41. 8 million in 1911—an annual increase of 1. 26 percent—its national product rose much faster, perhaps as much as fourteenfold over the nineteenth century. Depending upon the area covered by the statistics,* there was an annual average rise in gross national product of between 2 and 2. 25 percent. In Queen Victoria’s reign alone, product per capita rose two and a half times.
英国产业革命所做的（用很不成熟的宏观经济术语说）是持续地提高生产力，这样在国家财富和人口购买力方面随之发生的增长，都不断地超过了人口增加数。当这个国家的人口从1801年的l050万增加到1911年的4180万——年增长率为1.26%时，它的国民产值的增长要快得多，在19世纪也许是14倍。国民生产总值的年平均增长率在2%和2.25%之间，这要取决于统计数字所包括的地区。[1]仅在维多利亚女王统治时期，人均产量就增加了1倍半。
Compared with the growth rates achieved by many nations after 1945, these were not spectacular figures. It was also true, as social historians remind us, that the Industrial Revolution inflicted awful costs upon the new proletariat which labored in the factories and mines and lived in the unhealthy, crowded, jerry-built cities. Yet the fundamental point remains that the sustained increases in productivity of the Machine Age brought widespread benefits over time: average real wages in Britain rose between 15 and 25 percent in the years 1815–1850, and by an impressive 80 percent in the next half-century. “The central problem of the age,” Ashton has reminded those critics who believe that industrialization was a disaster, “was how to feed and clothe and employ generations of children outnumbering by far those of any earlier time. ”7 The new machines not only employed an increasingly large share of the burgeoning population, but also boosted the nation’s overall per capita income; and the rising demand of urban workers for foodstuffs and essential goods was soon to be met by a steam-driven communications revolution, with railways and steamships bringing the agricultural surpluses of the New World to satisfy the requirements of the Old.
与1945年以后许多国家达到的增长率相比，这些并不是了不起的数字。正像社会史学家提醒我们的，产业革命的确使新的无产阶级付出了可怕的代价，他们在厂矿劳动，居住在有碍于健康的、拥挤的、草率建成的城市中。可是基本的事实依然是，机器时代生产力的持续增长，给这个时期带来了广泛的利益：1815至1850年英国的平均实际工资增加了15%到25%，在以后半个世纪增加到引人注目的80%。艾什顿提醒那些认为工业化是一场灾难的批评者：“这个时代的中心问题是，怎样给人数远远超过以往任何时候的几代儿童提供粮食，给他们衣服穿，和如何去雇用他们。”新机器不但越来越多地雇用了增长的人口中的大部分，而且提高了国民总的人均收入，一场蒸汽推动的交通工具的革命，很快满足了城市工人对食品和必需品日益增长的需求，铁路和轮船运送新大陆的剩余农产品，来满足旧大陆的需要。
We can grasp this point in a different way by using Professor Landes’s calculations. In 1870, he notes, the United Kingdom was using 100 million tons of coal, which was “equivalent to 800 million million Calories of energy, enough to feed a population of 850 million adult males for a year (actual population was then about 31 million). ” Again, the capacity of Britain’s steam engines in 1870, some 4 million horsepower, was equivalent to the power which could be generated by 40 million men; but “this many men would have eaten some 320 million bushels of wheat a year—more than three times the annual output of the entire United Kingdom in 1867–71. ”8 The use of inanimate sources of power allowed industrial man to transcend the limitations of biology and to create spectacular increases in production and wealth without succumbing to the weight of a fast-growing population. By contrast, Ashton soberly noted (as late as 1947):
通过利用兰德斯教授的各种计算，我们可以以另一种方式来领会这一要点。他指出，在1870年，联合王国使用1亿吨煤，这“相当于800万亿大卡的能，它足以供养8.5亿成年男人达一年之久（当时的实际人口约3100万）”。另一方面，英国在1870年的蒸汽机的能力约为400万马力，这相当于4000万个男人所能产生的力。但“这样多的人一年会吃掉3.2亿蒲式耳的小麦，这是1867～1871年整个联合王国年产量的3倍多”。无生命的动力源的使用，能容许从事工业的人突破生物学的限制，并且惊人地提高生产力和增加财富，而用不着屈服于迅速增长的人口压力。对比之下，艾什顿却清醒地注意到（晚至1947年）：
There are today on the plains of India and China men and women, plague-ridden and hungry, living lives little better, to outward appearance, than those of the cattle that toil with them by day and share their places of sleep by night. Such Asiatic standards, and such unmechanised horrors, are the lot of those who increase their numbers without passing through an industrial revolution. 9
今天，在印度和中国土地上的男女们受着瘟疫和饥馑的折磨，他们的生活在外表上只比白天同劳动、晚上同睡一地的牲畜稍好一些。这种亚细亚的标准，这种无机械装备的恐惧，就是那些只增加其人数而没有经历一场产业革命的人的命运。