后记
后记
After a five-hundred-year survey of the rise and fall of the Great Powers within the international system, there is a case for concluding with a substantial final section on theory and methodology, in which the author would engage the proliferating theories upon “war and the cycle of relative power,”1 “global wars, public debts, and the long cycle,”2 “the size and duration of empires,”3 and the various other attempts4 by political scientists to make some sense of the whole and —usually—to suggest implications for the future. But this is not a work of political science, even if it hopes to have offered a large body of detailed facts and commentaries to those scholars in that discipline who are investigating the larger patterns of war and change in the international order.
对国际体系中500年的大国兴衰史进行考察后，在本书结束之前，笔者写了最后一节。在这相当重要的一节中，笔者阐发了许多理论和方法论问题，如“战争与力量对比发展周期”，“全球性战争、公债与长周期”，“帝国的大小与持续时间”，以及许多政治学家曾经探讨过的其他各种理论，以便读者对本书所述主题有一个总体概念，并对某些事物未来的发展趋势进行预测。但是，这不是一部政治学专著，尽管它向正在研究战争和国际秩序变化规律的政治学家们，提供了大量翔实的材料和评论。
This section will also not attempt to offer a conclusive summary of where we stand now, for that would contradict one of the chief messages of this book, which is that the international system is subject to constant changes, not only those caused by the day-to-day actions of statesmen and the ebb and flow of political and military events, but also those caused by the deeper transformations in the foundations of world power, which in time make their way through to the surface.
笔者在本节中不打算对目前国际形势做出结论性概括，因为这违背本书的主要宗旨。本书认为，国际体系是不断变化的。这不仅由于政治家们的日常活动和政治、军事事件的不断发生所致，还由于世界力量的形成会发生深刻的变化，这些力量在一定时候就会脱颖而出。
Nevertheless, it is proper to offer a few general observations before closing this study. It has been argued throughout the book that so far as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, or economic strength and military strength, are always relative and should be seen as such. Since they are relative, and since all societies are subject to the inexorable tendency to change, then the international balances can never be still, and it is a folly of statesmanship to assume that they ever would be. Given the anarchic and competitive nature of rivalries between nations, the history of international affairs over the past five centuries has all too frequently been a history of warfare, or at least of preparation for warfare—both of which consume resources which societies might use for other “goods,” whether public or private. Whatever the stage of economic and scientific development reached, each century has therefore witnessed a debate about the extent to which national wealth ought to be used for military purposes. It has also recorded a debate about how best to enhance national prosperity, not only because of the individual benefits which increased wealth brings, but also because of the recognition that economic growth, productivity, flourishing finances, will all affect a Great Power’s relative prospects if another international conflict occurs. Indeed, the outcome of all of the major, lengthy wars among the Great Powers which have been surveyed here repeatedly points to the crucial influences of productive economic forces—both during the struggle itself, and during those periods between wars when differentiated growth rates cause the various Powers to become relatively stronger or weaker. To a large degree, the outcome of the great coalition wars of the period 1500–1945 confirms the shifts which have been taking place, over a longer period, at the economic level. The new territorial order established at the end of each war thus reflects the redistribution of power which has been taking place within the international system. The coming of peace, however, does not stop this process of continual change; and the differentiated pace of economic growth among the Great Powers ensures that they will go on, rising and falling, relative to each other.
然而，在结束本书之前，谈几点一般性意见是适宜的。在全书中都谈到，在国际体系中财富与力量或经济力量与军事力量总是相互依存的，而且也应该这样看。既然这两者关系密切，既然各国的发展变化是不可抗拒的规律，那么，国际力量对比就不会一成不变，任何政治家不这样假定就是愚蠢的。由于各国间的对抗具有无序性和竞争性，过去5个世纪的国际事务史基本上是一部战争史，或至少是一部备战史。无论作战或备战都会消耗本可用于做其他（公共的或私人的）“好事”的资源。因此，不管国民经济和科学技术发展到何种阶段，在每个世纪都会有一场关于应将多少国家财富用于军事目的的辩论。与此同时，还有一场关于如何更好地繁荣国民经济的辩论。这不仅因为财富的增多可使国民受益，还由于人们认为，经济力量的增长、生产力的提高和财政收入的增加，将影响到大国的胜负——如果再次发生国际性战争的话。的确，本书论及的所有大国间长期大规模战争都说明，在战争期间和两次大战之间的和平时期，经济力量的影响是巨大的，不同的经济增长率可使不同国家变得相对强大或弱小。1500～1945年发生的多次大规模联盟战争的结局，在很大程度上证实了长期以来一直在进行的经济力量的变化。因此，每次战争结束后建立起来的“各国版图”新秩序，都是已经形成的国际体系中权力再分配的结果。然而，和平的到来并不能使这一不断变化的过程结束，各大国不同的经济增长速度将使它们继续处于相对兴旺和衰微之中。
Whether the existence of “rising” and “falling” Powers in an anarchical world order must always lead to war is not certain. Most of the historical literature assumed that “war” and “the Great Power system” go hand in hand. Mackinder, one of the founding fathers of neomer-cantilist and geopolitical thought, held that “the great wars of history … are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations. ”5 But did this pattern cease in 1945? It may indeed be the case that the advent of nuclear weapons, with their built-in threat to turn any exchange of fire into mutual devastation, has finally checked the habit of resorting to armed conflict in response to secular shifts in the Great Power balances, leaving only indirect, small-scale, “surrogate” wars. However, it might also be the case that the mutual apprehensions of nuclear weapons merely ensure that future conflicts, if they occur between the Great Powers, would remain conventional—although even they would be dreadfully bloody affairs, given modern battlefield weaponry.
在混乱的世界秩序中，兴旺和衰微的大国的存在是否必然导致战争，尚无法确定。大部分历史著作认为，“战争”与“大国体系”是形影不离的。新商业理论和地缘政治学的创始人之一麦金德指出，“历史上的大规模战争，都是由诸国的不平衡发展直接或间接造成的”。但是，这种情况是不是1945年以后就不复存在了呢？的确，此后可能出现两种情况。第一，核武器（它的使用有将相互交火变为相互毁灭的内在危险）的问世，最终制止了只从武装冲突对付大国力量对比不断变化的习惯做法，使间接的小规模“代理人”战争成为唯一尚存于世的战争样式。第二，双方对核武器的恐惧将使大国间的未来战争（如果这种战争发生的话）仍保持常规形态。但是，鉴于现代化常规武器的巨大威力，即便是常规战争也是极其残酷的流血事件。
Obviously, no one knows the answer to such critical questions. Those who assume that mankind would not be so foolish as to become involved in another ruinously expensive Great Power war perhaps need reminding that that belief was also widely held for much of the nineteenth century; and, indeed, Norman Angell’s book The Great Illusion, which became an international bestseller with its argument that war would be economically disastrous to both victors and vanquished, appeared as late as 1910, as the European general staffs were quietly finalizing their war plans.
显然，对这些重大问题，任何人都无法做出回答。有些人认为，人类不会如此愚蠢，以至于再去进行另一场代价极高的大国战争。我们必须提醒这些人的一点是，在19世纪的很大一部分时间里，这种看法也很普遍。诺尔曼·安吉尔的《大幻想》一书（该书是一部国际畅销书，其主要观点是，战争对战胜国和战败国在经济上都会造成巨大损失）于1910年出版，而欧洲各国的总参谋部正无声无息地制订最后的作战计划。
Whatever the likelihood of nuclear or conventional clashes between the major states, it is clear that important transformations in the balances are occurring, and will continue, probably at a faster pace than before. What is more, they are occurring at the two separate but interacting levels of economic production and strategic power. Unless the trends of the past two decades alter (but why should they?), the pattern of world politics looks roughly as follows:
不管大国间发生核战争或常规战争的可能性如何，有一点很清楚，那就是世界力量对比正处在重大变化时期，而且这种变化很可能以比以往更快的速度进行。此外，这种变化主要发生在经济生产和战略力量这两个既分开又相互影响的方面。假如过去20年的发展趋势今后仍然如故，世界政治格局可能出现如下情况：
First, there will be a shift, both in shares of total world product and total world military spending, from the five largest concentrations of strength to many more nations; but that will be a gradual process, and no other state is likely to join the present “pentarchy” of the United States, the USSR, China, Japan, and the EEC in the near future.
第一，在世界经济总产量和世界军事开支总额方面，“五个力量中心”所占的比例与世界其他国家相比将会减少。但是，这种减少是一个缓慢的过程。在不远的将来，可能没有任何国家可加入由美国、苏联、中国、日本和欧共体组成的“五头政治联盟”。
Secondly, the global productive balances between these five have already begun to tilt in certain directions: away from Russia and the United States, away also from the EEC, to Japan and China. This does not make for a balanced five-sided arrangement in economic terms, for the United States and the EEC have roughly the same productive and trading muscle (though the former gains immensely by being a military state); the USSR and Japan are also roughly equal (though Japan is growing the faster), with each having only around two-thirds of the productive power of the previous two; and the PRC is still a long way behind, but growing fastest of all.
第二，这“五个力量中心”各自在世界经济总产量中所占的比重已经开始沿着一定方向变化，即苏联、美国、欧共体所占比重逐渐减小，日本和中国所占比重逐渐增大。在经济方面，这五个中心并非处于均势。美国的生产能力和贸易能力与欧共体大体相同（虽然前者在军事力量方面占有巨大优势），苏联与日本也基本相同（虽然日本的经济发展较快），并且后两者的生产能力分别大约只占前两者的2/3。中国的生产能力仍远远落在后面，但它的经济发展最快。
Thirdly, in military terms there still exists a bipolar world, in that only the United States and the USSR have the capacity to ensure each other’s destruction—and the destruction of any other country. Nevertheless, that bipolarity may be being slowly eroded, both at the nuclear level, either because such weapons are unusable under most circumstances, or because China, France, and Britain are each acquiring massive additions to their own nuclear arsenals; and at the conventional level, because of the steady buildup of Chinese strength, plus the growing realization that a West German-French (with, possibly, British and Italian) agglomeration of land, sea, and air forces would be an extremely large combination of power, if those nations really could work together effectively. For domestic-political reasons, that is not likely to happen in the near future; but the very fact that such a potential exists places a further uncertainty over the “bipolar” system, at least at the conventional level. By contrast, no one is at present suggesting that Japan will transform itself into a great military Power; yet all acquainted with the pattern of “war and change in world politics” would find it unsurprising if, one day, a different political leadership in Tokyo decided to turn its economic strength into a larger degree of military strength.
第三，在军事方面，当前仍是一个两极世界，只有美国和苏联有能力毁灭对方和其他任何国家。尽管如此，世界的两极性可能逐渐减弱。在核力量方面逐渐减弱的原因有二：一是在绝大多数情况下，核武器不能使用；二是中国、法国和英国都在努力扩大各自的核武库。在常规力量方面减弱的原因则是：中国的常规作战能力在稳步增强；联邦德国和法国（可能还有英国和意大利）越来越深刻地认识到，如果它们能真正有效地合作，它们的陆、海、空军合并后将成为一支非常强大的联合军事力量。由于国内政治方面的原因，这种情况在不远的将来发生的可能性很小。但是，存在这种可能性本身，就足以使世界“两极”体制究竟能持续多久更加令人怀疑，至少在常规力量方面是这样。相比之下，目前任何人都不会想到，日本将把自己建成一个军事大国。不过，如果今后有一天新上台的东京政治领导人决定将其更多的经济力量用于发展一支更强大的军事力量，则任何熟悉“战争与世界政治变化”方式的人都不会感到惊奇。
If Japan did decide to become a more active military presence in world affairs, it would presumably be because it felt it could no longer preserve its interests by acting simply as a “trading state”;6 in strengthening its armed forces, it would therefore be hoping to enhance its power and influence internationally to an extent that could not be achieved by nonmilitary measures. Yet the history of the past five hundred years of international rivalry demonstrates that military “security” alone is never enough. It may, over the shorter term, deter or defeat rival states (and that, for most political leaders and their publics, is perfectly satisfactory). But if, by such victories, the nation over-extends itself geographically and strategically; if, even at a less imperial level, it chooses to devote a large proportion of its total income to “protection,” leaving less for “productive investment,” it is likely to find its economic output slowing down, with dire implications for its long-term capacity to maintain both its citizens’ consumption demands and its international position. 7 Already this is happening in the case of the USSR, the United States, and Britain; and it is significant that both China and West Germany are struggling to avoid an excessive investment in military spending, both suspecting that it would affect their long-term growth prospects.
如果日本的确想用更多的军事手段积极参与世界事务，那么很可能是由于它感到只作为一个“贸易大国”进行活动，已无法维护自己的利益。它希望通过加强自己的武装部队，把自己的国际地位和影响提高到只使用非军事手段无法达到的程度。然而，过去500年的国际竞争史表明，只有军事“安全”是绝对不够的。从近期来看，军事强国可遏制或打败敌对国家（只要做到这一点，多数政治领导人及其民众就非常满意了）。但是，如果它们因为取得了胜利就无限制地进行领土和战略扩张，如果它们像帝国那样将很大一部分国民收入用于“防务”，而“生产性投资”越来越少，它们的经济增长速度就会放慢。从长远看，这将对满足本国公民的消费要求和保持本国的国际地位，造成不良影响。在苏联、美国和英国，这种情况已在发生。值得注意的是，中国和联邦德国都在竭力防止将过多的资金用于军事。它们都认为，军事投入过大会影响国家长期发展前景。
We therefore return to the conundrum which has exercised strategists and economists and political leaders from classicaltimes onward. To be a Great Power— by definition, a state capable of holding its own against any other nation8— demands a flourishing economic base. In List’s words, “War or the very possibility of war makes the establishment of a manufacturing power an indispensable requirement for a nation of the first rank. … ”9 Yet by going to war, or by devoting a large share of the nation’s “manufacturing power” to expenditures upon “unproductive” armaments, one runs the risk of eroding the national economic base, especially vis-à-vis states which are concentrating a greater share of their income upon productive investment for long-term growth. All of this was fully recognized by the classical writers on political economy.
因此，我们现在必须回到这个从古至今都使战略家、经济学家和政治领导人困惑不解的难题上。要成为一个大国（根据定义，大国就是一个能保卫自己并可对付任何国家的强国），必须有可使国家欣欣向荣的经济基础。利斯特说：“对于一个一流强国来说，要进行战争或非常可能进行战争，就必须使自己成为一个工业生产大国。”然而，进行战争，或将国家的很大一部分“生产能力”用于生产武器装备，就有破坏国家经济基础的危险，对于那些为得到长期发展而将绝大部分国民收入用于发展生产的国家的经济基础更是如此。
All of this was fully recognized by the classical writers on political economy. Those who followed Adam Smith’s preferences inclined to keep defense expenditures low; those sympathetic to List’s notion of Nationaloekonomie wanted to see the state possess greater instruments of force. All of them, if they were honest, admitted that it was really a matter of choice, and a difficult choice at that. 10 Ideally, of course, “profit” and “power” should go hand in hand. Far too often, however, statesmen found themselves confronted with the usual dilemma: between buying military security, at a time of real or perceived danger, which then became a burden upon the national economy; or keeping defense expenditures low, but finding one’s interests sometimes threatened by the actions of other states. 11
对于上述所有观点，政治经济学的经典作家们都认为是正确的。追随亚当·斯密的经济学家主张保持低水平的国防开支，而赞同利斯特的国防经济观点的人，则要求国家拥有强大的暴力手段。他们都承认（如果他们诚实的话），这实际上只是一个做出何种选择的问题，并且是一个困难的选择。当然，最理想的是，“利润”和“军力”齐头并进。但是，政治家们往往发现自己面临如下困境：在现实的或想象的危险时期，必须“花钱购买”军事安全，而过后这种安全又会变成国民经济的负担；而保持低水平的国防开支，有时又会感到本国的利益受到了其他国家行动的威胁。
The present large Powers in the international system are thus compelled to grapple with the twin challenges which have confronted all their predecessors: first, with the uneven pattern of economic growth, which causes some of them to become wealthier (and, usually, stronger), relative to others; and second, with the competitive and occasionally dangerous scene abroad, which forces them to choose between a more immediate military security and a longer-term economic security. No general rule will provide the decision-makers of the time with a universally applicable course of action. If they neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they may be unable to respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them; if they spend too much on armaments—or, more usually, upon maintaining at growing cost the military obligations they had assumed in a previous period—they are likely to overstrain themselves, like an old man attempting to work beyond his natural strength. None of this is made easier by the “law of the increasing cost of war. ”12 Even if, to take the most often cited example, one actually can prevent the entire U. S. Air Force budget from being consumed by the production of a single aircraft in the year 2020, the cost escalation of modern weaponry is an alarming tendency for all governments—and their taxpayers.
因此，当前国际体系中的大国必须应付以前所有大国都遇到过的两种挑战：第一是经济发展的不平衡，这可致使一些国家比另一些国家更富有、更强大；第二是紧张的有时甚至是危险的国际形势，这将迫使它们在追求近期军事安全和长远经济发展之间做出抉择。没有什么普遍适用的准则可使当今各国决策者制定出适用于所有情况的行动方案。他们如果不重视国防建设，当敌国乘虚而入时，就无法做出有效的反应。他们如果在军备上花钱过多，或不顾费用的不断增加仍然继续承担过去接受的各项军事义务，就会感到力不从心，像一个老人那样本已经精疲力竭但仍在拼命地工作。由于“战争费用日益增加的规律”，上述两种挑战都难以应付。人们经常引用的一个例子是，今天美国空军一年的预算到2020年只够研制一种飞机。尽管人们或许能够避免这一点，但对于各国政府及其纳税人来说，现代武器费用的增长速度仍然是一个惊人的事实。
Each of today’s large Powers—the United States, the USSR, China, Japan, and (putatively) the EEC—is therefore left grappling with the age-old dilemmas of rise and fall, with the shifting pace of productive growth, with technological innovation, with changes in the international scene, with the spiraling cost of weapons, with alterations in the power balances. Those are not developments which can be controlled by any one state, or individual. To paraphrase Bismarck’s famous remark, all of these Powers are traveling on “the stream of Time,” which they can “neither create nor direct,” but upon which they can “steer with more or less skill and experience. ”13 How they emerge from that voyage depends, to a large degree, upon the wisdom of the governments in Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, Peking, and the various European capitals. The above analysis has tried to suggest what the prospects are likely to be for each of those polities and, in consequence, for the Great Power system as a whole. But that still leaves an awful lot depending upon the “skill and experience” with which they manage to sail on “the stream of Time. ”
因此，当今世界的所有大国——美国、苏联、中国、日本和欧共体各国——都必须认真分析从古至今的大国兴衰和各国生产力发展速度时快时慢的原因，都面临技术革命、国际形势和世界力量对比不断变化、武器费用螺旋上升、力量对比的变化等问题。任何国家和个人都无法左右这些情况的发展变化。用俾斯麦的名言说，所有国家都在“时间的长河”中航行，它们“不能创造或控制时间”，但却“能以不同的技能和经验驾驶航船前进”。它们的航行顺利与否，在很大程度上取决于在华盛顿、莫斯科、东京、北京和西欧各国首都的政府领导人的智慧。上述分析试图表明，五大政治实体中每个实体的前景可能会是什么样子，因而也要表明整个大国体系的前景如何。但是，这在很大程度上仍然取决于它们在“时间长河”中驾驶航船的“技能和经验”。