History and Speculation
历史回顾与思考
A chapter with a title such as that above implies not merely a change in chronology but also, and much more significantly, a change in methodology. Even the very recent past is history, and although problems of bias and source make the historian of the previous decade “hard put to separate the ephemeral from the fundamental,”1 he is still operating within the same academic discipline. But writings upon how the present may evolve into the future, even if they discuss trends which are already under way, can lay no claim to being historical truth. Not only do the raw materials change, from archivally based monographs to economic forecasts and political projections, but the validity of what is being written about can no longer be assumed. Even if there always were many methodological difficulties in dealing with “historical facts,”2 past events like an archduke’s assassination or a military defeat did indeed occur. Nothing one can say about the future has that certainty. Unforeseen happenings, sheer accidents, the halting of a trend, can ruin the most plausible of forecasts; if they do not, then the forecaster is merely lucky.
这一章的节标题，不仅包含着年代的变化，更重要的还意味着方法论的不同。即使是最近的过去都已成了历史，尽管偏见和资料的问题曾使前10年的历史学家很难把事物的暂时现象和本质区分开来，时至今日，历史学家却依旧根据同样的学术原则行事。然而，论述当前如何向未来演变的著作，即使是讨论业已出现的趋势，也不能自以为它就是历史的真理。从以档案材料为依据的专著到经济预报和政治预测，不仅原始材料发生变化，而且所写的东西是否正确也不能肯定。在处理“历史事实”时，尽管经常遇到许多方法论方面的困难，但过去的事件，如皇太子被刺杀和军事失败等，事情毕竟确已发生。而关于未来，我们能说的连这样的确实性也没有。预料不到的事情，纯粹的偶发事件，发展趋势的突然中止，都可以使本来最合理的预测归于破灭。如果不是这样，那也只不过是预言家走运罢了。
What follows, then, can only be provisional and conjectural, based upon a reasoned surmise of how present tendencies in global economics and strategy may work out—but with no guarantee that all (or any) of this will happen. The gyrations which have occurred in the international value of the dollar over the past few years and the post-1984 collapse in oil prices (with its differing implications, for Russia, for Japan, for OPEC) offer a good warning against drawing conclusions from economically based trends; and the world of politics and diplomacy has never been one which followed straight lines. Many a final chapter in works dealing with contemporary affairs has to be changed, only a few years later, in the wisdom of hindsight; it will be surprising if this present chapter survives unscathed.
那么，我们只能根据当前全球经济和战略的趋向做出合理的推测，而这些也只能是暂时性的和猜测性的，不能保证所有的（或任何一项）推测都成为现实。过去几年业已发生的美元国际价格的起落和1984年后石油价格下跌（对苏联、日本、石油输出国产生了不同的影响），给我们提出很好的警告，说明不能根据经济动向来做结论；而且，政治和外交世界是从来没有直路的。许多著作中论述当代事务的最后章节，仅仅在几年之后就要根据后来的认识加以修改。要是本书这一章能经久不改，完美无瑕，岂不怪哉！
Perhaps the best way to comprehend what lies ahead is to look backward briefly, at the rise and fall of the Great Powers over the past five centuries. The argument in this book has been that there exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires. The speed of this global economic change has not been a uniform one, simply because the pace of technological innovation and economic growth is itself irregular, conditioned by the circumstance of the individual inventor and entrepreneur as well as by climate, disease, wars, geography, the social framework, and so on. In the same way, different regions and societies across the globe have experienced a faster or slower rate of growth, depending not only upon the shifting patterns of technology, production, and trade, but also upon their receptivity to the new modes of increasing output and wealth. As some areas of the world have risen, others have fallen behind—relatively or (sometimes) absolutely. None of this is surprising. Because of man’s innate drive to improve his condition, the world has never stood still. And the intellectual breakthroughs from the time of the Renaissance onward, boosted by the coming of the “exact sciences” during the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, simply meant that the dynamics of change would be increasingly more powerful and self-sustaining than before.
对过去5个世纪以来大国的兴衰作一简要回顾，也许是预测未来的最好方法。本书的一个论点是，世界上有一种变革的动力，这个动力主要由经济和技术的发展所驱动，然后对社会结构、政治制度、军事力量与各个国家和帝国的地位都产生影响。世界经济变化的速度之所以快慢不一，就是因为技术发明和经济增长的速度本身是参差不齐的，它们受着各个发明家、企业家，以及气候、灾害、战争、地理、社会结构等情况的制约。同样，由于技术、生产和贸易方式的变化，以及对增加生产和财富的新方式的接受能力不同，世界不同地区和社会都有过或快或慢的增长速度。世界一些地区崛起了，另一些地区则相对或者（有时则是）绝对地落后了。所有这些都不足为奇。由于人类具有改善自身条件的本能，世界的发展从来没有停止过。而且，人类智慧从文艺复兴时起取得突破，后来在启蒙运动和工业革命中受到“精密科学”的推动而飞速发展，这一事实足以表明，变革的动力将日益具有比以往更加强大的威力和自身持续发展的能力。
The second major argument of this book has been that this uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategical position of the members of the states system. This again is unsurprising, and has been said many times before, although the emphasis and presentation of argument may have been different. 3 The world did not need to wait until Engels’s time to learn that “nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely the army and the navy. ”4 It was as clear to a Renaissance prince as it is to the Pentagon today that military power rests upon adequate supplies of wealth, which in turn derive from a flourishing productive base, from healthy finances, and from superior technology. As the above narrative has shown, economic prosperity does not always and immediately translate into military effectiveness, for that depends upon many other factors, from geography and national morale to generalship and tactical competence. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.
本书第二个主要论点是，经济增长速度不均衡，对于国家体系中许多成员国相对的军事力量和战略地位都产生了决定性的长期的影响。这也是不奇怪的，而且，人们以前就多次这样说过，尽管强调的方面和表述的方式可能各不相同。世界不必等到恩格斯时代才知道，“没有什么比陆军和海军更依赖于经济条件的了”。对文艺复兴时期的君主和对今天的五角大楼一样，事情非常清楚，军事力量要靠足够的社会财富来支持，而财富来自生机勃勃的生产基础，来自健康的金融财政和先进的技术。如上所述，经济繁荣并不总是而且不会直接转化为军事实力，因为这要取决于许多其他因素——从地理、民族志气到军事领导和战术才能。尽管如此，事实仍然是，世界军事力量对比的所有重大变化，都是随着生产力对比的变化而变化，而且，国际体系中各帝国和国家的兴衰，同主要大国之间战争的结局是一致的。在这些战争中，胜利通常属于拥有最雄厚的物质资源的一方。
While what follows is speculation rather than history, therefore, it is based upon the plausible assumption that these broad trends of the past five centuries are likely to continue. The international system, whether it is dominated for a time by six Great Powers or only two, remains anarchical—that is, there is no greater authority than the sovereign, egoistical nation-state. 5 In each particular period of time some of those states are growing or shrinking in their relative share of secular power. The world is no more likely to remain frozen in 1987 or 2000 than it was in 1870 or 1660. On the contrary, certain economists would argue that the very structures of international production and trade are changing faster than ever before: with agricultural and raw-materials products losing their relative value, with industrial “production” becoming uncoupled from industrial “employment,” with knowledgeintensive goods becoming dominant in all advanced societies, and with world capital flows becoming increasingly detached from trade patterns. 6 All this, and the many new developments in science, are bound to influence international affairs. In sum, without the intervention of an act of God, or a disastrous nuclear conflagration, there will continue to be a dynamic of world power, essentially driven by technological and economic change. If the rosy forecasts of the impact of computers, robotics, biotechnology, and so on are correct—and if, in addition, forecasts of the success of a “green revolution” in parts of the Third World (with India and even China becoming regular net exporters of grain)7 do turn out right— then the world as a whole could be a lot richer by the early twenty-first century. Even if technological progress is less dramatic, economic growth is likely to occur. Changing demographic patterns, with their impact upon demand, would ensure that, as would the more sophisticated exploitation of raw materials.
下面要谈的是预测，而不是历史。因此，这里的讨论是以过去500年的主要趋向仍在继续这样一个似乎合理的假设为基础的。国际体系，不管一个时期内受6个大国还是仅仅受两个大国所主宰，它仍然处于无政府状态之中，没有什么比主权，即利己的民族国家具有更大的权威。在每一个特定时期里，都有一些国家在世俗权力中所拥有的分量或者在扩大或者在萎缩。世界到了1987年或2000年，不会再停留在1870年或1660年的状态中。相反，一些经济学家认为，国际生产与贸易的结构正在以前所未有的高速度变化着：农产品和原料产品在相对贬值，工业“生产”同工业“雇工”在相互脱钩，知识密集型产品在所有先进的社会里正在占据主导地位，世界资本的流动与贸易方式在日渐分离。所有这些，加上科学上的许多新发展，必然影响国际事务。总而言之，如果没有上帝的干预或灾难性的核战争，由于技术和经济发展的推动，世界力量将继续处于动态发展之中。如果关于计算机、人工智能、生物工程等的预测是正确的；此外，如果关于“第三世界的”绿色革命（其结果，印度甚至中国将成为粮食的纯出口国）将会成功的预测最后证明是对的，那么，到21世纪初，世界作为一个整体将富裕得多。即使技术进步不那么快，经济增长还是可能的。人口结构的变化及其对需求的影响，如同资源被更充分利用一样，对于实现这一点将起保证作用。
What is also clear is that this growth will be uneven—faster here, slower there, depending upon the conditions for change. It is this, more than anything else, which makes the prognoses that follow so provisional; for there is no guarantee that, for example, Japan’s impressive economic expansion over the past four decades will continue during the next two; nor is it impossible for Russian growth rates, which have been declining since the 1960s, to increase again in the 1990s, given changes in that country’s economic policy and mechanisms. On the evidence of existing trends, however, neither of those outcomes appears very likely. To put it another way, if it did happen that Japan stagnated and Russia boomed economically between now and the early twenty-first century, then that could only come about from changes in circumstances and policies far more drastic than it is reasonable to assume from the available evidence. Just because estimates of how the world will appear in fifteen or twenty-five years’ time may go wrong does not mean that one should prefer implausible outcomes rather than sensible expectations based upon current broad developments.
同样清楚的是，由于变革的条件不同，这种增长将是此快彼慢，不平衡的。正是这一点，而不是任何别的什么东西，使预测具有暂时性。例如，不能保证40年来取得了引人注目的成就的日本经济在今后20年一定能继续发展；而苏联经济自20世纪60年代以来增长率不断下降，但如果苏联国内经济政策和机制发生变革，那么，在90年代其增长速度再度回升也不是不可能的。然而，目前的发展趋势证明，上述两种结果都不大可能。换言之，从现在到21世纪初期，如果真的出现日本停滞不前，而苏联经济欣欣向荣，那么，这也只有在条件和政策发生的变革比目前根据现有证据所做的合理假设要急剧得多的情况下才有可能。对今后15至25年内世界变化的估计确实可能有误，但这并不是说，人们宁可接受难以置信的结局，而不相信以当前广泛的发展为依据所得出的合理的预测。
It is reasonable to expect, for example, that one of the better-known “global trends” of today, the rise of the Pacific region, is likely to continue, simply because that development is so broad-based. It includes not only the economic powerhouse of Japan, but also that swiftly changing giant the People’s Republic of China; not only the prosperous and established industrial states of Australia and New Zealand, but also the immensely successful Asian newly industrializing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore—as well as the larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) lands of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines; by extension, it also includes the Pacific states of the United States and provinces of Canada. 8 Economic growth in this vast area has been stimulated by a happy combination of factors: a spectacular rise in industrial productivity by exportoriented societies, in turn leading to great increases in foreign trade, shipping, and financial services; a marked move into the newer technologies as well as into cheaper, labor-intensive manufactures; and an immensely successful effort to increase agricultural output (especially grains and livestock) faster than total population growth. Each success has beneficially interacted with the others, to produce a rate of economic expansion which has far eclipsed that of the traditional western powers—as well as that of Comecon—in recent years.
例如，当今众所周知的一个“全球性发展趋向”——太平洋地区的崛起。对这个趋向将会继续发展做出肯定的预测是合理的，因为其发展的基础十分广泛。它不仅包括日本强大的经济，而且包括中华人民共和国这个急速变化着的巨人；不仅包括为人们所公认的繁荣的工业国澳大利亚和新西兰，而且包括像中国台湾、韩国、中国香港、新加坡，以及东南亚国家联盟的其他成员国马来西亚、印度尼西亚、泰国、菲律宾等在工业化方面新近取得了巨大成功的国家和地区。广而言之，它还包括美国和加拿大沿太平洋的州和省。这一广大地区的经济发展，由于各种因素的巧妙结合而得到了促进，即一些地区以出口为导向的工业生产迅速上升，反过来它又导致外贸、航运、金融各业的巨大增长，新技术以及更加廉价的劳动密集型产业的长足进步；由于巨大而富有成果的努力，使农业生产（特别是粮食和副食品）增产的速度超过了人口的增长。每一项成就都产生良好的相互作用，从而创造出远远超过传统的西方强国的经济增长率，同时近年来也超过了经济互助委员会成员国的经济增长速度。
In 1960, for example, the combined gross domestic product of the Asian-Pacific countries (i. e. , excluding the United States) was a mere 7. 8 percent of world GDP; by 1982, it had more than doubled, to 16. 4 percent, and since then the area’s growth rates have exceeded those of Europe, the United States, and the USSR by ever wider margins. It is very likely to contain over 20 percent of world GDP by the year 2000— the equal of Europe, or the United States; and that achievement will occur even on the basis of growth-rate differentials “much smaller” than those which have existed over the past quarter-century. 9 The dynamism of the Pacific basin has also been felt in the shifting economic balances within the United States itself during that same period. American trade with Asia and the Pacific was only 48 percent of that with Europe (OECD members) in 1960, but had risen to 122 percent of American-European trade by 1983—a change which has been accompanied by a redistribution of both population and income within the United States in the direction of the Pacific. 10 Despite a slowdown in, say, any one country’s growth, or problems affecting a particular industry, it is evident that these trends are continuing as a whole. It is not surprising, therefore, that one economic expert has confidently predicted that the entire Pacific region, which now possesses 43 percent of the world’s GNP, will enjoy a good 50 percent of it by the year 2000; and concludes, “The center of world economic gravity is shifting rapidly towards Asia and the Pacific, as the Pacific takes its place as one of the key centers of world economic power. ”11 This sort of language has of course been heard frequently since the nineteenth century; but only with the massive growth of the region’s commerce and productivity since 1960 has that forecast become a reality.
以生产总值为例，1960年亚太地区各国（美国除外）国内生产总值仅占世界生产总值的7.8%；到1982年其所占比例翻了一番以上，达16.4%；此后，这个地区的经济增长率以更大的幅度超出欧洲、美国和苏联。到2000年，这个比例很可能突破20%，相当于欧洲或美国的产值。即使其增长率低于过去25年已经取得的速度，也会达到这个比例。在这同一时期里，环太平洋的这种势头在美国本身的经济对比中也得到了体现。1960年，美国同亚太地区的贸易额仅占它同欧洲（欧洲经济合作与发展组织成员国）贸易额的48%，但到了1983年，上升到美欧贸易的122%。与这一变化并行不悖的是，美国人口的分布和收入的分配也向泛太平洋地区转移。尽管有个别国家的发展速度减缓，或一些问题影响某一工业的发展，但总的趋势在继续发展，这是显而易见的。因此，有一位经济学家满怀信心地预言，目前国民生产总值占世界总数43%的整个太平洋地区，到2000年其所占比例将高达50%，他还得出结论：“亚太地区已成为世界经济力量的主要中心之一，世界经济的重心正向该地区迅速转移。”这丝毫也不奇怪。当然，这种说法自19世纪以来就多次听到过。但是，只有自1960年以来该地区的商业和生产取得了大规模发展之后，这种预测才成了现实。
Similarly, it is also reasonable to assume that the next few decades will witness a continuation of a much less attractive but even broader trend: the spiraling cost of the arms race, which is fueled by the sheer expensiveness of newer weapon systems as well as by international rivalries. “One of the few constancies in history,” it has been observed, “is that the scale of commitment on military spending has always risen. ”12 And if that was true (granted some short-term fluctuations) for the wars and arms races of the eighteenth century, when weapons technology changed only slowly, it is much truer of the present century, when each new generation of aircraft, warships, and tanks is vastly more expensive than preceding ones, even when allowance is made for inflation. Edwardian statesmen, appalled that a pre- 1914 battleship cost ￡2. 5 million, would be staggered to learn that it now costs the British Admiralty ￡120 million and more for a replacement frigate! American legislators, who had willingly allocated funds for thousands of B-17 bombers in the late 1930s, now understandably wince at the Pentagon’s estimate that the new B-l bomber will cost over $200 billion for a mere one hundred planes. In all areas, the upward spiral is at work:
同样，设想今后几十年将会出现一个不那么引人注目但却更加广泛的趋向，也是合乎情理的。这一趋向是：由于昂贵的新武器系统和国际上的抗争，军备竞赛的耗费呈螺旋式上升。人们评论说：“历史上少有的经久不变的事情之一，是军费的投入总是上升的。”如果这一论断对于军事技术发展缓慢的18世纪的战争与军备竞赛（即便有短期的起伏）是正确的，那么，它对于每一代新的飞机、战舰、坦克都昂贵空前，甚至薪金也受通货膨胀的影响的20世纪来说，就更是千真万确的了。爱德华七世[1]时代的政治家们现在惊讶地发现，1914年以前的一艘价值250万英镑的战列舰，如今要用一艘价值1.2亿英镑以上的护卫舰来替换。20世纪30年代后期曾乐意为生产数以千计的B-17型轰炸机拨款的美国国会议员们，在今天当五角大楼估计生产100架新型的B-l轰炸机就要耗资2000亿美元时，也显得缩手缩脚了。在所有军事领域，费用都在攀升：
Bombers cost two hundred times as much as they did in World War II. Fighters cost one hundred times or more than they did in World War II. Aircraft carriers are twenty times as expensive and battle tanks are fifteen times as expensive as in World War II. A Gato class submarine cost $5,500 per ton in World War II, compared with $1. 6 million per ton for the Trident. 13
与第二次世界大战时相比，目前轰炸机的价格是过去的200倍，战斗机是100倍，航空母舰是20倍，主战坦克是“二战”时的15倍。“二战”时期一般G级潜艇的造价，每吨仅5500美元，而今三叉戟潜艇则每吨需160万美元。
Compounding these problems is the evidence that today’s armaments industry is becoming increasingly divergent from commercial, free-market manufacturing. The former, usually concentrated in a few gigantic firms enjoying a special relationship with their own department of defense (whether in the United States, Britain, or France, or even more in the “command economy” of the USSR), is frequently protected from marketplace operations by the state’s granting of exclusive contracts and cost-overrun guarantees, for products for which only it (and friendly states) will be the consumer. The latter, even in the case of giant companies like IBM and General Motors, has to struggle against cutthroat competition to win merely a share of the volatile internal and external markets in which quality, consumer taste, and price are vital variables. The former, driven by military men’s desire to have the most advanced “state-of-the-art” weaponry so that their armed services may be able to fight in all possible (if sometimes highly implausible) battle scenarios, produces goods which are increasingly more expensive, more elaborate, and much less numerous. The latter, after initial heavy investment in the early prototypes of household goods or office computers, has its average unit costs pushed downward, because of market competition and large-scale production. 14 And while it may be true that the explosion in new technological and scientific developments since the late nineteenth century inevitably drove defense manufacturers into a relationship with governments which deviated from “free market” norms,15 the present pace of this increase is an alarming one. The various proposals about “military reform” in the United States could perhaps prevent the result forecast by the cynics, that the entire Pentagon budget may be swallowed up on one aircraft by the year 2020; but even those efforts are unlikely to reverse the trend toward ever fewer weapons at ever higher cost.
综合考察一下这些问题就会发现，今天的军火工业正日益脱离商业和自由贸易市场的生产轨道。军火工业通常集中在少数与本国国防部门有特殊关系的大公司（无论美国、英国、法国都是如此，在苏联的计划经济中更是如此）。国家在市场管理中经常通过转让专有合同和对产品提供超成本保障等方式，给军火工业以保护，因为这种产品只有国家（和友好国家）是买主。这些公司，即使是像IBM公司和通用汽车公司这样的大公司，仅仅为了在瞬息多变的国内外市场中争得一席之地，都必须在残酷无情的竞争中奋斗。在这样的市场里，质量要求、消费者的胃口和价格都捉摸不定。为了满足军人获得当前最先进的武器、使军队能在所有可能的（有时也许是十分难以令人置信的）战场上作战的愿望，国家要生产愈加昂贵的复杂的但数量更少的产品。在对家庭用品或办公室电脑产品的最初原型进行大量投资后，因为要进行市场竞争和争取大批量生产，各公司都把产品的平均成本费用压低。与此同时，19世纪后期以来，新科技的迅猛发展不可避免地促进了军火制造商与政府的联系。这种与“自由市场”准则背道而驰的联系，目前已发展到令人吃惊的地步。玩世不恭的人们预言，到2020年，一架飞机就可以一口吞掉整个五角大楼的预算。美国关于“军事改革”的各种建议也许能阻止这种情况的出现。但即使采纳这些建议，更少的武器需要更多的费用这一趋势是不可能逆转的。
While much of this is of course due to the growing and inescapable sophistication of weapons—like modern fighter aircraft, which may contain 100,000 separate parts —it is also caused by the continuing array of arms races on land, on and under the oceans, in the air, and in space. If the greatest of those rivalries is between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries (which, thanks to the two superpowers, spend almost 80 percent of the world’s investment in armaments, and possess 60–70 percent of its aircraft and ships), there are smaller yet still significant arms races— not to mention wars—in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and across Asia, from Iran to Korea. The consequence has been an explosion in Third World military expenditures, even by the poorest regimes, and large-scale increases in arms sales and transfers to those countries; by 1984, world arms imports of a colossal $35 billion had exceeded the world trade in grain ($33 billion). In the following year, it is also worth noting, world military expenditures had reached a total of about $940 billion, rather more than the entire income of the poorer half of this planet’s population. What was more, that expenditure on weapons was rising faster than the global economy and most national economies were expanding. At the head were the United States and the USSR, each devoting well over $250 billion annually to defense and likely to push that total to over $300 billion in the near future. In most countries, spending on the armed forces was taking an increasing share of governmental budgets and of GNP, checked only (with very few exceptions of motive, as in Japan and Luxembourg) by economic weaknesses, shortage of hard currency, etc. , rather than by a genuine commitment to reduce arms expenditures. 16 The “militarization of the world economy,” as the Worldwatch Institute terms it, is now advancing faster than it has for a generation. 17
当然，这主要是由于武器装备不可避免地日趋复杂。比如，一架现代战斗机的部件可多达10万件。同时，也因为地上、海面、海底、空中和外层空间的军备竞赛在继续进行。如果说最大的竞赛是在北约组织与华约组织国家之间（这两个集团，由于有两个超级大国，其军备投资占世界总数的80%，拥有世界60%～70%的飞机和舰艇）进行的话，那么，在中东、非洲、拉丁美洲，以及从伊朗到朝鲜的亚洲地区，也存在着虽然规模较小但却值得注意的军备竞赛，至于战争就更不用说了。其结果是，第三世界军事费用急剧膨胀，即便最穷的国家也是如此，而且，军火交易大幅增加，并转向这些国家。1984年，世界武器交易额高达350亿美元，超过同年世界粮食贸易额（330亿美元）。同时值得注意的是，在其后的1985年，世界军费开支总额达9400亿美元，大大超过全球比较贫穷的一半人口的总收入。更有甚者，武器装备费的增长，比全球经济和大部分国家的国民经济的发展速度还快。在这方面，占据首位的是美国和苏联。美苏两国每年各自的国防费用都大大超过2500亿美元，在最近的将来，很可能突破3000亿美元。大多数国家花在武装部队上的费用在政府预算和国民生产总值中的比例还在上升，只有在经济困难和缺少硬通货等情况下，而不是出于真正的裁减军备费用的承诺（只有少数例外，如日本、卢森堡等），这种趋向才会中止。正如“世界动向研究所”所说的，“世界经济军事化”正以比30年前更快的速度向前发展着。
These two trends—the uneven pattern of growth, with the global productive balances tilting toward the Pacific basin; and the spiraling costs of weapons and armed forces—are of course separate developments. Yet at the same time it is obvious that they are increasingly likely to interact and indeed are doing so already. Both of them are driven by the dynamic of technological and industrial change (even if individual arms races will have political and ideological motives as well). Both of them impinge heavily upon the national economy: the first by boosting wealth and productivity at a faster or slower pace, and by making certain societies more prosperous than others; the second by consuming national resources— measured not simply in terms of investment capital and raw materials, but also (and perhaps even more importantly) in the share of scientists, engineers, R&D personnel, engaged in defense-related production as opposed to commercial, export-oriented growth. Although it has been claimed that defense expenditures can have certain commercial economic spin-offs, it seems increasingly difficult to argue against the proposition that excessive arms spending will hurt economic growth. 18 The difficulties experienced by contemporary societies which are militarily top-heavy merely repeat those which, in their time, affected Philip II’s Spain, Nicholas II’s Russia, and Hitler’s Germany. A large military establishment may, like a great monument, look imposing to the impressionable observer; but if it is not resting upon a firm foundation (in this case, a productive national economy), it runs the risk of a future collapse.
一个是不均衡的发展方式伴随着全球生产力对比倾向太平洋地区，一个是武器和军事费用螺旋式上升，这两个趋势当然是独立发展的。但与此同时，非常明显的是，二者很可能越来越互相影响，并且事实上现在就已在互相影响了。二者都由技术和工业变革的动力所推动（即便是单个的军备竞赛项目也都有其政治和思想动机）。二者都严重冲击着国民经济：一是促进财富和生产的不同速度增长，并促使某些社会比另一些社会更加繁荣；二是消耗国家的资源——不单纯从投资和原材料方面来衡量，而且（这也许是更重要的方面）要看与国防有关的生产部门同商业和以出口为导向的生产部门相比，占有多少科学家、工程师、研究与开发人员。虽说防务开支能产生某些经济副产品，但过多的军备支出将妨害经济发展。要反对这一观点看来是越来越困难了。军费负担沉重的当代社会所经历的困难，只不过是重蹈菲利普二世的西班牙、尼古拉二世的俄国和希特勒德国的覆辙。庞大的军事建设，就像一块巨大的纪念碑，对于敏感的观察家来说，它看起来很具诱惑力，但如果它不是建立在坚实的基础上（一个生机盎然的国民经济），将来就有倒塌的危险。
By extension, therefore, both of these trends have profound socioeconomic and political implications. Slow growth occurring in a particular country is likely to depress public morale, produce discontents, and exacerbate the discussion over national spending priorities; on the other hand, a fast pace of technological and industrial expansion will also have its consequences, especially upon a hitherto nonindustrial-ized society. Large-scale armaments spending, for its part, can benefit specific industries within the national economy; but it can also lead to a diversion of resources from other groups in society, and it can make that national economy less capable of handling the commercial challenges of other countries. Unless there is an enemy immediately at the gate, high defense spending in this century has nearly always provoked a “guns versus butter” controversy. Less publicly, but of even greater significance for our purposes, it has provoked a debate upon the proper relationship of economic strength to military power. 19
因此，从广义上说，这两个趋势都具有重大的社会、经济和政治意义。一个国家的经济发展滞缓，可能引起民众情绪低沉和不满，并激化公众对政府财政分配的议论；另一方面，技术和工业的高速发展也将产生影响，对迄今仍未实现工业化的社会尤其如此。大规模的军备开支，其本身对国民经济中的某些工业是有利的，但它也会导致社会其他集团的资源发生转移，从而削弱国民经济应对其他国家商业挑战的能力。除非大敌压境，否则一个国家实行高额国防开支几乎总是要激起关于“大炮与黄油”的争吵。对我们来说，更有意义的是，这将引起关于经济实力与军事力量的适当关系问题的争论，尽管这种争论不那么具有广泛的群众性。
Not for the first time in history, therefore, there looms today a tension between a nation’s existence in an anarchic military-political world and its existence in a laissez-faire economic world; between on the one hand its search for strategic security, as represented by its investment in the latest weapon systems and in its large-scale diversion of national resources to the armed forces, and on the other hand its search for economic security, as represented by an enhanced national prosperity, which depends upon growth (which in turn flows from new methods of production and wealth creation), upon increased output, and upon flourishing internal and external demand—all of which may be damaged by excessive spending upon armaments. Precisely because a top-heavy military establishment may slow down the rate of economic growth and lead to a decline in the nation’s share of world manufacturing output, and therefore wealth, and therefore power, the whole issue becomes one of the balancing the short-term security afforded by large defense forces against the longer-term security of rising production and income.
因此，今天一个国家会在下述关系上出现紧张问题，这在历史上已经不是第一次了。这些关系是：国家既要在尽可能宽松的军事-政治世界中存在，又要在自由放任的经济世界中存在。一方面国家要寻求其战略安全，表现为向最新式的武器系统投入资金，向武装部队投入大量的国家资源；另一方面，国家要获得经济安全，表现为促进社会的兴旺，而这取决于经济的发展（来自生产和创造财富的方式的革新），取决于生产的增长和国内外旺盛的需求——过大的军费开支对所有这些都会造成损害。正因为过于沉重的军费负担会减缓经济的增长速度，导致国家在世界工业产品出口总额中的比例以及在世界财富和力量中所占的分量下降，所以，整个问题是一个如何权衡供养庞大的武装部队以获取近期安全，与发展生产、增加收入，以取得长远安全的问题。
The tension between these conflicting aims is perhaps particularly acute in the late twentieth century because of the publicity given to the existence of various alternative “models” for emulation. On the one hand, there are the extremely successful “trading states”—chiefly in Asia, like Japan and Hong Kong, but also including Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria—which have taken advantage of the great growth in world production and in commercial interdependence since 1945, and whose external policy emphasizes peaceful, trading relations with other societies. In consequence, they have all sought to keep defense spending as low as is compatible with the preservation of national sovereignty, thereby freeing resources for high domestic consumption and capital investment. On the other hand, there are the various “militarized” economies—Vietnam in Southeast Asia, Iran and Iraq as they engage in their lengthy war, Israel and its jealous neighbors in the Near East, and the USSR itself—all of which allocate more (in some cases, much more) than 10 percent of their GNP to defense expenditures each year and, while firmly believing that such levels of spending are necessary to guarantee military security, manifestly suffer from that diversion of resources from productive, peaceful ends. Between the two poles of the merchant and the warrior states, so to speak, there lie most of the rest of the nations of this planet, not convinced that the world is a safe enough place to allow them to reduce arms expenditure to Japan’s unusually low level, but also generally uneasy at the high economic and social costs of large-scale spending upon armaments, and aware that there is a certain trade-off between short-term military security and long-term economic security. For countries which have—again, in contrast to Japan—extensive overseas military obligations from which it would be difficult to escape, the problem is further compounded. Moreover, in many of the leading Powers the planners are acutely aware that they have to balance the spiraling cost of weaponry not only against productive investment but also against growing social requirements (especially as their overall population ages), which makes the allocation of spending priorities a more difficult task than ever.
这种存在于相互矛盾的目的之间的紧张关系，到20世纪后期可能会特别尖锐，因为在公众面前有各种“模式”可供仿效。一方面，有极其成功的“贸易型”国家和地区——主要在亚洲，诸如日本和中国香港，也包括瑞士、瑞典和澳大利亚——这些国家和地区，得益于世界生产大发展和1945年以来相互依存的贸易，以及它们所强调的同其他国家实现和平贸易关系的对外政策。因此，它们在不危及国家主权的情况下，千方百计把防务费用保持在尽可能低的水平上，从而解放了国内高消费和投资所需要的资源。另一方面，有各种类型的“军事化”经济——战争旷日持久的越南、伊拉克和伊朗，以色列和它满怀猜疑与嫉妒的中东邻国，以及苏联本身——所有这些国家每年都拨出超过（某些情况下则大大超过）其国民生产总值10%的财力用于防务，它们坚信这样高的防务开支对于保证其军事安全是必要的。显然，这些国家因把用于生产与和平目的的资源转做他用而吃了苦头。介于商业型和尚武型这两个极端之间的国家，绝大多数是这样的：它们既不相信世界太平到了可以把军费降到日本那样的低水平，也对大规模的军备给经济和社会造成的高额消耗感到不安，而且意识到，在短期的军事安全与长期的经济安全之间是可以作某种变通的。对于那些在海外承担广泛军事义务的国家来说——这同日本再次形成鲜明的对照——这个问题更需作综合考虑。而且，许多大国的领导者强烈意识到，他们必须把武器费用的螺旋式上升同生产投资和日益增长的社会需求（特别是整个人口中不同年龄的人群的需求）加以平衡，这又使得对财政开支轻重缓急的确定比以往更加困难。
The feat demanded of most if not all governing bodies as the world heads toward the twenty-first century is therefore a threefold one: simultaneously to provide military security (or some viable alternative security) for its national interests, and to satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry, and to ensure sustained growth, this last being essential both for the positive purposes of affording the required guns and butter at the present, and for the negative purpose of avoiding a relative economic decline which could hurt the people’s military and economic security in the future. Achieving all three of those feats over a sustained period of time will be a very difficult task, given the uneven pace of technological and commercial change and the unpredictable fluctuations in international politics. Yet achieving the first two feats—or either one of them—without the third will inevitably lead to relative eclipse over the longer term, which has of course been the fate of all slower-growing societies that failed to adjust to the dynamics of world power. As one economist has soberly pointed out, “It is hard to imagine, but a country whose productivity growth lags 1 percent behind other countries over one century can turn, as England did, from the world’s indisputed industrial leader into the mediocre economy it is today. ”20
因此，当世界迈向21世纪的时候，世界大部分（如果不是全部的话）强国所追求的伟业具有三重性，即同时要实现三项目的：为国家利益提供军事安全（或者可供选择的可行的安全），满足老百姓的社会经济需求，保证经济持续增长。其中最后一项，无论对于提供当前所需的大炮和黄油这个积极的目的，还是对于防止相对的经济下降以免损害人民未来的军事与经济安全这个消极目的，都是必不可少的。如果技术和商业发展速度不平衡，国际政治出现难以预料的动荡，要在一个长时期内实现上述三点将是一项极其艰巨的任务。而只实现头两项或两项中的一项，而没有第三项，必然导致在更长的时期里出现相对黯淡无光的前景，而这一直是那些未能适应世界力量变动、发展缓慢的社会的命运。正如一位经济学家严肃指出的：“真难以想象，一个国家如果在一个世纪之内生产力的增长以1%的速度落后于其他国家，其地位就会改变，如同英国从无可争辩的世界工业国领袖地位降到了今天的中等经济国家的地位一样。”
Just how well (or badly) the leading nations seem placed to carry out this task is the focus of the rest of this chapter. It hardly needs emphasizing that since the varied demands of defense spending/military security, social/consumer needs, and investment for growth involve a triangular competition for resources, there is no absolutely perfect solution to this tension. Probably the best that can be achieved is that all three aims be kept in rough harmony, but just how that balance is reached will always be strongly influenced by national circumstances, not by some theoretical definition of equilibrium. A state surrounded by hostile neighbors will think it better to allocate more to military security than one whose citizens feel relatively unthreatened; a country rich in natural resources will find it easier to pay for guns and butter; a society determined upon economic growth in order to catch up to the others will have different priorities from one on the brink of war. Geography, politics, and culture will all ensure that one state’s “solution” will never be exactly the same as another’s. Nevertheless, the basic argument remains: without a rough balance between these competing demands of defense, consumption, and investment, a Great Power is unlikely to preserve its status for long
世界主要国家将如何实现这个任务，是本章其余各节要探讨的焦点。无须强调，防务费用与军事安全、社会与消费的需要，以及为发展经济而进行投资，这三者都要争夺资源，要解决这个紧张关系，没有绝对的万全之策。也许最好的办法是使这三者保持大体的协调。但如何达到这种协调，总要受到国家的各种条件（而不是均衡论的定义）的巨大影响。一个处于敌对邻国包围的国家与一个相对没有感受到威胁的国家相比，它就会认为在军事安全方面最好多花点钱；一个资源丰富的国家支付大炮和黄油的费用都会感到容易些；一个将发展生产以赶上其他国家作为主导思想的社会，同一个濒临战争边缘的社会相比，对各项事务的轻重缓急会有不同的财政支出安排。由于地理、政治和文化等原因，一个国家的“方略”永远不会跟另一个国家完全相同。尽管如此，一个基本的论点仍是存在的：如果在防务、消费和投资这三个相互竞争的需求中没有大致的平衡，一个大国就不可能长久地保持它的地位。