The Unfolding Crisis, 1931–1942
无法避免的危机（1931～1942）
When the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the Great Powers are viewed in their entirety, and also integrated into the economic and technologicalmilitary dynamics of the age, the course of international diplomacy during the 1930s becomes more comprehensible. This is not to imply that the local roots of the various crises—whether in Mukden, Ethiopia, or the Sudetenland—were completely irrelevant, or that there would have been no international problems if the Great Powers had been in harmony. But it is clear that when a regional crisis arose, the statesmen in each of the leading capitals were compelled to view such events in the light both of the larger diplomatic scene and, perhaps especially, of their pressing domestic problems. The British prime minister, MacDonald, put this nicely to his colleague Baldwin, after the 1931 Manchurian affair had interacted with the sterling crisis and the collapse of the second Labor government:
在全面考察每一个大国的相对实力和薄弱环节，并同当时的经济和军事技术动力结合起来看之后，就更容易理解20世纪30年代世界外交的进程了。这并不是说各种危机的地区性根源——无论是沈阳、埃塞俄比亚，还是苏台德区——毫不相关，也不是说如果大国都协调一致的话，就不会出现国际问题了。很清楚，当地区性危机发生时，各主要国家的领导人都不得不根据更广阔的外交舞台，特别是根据迫切的内政问题来考虑这些危机。1931年中国东北九一八事变与英镑危机和第二届工党政府倒台产生相互影响后，英国首相麦克唐纳就此对他的幕僚鲍尔温作了精辟评论：
We have all been so distracted by day to day troubles that we never had a chance of surveying the whole situation and hammering out a policy regarding it, but have had to live from agitation to agitation. 166
我们都为日常的杂事而分心过多，因为我们从来没有机会对全面的形势进行调查，并制定出相应的政策，但是我们不得不经受着一个又一个焦虑的折磨。
It is a good reminder of the way politicians’ concerns were often immediate and practical, rather than long-term and strategic. But even after the British government had recovered its breath, there is no sign that it contemplated a change in its circumspect policy toward Japan’s conquest of Manchuria. Quite apart from the continued need to deal with economic problems, and the public’s unrelenting dislike of entanglements in the Far East, British leaders were also aware of dominion pressures for peace and of the very rundown state of imperial defenses in a region where Japan enjoyed the strategical advantage. In any case, there were various Britons who approved of Tokyo’s decision to deal with the irritating Chinese nationalists and many more who wanted to maintain good relations with Japan. Even when those sentiments waned, after further Japanese aggressions, the only way in which Whitehall might be moved to stronger action would be in conjunction with the League and/or the other Great Powers.
这是对政治家的一个很好的提示，他们关心问题的方式常常是从迫切而实际的方面出发，而不是从长远和战略的角度出发。当英国政府喘过气来后，没有迹象表明它想过要改变它对日本征服中国东北行动的小心翼翼的政策。除了需要不断对付经济问题外，还要考虑到公众极其厌恶卷入远东事务之中，英国领导人还认识到自治领要求和平的压力，也意识到在日本享有战略优势的地区里，帝国防务所处的劣势地位。总之，有许多英国人赞成东京对付令人不愉快的中国民族主义者这一决定，并且有更多的人希望同日本保持良好的关系，甚至在这种情绪有所减弱时，在日本发动进一步侵略行动后，白厅仍可能被迫采取的较为强硬的唯一办法，是与国际联盟或其他大国站在一起。
But the League itself, however admirable its principles, had no effective means for preventing Japanese aggression in Manchuria other than the armed forces of its leading members. Thus its recourse to an investigative committee (the Lytton Commission) merely gave the Powers an excuse to delay action while at the same time Japan continued its conquest. Of the major states, Italy had no real interests in the Far East. Germany, although enjoying commercial and military ties with China, preferred to sit back and observe whether Japan’s “revisionism” could offer a useful precedent in Europe. The Soviet Union was concerned about Japanese aggression, but was unlikely to be invited to cooperate with the other powers and had no intention of being pushed forward alone. The French, predictably, were caught in a dilemma: they had no wish to see precedents being set for altering existing territorial boundaries and flouting League resolutions; on the other hand, being increasingly worried about clandestine German rearmament and the need to maintain the status quo in Europe, the French were appalled at the idea of complications arising in the Far East which would direct attention, and possibly military resources, away from the German problem. While Paris publicly stood firm alongside League principles, it privately let Tokyo know that it understood Japan’s problems in China. 167 By contrast, the U. S. government—at least as represented by Secretary of State Stimson—in no way condoned Japanese actions, rightly seeing in them a threat to the open-door world upon which, in theory, the American way of life was so dependent. But Stimson’s high-principled condemnations attracted neither Hoover, who feared the consequent entanglements, nor the British government, which preferred trimming to crusading. The result was a Stimson- Hoover quarrel in their respective memoirs, and (more significant) a legacy of mistrust between Washington and London. All this offered a depressing and convincing example of what one scholar has termed “the limits of foreign policy. ”168
尽管国际联盟所倡导的原则受到广泛的赞赏，但是除了动用它的几个主要成员国的军队外，它没有任何能够有效地制止日本对中国东北进行侵略的手段。因而，它求助于调查委员会（李顿调查团）来制止日本侵略，但这只是让大国在日本继续征服中国时找到延缓行动的借口。在几个大国中，意大利在远东没有真正的利益。德国尽管一直在华享有贸易和军事利益，但还是愿意袖手旁观，想看看日本对《凡尔赛和约》的“修正主义”能否为欧洲提供一个有用的先例。苏联对日本的侵略感到担忧，但其他大国不可能邀请它一同合作，它也不想被单独推上第一线，与日本大拼一场。可以预言的是，法国人陷入了进退维谷的境地：他们不希望看到别人开一个先例，改变现行边界和藐视国际联盟的决议；另一方面，由于他们越来越担忧德国秘密重整军备和维持欧洲现状所出现的困境，因此他们一想到在远东出现的混乱就十分吃惊，害怕这会转移对德国问题的注意力和可能的军事行动。巴黎一方面在公开场合坚决地维护国际联盟的原则，另一方面它私下让东京知道，它理解日本在中国碰到的问题。相比之下，美国政府——至少是由国务卿史汀生所代表的——一点儿也不宽恕日本在中国的所作所为。美国直截了当地认为，日本的行动从理论上讲是对美国生活方式所依赖的门户开放世界的威胁。但是史汀生的有高度道义原则的谴责，既没有引起胡佛的重视，因为他害怕这会连累美国，也没有吸引住英国政府，因为它宁愿见风使舵。最后的结果是，史汀生和胡佛在他们各自的回忆录中互相指责。更为重要的是，华盛顿和伦敦之间留下了互不信任的后遗症。所有这一切，都为一位学者提出的“对外政策的局限性”观点提供了令人沮丧而又令人信服的例证。
Whether or not the Japanese military’s move into Manchuria in 1931 was carried out169 without the home government’s knowledge was less important than the fact that this action succeeded, and was expanded upon, without the West being able to do anything substantial. The larger consequences were that the League had been shown to be an ineffective instrument for preventing aggression, and that the three western democracies were incapable of united action. This was also evident in the contemporaneous discussion at Geneva concerning land and air disarmament; here, of course, the United States was missing, but the Anglo-French differences over how to respond to German demands for “equality” and the continued British evasion of any guarantee to ease France’s fears meant that Hitler’s new regime could walk out of the talks and denounce the existing treaties without fear of any retribution. 170
日本军队在1931年是否没有让日本政府知道就侵入了中国东北，这点相对来说并不重要，重要的是，在西方国家没有能够采取实际行动的情况下，日军的侵略接连不断，并进一步扩大。更严重的后果是，事实证明，国际联盟不能有效制止侵略，西方3个民主大国不能采取联合行动。这点在日内瓦同时进行的有关削减陆军和空军的讨论中[9]，也显得很突出。美国没有参加这个讨论，但英法在如何对待德国提出的“平等”要求问题上的分歧，以及英国仍继续避免做出保证以减轻法国的恐惧，意味着希特勒新政权可以退出会谈，并废除当时存在的条约而不必害怕受到任何惩罚。
The revival of a German threat by 1933 placed further strains upon Anglo-French- American diplomatic cooperation at a time when the World Economic Conference had broken down and the three democracies were erecting their own currency and trading blocs. Although France was the more directly threatened by Germany, it was Britain which felt that its freedom of maneuver had been more substantially impinged upon. By 1934 both the Cabinet and its Defence Requirements Committee conceded that while Japan was the more immediate danger, Germany was the greater long-term threat. But since it was not possible to be strong against both, it was important to achieve a reconciliation in one of those regions. Whereas some circles favored improving relations with Japan so as to be better able to stand up to Germany, the Foreign Office argued that an Anglo-Japanese understanding in the Far East would ruin London’s delicate relations with the United States. On the other hand, it could be pointed out to those imperial and naval circles who wanted to give priority to strengthening British defenses in the Orient that it was impossible to turn one’s back upon French concern over German revisionism and (after 1935) fatal to ignore the growing threat from the Luftwaffe. For the rest of the decade the decision-makers in Whitehall sought to escape from this strategical dilemma of facing potential enemies at opposite ends of the globe. 171
本来在1933年时，在世界经济会议破产之后，英、法、美3个主要民主国家便动手建立自己的货币和贸易集团。这时，德国威胁的重新抬头，为英—法—美外交合作设置了更大障碍。尽管法国更直接地受到德国的威胁，但是英国感到它的行动自由已受到实质性的侵犯。到1934年时，英国内阁和防务需求委员会都认为，日本的危险较直接，但从长远来看，德国是更大的威胁。由于英国不能同时强硬地对抗两国，因此，在欧亚这两个地区中，在一个地区达成妥协是很重要的。有些英国人士主张与日本改善关系；以便更好地抗衡德国。但外交部争辩说，英日在远东达成谅解，会损害英国与美国之间的微妙关系；另一方面，对那些要求优先加强英国在东方防务的英帝国和海军部门的人应当指出，对于法国对德国修正主义的忧虑，不加理睬是不可能的，而且（在1935年后）忽视来自德国空军的不断增长的威胁，也将是致命的错误。在20世纪30年代余下的岁月里，白厅的决策者们一直想逃脱这个要同时抗衡地球两端潜在敌人的战略上的两难困境。
In 1934 and 1935, however, such a dilemma seemed disturbing but not acute. If Hitler’s regime was clearly an unpleasant one, he had shown himself surprisingly willing to negotiate a settlement with Poland; in any case, Germany was still considerably weaker in military terms than either France or Russia. Furthermore, the German effort to move into Austria following Dollfuss’s assassination in 1934 had provoked Mussolini to deploy troops on the Brenner Pass as a warning. The prospect of Italy being associated with the status quo powers was especially comforting to France, which sought to bring an anti-German coalition together in the “Stresa Front” of April 1935. At almost the same time, Stalin indicated that he, too, wished to associate with the “peace-loving” states, and by 1935 the Soviet Union had not only joined the League of Nations but had instituted its security pacts with Paris and Prague. Although Hitler had made plain his opposition to an “eastern Locarno,” it looked as if Germany was nicely contained on all sides. And in the Far East, Japan was quiet. 172
在1934年和1935年，这个困境令人困扰，但并不尖锐。虽然希特勒政权明显令人不悦，但他出人意料地表示愿意与波兰谈判，签订条约，不管怎么说，在军事上德国仍然比法国和苏联弱得多。而且，在1934年奥地利总理陶尔斐斯被暗杀后，德国试图出兵奥地利，使得墨索里尼陈兵于布伦纳山口，以示警告。意大利有可能与维持现状的国家站在一起，这特别令法国感到宽慰。法国在1935年的“斯特雷扎阵线”中，力图组成一个反德联盟。几乎同时，斯大林暗示，他也愿意与“爱好和平”的国家联合在一起。到1935年，苏联不仅加入了国际联盟，而且还与巴黎和布拉格订立了安全条约。尽管希特勒公开地大力反对“东方洛迦诺公约”，但看起来，德国在各方面都被严密遏制住了。在远东，日本显得很平静。
By the second half of 1935, however, this encouraging scene was disintegrating fast without Hitler having lifted a finger. The differing Anglo-French perceptions of the “security problem” were already revealed in the British unease at France’s renewed links with Russia on the one hand and the French dismay at the Anglo- German naval agreement of June 1935 on the other. Both measures had been taken unilaterally to gain extra security, France desiring to bring the USSR into the European balance, Britain eager to reconcile its naval needs in European waters and the Far East; but each step seemed to the other neighbor to give a wrong signal to Berlin. 173 Even so, such contradictions were damaging but not catastrophic, which could not be said of Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia following a series of local clashes and in vain pursuit of his own ambition to create a new Roman Empire. This, too, was a good example of a regional quarrel having extraordinarily broader ramifications. To the French, aghast at the idea of turning a new potential ally against Germany into a bitter foe, the whole Abyssinian episode was an unmitigated disaster: to allow a flagrant transgression of the League’s principles was disturbing, as was Mussolini’s muscle-flexing (for where might he strike next?); on the other hand, to drive Italy into the German camp would be an appalling act of folly in strictly Realpolitik terms—but the latter consideration was unlikely to sway the idealistic British. 174 Yet Whitehall’s dilemma was at least as large, since it not only had to handle even greater public unease about Italy’s blatant transgression of League principles, but also had to worry about what Japan might do in the Far East if the West was engaged in a Mediterranean imbroglio. Whereas France feared that quarreling with Italy would tempt Hitler into the Rhineland, Britain suspected that it would encourage Japan to expand farther into Asia, the more especially since, at that exact time, Tokyo was on the point of denouncing the naval treaties and going for an unrestricted fleet buildup. 175 In a larger sense, both were right; the difficulty, as usual, was in reconciling the immediate problem with the longer-term implication.
然而，到了1935年下半年，不需希特勒动一个指头，这一令人鼓舞的局面便迅速四分五裂了。英法对“安全问题”的不同看法，在两件事上反映出来。一是英国对法国与苏联恢复关系感到不安，二是法国对1935年6月的《英德海军协定》感到震惊。两国单方面采取这两个措施，以取得更多的安全。法国想把苏联拉入欧洲均势，英国急于满足它在欧洲海域和远东方面对海军的需要。但是，对英法这两个邻国的每一方来说，对方的行动都像是给了柏林一个错误的信号。尽管如此，如果不是在阿比西尼亚出现一系列地区性冲突后，墨索里尼决定入侵该地，并开始他建立新罗马帝国的徒劳无功的努力的话，上述矛盾虽具有破坏性的影响，但还不是灾难性的。这又是一个地区冲突带来极大影响的绝妙例子。法国害怕把一个新的、潜在的反德盟国变成势不两立的敌人，因此对于法国人来说，整个阿比西尼亚事件是一场十足的灾难！听任国际联盟的原则遭受公然的践踏，只能带来混乱，任凭墨索里尼舒展筋骨也只能带来不幸（他下一步会在哪儿下手呢？）；另一方面，法国人也觉得，从严格的现实政治意义上说，把意大利赶到德国一边，也是极不可取的，这样做简直是愚蠢——但后一个考虑不太可能左右富于理想主义的英国人的立场。然而，由于白厅不仅要对付意大利断然破坏国际联盟原则所引起的国内公众的更大不满，而且要考虑，如果西方介入地中海的纠葛，日本将会在远东如何动作，因此，白厅所处的两难困境，至少与以前一样严重。法国害怕与意大利争吵会诱使希特勒出兵莱茵区，而英国则担忧，特别是在日本宣布海军条约无效，并着手无限制地制造军舰时，与意大利吵闹会鼓动日本进一步向亚洲扩张。从更广泛的意义上说，英法两家的想法都是正确的，像以往一样，它们面临的困难是，如何在眼前的问题与具有长远意义的问题之间取得协调。
The French fears were proved correct first. The 1935 Anglo-French offer of a territorial readjustment in Northeastern Africa to Italy’s favor (the Hoare-Laval Pact) had caused British public opinion in particular to explode in moral indignation. Yet while the London and Paris governments were torn between responding to that mood, and still in private facing the overwhelmingly plausible strategic and economic reasons why they should not go to war with Italy, Hitler chose to order a reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland (March 1936). In strictly military terms, that was not such a blow; it was highly unlikely by then that France could have launched an offensive strike against Germany, and quite impossible for the British to have done so. 176 But this further weakening of the Versailles settlement— and the total abandonment of the Locarno Treaty—raised the general issue of what was, or was not, an internationally acceptable way of altering the status quo. Because of the failure of its leading members to halt Mussolini’s aggression in 1935– 1936, the League was now pretty much discredited; it played little or no role, for example, either in the Spanish Civil War or in Japan’s open assault upon China in 1937. If further changes in the existing territorial order were going to be checked, or at least controlled, that could only be done by determined moves against the “revisionist” states by the major “status quo” powers.
法国的担心首先被证明是正确的。1935年，英法应允在东北非作对意大利有利的领土调整（《霍尔-赖伐尔协定》），引起了尤其是英国公众的义愤爆发。伦敦和巴黎政府在两件事上疲于奔命。一方面，它们要忙于应付公众愤怒的情绪；另一方面，它们在私下又得面对他们之所以不同意大利交战的听起来似乎有理的战略和经济原因。而就在此时，希特勒做出了选择，命令德军重新占领非军事化的莱茵区（1936年3月）。从严格的军事意义上讲，这对英法并不是什么打击。在这时，法国不大可能对德国发动反攻。但这就进一步削弱了《凡尔赛和约》并意味着《洛迦诺公约》的完全废弃。这就提出了一个普遍性问题：哪种方式是国际社会能接受的改变现状的方式，哪种不是？由于国际联盟的主要会员国未能制止1935～1936年墨索里尼的侵略行为，此时的国际联盟几乎是威信扫地。例如，不管是在西班牙内战期间，还是在1937年日本对华的公开进犯期间，国际联盟所起的作用甚微，或根本不起作用。因此，只有当主要的“维持现状”国家采取果断行动，反对“修改现状”国家的时候，才能制止或至少是控制住对当时边界秩序的进一步更改。
To none of the latter, however, did the threat to resort to arms seem a practical possibility. Indeed, just as the fascist countries were coming closer together (in November 1937 Germany and Japan signed their anti-Comintern pact, shortly after Mussolini had proclaimed the Rome-Berlin axis), their potential opponents were becoming even more introspective and disunited. 177 Despite American resentments at the Japanese invasion of China and the bombing of the U. S. S. Panay, 1937 was not a good year for Roosevelt to take decisive steps in overseas affairs even had he wished to: the economy had been hit by a renewed slump, and Congress was passing ever tighter neutrality legislation. Since all Roosevelt could offer was words of condemnation without any promise of action, his policies merely “tended to strengthen Anglo-French doubts about American reliability. ”178 In a quite different way, Stalin also was concentrating upon domestic affairs, since his purges and show trials were then at their height. Although he cautiously extended aid to the Spanish republic in the Civil War, he was aware that many in the West disliked the “redshirts” even more than the “blackshirts,” and that it would be highly dangerous to be pushed forward into an open conflict with the Axis. Japan’s actions in the Far East, and the signing of the anti-Comintern pact, made him more cautious still.
然而，没有一个“维持现状”的大国认为，以武力相威胁是切实可行的。实际上，正当法西斯国家走到一起时（在墨索里尼宣布罗马—柏林轴心形成不久，1937年11月，德国和日本签订了《反共产国际协定》），它们潜在的对手变得更加专注于国内事务及不和。尽管美国对日本侵华和轰炸美国船“佩奈”号表示不满，尽管罗斯福想采取行动，但1937年却不是罗斯福在海外事务上采取决定性步骤的好年份：新的经济萧条打击了经济，国会通过了更为严格的中立法案。由于罗斯福所能提供的只有谴责的词句而不是行动，他的政策只能“增加英法对美国可靠性的怀疑”。斯大林也专注于国内事务，只是方式大不相同而已。在这时，他的清洗活动和公开审判活动达到了高潮。尽管他谨慎地向内战中的西班牙共和国提供帮助，但他明白，西方许多人厌恶“红衫队”[10]甚于厌恶“黑衫队”[11]，而且，苏联被推上第一线与轴心国公开作战是十分危险的。日本在远东的行动、《反共产国际协定》的签订，也使苏联变得更加谨慎。
Yet the Power worst affected of all in the years 1936–1937 was undoubtedly France. Not only was its economy sagging and its political scene so divided that some observers thought it close to civil war, but its own elaborate security system in Europe had been almost totally destroyed in a series of shattering blows. The German reoccupation of the Rhineland removed any lingering possibility that the French army could undertake offensive actions to put pressure upon Berlin; the country now seemed dangerously vulnerable to the Luftwaffe, just as the French air force was becoming obsolescent; the Abyssinian affair and the Rome-Berlin axis turned Italy from a potential ally into a most unpredictable and threatening foe; Belgium’s retreat into isolation dislocated existing plans for the defense of France’s northern frontiers, and there was no way (due to the cost) that the Maginot Line could be extended to close this gap; the Spanish Civil War raised the awful prospect of a fascist, pro-Axis state being created in France’s rear; and in eastern Europe, Yugoslavia was tacking closer toward Italy and the Little Entente seemed moribund. 179
然而，1936～1937年，在各大国中，受打击最大的莫过于法国。不但它的经济萎缩了，它政治上的分裂也到了如此程度，以致有些观察家认为它已接近内战边缘，而且，在一连串粉碎性打击中，它自己在欧洲精心缔造的安全体系，几乎被完全摧毁。德国对莱茵兰的重新占领，消除了以前存在的法军可采取进攻来对柏林施加压力的所有可能性；正因为法国空军变得越来越落后，法国此时极易受到德国空军的攻击；阿比西尼亚事件和罗马—轴心的形成，使意大利从一个潜在的盟友，变成了一个不可预料并且具有威胁性的敌手；比利时返回孤立状态，打乱了法国当时北部边界的防御计划，马其诺防线无法扩展（由于费用问题）来填补这段防线上的缺口；西班牙内战造成了一种可怕前景，即在法国后方，一个法西斯的亲轴心国的国家正在形成；在东欧，南斯拉夫调过头来向意大利靠拢，小协约国看来行将就木。
In these gloomy, near-paralyzing circumstances, the role of Great Britain became of critical importance, as Neville Chamberlain (in May 1937) replaced Baldwin as prime minister. Concerned at his country’s economic and strategical vulnerability and personally horrified at the prospect of war, Chamberlain was determined to head off any future crisis in Europe by making “positive” offers toward satisfying the dictators’ grievances. Suspicious of the Soviet Union, disdainful of Roosevelt’s “verbiage,” impatient at what he felt was France’s confused diplomacy of intransigence and passivity, and regarding the League as totally ineffective, the prime minister embarked upon his own strategy to secure lasting peace by appeasement. Even before then, London had been making noises to Berlin about commercial and colonial concessions; Chamberlain’s contribution was to increase the pace by being willing to consider territorial changes in Europe itself. At the same time, and precisely because he saw in Germany the greatest danger, the prime minister was eager to improve relations with Italy in the hope of detaching that country from the Axis. 180 All this was bound to be controversial—it caused, inter alia, the resignation of Chamberlain’s foreign secretary (Eden) early in 1938, criticism from the small but growing number of anti-appeasers at home, and increased suspicion in Washington and Moscow—but on the other hand it could well be argued that so many bold moves in the past history of diplomacy were also controversial. The real flaw in Chamberlain’s strategy, understood by some in Europe but not by the majority, was that Hitler was fundamentally unappeasable and determined upon a future territorial order which small-scale adjustments alone could never satisfy.
在这种暗淡无光、接近瘫痪的情况下，在张伯伦取代鲍尔温成为首相（1937年5月）后，英国充当了一个关键性的重要角色。张伯伦关心英国经济和战略上的脆弱性，他本人对战争的前景感到惊恐，因而决心通过做出“积极的”奉献，来平息独裁主义者的委屈情绪，从而防止欧洲将来发生任何危机。由于他对苏联持有戒心，对罗斯福的“冗词”抱蔑视态度，他感到法国外交充满着不妥协性和被动、混乱，因而表示不耐烦。他把国际联盟看成完全无效的机构，因此，这位首相便着手实施他自己的以绥靖求得持久和平的个人战略。然而，即便在他之前，伦敦就对柏林大声鼓噪，要在贸易和殖民地问题上做出让步。张伯伦的“贡献”是，愿意考虑欧洲本身的领土变更，以加速对德让步的步伐。与此同时，正因为他从德国身上看到了最大的危险，这位首相才急于与意大利改善关系，以图把意大利从轴心国中分离出来。所有这一切注定是要引起争论的——特别是它导致张伯伦的外交大臣（艾登）于1938年初辞职，引起了国内虽为数尚少但不断增多的反绥靖者的批评，还增加了华盛顿和莫斯科的猜疑。但另一方面，人们可以有力地争辩说，在以往的外交史上，许许多多的大胆举动也都是有争议的。一些欧洲人（但不是大多数）认识到，张伯伦战略的真正缺陷是，希特勒根本不是绥靖主义可以对付得了的，他决意要建立一个新的领土秩序，小范围的领土调整永远不能满足他的要求。
If that conclusion became clear by 1939, and still more by 1940–1941, it was not evident either to the British or even the French government in the crisis year of 1938. The takeover of Austria in the spring of that year was an unpleasant instance of Hitler’s fondness for unannounced moves, but could one really object to the principle of joining Germans with Germans? If anything, it merely intensified Chamberlain’s conviction that the issue of the German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia had to be settled before that crisis brought the Powers up to, and over, the brink of war. Admittedly, the question of the Sudetenland was a much more contentious one—Czechoslovakia, too, had rights to a sovereignty which had been internationally guaranteed, and the western Powers’ desire to satisfy Hitler now seemed more influenced by negative selfish fears than by positive ideals—but the fact was that the Führer was the only leader at this time prepared to fight, and was indeed irritated that the prospect of smashing the Czechs was removed by the concessions he gained at the Munich conference. As ever, it took two to make a Great Power war; and in 1938 there was no willing opponent to Hitler. 181
虽然，到1939年这个结论开始变得清楚了，而到1940～1941年，这一结论变得更清楚，但在1938年的危机时期，不管是对英国政府还是对法国政府来说，这个结论都还显得不清楚。1938年春天德国对奥地利的占领，令人不快地证明了，希特勒喜欢不加宣布便采取行动。但是，人们会真正反对把德国人与德国人统一起来的原则吗？如果有人反对的话，它只会加深张伯伦的信念，即在危机把大国逼到战争边缘和进行战争之前，捷克斯洛伐克讲德语的少数民族问题必须得到解决。大家承认，苏台德区问题是要引起争论的——同样，捷克斯洛伐克有权维护已得到国际保证的主权，西方大国想满足希特勒的欲望，在这时看来，更多的是为消极、自私的恐惧所驱使，而不是为积极的理想而驱动——但事实是，此时“元首”才是唯一准备打仗的领袖。当武装摧毁捷克的前景已为他在慕尼黑会议上所赢得的英法的让步而一扫而空时，他的确十分烦恼。当时的形势是，要打一场大国战争，必须有两个大国参战；但在1938年，没有一个国家愿意反对希特勒。
Because the political and public will for war was lacking in the west, it makes little sense here to enter into the long-lasting debate about what might have happened had Britain and France fought on Czechoslovakia’s behalf, although it is worth noting that the military balance was not as favorable to Germany as the various apologists of appeasement suggested. 182 What is clear, however, is that that balance swung even more in Hitler’s favor following the Munich settlement. The elimination of Czechoslovakia as a substantial middleweight European force by March 1939, the German acquisition of Czech armaments, factories, and raw materials, and Stalin’s increasing suspicion of the West outweighed the factors working in favor of London and Paris such as the considerable increases in British arms output, the more intimate Anglo-French military cooperation, or the swing in British and dominion opinion in favor of standing up to Hitler. At the same time, Chamberlain failed (January 1939) to detach Italy from the Axis, or to deter it from its own aggressions in the Balkans—even if Mussolini, for urgent reasons of his own, would not fight immediately alongside his fellow dictator in a Great Power war against the western nations.
值得指出的是，尽管当时欧洲的军事力量对比并不像形形色色的绥靖政策辩护者所声称的那样对德国有利，但是，由于西方的政治家和公众都不愿打仗，因此，我们在这里加入旷日持久的辩论，争论假如英法与捷克一道对德作战的话情况将会怎样，这样的争论意义并不大。然而，显而易见的是，在慕尼黑会议后，力量对比变得对希特勒更有利。虽然对伦敦和巴黎有利的因素正在增长，如英国的武器产量明显增长，英法军事合作更加密切，英国和英帝国自治领的舆论转向支持抗击希特勒，但是，1939年3月捷克斯洛伐克作为一个重要的欧洲中等国家的消亡，德国获得捷克的军备、工厂和原料，连同斯大林对西方国家猜疑的加剧，这一切不利因素超过了上述对英法两国有利的因素。与此同时，纵然墨索里尼出于自己的迫切需要，不会立即与他的独裁伙伴一道介入反西方国家的大国战争中去，但张伯伦想把意大利从轴心国中分离出来，防止它侵略巴尔干国家的努力却失败了（1939年1月）。
When Hitler began to apply pressure upon Poland in the late spring of 1939, therefore, the possibilities of avoiding a conflict were less than in the previous year —and the prospects of an Anglo-French victory should war break out were much less. Germany’s annexation of the “rump” state of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and Italy’s move into Albania a month later had led the democracies, under mounting public pressure to “stop Hitler,” to offer guarantees to Poland, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, thus tying western Europe to the fate of eastern Europe to a degree which the British at least had never before contemplated. Yet Poland could not be directly assisted by the western countries, and any indirect assistance was going to be small in a period when the French army had assumed the strategic defensive and the British were concentrating so much of their resources upon improved aerial defenses at home. The only direct aid which could be given to Poland must come from the east, and if Chamberlain’s government was unenthusiastic about agreements with Moscow, the Poles for their part were adamantly opposed to having the Red Army on their territory. Since Stalin’s overwhelming concern was to buy time and avoid a war, and Hitler’s need was to increase the pressure upon the western nations to abandon Poland, both dictators had a secular interest in doing a “deal” at Warsaw’s expense, whatever their own ideological differences. The shock announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (August 23, 1939) not only enhanced Germany’s strategical position but also made a war over Poland virtually inevitable. This time “appeasement” was not an option open to London and Paris, even if the economic and military circumstances pointed (perhaps more than in the preceding years) to the avoidance of a Great Power conflict. 183
因而，当1939年暮春希特勒开始向波兰施加压力时，与过去几年相比，避免冲突的可能性更小了，而且，一旦战争爆发，英法取胜的希望大大减少。1939年3月，德国并吞捷克斯洛伐克“余下”的国土，以及一个月后意大利出兵阿尔巴尼亚这些举动，激起了民主国家要求“制止希特勒”的强烈的舆论。在这种形势与压力之下，民主国家政府不得不向波兰、希腊、罗马尼亚和土耳其提供安全保证。这样就把东欧与西欧的命运系在一起，二者密切联系的程度至少是英国从未料到的。但在此时，法国军队实行战略防御，英国人则把很大一部分资源用于改进国内的空中防御，因此，波兰不可能得到西方国家的直接援助，而且任何间接援助也都将是小规模的。波兰可以得到的唯一援助只能来自东方，而且，如果张伯伦政府对与莫斯科订立协议不热心的话，那么，对于波兰人来说，他们就会坚决反对苏联红军进入他们的国家。由于斯大林最关心的是争取时间和避免战争，而希特勒所需要的则是迫使西方国家放弃波兰，这样一来，不管二人在意识形态上的分歧是如何之大，两个独裁者都对牺牲华沙、达成“交易”抱有长远的兴趣。轰动一时的莫洛托夫—里宾特洛甫协定的公布（1939年8月23日），不仅加强了德国的战略地位，而且还使对波兰的战争不可避免。纵然从当时经济和军事情况看（或许比前几年更明显）应防止大国冲突，但这一回伦敦和巴黎却不再选择“绥靖”政策了。
The outbreak of the Second World War thus found Britain and France once again opposing Germany, and, as in 1914, a British expeditionary force was dispatched across the Channel while the Anglo-French navies imposed their maritime blockade. 184 In so many other respects, however, the strategical contours of this war were quite different from the previous one, and disadvantageous to the Allies. Not only was there no eastern front, but the political agreement between Berlin and Moscow to carve up Poland also led to commercial arrangements, so that an increasing flow of raw materials sent from Russia steadily obviated any effects which the blockade might have had upon the German economy. It was true that in the first year of the war, stocks of oil and other raw materials were still desperately low in Germany, but ersatz production, Swedish iron ore, and the growing supplies from Russia helped to bridge the gap. In addition, Allied inertia on the western front meant that there was little pressure upon German holdings of petroleum and ammunitions. Finally, there were no encumbrancing allies for Germany to prop up, like Austria-Hungary in the 1914–1918 war. Had Italy also joined in the conflict in September 1939, its own economic deficiencies might have posed an excessive strain upon the Reich’s slender stocks and, arguably, dislocated the chances for the German westward strike in 1940. To be sure, Italy’s participation would have complicated the Anglo-French position in the Mediterranean, but not perhaps by much, and Rome’s neutrality made it a useful conduit for German trade—which is why many of the planners in Berlin hoped that Mussolini would remain on the sidelines. 185
第二次世界大战的爆发促使英法两国联合一致，反对德国。而且，与1914年的情形相似，一方面英法两国海军对德国实行海上封锁，另一方面，英国派遣一支远征军，渡过英吉利海峡与法军并肩战斗。然而，在其他许多方面，这场战争的战略轮廓与上一次世界大战大不相同，而且对同盟国不利。在这场世界大战中，不仅没有东方战线，而且，柏林和莫斯科达成的瓜分波兰的协议还带来了两国间的贸易协议。结果，按照两国间的贸易安排，苏联对德国输出的原料不断增加，这就逐渐消除了对德封锁本来可以给德国经济带来的各种消极影响。的确，在大战的第一年里，德国的石油相比其他原料的贮存仍少得可怜，但代用品生产、瑞典的铁矿石和来自俄国的不断增加的原料供应，帮了德国的大忙。此外，同盟国在西线消极应战，意味着它们对德国石油和军火的控制施加不了多大压力。最后一点是，在1914～1918年的世界大战中，德国要支持奥匈帝国这个累赘，而这一回，德国却无须支持一个碍手碍脚的盟国。如果意大利在1939年9月也加入战争的话，由于意大利经济有严重问题，这会给第三帝国极有限的资源贮存带来额外的负担，而且，可以大胆地说明，如果那样，还将破坏1940年德国向西进攻的机会。诚然，如果意大利真的参战，则可能使英法在地中海的处境变得复杂起来，但也许不会变得特别复杂。假如意大利保持中立，则可为德国的对外贸易提供有用的渠道，这就是柏林许多决策者认为墨索里尼应在局外旁观，而不应加入战争的原因。
While the “phony war” did not put Germany’s economic vulnerability to the test, it did allow Germany to perfect those elements of national strategy in which the Wehrmacht was so superior—that is, operational doctrine, combined arms, tactical air power, and decentralized offensive warfare. The Polish campaign in particular confirmed the efficacy of Blitzkrieg warfare, exposed a number of weaknesses (which could then be corrected), and strengthened German confidence in being able to overun foes by rapid, surprise assaults and the proper concentration of aerial and armored power. This was again easily demonstrated in the swift overrunning of Denmark and the Netherlands, although geography made Norway both inaccessible to German panzer divisions and subject to the influence of British sea power, which is why that campaign was touch-and-go for a while until the Luftwaffe’s dominance was established. But the best example of the superiority of German military doctrine and operational tactical ability came in the French campaign of May-June 1940, when the larger but less well organized Allied infantry and armored forces were torn apart by Guderian’s clusters of tanks and motorized infantry. In all of these encounters, the attacker enjoyed a considerable air superiority. Unlike the 1914– 1916 battles, therefore, in which neither side showed much skill in grappling with the newer condition of warfare, these 1940 campaigns revealed German advantages which seemed to obviate Germany’s long-term economic vulnerability. 186
“模拟战争”并不能考验出德国经济的脆弱性，但它使德国能完善其军队那高出一筹的国家战略中的一些要素——作战原则、兵种协同、战术空军力量和多线进攻战。特别是波兰战役，它证明了“闪电战”的有效性，也暴露了一些缺陷（当时即可以克服），并加强了德国人通过快速及出其不意的攻击和空中、装甲部队的适当集中，便可打败敌人的信心。挪威的地理环境不利于德国的装甲师进攻，也使挪威易受英国海军的控制。因此，在德国空军占有绝对优势前，在一段时间内，挪威战役还只是处在一触即发状态，尽管如此，在丹麦和荷兰的溃败中，德国人的信念又轻而易举地得到了验证。在1940年5～6月的法国战役中，德国军事学和战役战术能力方面的优势得到了最充分的证明。在这场战役中，盟国出动了数量更大但组织欠佳的步兵和装甲部队。盟国军队被德国古德里安的坦克群和摩托化步兵撕成两半。在所有这些遭遇战中，进攻者占有很大的空中优势。在1914～1916年的多次战役中，双方在对付新的战争时，都拿不出多少本领。但是1940年的这些战役，却显示出德国的种种优势。它们似乎可以消除德国在长期对抗中经济上的脆弱性。
What was more, by winning so decisively in 1939–1940 the German war machine greatly expanded its available sources of oil and raw materials. Not only could it (and did it!) plunder heavily from its defeated foes, but the elimination of France and Britain’s obvious incapacity to launch a major military campaign also meant that there would be no serious drain upon the Wehrmacht’s stocks through extensive campaigning. A land line had been made to Spanish raw materials, Swedish ores were now safe from Allied expeditions, and Russia, secretly appalled at Hitler’s swift successes, was increasing its supplies. In these circumstances, Italy’s entry into the war just as France was collapsing was not the economic embarrassment it might have been—and, indeed, distracted British resources away from Europe to the Near East, even if Italy’s spectacularly unsuccessful campaigning showed how overrated it had been throughout the 1930s. 187
而且，德国的战争机器在1939～1940年取得了决定性胜利后，大大扩展了它的石油和原材料来源。德国不仅可以（而且确实）对战败的敌国大肆掠夺，而且，一旦法国灭亡，英国将明显无力发动一场重大的战役，这些也意味着盟国不能通过大规模的战役来严重消耗德军的物资贮备。这时，到西班牙运原料的陆路交通线已经建成，瑞典的矿石来源也不再受盟国远征的威胁，而且，苏联由于对希特勒顷刻取得的胜利暗中感到震惊，也增加了对德的原料供应。前面提到，假如意大利在1939年9月参战，它的经济将给轴心国带来困难。在目前这种情形下，意大利在法国崩溃时参战却不会带来经济上的困难——而且，尽管意大利在战斗中无能透顶，反映出它在20世纪30年代太自吹自擂了，但它的确迫使英国放弃了在欧洲的原材料供应地，到近东去寻找原材料。
Had the war continued simply with these three belligerents, it is difficult to say how long it might have gone on. The British Empire under Churchill was determined to continue the struggle and was mobilizing large numbers of men and stocks of munitions—outbuilding Germany both in aircraft and tank production in 1940, for example. 188 And while Britain’s own holdings of gold and dollars were by then insufficient to pay for American supplies, Roosevelt was managing to undo the damaging neutrality legislation and to persuade Congress that it was in the country’s own security interests to sustain Britain—by Lend-Lease, the “destroyers for bases” deal, convoy protection, and so on. 189 The overall result was to leave the two major combatants in the position of being unable to damage the other decisively. If the Battle of Britain had rendered impossible a German cross-Channel invasion, the imbalance of land forces made a British military entry into Europe quite out of the question. Bomber Command’s raids upon Germany were good for British morale, but did little real damage at this stage. Despite occasional raids into the North Atlantic, the German surface fleet was in no position to take on the Royal Navy; on the other hand, the U-boat campaign was as threatening as ever, thanks to Doe-nitz’s newer tactics and additional boats. In North Africa, Somalia, and Abyssinia, British Empire forces found it easy to take Italian-held positions, but extremely difficult to cope with the explosive form of warfare practiced by Rommel’s Afrika Korps or by the German invading forces in Greece. The second year of what has been termed “the last European war” was, therefore, characterized by defensive victories and small-scale gains rather than by epic encounters and conquests. 190
如果战争只是在英、德、意这3个交战国之间进行，这场战争会持续多久，那就很难说了。在丘吉尔的领导下，英帝国决心继续斗争，并动员大批人员，调动大批库存军火。例如，在1940年，英国的飞机和坦克产量都超过了德国。当英国自己拥有的黄金和美元不够支付美国的供应物资时，罗斯福千方百计地要取消带破坏性的中立法案，并劝国会说，维护英国的生存是为了美国本身的安全利益，具体办法是通过租借法案、“驱逐舰换基地”的交易、护航等。这样做总的结果是，两个主要交战国谁也不能给对方以决定性的打击。如果说，不列颠战役使德国横渡海峡的入侵流产的话，两国陆军兵力对比的不平衡，则使英国出兵欧洲大陆成为不可能。英国皇家空军轰炸机对德国的多次空袭，有利于提高英国人的士气，但在这个阶段对德国造成的实际破坏是不大的。尽管德国水面舰艇不时进犯北大西洋，但却不能对付英国的皇家海军；另一方面，由于德军的邓尼茨采取了更新的战术、增加了潜艇编制，潜艇战像以往一样具有威胁性。在北非索马里和阿比西尼亚，英帝国军队发现，要夺取意大利人控制的阵地并不困难，但要应付德国隆美尔的非洲军团和在希腊的德国侵略军惯用的爆炸型打法，却异常困难。因此，在被称为“最后一次欧洲战争”的第二个年头，其特征是防御战的胜利和小规模的成功，而不是大规模的遭遇战和征服。
Inevitably, then, Hitler’s fateful decision to invade Russia in June 1941 changed the entire dimensions of the conflict. Strategically, it meant that Germany now had to fight on several fronts and thus revert to its dilemma of 1914–1917—this being a particularly heavy strain for the Luftwaffe, which had its squadrons thinly spread between the west, the east, and the Mediterranean. It also ensured that the British Empire’s position in the Middle East—which could surely have been overrun had Hitler dispatched there one-quarter of the troops and aircraft used for Operation Barbarossa—would remain, like the home islands, as a springboard for an enemy counteroffensive in the future. Most important of all, however, the sheer geographical extent and logistical demands of campaigning hundreds of miles deep into Russia undermined the Wehrmacht’s greatest advantage: its ability to launch shock attacks within limited confines, so as to overwhelm the enemy before its own supplies began to run out and its war machine slowed down. In contrast to the stupendous array of front-line strength assembled by Germany and its allies in June 1941, the supporting and follow-on resources were minimal, especially in the light of the poor road system; no thought had been given to winter warfare, since it was assumed that the struggle would be over within three months; German aircraft production in 1941 was significantly smaller than that of Britain or Russia, let alone the United States; the Wehrmacht had far fewer tanks than Russia; and the supplies of petroleum and ammunition were quickly run down in the extensive campaigning. 191 Even when the Wehrmacht was spectacularly successful in the field —and Stalin’s inept deployment orders in the face of the impending attack allowed the Germans to kill or capture three million Russians in the first four months of fighting—that did not of itself solve the problem. Russia could suffer appalling losses of men and equipment, and cede a million square miles of territory, and still not be defeated; the capture of Moscow, or perhaps even of Stalin himself, might not have forced a surrender, given the country’s extraordinarily large reserves. In sum, this was a limitless war, and the Third Reich, for all its imposing successes and operational brilliance, was not properly equipped to fight it.
然而，希特勒在1941年6月入侵苏联的重大决定，不可避免地从各方面改变了这场战争的进程。从战略上说，这意味着德国此时要在几条战线上同时作战，这就使它又回复到1914～1917年的困境中——这对把飞行中队稀疏地配置在西面、东面和地中海的德国空军来说，是个特别沉重的负担。可以肯定，英帝国在中东的地位仍会像本土岛屿一样存在下去，作为未来反攻的跳板——尽管希特勒只派遣执行“巴巴罗萨计划”的1/4的陆军和空军就会横行于中东。然而，最为重要的是，要深入苏联几百英里这样广袤的地理范围里进行作战，其后勤供给削弱了德军的最大优势，即在有限区域内发动突然袭击，在自己供给短缺及战争机器放慢速度之前就战胜敌人。1941年6月，德国及其盟军在前线集中了强大兵力，相反，后备部队和补充物资却相当不足，尤其是交通条件极差；由于原计划3个月内便结束战斗，因此对冬季作战没有丝毫准备；1941年德国的飞机产量远不如英国和苏联，更不用说美国了；德军拥有的坦克比苏联少得多；燃料和弹药在大范围的作战中也消耗得很快。甚至当德军在战场上取得辉煌胜利时——斯大林在迎面压来的敌人面前错误地部署红军战斗序列，使德军在头4个月中打死和俘虏300万俄国人——这本身也并没有解决问题。苏联可以承受惊人的人员和装备的损失，可以让出百万平方英里的领土，但它仍没有被打败。即使占领莫斯科，甚至俘获斯大林本人，也不一定能迫使苏联投降，因为苏联有异常大量的后备军。总之，这是一场无限的战争，第三帝国纵然有辉煌的成功和指挥天才，但却打不赢这场战争。
Whether Russia could have survived the German army at the gates of Moscow and a heavy attack by Japan upon Siberia in December 1941 is quite another matter, fascinating to speculate upon and impossible to answer. In signing both the Tripartite Pact (September 194 ) with Germany and Italy and the later (April 1941) neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union, Japan had hoped to deter the USSR while concentrating on its southern expansion; but many in Tokyo were tempted again to a war against Russia at the news of the German advance upon Moscow. If indeed the Japanese army had struck against its traditional foe in Asia instead of agreeing to the southern operations, it might still have been difficult for Roosevelt to persuade the American people to enter fully into such a war, and the assistance which the British could have given Russia in the Far East (had Churchill alone entered that conflict) would have been minimal. Instead of facing that dreadful twofront scenario, Stalin was able to switch his well-trained, winter-hardy divisions from Siberia in late 1941 to help blunt the German offensive and then to drive it back. 192 Seen from Tokyo’s viewpoint, however, the decision to expand southward was utterly logical. The West’s embargo on trade with Japan and freezing of its assets in July 1941 (following Tokyo’s seizure of French Indochina) made both the army and the navy acutely aware that unless they gave in to American political demands or attempted to seize the oil and raw materials supplies of Southeast Asia, they would be economically ruined within a matter of months. From July 1941, therefore, a northern war against Russia became virtually impossible and southern operations virtually inevitable—but since the Americans were judged hardly likely to stand by while Japan helped itself to Borneo, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, their military installations in the western Pacific—and their fleet base at Pearl Harbor—also needed to be eliminated. Simply to keep up the momentum of their “China incident,” the Japanese generals now found it necessary to support largescale operations thousands of miles from home against targets they had scarcely heard of. 193
苏联假如面对莫斯科城下的德军以及同时（1941年12月）进攻西伯利亚的日军的双重攻击，它能否生存就是另外一回事了。这个问题很有趣，却无法回答。日本继在1940年9月与德、意签订了三国条约，其后又在1941年4月与苏联签署了中立协定。日本希望在集中进行南下扩张时稳住苏联。但东京许多人听到德国逼近莫斯科的消息又禁不住想对苏联宣战。如果日军真的去进攻它在亚洲的宿敌，而不是执行其南下方案的话，那么罗斯福要劝说美国人民完全参与这场战争将很困难。英国在远东能够给苏联提供的援助（如果丘吉尔参与了这场战争的话）将会很少。幸运的是斯大林并没有陷入两线作战的可怕境地，而是能在1941年下半年把西伯利亚训练有素、不怕严寒的部队抽调过来抵抗德军进攻，并进行反击。从东京的角度来看，南下扩张的决定是合乎情理的。1941年7月（在日本侵占了法属印度支那以后），西方对日本的贸易封锁和资产冻结，使日本陆军、海军都清楚地意识到，如果他们不屈从于美国的政治要求，就得夺取东南亚的石油和原材料，否则他们在几个月之内就会发生经济崩溃。因此，从1941年7月起，北上与苏联交战已不可能，而南下行动是势在必行了。但因为日军占领婆罗洲、马来亚以及荷属东印度群岛时，美军不会袖手旁观，所以日本必须摧毁美国在西太平洋的军事设施以及其在珍珠港的舰队基地。仅仅为了保持他们的“支那事件”的势头，日本将军们发现日本必须支撑起一个几千英里之外的大规模军事行动，去对付他们很少听说过的目标。
December 1941 marked the second major turning point in a war which had now become global. The Russian counterattacks around Moscow in the same month confirmed that here, at least, the Blitzkrieg had failed. And if the stunning array of Japanese successes in the first six months of the Pacific war dealt heavy blows to the Allies, none of the territories lost (not even Singapore or the Philippines) was really vital in grand-strategical terms. What was much more important was that Japan’s actions, and Hitler’s gratuitous declaration of war upon the United States, at last brought into the conflict the most powerful country in the world. To be sure, industrial productivity alone could not ensure military effectiveness—and German operational skills in particular meant that simple man-to-man and dollar-to-dollar comparisons were foolish194—but the Grand Alliance, as Churchill fondly called it, was so superior in matériel terms to the Axis and its productive bases were so far away from the German and Japanese armed forces that it had the resources and the opportunity to build up an overwhelming military strength which none of the earlier opponents of fascist aggression could have hoped to possess. Within another year, in fact, de Tocqueville’s forecast of 1835 concerning the emergence of a bipolar world was at last on the point of being realized.
1941年12月是这场已变为全球性大战的战争的第二个大转折点。苏联人在莫斯科周围的反攻证明，至少在这里“闪击战”是失败了。而且，虽说日本在太平洋战争中头6个月的胜利对同盟国是很大的打击，但是从大的战略观点来看，沦陷的领土（甚至新加坡和菲律宾）都不是致命的，重要的是日本的行动和希特勒无故对美宣战，使世界最强大的国家最终参加了这场战争。当然，仅仅有工业生产力并不能保证军事效力——德国的指挥才能意味着单纯的人力财力的较量是愚蠢的——但伟大的同盟国，正像丘吉尔喜欢称呼的那样，在物质方面远远胜过轴心国，它的生产基地远离德军和日军，使德日军队鞭长莫及，它有资源和机会迅速建立起具有压倒优势的军事力量，这种力量是法西斯侵略者任何一个早期对手所不可能拥有的。两年之内，德·托克维尔在1835年关于形成两极世界的预见，终于到了实现的时候。
*That is to say, its output in 1929 totaled what it probably would have reached in 1921, had there been no war and had the pre-1913 growth rates continued.
[1]?这就是说，如果不发生战争，如果1913年以前的生产速度能够保持下去，那么欧洲的经济早在1921年就可能达到1929年的水平。
*That is, the post-1919 directive that the armed services should frame their estimates on the assumption that they would not be engaged in a major war within the next ten years.
[2]?澳大拉西亚，西方国家在16、17世纪开始使用的地理名称，原指亚洲以南可能存在的全部陆地，其后专指澳大利亚、新西兰、巴布亚新几内亚及邻近岛屿。广义说法与大洋洲范围一致。——审校者注
[3]?指1923年。——译者注
[4]?普恩加莱（1860～1934年），亦译彭加勒，法国著名政治家，曾任总统（1913～1920年），两度任总理（1922～1924年，1926～1929年）。——审校者注
[5]?勃鲁姆（1872～1950年），法国政治家、社会党人。曾几次出任总理（1936～1937年，1938年，1946～1947年）。
[6]?鲍尔温（1867～1947年），英国保守党领袖，三次任首相（1923～1924年，1924～1929年，1935～1937年）。——审校者注
[7]?张伯伦（1869～1940年），从1922年起历任英国邮政大臣、卫生大臣、财政大臣。1937～1940年任首相，以对德国奉行绥靖政策著称。——审校者注
[8]?这是1919年颁布的一条指令，即要求军队按照在下一个10年里不参加大的战争这一设想做出自己的预算。
[9]?指1932年初开幕的日内瓦国际裁军会议。——审校者注
[10]?指共产党军队。——译者注
[11]?指意大利法西斯军队。——译者注