CHAPTER ONE
The Rise of the Western World
1. W. H. McNeill, A World History (London, 1979 edn.), p. 295; idem, The Rise of
the West (Chicago, 1967), p. 565; J. M. Roberts, The Pelican History of the World
(Harmondsworth, Mdssx., 1980), p. 519; G. Barraclough (ed.), The Times Atlas
of World History (London, 1978), p. 153.
2. For surveys of international relations in Europe around 1500, see The New
Cambridge Modern History (hereafter NCMH), vol. 1, The Renaissance 1493–
1520, ed. G. R. Potter (Cambridge, 1961), espec. chs. 7–14; vol. 2, The
Reformation 1520–1529, ed. G. R. Elton (Cambridge, 1958), chs. 10–11 and 16;
G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517–1559 (London, 1963), ch. 2; G. Mattingly,
Renaissance Diplomacy (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1965), pp. 115ff.
3. There are succinct accounts of Ming China in McNeill, Rise of the West, pp. 524–
34; and Roberts, History of the World, pp. 424–44. For more detail, C. O.
Hucker, China’s Imperial Past (Stanford, Calif., 1975), pp. 303ff; J. A. Harrison,
The Chinese Empire (New York, 1972); W. Eberhard, A History of China (2nd
edn., London, 1960), pp. 232–70; M. Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past
(London, 1973).
4. Y. Shiba, Commerce and Society in Sung China (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970); J.
Needham, The Development of Iron and Steel Technology in China (London, 1958);
L.-S. Yang, Money and Credit in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1952); and espec. W.
H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since
1000 A.D. (Chicago, 1983), ch. 2.
5. The great source (in English) for the above is J. Needham, Science and
Civilization in China, vol. 4, pt. 3, Civil Engineering and Nautics (Cambridge,
1971), espec. pp. 379–536; but see also Lo Jung-pang, “The Emergence of
China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods,” Far
Eastern Quarterly, vol. 14 (1955), pp. 489–503; C. G. Reynolds, Command of the
Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York, 1974), pp. 98–104.
6. For what follows, see McNeill, World History, pp. 254–55; Needham, Science
and Civilization in China, vol. 4, pt. 3, pp. 524ff; R. Dawson, Imperial China
(London, 1972), pp. 230ff; Lo Jung-pang, “The Decline of the Early Ming
Navy,” Orient Extremus, vol. 5 (1958), pp. 149–68; and Ho Ping-Ti, “Economic
and Institutional Factors in the Decline of the Chinese Empire,” in C. C. Cipolla
(ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires (London, 1970), pp. 274–76, although in
general the picture given is less gloomy than other accounts. See also the
careful comparisons in J. Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in
East and West (London, 1969), passim; and in E. L. Jones, The European Miracle:
Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
(Cambridge, 1981).
7. Jones, European Miracle, ch. 9; F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols. (London, 1972), vol. 2, pp.
661ff; P. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1938); H. Inalcik, The
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600 (New York, 1973); M. A. Cook
(ed.), A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 (Cambridge, 1976); M.G.S.
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vols. 2 and 3 (Chicago/London, 1924); C. M.
Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation (London, 1973).
8. A. C. Hess, “The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the
Oceanic Discoveries, 1453–1525,” American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 7
(December 1970), pp. 1892–1919; Braudel, Mediterranean, vol. 2, pp. 918ff;
Reynolds, Command of the Sea, pp. 112ff; and the comments in J. F. Guilmartin,
Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in
the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1974).
9. Jones, European Miracle, pp. 176ff; Cook (ed.), History of the Ottoman Empire,
espec. pp. 103ff; B. Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman
Empire,” in Cipolla (ed.), Economic Decline of Empires, pp. 215–34; H.A.R. Gibbs
and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, vol. 1, 2 pts. (London, 1950 and
1957), pt. 1, pp. 273ff.; pt. 2, pp. 1–37. See also H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire:
Conquest, Organization and Economy: Collected Studies (London, 1978), chs. 10–
13.
10. Jones, European Miracle, p. 182.
11. For the gloomy side, see ibid., ch. 10; Roberts, History of the World, pp. 415–23;
W. H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb: A Study in Indian Economic History
(London, 1923); M. D. Morris, “Values as an Obstacle to Economic Growth in
South Asia,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 27 (1967), pp. 588–607. For a
brighter presentation, A. J. Qaisar, The Indian Response to European Technology
and Culture, A.D. 1498–1707 (Delhi, India, 1982), passim; and, for a slightly
later period, C. A. Bayley, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars (Cambridge, 1983).
12. McNeill, Rise of the West, pp. 645–49; Jones, European Miracle, pp. 157–59; R.
Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley/Los Angeles,
1978), pp. 431ff; G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (London, 1950),
pp. 3–208; idem, A History of Japan, vols. 2–3 (London, 1961 and 1964); C. R.
Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan 1549–1650 (Berkeley, 1951); J. W. Hall,
Government and Local Power in Japan (Princeton, 1966); D. M. Brown, “The
Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare,” Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 7 (1947),
pp. 236–45; R. P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan (Princeton,
N.J., 1984).
13. McNeill, World History, pp. 328–43; Bendix, Kings or People, pp. 491ff; I.
Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 1, Capitalist Agriculture and the
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New
York/London, 1974), pp. 301–24; G. Vernadsky, The Tsardom of Muscovy 1547–
1682 (New Haven, Conn., 1969); R. H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade 1550–
1700 (Berkeley, Calif., 1943); M. Florinsky, Russia: A Short History (New York,
1964), chs. 3–9; R. J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (New York, 1971 reprint); T.
Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London, 1974); L. Kochan and R. Abraham,
The Making of Modern Russia (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 2nd edn., 1983), chs.
3–6.
14. See Roberts, History of the World, p. 585: “So little was Russia known even in
the [seventeenth] century that a French king could write to the Tsar, not
knowing that the prince whom he addressed had been dead for ten years.”
Note also the condescending remarks of English traders in Russia in Kochan
and Abraham, Making of Modern Russia, pp. 56–57.
15. This is the title, of course, of E. L. Jones’s impressive book. It, and the
important work by W. H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, have strongly
influenced my argument in the following paragraphs. See also McNeill, Rise of
the West, passim; Wallerstein, Modern World System; D. C. North and R. P.
Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge, 1973); J. H. Parry, The
Establishment of the European Hegemony 1415–1715 (3rd edn., New York, 1966);
S. Viljoen, Economic Systems in World History (London, 1974), passim; P.
Chaunu, European Expansion in the Later Middle Ages (Amsterdam, 1979).
16. H. C. Darby, “The Face of Europe on the Eve of the Great Discoveries,” in
NCMH, vol. 1, pp. 20–49; N. J. G. Pounds and S. S. Ball, “Core-Areas and the
Development of the European States System,” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, vol. 54 (1964), pp. 24–40; R. G. Wesson, State Systems:
International Relations, Politics and Culture (New York, 1978), p. 111; Jones,
European Miracle, ch. 7.
17. N. J. G. Pounds, An Historical Geography of Europe 1500–1840 (Cambridge,
1979), ch. 1; C. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and
Economy 1000–1700 (2nd edn., London, 1980), passim; C. Cipolla (ed.), The
Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 1, The Middle Ages (London, 1972), ch.
7; E. Samhaber, Merchants Make History (London, 1963), pp. 130ff.; Wallerstein,
Modern World System, vol. 1, pp. 42ff.; Braudel, Mediterranean, vol. 1, pp.
188–224.
18. Roberts, History of the World, pp. 505–6; J. H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance
(2nd edn., London, 1966), pp. 60ff.
19. Quoted in Jones, European Miracle, p. 235.
20. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, ch. 3; J. U. Nef, War and Human Progress (New York,
1968 edn.), ch. 2; R. A. Preston, S. F. Wise, and H. O. Werner, Men in Arms
(London, 1962), ch. 7; C. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European
Expansion 1400–1700 (London, 1965), passim; and R. Bean, “War and the Birth
of the Nation State,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 33 (1973), pp. 203–21.
21. One is bound to put quotation marks around the word “national,” since so
many men in the French army were mercenaries: see V. G. Kiernan, “Foreign
Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,” Past and Present, vol. 11 (1957), p. 72.
For the general comments above, see McNeill, Pursuit of Power, ch. 3; H.
Thomas, History of the World (New York, 1979 edn.), ch. 24; M. E. Mallet,
Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London, 1976); and
J. R. Hale, “Armies, Navies and the Art of War,” NCMH, vol. 2, espec. pp.
486ff; idem, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450–1620 (London, 1985),
ch. 2.
22. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, passim; Nef, War and Human Progress, pp. 46ff.
23. C. Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494–1660
(London, 1979), chs. 1–2; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, ch. 3; Wesson, State
Systems, pp. 112ff; Braudel, Mediterranean, vol. 2., pp. 845ff; J. R. Hale, “The
Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology c. 1450—c.1534,” in
Hale et al. (eds.), Europe in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1965), pp. 466–94.
24. For what follows, see Parry, Age of Reconnaissance, ch. VII; Reynolds, Command
of the Sea, pp. 106ff; P. Padfield, Guns at Sea (London, 1973), pt. 1; G. V.
Scammell, The World Encompassed: The First European Maritime Empires, c. 800–
1650 (Berkeley, Calif., 1981), which places the fifteenth-century voyages in the
broader sweep of European expansionism.
25. Jones, European Miracle, p. 80. The importance of “efficient economic
organization” is also repeatedly stressed in North and Thomas, Rise of the
Western World, p. 1 and passim.
26. This is the thrust of Guilmartin’s excellent study, Gunpowder and Galleys,
passim.
27. For the Portuguese experience, see Parry, Age of Reconnaissance; P. Padfield,
Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, vol. 1, 1481–
1654 (London, 1979), ch. 2; C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–
1825 (London, 1969); V. Magalhaes-Godinho, L’économie de l’Empire Portugais
aux XVe et XVIe siècles (Paris, 1969); B. W. Diffie and C. D. Winius, Foundations
of the Portuguese Empire 1415–1580 (Minneapolis, 1977); Waller-stein, Modern
World System, p. 325ff; Braudel, Mediterranean, vol. 2, pp. 1174–76; Scammell,
World Encompassed, ch. 5.
28. P. M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London/New York,
1976), p. 18.
29. Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 1, p. 49.
30. Whether the Portuguese government itself benefited so much is more doubtful:
see M. Newitt, “Plunder and the Rewards of Office in the Portuguese Empire,”
in M. Duffy (ed.), The Military Revolution and the State 1500–1800 (Exeter
Studies in History, Exeter, 1980), pp. 10–28;. and W. Reinhard, Geschichte der
europ?ischen Expansion, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1983), ch. 3 and 5.
31. Wallerstein, Modern World System, p. 170; C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in
America (New York, 1947); Parry, Spanish Seaborne Empire, passim; Scammell,
World Encompassed, ch. 6; C. Gibson, Spain in America (New York, 1966).
32. Wallerstein, Modern World System. See also Jones, European Miracle, ch. 4;
Parry, Age of Reconnaissance, pt. 3; Roberts, History of the World, pp. 600ff;
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, The Economy of Expanding Europe
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1967), passim. A sensible
warning against anticipating a real “world system” is contained in R. A.
Dodgshon, “A Spatial Perspective,” Peasant Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (January
1977), pp. 8–19.
33. For the beginnings of this challenge to the Iberian trading monopoly overseas,
see NCMH, vol. 1, ch. 16, and vol. 3, ch. 17; Padfield, Tide of Empires, ch. 4;
Scammell, World Encompassed, ch. 7 and 9.
34. K. Mendelsohn, Science and Western Domination (London, 1976), passim; Nef,
War and Human Progress, ch. 3; Elton, Reformation Europe, pp. 292ff; McNeill,
Rise of the West, pp. 592–98; Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe,
vol. 2, ch. 3; A. Wolf, A History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York, 1935).
35. Jones, European Miracle, pp. 170–71 and passim; and cf. A. G. Frank, World
Accumulation 1492–1789 (New York/London, 1978), pp. 137ff.
36. See again Mendelsohn, Science and Western Domination, which stresses the
importance of scientific observation and prediction; and McNeill, Rise of the
West, pp. 593–99.
CHAPTER TWO
The Habsburg Bid for Mastery, 1519–1659
1. C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1937), p.
3. For the earlier wars, see idem, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2
vols. (London, 1924).
2. See the warning about this in G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517–1559
(London, 1963), pp. 305ff.
3. Ibid., p. 35.
4. R. A. Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System,
1580–1720 (London/Boston, 1981), p. 44.
5. For example, Gattinara’s declaration to Charles V that “God has set you on the
path towards a world monarchy,” quoted in NCMH, vol. 2, pp. 301ff.; and the
quotations in H. Kamen, Spain 1469–1714 (London, 1983), p. 67.
6. Oman, War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 5. This book remains the best military
narrative for this period. Useful succinct accounts of these 140 years are in the
three relevant volumes of Fontana History of Europe: G. R. Elton, Reformation
Europe 1517–1559 (London, 1963); J. H. Elliott, Europe Divided 1559–1598
(London, 1968); and G. Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598–1648 (London, 1979). See
also NCMH, vols. 2–5; and H. G. Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe
1516–1660 (Ithaca/London, 1971).
7. NCMH, vol. 2, ch. 11 and 17.
8. V. S. Mamatey, Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1815 (Huntingdon, N.Y., 1978
edn.), p. 9.
9. Details in Oman, War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 703ff; Braudel, Mediterranean
World, vol. 2, pp. 904–1237.
10. H. C. Koenigsberger, “Western Europe and the Power of Spain,” in NCMH, vol.
3, pp. 234–318; G. Parker, Spain and the Netherlands 1559–1659 (London,
1979), passim; C. Wilson, The Transformation of Europe 1558–1648 (London,
1976), chs. 8–9.
11. The international nature of the rivalry is well covered in Parker, “The Dutch
Revolt and the Polarization of International Politics,” in Spain and the
Netherlands, pp. 74ff; and, for a more economic/social interpretation, J. V.
Polisensky, The Thirty Years War (London, 1971), espec. ch. 4.
12. C. V. Wedgewood, The Thirty Years War (London, 1964 edn.), chs. 3–6.
13. Parker, Europe in Crisis, p. 252; J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares (New
Haven, Conn., 1986), p. 495.
14. Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 54–77; C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne
Empire 1600–1800 (London, 1972), pp. 25–26.
15. For the final years of conflict, see Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain, chs.
2–4; J. Stoye, Europe Unfolding 1648–1688 (London, 1969), chs. 3–4.
16. Apart from specific works cited in the notes below, this section has been much
influenced by a number of excellent studies of Spanish imperial power, namely:
J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469–1716 (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1970); J.
Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1964 and 1969); Stradling,
Europe and the Decline of Spain, passim. Also used were two older works, R.
Trevor Davies, The Golden Century of Spain 1501–1621 (London, 1937); and B.
Chudoba, Spain and the Empire 1519–1643 (New York, 1969 edn.). Finally,
there is John Elliott’s thoughtful article, reproduced in Cipolla (ed.), Economic
Decline of Empires, as “The Decline of Spain,” pp. 168–95.
17. Koenigsberger, Habsburgs and Europe, p. xi.
18. R. Ehrenberg, Das Zeitalter der Fugger: Geldkapital und Creditverkehr im 16.
Jahrhundert, 2 vols. (Jena, 1896); E. Samhaber, Merchants Make History
(London, 1963), ch. 8; and see the broad recent survey by G. Parker, “The
Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe 1500–1730,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana
Economic History of Europe, vol. 2, pp. 527–89.
19. NCMH, vol. 1, ch. 7; R. A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1974), chs. 1–2.
20. Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 1, p. 77.
21. M. Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560–1660,” in Roberts, Essays in
Swedish History (London, 1967), pp. 195–225; G. Parker, “ ‘The Military
Revolution, 1560–1660’—a Myth?” in Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, pp.
86–105; M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
(Cambridge, 1977), pp. 5–6; J. R. Hale, “Armies, Navies, and the Art of War,”
in NCMH, vol. 2, pp. 481–509, and vol. 3, pp. 171–208; McNeill, Pursuit of
Power, ch. 4; R. Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” Journal of
Economic History, vol. 33 (1973), pp. 203–21.
22. G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659: The Logistics
of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries War (Cambridge, 1972), p. 6.
23. I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560–1620 (London,
1976), p. 16; more generally, see Reynolds, Command of the Sea, chs. 4–6.
24. Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 1, pp. 53–58.
25. Ibid., p. 128. See also Parker, Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, ch. 6.
26. Braudel, Mediterranean World, vol. 2, p. 841; and, for a full breakdown, Parker,
“Lepanto (1571): the Costs of Victory,” in Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 122–
34.
27. NCMH, vol. 3, pp. 275ff.; Parker, “Why Did the Dutch Revolt Last So Long?”,
and “Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders 1572–1607,” in
Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 45–64, 106–21.
28. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, ch. 3.
29. Ibid., pp. 36ff, 89ff; Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 2, pp. 30ff.
30. For further details, see J. Regla, “Spain and Her Empire,” in NCMH, vol. 5, pp.
319–83; Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 2, chs. 4–5; Elliott, Imperial
Spain, ch. 10; Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain, chs. 3–5; but see also
Kamen, Spain 1469–1714, arguing for a later “recovery.”
31. See the interesting remarks of Braudel about the disadvantages facing the two
“overlarge” empires of Spain and Islam, in Mediterranean World, vol. 2, pp.
701–03.
32. The fluctuations of Spanish effort from one theater to another are nicely
charted in Parker, “Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands,
1559–1648,” in Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 17–42.
33. Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 1, p. 347.
34. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 70.
35. E. Heischmann, Die Anf?nge des stehenden Heeres in Oesterreich (Vienna, 1925).
36. NCMH, vol. 5, chs. 18 and 20; Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire.
37. See the excellent analysis of the war in the Netherlands in Duffy, Siege Warfare,
ch. 4.
38. Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 185, 188.
39. Idem, Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 50ff.
40. NCMH, vol. 3, p. 308.
41. Cited in Parker, Europe in Crisis, p. 238.
42. Ibid., p. 239.
43. For what follows, see Kamen, Spain 1469–1714, pp. 81ff, 161ff, 214ff; H. G.
Koenigsberger, “The Empire of Charles V in Europe,” in NCMH, vol. 2, pp. 301–
33; and the extended version in Koenigsberger, Habsburgs and Europe, passim.
44. H. G. Koenigsberger, The Government of Sicily Under Philip II (London, 1951),
passim.
45. Idem, The Habsburgs and Europe, passim; and see also the excellent new study
by D. Stella, Crisis and Continuity: The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
46. Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 21–22.
47. NCMH, vol. 1, pp. 450ff, and vol. 2, pp. 320ff; Elliott, Imperial Spain, chs. 5 and
8; Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 1, pp. 53ff and passim, and vol. 2, pp.
3ff.
48. For what follows, see Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, pp. 250ff; J. V.
Vives, “The Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Economic Decline of Empires, pp. 121–67, Davies, Golden Century of Spain, chs. 3
and 8; Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 1, pp. 191ff; as well as the books
by Elliott and Lynch.
49. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, p. 33; Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg
Spain, p. 25.
50. D. Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1966), p. 214; Lynch,
Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 2, pp. 139ff. But this Spanish policy of
tolerating trade with their Dutch enemies was often reversed, as is made clear
in Israel’s article, note 82 below.
51. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, p. i; Parker, Europe in Crisis,
pp. 71–75; more generally, Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, chs. 8–
9.
52. Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, p. 96.
53. NCMH, vol. 2, p. 472.
54. Ibid., vol. 1, ch. 10; and espec. M. Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance
France (New Haven/London, 1972), chs. 2–3.
55. Oman, War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 393–536, gives the military details of
the French wars. For the politics, see J.H.M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in
the Sixteenth Century (London, 1975), passim; and R. Briggs, Early Modern
France 1560–1715 (Oxford, 1977), ch. 1.
56. Nef, War and Human Progress, pp. 103ff; Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance
France, ch. 8; Salmon, Society in Crisis, pp. 301ff; E. J. Hamilton, “Origin and
Growth of National Debt in Western Europe,” American Economic Review, vol.
37, no. 2 (1947), pp. 119–20.
57. NCMH, vol. 3, pp. 314–17; Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, ch. 8;
Salmon, Society in Crisis, ch. 12; Briggs, Early Modern France, pp. 80ff; Parker,
Europe in Crisis, pp. 119–22.
58. Parker, Europe in Crisis, pp. 17ff, 246ff; J. B. Wolf, Toward a European Balance
of Power 1620–1715 (Chicago, 1970), pp. 17–19.
59. A. Guery, “Les finances de la monarchie Fran?aise,” Annales, vol. 33, no. 2
(1978), pp. 216–39, espec. pp. 228–30, 236. The similarity of the strains upon
both France and Spain is well argued in J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares
(Cambridge, 1984), especially chs. 3 and 5–6; and in M. S. Kimmell, “War,
State Finance, and Revolution,” in P. McGowan and C. W. Kegley (eds.), Foreign
Policy and the Modern World-System (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1983), pp. 89–124.
60. E. H. Jenkins, A History of the French Navy (London, 1973), ch. 4; Briggs, Early
Modern France, pp. 128–44; Parker, Europe in Crisis, pp. 276ff.
61. R. Stradling, “Catastrophe and Recovery: The Defeat of Spain 1639–43,”
History, vol. 64, no. 211 (June 1979), pp. 205–19.
62. On English economic history in this period, see Cipolla, Before the Industrial
Revolution, pp. 276–96; D. C. Coleman, The Economy of England 1450–1750
(Oxford, 1977); B. Murphy, A History of the British Economy (London, 1973), pt.
1, ch. 4; C. Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution (Harmondsworth, Mddsx.
1969); R. Davis, English Overseas Trade 1500–1700 (London, 1973). Among the
more prominent political surveys are G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors
(London, 1955); D. M. Loades, Politics and the Nation 1450–1660 (London,
1974), pp. 118ff; and P. Williams, The Tudor Regime (Oxford, 1979), espec. chs.
2 and 9. On the crown’s finances, see the older work F. C. Dietz, English Public
Finance 1485–1641, vol. 1, English Government Finance 1485–1558 (London,
1964 edn.).
63. Nef, War and Human Progress, pp. 10–12, 71–73, 87–88.
64. C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509–1970: A Military, Political and Social
Survey (London, 1970), ch. 1; Oman, War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 285ff; G.
J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries 1485–1547 (Charlottesville, Va.,
1980). For the later period, see C. G. Cruikshank, Elizabeth’s Army (2nd edn.,
Oxford, 1966).
65. Williams, Tudor Regime, pp. 64ff; Dietz, English Government Finance, chs. 7–14;
Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution, ch. 6; P. S. Crowson, Tudor Foreign
Policy (London, 1973), ch. 25.
66. K. R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering (Cambridge, 1964); indem, Trade,
Plunder and Settlement (Cambridge, 1983); Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 1, pp.
120ff; D. B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, 1550–1642 (London,
1983), ch. 5; Scammell, World Encompassed, pp. 465ff.
67. As quoted in Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, p. 28. See also M. Howard, “The
British Way in Warfare” (Neale Lecture, London, 1975); Barnett, Britain and Her
Army, pp. 25ff, 51ff; R. B. Wernham, “Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy,” in
Elizabethan Government and Society, ed. S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield, and C. H.
Williams (London, 1961), pp. 340–68. See also the two general surveys by
Wernham, Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485–1588
(London, 1966), and The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy 1588–1603
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1980).
68. For these figures, see F. C. Dietz, “The Exchequer in Elizabeth’s Reign,” Smith
College Studies in History, vol. 8, no. 2 (January 1923); idem, English Public
Finance 1485–1641, vol. 2, 1558–1641, chs. 2–5; W. R. Scott, The Constitution
and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, 3 vols.
(Cambridge, 1912), vol. 3, pp. 485–544.
69. Loades, Politics and the Nation, pp. 301ff; R. Ashton, The Crown and the Money
Market 1603–1640 (Oxford, 1960), passim, espec. chs. 2 and 7.
70. R. Ashton, The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution 1603–1649
(London, 1979); C. Hill, The Century of Revolution 1603–1714 (Edinburgh,
1961), pt. 1; C. Russell (ed.), The Origins of the English Civil War (London,
1973); L. Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642 (London, 1972);
Loades, Politics and the Nation, pp. 327ff.
71. Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, pp. 44ff; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp.
90ff; Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution, pp. 155ff; J. R. Jones, Britain and
the World 1649–1815 (London, 1980), pp. 51ff. See also two important German
studies: B. Martin, “Aussenhandel und Aussenpolitik Englands unter
Cromwell,” Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 218, no. 3 (June 1974), pp. 571–92; and
H. C. Junge, Flottenpolitik und Revolution: Die Entstehung der englischen Seemacht
w?hrend der Herrschaft Cromwells (Stuttgart, 1980).
72. M. Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy Under the Cromwellian Protectorate
(London, 1962 edn.), p. 48.
73. C. Hill, Century of Revolution, p. 161.
74. North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, pp. 118, 150, and passim.
75. What follows relies heavily upon the writings of Michael Roberts, not only his
classic Gustavus Adolphus, 2 vols. (London, 1958), but also his broader surveys:
Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967); Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of
Sweden (London, 1973); (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness, 1632–1718 (London,
1973); and The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560–1718 (Cambridge, 1979).
76. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, pp. 52ff; Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, vol. 2, pp. 107ff;
Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 2, pp. 203ff; and E. F. Heckscher, An
Economic History of Sweden (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), ch. 4, espec. pp. l0lff.
77. There is a brief summary of the reforms in Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus and the
Rise of Sweden, chs. 6–7; full details in idem, Gustavus Adolphus, vol. 2, pp. 63–
304.
78. See F. Redlich, “Contributions in the Thirty Years War,” Economic History
Review, 2nd series, vol. 12 (1959), pp. 247–54, as well as his larger work, The
German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1964). M.
Ritter, “Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins,” Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 90
(1902), and A. Ernstberger, Hans de Witte: Finanzmann Wallensteins (Wiesbaden,
1954), have further details. For Sweden, see Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus and the
Rise of Sweden, ch. 8; and S. Lundkvist, “Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630–1635,”
Historisk tidskrift, 1966, pp. 377–421, with a German summary.
79. Roberts, “Charles XI,” in Essays in Swedish History, p. 233.
80. Idem, Swedish Imperial Experience, pp. 132–37.
81. Ibid., p. 51.
82. G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977), supersedes all other accounts of
the sixteenth-century phase of the “Eighty Years War.” For the later struggle,
see the important article by J. I. Israel, “A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the
Netherlands, 1618–1648,” Past and Present, no. 76 (1977), pp. 34–74; and
idem, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661 (Oxford, 1982).
83. G. Gash, Renaissance Armies 1480–1650 (Cambridge, 1975), p. 106.
84. C. Wilson, The Dutch Republic and the Civilization of the Seventeenth Century
(London, 1968), p. 31. See also Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 1, pp.
199ff; vol. 2, ch. 2.
85. Quoted from Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 249; Reynolds, Command of the Sea, pp.
158ff; Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, passim; Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 1,
ch. 5; Scammell, World Encompassed, ch. 7.
86. On this “shift” from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic world, see Cipolla, Before
the Industrial Revolution, ch. 10; Braudel, Mediterranean World, vol. 2; Wallerstein,
Modern World System, vols. 1 and 2; and R. T. Rapp, “The Unmaking of
the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 35
(1975), pp. 499–525, with some useful reservations about what was happening.
87. On the losses caused to the United Provinces by the war, see Parker, “War and
Economic Change,” passim, and Israel, “Conflict of Empires,” passim. On
Amsterdam’s financial role, and official debts, see Parker, “Emergence of
Modern Finance in Europe,” pp. 549ff, 573ff; V. Barbour, Capitalism in
Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, 1950), passim; André-E.
Sayous, “Le r?le d’Amsterdam dans l’histoire du capitalisme commercial et
financier,” Revue Historique, vol. 183, no. 2 (October-December 1938), pp. 242–
80.
88. Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” passim. See also S. E. Finer,
“State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” in C. Tilly
(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, 1975), pp.
84–163.
89. NCMH, vol. 3, ch. 16; Wesson, State Systems, pp. 121ff; O. Ranum (ed.),
National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe
(Baltimore/London, 1975); and E. D. Marcu, Sixteenth Century Nationalism
(New York, 1976). This was also seen in the “national” economic theories of
the time: see G. H. McCormick, “Strategic Considerations in the Development
of Economic Thought,” pp. 4–8, in G. H. McCormick and R. E. Bissess (eds.),
Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behavior (New York, 1984).
90. Among the more general interpretations and syntheses, see Tilly (ed.),
Formation of National States in Western Europe, passim; Bendix, Kings or People,
pp. 247ff; Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 1, ch. 3; V. G. Kiernan, “State
and Nation in Western Europe,” Past and Present, vol. 31 (1965), pp. 20–38; J.
H. Shennan, The Origins of the Modern European State 1450–1725 (London,
1974); H. Lubasz (ed.), The Development of the Modern State (New York, 1964).
91. Cited in Creveld, Supplying War, p. 17.
92. Ibid., pp. 13–17.
93. See again Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares, ch. 6.
CHAPTER THREE
Finance, Geography, and the Winning of Wars, 1660–1815
1. For basic political narratives of this period, see D. McKay and H. M. Scott, The
Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815 (London, 1983), an excellent survey; NCMH,
vols. 5–9; W. Doyle, The Old European Order 1660–1800 (Oxford, 1978); E. N.
Williams, The Ancien Regime in Europe 1648–1789 (Harmondsworth, Mddsx.,
1979 edn.). Europe in the outside world is treated in J. H. Parry, Trade and
Dominion: The European Overseas Empire in the Eighteenth Century (London,
1971); G. Williams, The Expansion of Europe in the Eighteenth Century (London,
1966). For cartographical representations of these trends, see G. Barraclough
(ed.), Times Atlas of World History, pp. 192ff.
2. On military and naval developments generally, see Nef, War and Human
Progress, pt. 2; Ropp, War in the Modern World, chs. 1–4; Preston, Wise, and
Werner, Men in Arms, chs. 9–12; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, chs. 4–6; H.
Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London/Boston, 1983), chs.
1–4; J. Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe 1648–1789 (Manchester, 1982). On
navies, see Reynolds, Command of the Sea, chs. 6–9; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of
British Naval Mastery, chs. 3–5; Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 2.
3. On these developments, see, in addition to the references in note 2 above, A.
Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe 1494–1789 (Bloomington, 1979), espec.
pt. 2; Howard, War in European History, ch. 4; van Creveld, Supplying War, pp.
l0ff; C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton,
N.J., 1975), espec. S. E. Finer’s essay “State-and-Nation-Building in Europe: The
Role of the Military,” pp. 84–163.
4. G. Parker, “Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe,” passim; Tilly (ed.),
Formation of National States in Western Europe, chs. 3–4; F. Braudel, The Wheels
of Commerce, vol. 2 of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Centuries (London,
1982); H. van der Wee, “Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems,” in E. R. Rich
and C. H. Wilson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 5
(Cambridge, 1977), pp. 290–392; P.G.M. Dickson and J. Sperling, “War
Finance, 1689–1714,” in NCMH, vol. 6, ch. 9. Note also K. A. Rasier and W. R.
Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” World Politics, vol.
35 (1983), pp. 489–516; and C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, A History of Taxation
and Expenditure in the Western World (New York, 1986), pp. 250ff.
5. The term refers, of course, to the title of P.G.M. Dickson’s excellent book The
Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit 1688–
1756 (London, 1967).
6. This endless debate is covered in W. Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus (Munich,
1913); Nef, War and Human Progress; and many later books and articles. See the
useful introduction and bibliography in J. M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic
Development (Cambridge, 1975).
7. Parker, “Emergence of Modern Finance,” passim; Wallerstein, Modern World
System, vol. 2, pp. 57ff; C. H. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1966 reprint); V. Barbour, Capitalism in
Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, 1950), espec. ch. 6. Above all,
see now J. C. Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital
Market 1740–1815 (Cambridge, 1980).
8. See the discussion on this in Wilson, “Decline of the Netherlands,” in Economic
History and the Historian: Collected Essays (London, 1969), pp. 22–47; and idem,
Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance; as well as the references in note 23 below.
9. Riley, International Government Finance, chs. 6–7.
10. For general comparisons of the French and British economies, financial
policies, and fiscal systems, see Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 2, chs. 3
and 6; P. Mathias and P. O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain and France, 1715–1810,”
Journal of European Economic History, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter 1976), pp. 601–49;
F. Crouzet, “L’Angleterre et France au XVIIIe siècle: essai d’analyse comparée
de deux croissances économiques,” Annales, vol. 21 (1966), pp. 254–91;
McNeill, Pursuit of Power, espec. ch. 6; N.F.R. Crafts, “Industrial Revolution in
England and France: Some Thoughts on the Question: ‘Why was England
First?’ ” Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 30 (1977), pp. 429–41. There
is a brief synopsis in P. Kriedte, Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists:
Europe and the World Economy, 1500–1800 (Leamington Spa, 1983), pp. 115ff.
11. Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain and France,” passim; and for the
earlier period, see again Dickson and Sperling, “War Finance 1689–1714,”
passim. There is, however, nothing quite like R. Braun’s penetrating
comparative essay “Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building,” in
Tilly (ed.), Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 243–327.
12. Dickson, Financial Revolution in England, p. 198. For the institutional story, see
J. H. Clapham, The Bank of England, vol. 1,1694–1797 (Cambridge, 1944); and
H. Roseveare, The Treasury: The Evolution of a British Institution (London/New
York, 1969); and compare with the much less satisfactory (and irregular)
situation prior to 1688: C. D. Chandaman, The English Public Revenue 1660–
1688 (Oxford, 1975).
13. Riley, International Government Finance, chs. 4 and 6; Wilson, Anglo-Dutch
Commerce and Finance, passim; A. C. Carter, “Dutch Foreign Investment, 1738–
1800,” Economica, n.s., vol. 20 (November 1953), pp. 322–40. The role of
Dutch finance in Britain’s growth is also stressed (and perhaps exaggerated) in
Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 2, pp. 279ff; but note also the
interesting arguments in L. Neal, “Interpreting Power and Profit in Economic
History: A Case Study of the Seven Years War,” Journal of Economic History, vol.
37 (1977), pp. 34–35.
14. Dickson, Financial Revolution in England, p. 9, which is the source for Table 2.
15. Bishop Berkeley’s quotation is from ibid., p. 15. For McNeill’s argument about
the “feedback loop,” see Pursuit of Power, pp. 178, 206ff.
16. The most useful study here is J. F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770–1795
(Cambridge, 1970); but see also the articles by Dickson and Sperling, “War
Finance,” and Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain and France,” as well as
the references in Chapter 2 above to the writings of Bonney, Dent, and Guery.
See also the older work R. Mousnier, “L’evolution des finances publiques en
France et en Angleterre pendant les guerres de la Ligue d’Augsburg et de la
Succession d’Espagne,” Revue Historique, vol. 44, no. 205 (1951), pp. 1–23.
17. Bosher, French Finances 1770–1795, p. 20. This argument is summarized in
Bosher’s article “French Administration and Public Finance in their European
Setting,” NCMH, vol. 8, ch. 20. For calculations of the amount of taxes
siphoned off into private hands, see Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain
and France,” pp. 643–46.
18. The direct quotations come from J. G. Clark, La Rochelle and the Atlantic
Economy During the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore/London, 1981), pp. 23, 226;
and see in particular chs. 1 and 7, as well as the conclusion. That story can be
compared with the British experience, as recounted in R. Davis, The Rise of the
Atlantic Economies (London, 1975); W. E. Minchinton (ed.), The Growth of
English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London,
1969); A. Calder, Revolutionary Empire: The Rise of the English-Speaking Empires
from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s (London, 1981), bks. 2–3; as well as a
host of specialized books upon individual ports and trades.
19. See the illuminating detail in the chapters “Finances” and “Supply and
Equipment” in L. Kennet, The French Armies in the Seven Years War: A Study in
Military Organization and Administration (Durham, N.C., 1967). For the navy’s
weaknesses, particularly with respect to provisions and timber, see P. W. Barnford,
Forests and French Sea Power 1660–1789 (Toronto, 1956), passim; and
Jenkins, History of the French Navy, ch. 8; and the remarkable analysis by J. F.
Bosher, “Financing the French Navy in the Seven Years War: Beaujon, Goossens
et compagnie in 1759,” to be published in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. For a
British comparison, see D. A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of
Walpole (Princeton, 1965), passim.
20. For these comparative statistics, see Bosher, French Finances 1770–1795, pp.
23–24. This can be supplemented by R. D. Harris, “French Finances and the
American War, 1777–1783,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 46, no. 2 (1976),
pp. 233–58; G. Ardent, “Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of
Modern States and Nations,” in Tilly (ed.), Formation of National States in
Western Europe, pp. 217ff; Hamilton, “Origin and Growth of the National Debt
in Western Europe,” pp. 122–24. The place of taxation in the French crisis of
the late 1780s is delineated in Doyle, The Old European Order, pp. 313–20; and
NCMH, vol. 8, chs. 20–21. For Pitt’s reforms, see J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, 2
vols. to date (London, 1969 and 1983), vol. 1, pp. 239ff; and J.E.D. Binney,
British Public Finance and Administration, 1774–1792 (Oxford, 1958), passim.
21. There is no prospect of giving a satisfactory (let alone an exhaustive) list of
references to the war finance of these other states. In general see Tilly (ed.),
Formation of National States in Western Europe, chs. 3–4; NCMH, vol. 6, pp. 20ff,
284ff; and C. Moraze, “Finance et despotisme, essai sur les despotes eclaires,”
Annales, vol. 3 (1948), pp. 279–96. For Prussia, see the brief remarks in NCMH,
vol. 7, pp. 296ff, and vol. 8, pp. 7ff, 565ff; and C. Duffy, The Army of Frederick
the Great (Newton Abbott, 1974), ch. 8. For the Habsburg Empire, see idem,
The Army of Maria Theresa: The Armed Forces of Imperial Austria, 1740–1780
(London, 1977), ch. 10. Even in Russia’s case, where conscription operated and
the resources of the country were ransacked for military purposes, the earlier
self-sufficiency in cash and kind had been replaced by an increasing recourse to
foreign loans and paper money by the final decade of the eighteenth century;
see idem, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian
Military Power 1700–1800 (London, 1981), pp. 36–38, 179–180.
22. Jones, Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century, ch. 5; Kennedy, Rise and
Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 50ff.
23. J. G. Stork-Penning, “The Ordeal of the States: Some Remarks on Dutch Politics
During the War of the Spanish Succession,” Acta Historiae Neerlandica, vol. 2
(1967), pp. 107–41; C. R. Boxer, “The Dutch Economic Decline,” in Cipolla
(ed.), Economic Decline of Empires; Wilson, “Taxation and the Decline of
Empires: An Unfashionable Theme,” in Economic History and the Historian, pp.
114–27; Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, ch. 7. See also the synopsis
in C. P. Kindleberger, “Commercial Expansion and the Industrial Revolution,”
Journal of European Economic History, vol. 4, no. 3 (Winter 1975), pp. 620ff.
24. A. C. Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London,
1971), especially ch. 7; and, more generally, idem, Neutrality or Commitment:
the Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy (1667–1795) (London, 1975), an excellent
survey.
25. Carter, Neutrality or Commitment, pp. 89ff; and the relevant chapters in E. H.
Kossmann, The Low Countries 1780–1940 (Oxford, 1978).
26. Figures from Doyle, Old European Order, p. 242. For France under Louis XIV,
see NCMH, vols. 5–6; A. de St. Leger and P. Sagnac, La Prepondérance fran?aise,
Louis XIV, 1661–1715 (Paris, 1935); R. M. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe
(London, 1976); P. Goubert, Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen (London,
1970); and J. B. Wolf, Louis XIV (London, 1968).
27. For excellent analyses of the military-geopolitical problems facing the rulers in
Vienna during this period, see K. A. Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question 1700–
1790 (Princeton, N.J., 1982); and C. W. Ingrao, “Habsburg Strategy and
Geopolitics during the Eighteenth Century,” in G. E. Rothenberg, B. K. Kiraly,
and P. F. Sugar (eds.), East Central European Society and War in the Pre-
Revolutionary Eighteenth Century (New York, 1982), pp. 49–96. See also the
running commentary in D. Mackay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (London, 1977).
28. O. Hufton, Europe: Privilege and Protest 1730–1789 (London, 1980), p. 155. See
also NCMH, vol. 8, ch. 10; Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, chs. 3 and 5;
and, more generally, E. Wangermann, The Austrian Achievement (New York,
1973); and V. S. Mamatey, Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1815 (New York,
1971). See also the very useful comments in Duffy, Army of Maria Theresa,
passim.
29. Hufton, Europe: Privilege and Protest, ch. 7; Williams, Ancien Regime in Europe,
chs. 13–16; Wallerstein, Modern World System, vol. 2, pp. 225ff; F. L. Carsten,
The Origins of Prussia (Oxford, 1954), passim; H. Rosenberg, Bureaucracy,
Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660–1815 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1958). There is also a good survey of the Prussian reforms and system in
NCMH, vol. 7, ch. 13.
30. G. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (Oxford, 1955), pp. 22ff;
Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, passim; T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The
German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), pp.
17ff; P. Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform (Princeton, N.J., 1961),
passim.
31. For a brief but very useful analysis, see P. Dukes, The Emergence of the
Superpowers: A Short Comparative History of the USA and the USSR (London,
1970), chs. 1–2.
32. Quoted from P. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to
1980,” Journal of European Economic History, vol. 11, no. 2 (Spring 1982), p.
291. See also L. H. Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution 1763–1775 (New York,
1962), pp. 13–18; R. M. Robertson, History of the American Economy (3rd edn.,
New York, 1973), p. 64.
33. NCMH, vol. 7, ch. 14, and vol. 8, ch. 11; Kochan and Abraham, Making of
Modern Russia, chs. 7–9; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, passim; P.
Dukes, The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613–1801 (London, 1982), passim;
M. Falkus, The Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914 (London, 1972), chs. 2–3;
M. Raeff, Imperial Russia 1682–1825 (New York, 1971), passim; and the many
comments on Russia’s rise in M. S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century
(London, 1961), espec. ch. 9.
34. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York, 1945 edn.), p. 452;
and see also the prognostications reported in Dukes, Emergence of the Super-
Powers, chs. 1–3; H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, 2 vols.
(G?ttingen, 1972, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 403ff; and the commentary in W.
Woodruff, America’s Impact on the World: A Study of the Role of the United States
in the World Economy 1750–1970 (New York, 1973).
35. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783 (London, 1965
edn.), p. 29.
36. On which see Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the British Naval Mastery,
introduction and chs. 3–5; M. Howard, The British Way in Warfare (Neale
Lecture, University of London, 1974), passim; Jones, Britain and the World, chs.
1–2 and passim.
37. D. E. C. Eversley, “The Home Market and Economic Growth in England 1750–
1780,” in E. L. Jones and G. E. Mingay (eds.), Land, Labour and Population of the
Industrial Revolution (London, 1967), pp. 206–59; F. Crouzet, “Toward an
Export Economy: British Exports During the Industrial Revolution,” Explorations
in Economic History, vol. 17 (1980), pp. 48–93; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins,
“The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–1914,” Economic
History Review, 2nd series, vol. 33, no. 4 (1980), pp. 463–90.
38. Quoted in H. Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Oxford, 1946), p. 111; and
see further details of this strategical debate in R. Pares, “American versus
Continental Warfare 1739–63,” English Historical Review, vol. 51, no. 103
(1936), pp. 429–65; Wallerstein, Modern World-System, vol. 2, pp. 246ff; G.
Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der britischen Weltpolitik 1738–1763 (Munich,
1979), pp. 64ff.
39. L. Dehio, The Precarious Balance (London, 1963), p. 118.
40. These figures—all approximations—come from a variety of sources, including
Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, p. 4; A. Armengaud, “Population in
Europe 1700–1914,” in C. M. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe,
vol. 3 (1976), pp. 22–76; NCMH, vol. 8, p. 714; B. R. Mitchell, European
Historical Statistics, 1750–1970 (London, 1975), pt. A; W. Woodruff, Impact of
Western Man: A Study of Europe’s Role in the World Economy 1750–1960 (New
York, 1967), p. 104.
41. Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe 1494–1789, p. 113, gives different
figures from Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe 1648–1789, p. 42—and both
differ on occasions from data given in specific works on national armies or
individual wars.
42. These figures are taken from Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, pp.
144–45, with somewhat different ones given in L. W. Cowie, Eighteenth-Century
Europe (London, 1963), pp. 141–42. Again, amendments have been made in the
light of what seems to be a more authoritative source: thus, the 1779 figures
come from J. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence (Princeton, N.J.,
1975), appendix F; and the 1790 totals from O. von Pivka, Navies of the
Napoleonic Era (Newton Abbott, 1980), p. 30 (but cf. NCMH, vol. 8, p. 190).
43. See pp. 135–37 below.
44. For what follows, see McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 14ff; Stoye,
Europe Unfolding 1648–1688, ch. 9; Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power,
passim; idem, The Emergence of the Great Powers 1685–1715 (New York, 1951),
chs. 1–7; NCMH, vol. 5, ch. 9; St. Leger and Sagnac, La Préponderance fran?aise,
passim; and Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe, passim.
45. L. Andre, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (Paris, 1943 edn.); C. Jones, “The Military
Revolution and the Professionalization of the French Army under the Ancien
Régime,” in M. Duffy (ed.). The Military Revolution and the State 1500–1800
(Exeter Studies in History, no. 1, Exeter, 1980), pp. 29–48; Jenkins, History of
the French Navy, ch. 5.
46. Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 100–110; idem, Country and Court 1658–1714
(London, 1978), pp. 106ff; Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 2, ch. 4.
47. McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 34ff; Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and
Europe, passim.
48. NCMH, vol. 6, ch. 7; Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, ch. 4; McKay
and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 43–50.
49. G. Symcox, The Crisis of French Seapower 1689–1697 (The Hague, 1974),
passim; Jenkins, History of the French Navy, pp. 69–88; Padfield, Tide of Empires,
vol. 2, ch. 5.
50. For these remarks, see Symcox, Crisis of French Seapower, passim; Kennedy, Rise
and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 76–80; G. N. Clarke, The Dutch Alliance and
the War Against French Trade 1688–1697 (New York, 1971 edn.), passim; D. G.
Chandler, “Fluctuations in the Strength of Forces in English Pay sent to
Flanders During the Nine Years War, 1688–1697,” War and Society, vol. 1, no.
2 (September 1983), pp. 1–20; S. B. Baxter, William III and the Defense of
European Liberty 1650–1702 (Westport, Conn., 1976 reprint), pp. 288ff.
51. McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 54–63; Wolf, Toward a European
Balance of Power, ch. 7; NCMH, vol. 6, ch. 12.
52. For military events, and tactics, in this war, see G. Chandler, The Art of Warfare
in the Age of Marlborough (London, 1976); Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp.
152ff; McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy, pp. 58ff.
53. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, ch. 5; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of
British Naval Mastery, pp. 82–88; Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 2, pp. 156ff;
Jones, Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century, ch. 7; NCMH, vol. 6, chs.
11–13, 15.
54. For the Peace of Utrecht, see McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 63–
66; NCMH, vol. 6, ch. 14. On the Asiento concession, see G. J. Walker, Spanish
Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789 (Bloomington, 1979), ch. 4.
55. J. W. Stoye, The Siege of Vienna (London, 1964); T. M. Barker, Double Eagle and
Crescent (Albany, N.Y., 1967); McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy, chs. 3 and 5;
NCMH, vol. 6, ch. 19. For characteristics of military warfare in eastern Europe,
see B. K. Kiraly and G. E. Rotherberg (eds.), War and Society in Eastern Europe,
vol. 1 (New York, 1979), espec. pp. 1–33, 361ff.
56. For Charles XII, see R. M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (London, 1968), and
her ch. 20(i) in NCMH, vol. 6, as well as the comments in Roberts, Swedish
Imperial Experience. For Peter, see M. S. Anderson, Peter the Great (London,
1978); R. Wittram, Peter I: Czar und Kaiser, 2 vols. (G?ttingen, 1964); B. H.
Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London, 1940); NCMH, vol.
6, chs. 20(i) and 21.
57. McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, p. 92.
58. Dehio, Precarious Balance, p. 102.
59. McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, ch. 4.
60. NCMH, vol. 7, ch. 9. For the policies of the individual powers, see A. M.
Wilson, French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury
(Cambridge, Mass., 1936); P. Langford, The Eighteenth Century, 1688–1815:
British Foreign Policy (London, 1976), pp. 71ff; Kann, History of the Habsburg
Empire, pp. 90ff.
61. Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 2, pp. 194ff; R. Pares, War and Trade in the West
Indies 1739–1763 (Oxford, 1936); M. Savelle, Empires to Nations: Expansion in
America, 1713–1824 (Minneapolis, 1974), ch. 6; Walker, Spanish Politics and
Imperial Trade, espec. pt. 3; W. L. Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740–1763 (New
York, 1940). For the War of Austrian Succession, see NCMH, vol. 7, ch. 17.
62. Dorn, Competition for Empire, passim; Pares, War and Trade, passim; idem,
“American versus Continental Warfare,” passim; NCMH, vol. 7, chs. 20 and 22;
Padfield, Tide of Empires, vol. 2, pp. 224ff; Saville, Empires to Nations, pp. 135ff;
C. M. Andrews, “Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700–1750,” American
Historical Review, vol. 20 (1915), pp. 539–56, 761–80; P.L.R. Higonnet, “The
Origins of the Seven Years War,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 40 (1968), pp.
57–90.
63. See again Carter, Dutch Republic in the Seven Years War, passim; Walker, Spanish
Politics and Imperial Trade.
64. On the Seven Years War generally, see NCMH, vol. 7, ch. 20; McKay and Scott,
Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 192–200. British policy is covered in Niedhart,
Handel und Krieg in der britischen Weltpolitik, pp. 121–38; Jones, Britain and the
World, pp. 207ff; B. Tunstall, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 1938); J. S.
Corbett, England in the Seven Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy, 2 vols.
(London, 1907); R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany During the
Seven Years War (Oxford, 1966). The lackluster French effort is nicely described
in Kennett, French Armies in the Seven Years War; the improved Austrian
performance in Duffy, Army of Maria Theresa. Russia’s early role is described in
H. H. Kaplan, Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War (Berkeley, Calif.,
1968); and Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, pp. 92ff. Succinct accounts
of Prussia’s performance are in Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great; and J.
Kunisch, Das Mirakel des Hauses Brandenburg (Munich, 1978), with useful
comparisons.
65. Cited in Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 106; and see also
Pares, “American versus Continental Warfare,” passim. On Pitt’s difficulties in
the ministry of 1757–1762, see R. Middleton, The Bells of Victory (Cambridge,
1985).
66. Quoted in H. Rosinski, “The Role of Sea Power in the Global Warfare of the
Future,” Brassey’s Naval Annual (1947), p. 103. For French financial weaknesses
during the Seven Years War, see again Kennett, French Armies in the Seven Years
War, and Bosher, “Financing the French Navy in the Seven Years War,” passim.
67. For the above, see McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 253–58;
NCMH, vol. 8, pp. 254ff; J. F. Ramsay, Anglo-French Relations 1763–70: A Study
of Choiseul’s Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1939); H. M. Scott, “The
Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the Strategy of Choiseul after
the Seven Years War,” International History Review, vol. 1 (1979), pp. 17–35; R.
Abarca, “Classical Diplomacy and Bourbon ‘Revanche’ Strategy, 1763–1770,”
Review of Politics, vol. 32 (1970), pp. 313–37; M. Roberts, Splendid Isolation
1763–1780 (Stenton Lecture, Reading, 1970).
68. For what follows, see I. R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760–1815
(London, 1982), chs. 4–6; P. Mackesy, The War for America 1775–1783
(London, 1964); B. Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution
(London, 1964); G. S. Brown, The American Secretary: The Colonial Policy of Lord
George Germain 1775–1778 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1963); NCMH, vol. 8, chs. 15–
19; and the useful collection of essays in D. Higginbotham (ed.),
Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War (Westport, Conn., 1978). There is a
good survey of the newer literature in H. M. Scott, “British Foreign Policy in
the Age of the American Revolution,” International History Review, vol. 6
(1984), pp. 113–25.
69. D. Syrett, Shipping and the American War 1775–83 (London, 1970), p. 243 and
passim. See also N. Baker, Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and
War Supplies 1775–1783 (London, 1971); R. A. Bowler, Logistics and the Failure
of the British Army in America 1775–1783 (Princeton, N.J., 1975); E. E. Curtis,
The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution (Menston,
Yorkshire, 1972 reprint). For the American side, see the excellent survey D.
Higginbotham, The War of American Independence (Bloomington, Ind., 1977
ed.).
70. Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 225.
71. Figures are from Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 111. See
also the excellent work by Dull, French Navy and American Independence; and A.
T. Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in
1779 (Manchester, 1960). For the diplomatic aspects, see I. de Madariaga,
Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (London, 1962); S. F. Bemis,
The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (New York, 1935); and Higginbotham,
The War of American Independence, ch. 10; most recently, Dull, A Diplomatic
History of the American Revolution (New Haven, Conn., 1985).
72. For what follows, see McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, ch. 8; NCMH,
vol. 8, chs. 9 and 12; I. de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great
(London, 1981).
73. Ehrman, Younger Pitt, vol. 1, pp. 516–71, and vol. 2, pp. 42ff; Jones, Britain and
the World, pp. 252ff; Binney, British Public Finance and Administration; and, for
comparisons with France’s economy in the 1780s, see again Crouzet,
“Angleterre et France”; Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain and France,
1715–1810”; and Nef, War and Human Progress, pp. 282ff.
74. For the military reforms, see NCMH, vol. 8, pp. 190ff, and vol. 9, ch. 3;
McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 158ff; Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct
of War, pp. 25ff; R. S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (New
York, 1957); D. Bien, “The Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform,
Reaction and Revolution,” Past and Present, no. 85 (1979), pp. 68–98; and G.
Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, Ind.,
1978). For the early stages of the campaigning, see M. Glover, The Napoleonic
Wars: An Illustrated History 1792–1815 (New York, 1979); S. T. Ross, Quest for
Victory: French Military Strategy 1792–1799 (London/New York, 1973), chs. 1–
4; G. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the
Austrian Army 1792–1814 (London, 1982), ch. 2.
75. British policy and strategy is covered in Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 259ff;
Ehrman, Younger Pitt, vol. 2, pts. 4–5; Christie, Wars and Revolutions, pp. 215–
326; J. M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with
France 1793–1815 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), chs. 1–4; M. Duffy, “British Policy
in the War Against Revolutionary France,” in C. Jones (ed.), Britain and
Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda (Exeter Studies in
History, no. 5, Exeter, 1983); D. Geggus, “The Cost of Pitt’s Caribbean
Campaigns, 1793–1798,” Historical Journal, vol. 26, no. 2 (1983), pp. 691–706.
76. Quoted in Glover, Napoleonic Wars, p. 50. For Napoleon as strategist and
commander, see D. G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, 1966);
C. Barnett, Napoleon (London, 1978); Rothenberg, Art of Warfare in the Age of
Napoleon; and the running commentary in G. Lefevre, Napoleon, 2 vols.
(London/New York, 1969).
77. See A. B. Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition, 1798–1801 (Oxford, 1964);
P. Mackesy, Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798–1799 (London,
1974); the controversial comments in E. Ingram, Commitment to Empire:
Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia, 1797–1800 (Oxford, 1981); Sherwig,
Guineas and Gunpowder, chs. 6–7; Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, ch.
3. For the French side, see Ross, Quest for Victory, chs. 5–12; and idem,
European Diplomatic History 1789–1815: France Against Europe (Malabar, Fla.,
1981 reprint), ch. 6. The Russian intervention is covered in A. A. Lobanov-
Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1789–1825 (Durham, N.C., 1947), pp. 43–64; and
Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, pp. 208ff.
78. Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 272–80; C. Emsley, British Society and the
French Wars 1793–1815 (London, 1979), chs. 4–5; Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 1,
chs. 5 and 7; Glover, Napoleonic Wars, pp. 83–84. See also the comments in E.
L. Presseisen, Amiens and Munich: Comparisons in Appeasement (The Hague,
1978).
79. Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 1, chs. 7 and 9; Ross, European Diplomatic History, ch. 8;
Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pt. 7; Glover, Napoleonic Wars, ch. 3;
Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, ch. 5; Sherwig, Guineas and
Gunpowder, chs. 7–8; Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 281–87; Marcus, Naval
History of England, vol. 2, pp. 221–302.
80. For what follows, see Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 289ff; F. Crouzet,
L’Economie britannique et le Blocus Continental 1806–1813, 2 vols. (Paris, 1958);
idem, “Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe 1792–1815,” Journal
of Economic History, vol. 24 (1964), pp. 567–88; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of
British Naval Mastery, pp. 143–45; NCMH, vol. 9, pp. 326ff; E. F. Heckscher, The
Continental System (Oxford, 1922). For the debate over the impact of the 1793–
1815 struggle upon the British economy, see, in addition, Emsley, British
Society and the French Wars, chs. 7–8; J. E. Cookson, “Political Arithmetic and
War 1793–1815,” War and Society, vol. 1, no. 2 (1983), pp. 37–60; G. Hueckel,
“War and the British Economy, 1793–1815: A General Equilibrium Analysis,”
Explorations in Economic History, vol. 10, no. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 365–96; P.
Deane, “War and Industrialisation,” in Winter (ed.), War and Economic
Development, pp. 91–102; J. L. Anderson, “Aspects of the Effects on the British
Economy of the War Against France, 1793–1815,” Australian Economic History
Review, vol. 12 (1972), pp. 1–20.
81. see Table 2, above. For British war finances, see N. J. Silberling, “Financial and
Monetary Policy of Great Britain During the Napoleonic Wars,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 38 (1923–24), pp. 214–33; E. B. Schumpeter,
“English Prices and Public Finance, 1660–1822,” Review of Economic Statistics,
vol. 20 (1938), pp. 21–37; A. Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic Wars
(Cambridge, 1939); P. O’Brien, British Financial and Fiscal Policy in the Wars
Against France, 1793–1815 (Oxford, 1984).
82. L. Bergeron, France Under Napoleon (Princeton, N.J., 1981), pp. 37ff, 159ff; G.
Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799–1815 (New York, 1938), chs. 4–5;
S. B. Clough, France: A History of National Economics 1789–1939 (New York,
1939), chs. 2–3; Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 2, chs. 1–4; C. Trebilcock, The
Industrialization of the Continental Powers 1780–1914 (London, 1981), pp. 125ff.
83. Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, pp. 167ff, 184ff; Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade,
and Economic Change,” passim.
84. Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, pp. 37ff; Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 2, pp. 171ff;
Clough, France, chs. 2–3.
85. For what follows, see Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, pp. 40–41; Lefevre,
Napoleon, vol. 2, p. 291; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 198ff; Brunn, Europe and
the French Imperium, pp. 73–75, 1l0ff; E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution
1789–1848 (London, 1962), p. 97; G. Rudé, Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815
(London, 1964), ch. 13 and espec. pp. 274–75; S. Schama, “The Exigencies of
War and the Politics of Taxation in the Netherlands 1795–1810,” in Winter
(ed.), War and Economic Development, pp. 111, 117, 128.
86. Quoted in Glover, Napoleonic Wars, p. 129; and compare with Guibert’s
remarkable pre-Revolution forecast of a people “who, knowing how to make
war cheaply and live on the spoils of victory, was not obliged to lay down its
arms for reasons of finance”—as cited in NCMH, vol. 8, p. 217; and with
Spenser Wilkinson’s remarks, quoted in Tilly (ed.), Formation of National States
in Western Europe, pp. 147–48, 152.
87. Glover, Napoleonic Wars, pp. 140–41; Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 22, 317;
Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, chs. 9–10.
88. Figures from Glover, Napoleonic Wars, p. 152; see also Chandler, Campaigns of
Napoleon, p. 734. For the Austrian army’s campaigning—and recuperation—see
Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, pp. 123ff.
89. For the Peninsular War, see the relevant parts of Glover, Campaigns of
Napoleon: J. Weiler, Wellington in the Peninsula (London, 1962); R. Glover,
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795–1809 (Cambridge,
1963); M. Glover, The Peninsular War, 1807–1814: A Concise History (Newton
Abbott, 1974); Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 198ff. The French side is
covered in J. Thiry, La Guerre d’Espagne (Paris, 1966); Ross, European
Diplomatic History, pp. 276ff; G. H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern
Spain, 2 vols. (New York, 1965). The importance of the Spanish contribution is
rightly stressed in D. Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsula War
(London, 1986).
90. Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium, ch. 8; Rudé, Revolutionary Europe, chs.
13–14; Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 2, chs. 7–8; J. Godechet, B. F. Hyslop, and D. L.
Dowd, The Napoleonic Era in Europe (New York, 1971), espec. ch. 8; G. Best,
War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870 (London, 1982), chs. 11–
13; R. J. Rath, The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (New York, 1941),
chs. 1–2.
91. Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade and Economic Change,” passim; Glover, Napoleonic
Wars, chs. 4–5; O. Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (New York, 1965),
passim. For Russian policy, see Chandler, Campaign of Napoleon, pp. 739ff;
NCMH, vol. 9, pp. 512ff; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia in Europe, 1789–1825,
passim; and, earlier, H. Ragsdale, Détente in the Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and
the Russians (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980).
92. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pts. 13–14; Glover, Napoleonic Wars, pp.
160ff; Ross, European Diplomatic History, pp. 310ff; A. Palmer, Napoleon in
Russia (New York, 1967); C. Duffy, Borodino and the War of 1812 (London,
1973); Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 2, ch. 9; G. Blond, La Grande Armée 1804/1815
(Paris, 1979).
93. Glover, Napoleonic Wars, p. 193; Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, chs. 12–13,
espec. pp. 287–88; Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, pp. 178ff.
94. Which is perhaps why it is almost completely ignored in so many of the
standard military and diplomatic histories of this period. For details, see E. B.
Potter (ed.), Sea Power: A Naval History, 2nd edn. (Annapolis, Md., 1981), ch.
10, and bibliography on p. 392; B. Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the
United States 1805–1812 (Berkeley, Calif., 1961); A. T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its
Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (London, 1905); Marcus, Naval History of
England, vol. 2, ch. 16.
95. Ingram, Commitment to Empire, passim; G. J. Adler, “Britain and the Defence of
India—The Origins of the Problem, 1798–1815,” Journal of Asian History, vol. 6
(1972), pp. 14–44.
96. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pt. 17; Glover, Napoleonic Wars, pp. 212ff;
Lefevre, Napoleon, vol. 2, ch. 10; Blond, La Grand Armée, ch. 16; H. Lachouque,
Waterloo (Paris, 1972); U. Pericoli and M. Glover, 1815: The Armies at Waterloo
(London, 1973).
97. For details on the 1814–1815 settlements, see Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder,
ch. 14; NCMH, vol. 9, ch. 24; E. V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power
(New York, 1967 edn.), passim; C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,
1812–1815: Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (London, 1931); H. G.
Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (London/New York, 1946); D. Dakin, “The
Congress of Vienna, 1814–15, and Its Antecedents,” in A. Sked (ed.), Europe’s
Balance of Power 1815–1848 (London, 1979).
98. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, p. 304. See also the comments in H.
Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace
1812–1822 (Boston, 1957).
99. For a succinct coverage of the extensive literature, see P. J. Marshall, “British
Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: An Historical Revision,” History,
vol. 60 (1975), pp. 28–43; as well as the remarks in Ingram, Commitment to
Empire.
100. See Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, pp. 403ff, for a useful discussion of the
importance of long-distance trade. For the specifically British context, I have
benefited from reading Patrick O’Brien’s paper “The Impact of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815, on the Long Run Growth of
the British Economy” (Davis Center Paper, 1983).
101. This literature is covered in Crouzet, “Toward an Export Economy,” passim;
Cain and Hopkins, “The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas,
1750–1914,” passim; R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas
Trade (Leicester, 1979); N.F.R. Crafts, “British Economic Growth, 1700–1831: A
Review of the Evidence,” Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 36 (1983),
pp. 177–99.
102. The phrase is used in F. Crouzet, The Victorian Economy (London, 1982), p. 1.
103. Glover, Napoleonic Wars, pp. 182–83.
104. Quoted in Marcus, Naval History of England, vol. 2, p. 501.
CHAPTER FOUR
Industrialization and the Shifting Global Balances, 1815–1885
1. S. Pollard, Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe 1760–1970 (Oxford,
1981), passim. For good treatments of the Industrial Revolution in the West on
a country-by-country basis, see T. Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (London, 1969); W. O. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution on the
Continent: Germany, France, Russia 1800–1914 (London, 1967 edn.); C.
Trebilcock, The Industrialization of the Continental Powers 1780–1914 (London,
1981); C. M. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 3, The
Industrial Revolution (London, 1973); A. S. Milward and S. B. Saul, The Economic
Development of Continental Europe 1780–1870 (London, 1973).
2. C. M. Cipolla, “Introduction,” in Cipolla (ed.), Industrial Revolution, p. 7.
3. D. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial
Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969), p.
41.
4. Ibid.
5. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, vol. 1, pp. 42ff.
6. For details, see McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 185ff; G. Rudé, Paris and London
in the Eighteenth Century: Studies in Popular Protest (New York, 1971), passim.
7. T. S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution 1760–1830 (Oxford, 1968 edn.), p. 129.
For other excellent studies of British economic change in this period, see
Mathias, First Industrial Nation, passim; Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chs. 2–
4 and 6; and Crouzet, Victorian Economy, pt. 1, from where the population and
GNP figures given in the preceding paragraph come.
8. Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp. 97–98.
9. Ashton, Industrial Revolution, p. 129.
10. Mathias, First Industrial Nation, p. 5.
11. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” pp. 296
and 294 respectively. In the “Methodological Appendix” to this important
essay, Bairoch discusses how he reaches these figures. Bairoch’s assumptions
are by no means uncontested, however: see A. Maddison, “A Comparison of
Levels of GDP per Capita in Developed and Developing Countries, 1700–1980,”
Journal of Economic History, vol. 43 (1983), pp. 27–41.
12. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” pp. 290ff; Crouzet, Victorian
Economy, Introduction.
13. Woodruff, Impact of Western Man, passim; D. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires:
A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (London, 1966), pt. 2; idem,
Economics and Empire 1830–1916 (London, 1973), passim.
14. On which see V. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–
1960 (London, 1982); Strachen, European Armies and the Conduct of War, ch. 6.
15. Figures from Fieldhouse, Colonial Empires, p. 178.
16. This has now been very well covered in D. R. Headrich, The Tools of Empire:
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1981),
ch. 2 and passim.
17. E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875 (London, 1975), ch. 7.
18. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 291. For a new study which
stresses (and perhaps overstresses) the relative slowness of British economic
expansion in these decades, see N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During
the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985).
19. Crouzet, Victorian Economy, pp. 4–5.
20. Quoted in R. Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century 1815–1914 (London, 1975), p.
47. For further details, see B. Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British
Imperialism 1850–1970 (London, 1976), passim; Cain and Hopkins, “The
Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–1914,” passim; Crouzet,
“Towards an Export Economy,” passim; J. B. Williams, British Commercial Policy
and Trade Expansion 1750–1850 (Oxford, 1972), passim.
21. P. Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800–1975,” Journal of European
Economic History, vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall 1976), p. 282. And see Table 10 below.
22. D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905–1915 (London, 1982),
ch. 1, “Nineteenth-Century Political Economy and the Problem of War,” is a
good introduction to these ideas.
23. See H. Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830–54
(Manchester, 1984).
24. These seem reasonable assumptions, based upon the crude figures of British
GNP and government expenditures available in A. T. Peacock and J. Wiseman,
The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdon (London, 1967 edn.); and
P. Flora (ed.), State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1875–1975, vol. 1
(Frankfurt/London, 1983), especially pt. 4, p. 441.
25. Figures taken from the “Correlates of War” print-out data made available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the
University of Michigan.
26. C. Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy (London, 1961), p. 223.
27. For details, see Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, ch. 6; and espec.
C. J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power 1815–1853 (Oxford, 1963), passim.
For some regional manifestations: G. S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian
Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise 1810–1850 (Oxford, 1967); B. Gough, The
Royal Navy and the North West Coast of America 1810–1914 (Vancouver, 1971);
G. Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates 1832–1869 (London, 1940).
28. A.G.L. Shaw (ed.), Great Britain and the Colonies 1815–1865 (London, 1970), p.
2. Also important here are Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, passim; Porter,
Lion’s Share, passim; J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free
Trade,” Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 6, no. 1 (1953), pp. 1–15.
29. For British assumptions, see B. Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 1850–
1982: Delusions of Grandeur (London/Boston, 1983), ch. 1; B. J. Wendt,
“Freihandel und Friedenssicherung: Zur Bedeutung des Cobden-Vertrags von
1860 zwischen England und Frankreich,” Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozialund
Wirtschafts-geschichte, vol. 61 (1974), pp. 29ff. For the economic details, see
Cain and Hopkins, “Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas,” passim;
L. H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital to 1875 (London, 1963 edn.); Crouzet,
Victorian Economy, chs. 10—11 and passim; Mathias, First Industrial Nation, ch.
11; A. H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the “Pax Britannica” (Cambridge, Mass.,
1958). The complementarity in the trading/payments relationships is nicely
covered in S. B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870–1914 (Liverpool,
1960); and J. Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy: International
Economic Relations since 1850 (Brighton, Sussex, 1983), espec. chs. 1–6.
30. For this argument, see Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, ch. 7.
31. F. Crouzet, “Towards an Export Economy,” p. 70.
32. Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, chs. 1–2. For the strategical implications
of Britain’s increasing reliance upon “service” industries, see P. Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy, 1860–1945: Eight Essays (London/Boston, 1983), ch. 3;
French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, passim.
33. Quoted in Higham, Britain’s Imperial Century, p. 49.
34. See pp. 131–33 above.
35. Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-century Europe, chs. 2–3; Pollard, Peaceful
Conquest, chs. 2–3; T. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics
and Politics in Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1958).
36. J. Droz, Europe Between Revolutions 1815–1848 (London, 1967), p. 18.
37. D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1966 edn.), p.
111; and see also Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, pt. 3; A. Sked,
“Metternich’s Enemies or the Threat from Below,” in Sked (ed.), Europe’s
Balance of Power 1815–1848 (London, 1979), ch. 8.
38. F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System
1815–1914 (London, 1980), chs. 2–3; Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, pp.
65ff.; R. Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of
Vienna (London, 1965 edn.), chs. 1 and 3–4. The best study of Prussian and
German-state affairs in this period is now T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte
1800–1866 (Munich, 1983).
39. D. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of
Germany (Hamden, Conn., 1975), passim; Dupuy, Genius for War, chs. 4–6;
NCMH, vol. 10, The Zenith of European Power 1830–70, chs. 12 and 19; L. H.
Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, Ind.,
1984), pp. 39ff.
40. See again Mamatey, Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1815, passim; Kann, A
History of the Habsburg Empire, chs. 3 and 5.
41. A. Sked, “The Metternich System, 1815–48,” in Sked (ed.), Europe’s Balance of
Power 1815–1848, ch. 5; Bridge and Bullen, Great Powers and the European
States System, passim; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History, chs. 3–4; P. W.
Schroeder, “World War I as a Galloping Gertie,” Journal of Modern History, vol.
44 (1972), pp. 319–45—which echoes some of the remarks in his Austria,
Britain and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca,
N.Y., 1972).
42. Quoted in C. McEvedy, The Penguin Atlas of Recent History (Harmondsworth,
Mddsx., 1982), p. 8; see also Droz, Europe Between Revolutions, pp. 170ff.
43. G. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind., 1976), pp. xi,
61. See also A. Sked, The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetzky, The Imperial
Army and the Class War, 1848 (London, 1979), pt. 1.
44. D. F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914 (Berkeley,
Calif., 1984) is best here.
45. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 9; and J. Niemeyer, Das oesterreichische
Milit?rwesen im Umbruch (Osnabruck, 1979), pp. 43–45.
46. See Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 10, 41, 46, 58, for financial
allocations; and G. A. Craig, “Command and Staff Problems in the Austrian
Army, 1740–1866,” in M. Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War
(London, 1965), pp. 43–67, for institutional difficulties.
47. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 19; Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire,
ch. 6; A. Sked, “The Metternich System,” in Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–
1848, passim.
48. For a succinct survey, see R. Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48: The
Problems of Defeat and Recovery,” in Sked (ed.), Survival of the Habsburg
Empire, pp. 122–44. For economic histories, see again Clough, France; A History
of National Economics, passim; F. Caron, An Economic History of Modern France
(New York, 1979), pt. 1; T. Kemp, Economic Forces in French History (London,
1971), chs. 6–8, 10.
49. Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48,” pp. 125–26.
50. Ibid.
51. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 213, fn. 57.
52. As quoted in Milward and Saul, Economic Development of Continental Europe
1780–1870, pp. 307–9. See also Clough, France, pp. 41ff; Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers 1780–1914, pp. 130ff; Kemp, Economic
Forces in French History, pp. 106ff.
53. Calculated from the figures produced in Table 10 of Bairoch, “International
Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” p. 296. See also the figures offered
in R. E. Cameron, “Economic Growth and Stagnation in France 1815–1914,”
Journal of Modem History, vol. 30 (1958), pp. 1–13.
54. For these arguments, see Caron, Economic History of Modern France, espec. ch.
1. The study by P. O’Brien and C. Keydor, Economic Growth in Britain and France
1780–1914 (London, 1978), is also a useful corrective to the older literature;
but since it is not concerned with what they describe as “the mercantilist
jargon of ‘national power’ ” (p. 176), its implications are not so important for
our analysis. For a critique of O’Brien and Keydor’s handling of comparative
statistics, see V. Hentschel, “Produktion, Wachstum und Produktivit?t in
England, Frankreich und Deutschland von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhundert bis
zum Ersten Weltkrieg,” Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozialund Wirtschaftsgeschichte,
vol. 68 (1981), pp. 457–510.
55. R. Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe 1800–1914
(Princeton, N.J. 1961); Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental Powers,
pp. 176ff; A. Rowley, Evolution économique de la France de milieu du xixe siècle à
1914 (Paris, 1982), pp. 413ff.
56. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 226ff. French tactical and strategical (as well as
technical) innovations are nicely compared in C. E. Hamilton, “The Royal
Navy, La Royale, and the Militarization of Naval Warfare, 1840–1870,” Journal
of Strategic Studies, vol. 6 (1983), pp. 182–212.
57. In Padfield’s definition: see Tide of Empires, vol. 1, foreword; and see again
Bullen, “France and Europe,” passim. France’s colonial endeavors are briefly
covered in Fieldhouse, Colonial Empires, ch. 13.
58. This was Palmerston’s phrase of April 1848: see NCMH, vol. 10, p. 260. For
general surveys of Russia’s international position after 1815, see Bridge and
Bullen, Great Powers and the European States System, passim; Lobanov-
Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1789–1825, passim; R. W. Seton-Watson, The
Russian Empire 1801–1917 (Oxford, 1967), ch. 9.
59. See the discussion in M. E. Falkus, The Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914
(London, 1972), ch. 4; W. C. Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian
Industralization, 1800–1860 (Princeton, N.J., 1968); and idem, The
Industrialization of Russia: An Historical Perspective (New York, 1970), chs. 1–2.
60. Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product, 1800–1975,” Table 4, p. 281.
61. Ibid., Table 6, p. 286.
62. Kochan and Abraham, Making of Modern Russia, p. 164.
63. Ibid., chs. 9–10; Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental Powers, ch. 4;
Falkus, Industrialization of Russia, chs. 4–5; Dukes, Emergence of the SuperPowers,
chs. 3–4.
64. J. S. Curtiss, The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825–1855 (Durham, N.C.,
1965), passim; Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, ch. 18; Seton-
Watson, Russian Empire, pp. 289ff; J. Keep, “The Military Style of the Romanov
Rulers,” War and Society, vol. 1, no. 2 (1983), pp. 61–84. For the Anglo-Russian
rivalry, see D. Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828–1961 (London, 1977); E.
Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828–1834 (Oxford, 1979);
Ingram (ed.), “The Great Game in Asia,” International History Review, vol. 2, no.
2 (April 1980), special issue.
65. Curtiss, Russian Army Under Nicholas I, pp. 310–11.
66. By far the best study is J. S. Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, N.C.,
1979); but see also A. Seaton, The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle (London,
1977), passim; idem, The Russian Army of the Crimea (Reading, Berkshire,
1973).
67. D. W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power (New York, 1974), ch.
8.
68. For these details, see Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, passim; Seaton, Crimean
War, passim; Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, pp. 319ff; Blackwell, Beginnings of
Industrialization in Russia, pp. 183ff; and the very good summary in W.
Baumgart, The Peace of Paris, 1856 (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1981), pp. 68–80,
from where the quotation comes.
69. Baumgart, Peace of Paris, pp. 72–74; Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, p. 248; W.
Pintner, “Inflation in Russia During the Crimean War Period,” American Slavic
and East European Review, vol. 18 (1959), pp. 85–87.
70. Baumgart, Peace of Paris, pp. 25–31.
71. Ibid., pp. 31ff.; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 283–91; E. M. Spiers, The
Army and Society 1815–1914 (London, 1980), ch. 4; J.A.S. Grenville, Europe
Reshaped 1848–1878 (London, 1976), ch. 10.
72. O. Anderson, A Liberal State at War (London, 1967), passim.
73. Figures taken from the “Correlates of War” print-out data, made available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the
University of Michigan.
74. See again MacDonagh, Liberal State at War, and compare with Schroeder,
Austria, Britain and the Crimean War, Baumgart, The Peace of Paris, and N. Rich,
Why the Crimean War?: A Cautionary Tale (Hanover, N.H., 1985), pp. 157ff,
which concentrate much more upon Palmerston’s belligerent tone.
75. Quoted in D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London,
1983), p. 21. See also D. Beyrau, Milit?r und Gesellschaft im vorrevolution?ren
Russland (G?ttingen, 1984).
76. W. E. Mosse, Alexander 11 and the Modernization of Russia (New York, 1962
edn.), passim; Kochan and Abraham, Making of Modern Russia, ch. 10; Seton-
Watson, Russian Empire, pt. 4; Falkus, Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914, ch.
5; Blackwell, Industrialization of Russia, ch. 2.
77. See again Dukes, Emergence of the Super-Powers, chs. 3–4; Gollwitzer, Geschichte
des weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 1, chs. 3–4.
78. Covered in K. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815–
1908 (London, 1967).
79. “Correlates of War” print-out data; for the railway mileages, see W. W. Rostow,
The World Economy, History and Prospect (Austin, Texas, 1978), p. 152. See also
W. H. Becker and S. F. Wells, Jr. (eds.), Economics and World Power: An
Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 (New York, 1984), pp. 56ff.
80. The literature upon the American Civil War is staggeringly large. I found most
useful H. Hattaway and A. Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the
Civil War (Urbana, 111., 1983); P. J. Parish, The American Civil War (New York,
1975); A. R. Millett and P. Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States of America (New York, 1984), chs. 6–7; R. F.
Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, Ind., 1984 edn.), chs.
10–11; Ropp, War in the Modern World, pp. 175–194; Addington, Patterns of
War, pp. 62–82.
81. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, p. 155.
82. R. F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military
Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Ind., 1977 edn.); Millett and Maslowski, For
the Common Defense, passim.
83. For brief details of that position, see K. Bourne, Victorian Foreign Policy 1830–
1902 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 90–96; and, in much more detail, E. D. Adams, Great
Britain and the American Civil War, 2 vols. (London, 1925).
84. J. Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance
(Chicago, 1959), passim.
85. For post-Crimean War diplomacy in Europe, see Bridge and Bullen, Great
Powers and the European State System, pp. 88ff; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic
History, pp. 94ff; W. E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855–71
(London, 1963); NCMH, vol. 10, ch. 10, pp. 268ff; A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle
for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 83ff.
86. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 52ff.
87. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, ch. 7; C. Harvie, War and Society in the 19th Century,
block 4, unit 10 of War and Society (The Open University, Bletchley, 1973);
Strachan, European Armies, ch. 8; Ropp, War in the Modern World, ch. 6;
Showalter, Railroads and Rifles, passim; NCMH, vol. 10, ch. 12; M. Glover,
Warfare from Waterloo to M0Ons (London, 1980), pts. 2–3.
88. For Prussian military developments, see again Dupuy, Genius for War, pp. 75ff;
Showalter, Railroads and Rifles, passim; Strachan, European Armies, pp. 98ff. For
the mistakes made in 1866, see M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge,
Mass., 1985), ch. 4; G. A. Craig, The Battle of Koeniggratz (London, 1965),
passim. The Austrian side is summarized in Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph,
pp. 66ff.
89. See again van Creveld, Command in War, pp. 140ff; M. Howard, The Franco-
Prussian War (London, 1981 edn.), passim.
90. For military details, see Craig, Koeniggratz, passim; for the diplomatic and
political background, O. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The
Period of Unification 1815–1871 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), chs. 13–15.
91. Howard, Franco-Prussian War, offers outstanding coverage of these events. For
French military weaknesses, see also R. Holmes, The Road to Sedan: The French
Army, 1866–70 (London, 1984).
92. Howard, Franco-Prussian War, p. 1; and Holmes, Road to Sedan, passim, for the
French side.
93. The raw figures are available in Flora, State, Economy and Society in Western
Europe 1815–1975, vol. 1; and in B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics
1750–1975 (2nd edn., New York, 1981), e.g., coal figures on p. 381, etc. For
comparative analyses of the two nations’ economies, see again Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers, chs. 2–3; Kemp, Industrialization in
Nineteenth-Century Europe, chs. 3–4; Landes, Unbound Prometheus, ch. 4.
94. The diplomacy of the Franco-Prussian War is covered in Taylor, Struggle for
Mastery in Europe, pp. 201–17; W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and the
German Question 1848–1870 (Cambridge, 1958); E. Kolb (ed.), Europa und die
Reichsgründung (Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 6, Munich, 1980), passim; Bridge
and Bullen, Great Powers and the European States System, pp. 108ff.
95. On which see A. Mitchell, The German Influence in France After 1870: The
Formation of the French Republic (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979); and idem, Victors and
Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984).
96. See the revealing figures in Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. xxiv-xxvi
(and the remark on p. xxiii, fn. 4); also D. Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959); and C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy
1870–1940 (London, 1975).
97. To use the terms employed by P. W. Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The
Impact of 1870 on the European System,” International History Review, vol. 6
(1984), p. 14.
98. On the implications of which, see ibid., passim.
99. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 218ff; Bridge and Bullen, Great Powers
and the European State System, pp. 112ff; W. L. Langer, European Alliances and
Alignments 1871–1890 (New York, 1950 edn.), passim; Grenville, Europe
Reshaped 1848–1878, ch. 18. British policy is well covered in K. Hildebrand,
“Grossbritannien und die deutsche Reichsgründung,” in Kolb (ed.), Europa und
die Reichsgründung, pp. 37ff.
100. For a good discussion, see A. Hillgruber, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik (Freiburg,
1972), briefly summarized in idem, Die gescheiterte Grossmacht: Eine Skizze des
Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945 (Düsseldorf, 1980), pp. 17–30.
101. A. Hillgruber, “Die ‘Krieg-in-Sicht’-Krise 1875,” in E. Schulin (ed.),
Gedenkschrift Martin G?hring, Studien zur europ?ischen Geschichte (Wiesbaden,
1968), pp. 239–53; P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–
1914 (London/Boston, 1980), pp. 29–31.
102. Hillgruber, Die gescheiterte Grossmacht, pp. 30ff.; and for stimulating
discuszation sions of the longer-term issues, see D. Calleo, The German Problem
Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present (New
York/Cambridge, 1978), espec. chs. 2–4; W. D. Gruner, Die deutsche Frage: Ein
Problem der europ?ischen Geschichte seit 1800 (Munich, 1985), passim; K.
Hildebrand, “Staatskunst oder Systemzwang? Die ‘Deutsche Frage’ als Problem
der Weltpolitik,” Historische Zeitschrift, no. 228 (1979).
103. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 228ff; Langer, European Alliances and
Alignments, chs. 3–5; B. Jelavich, The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire, and the
Straits Question 1870–1887 (Bloomington, Ind., 1973).
104. Quoted in Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, p. 455. For the naval side, see
Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, pp. 184–90. More generally,
see B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870–1880 (London, 1937).
105. See the essays by Beyrau (on Russia) and Rumpler (on Austria-Hungary) in
Kolb (ed.), Europa und die Reichsgründung; Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe,
ch. 12; Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, chs. 6–7; W. Windelband,
Bismarck und die europ?ischen Grossm?chte 1878–85 (Essen, 1940); B. Waller,
Bismarck at the Crossroads (London, 1974).
106. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, ch. 13; Langer, European Alliances and
Alignments, chs. 7–9; NCMH, vol. 11, chs. 20–22.
107. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 189–90.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Coming of a Bipolar World and the Crisis of the “Middle Powers”: Part
One, 1885–1918
1. For full details, see S. E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference 1884–1885
(Westport, Conn., 1970 reprint). For the general background, see again Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments, ch. 9; NCMH, vol. 11, chs. 20–22; and the
various chapters in E. A. Benians et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the
British Empire, vol. 3, The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919 (Cambridge, 1959).
2. See generally D. M. Pletcher, “Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment,
1861–1898,” in W. H. Becker and S. F. Wells (eds.), Economics and World Power:
An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 (New York, 1984), pp. 119–71;
M. Plesur, America’s Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs 1865–1890
(DeKalb, Ill., 1971), pp. 151ff; W. A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American
Empire (New York, 1969), p. 262.
3. Crowe, Berlin West Africa Conference, p. 220.
4. G. F. Hudson, The Far East in World Affairs (2nd ed., London, 1939), p. 74.
5. This general story can be followed in G. Barraclough, An Introduction to
Contemporary History (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1967), chs. 3–4; A. de Porte,
Europe Between the Super Powers (New Haven/London, 1979) chs. 1–5; NCMH,
vol. 12, The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898–1965, passim; W. R. Keylor,
The Twentieth-Century World: An International History (Oxford, 1984), pt. 1; J.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, 1880–1970: The International Rivalry of the Great
Powers (London, 1984), chs. 1–9: F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace
(Cambridge, 1967), pp. 300ff.
6. Barraclough, Contemporary History, ch. 3; F. Fischer, War of Illusions: German
Policies from 1911 to 1914 (London, 1975), ch. 3; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of
British Naval Mastery, ch. 7.
7. J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth
Century, 1895–1902 (London, 1964), pp. 165–66; and more generally, W. L.
Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902 (2nd ed., New York, 1965), ch.
3 and p. 505.
8. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 36ff.
9. Ibid., p. 35.
10. Cited in P. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1860–1965: Eight Essays (London,
1983), pp. 157–58.
11. H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 2, Zeitalter des
Imperialismus und Weltkriege (G?ttingen, 1982), p. 198.
12. P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914
(London/Boston, 1980), chs. 16–17.
13. Idem, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 46; Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, pp. 27ff.
14. Amery comment, on H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,”
Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 6 (April 1904), p. 441.
15. Thucydides, The Peleponnesian War (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1954), p. 49. For
a discussion of this view, see R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics
(Cambridge, 1981).
16. Landes, Unbound Prometheus, p. 259.
17. Figures taken from the “Correlates of War” print-out data made available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the
University of Michigan.
18. C. E. Black et al., The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study
(New York, 1975), pp. 6–7; and, for the now classic account, W. W. Rostow,
The Process of Economic Growth (2nd edn., Oxford, 1960).
19. Ibid.
20. Figures from Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to
1980,” pp. 294, 302.
21. “Correlates of War” print-out data.
22. Ibid.
23. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” pp. 292, 299.
24. Ibid., pp. 296, 304.
25. C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London/New York, 1972), p. xi.
26. Wright, Study of War, pp. 670–71.
27. Ibid. The 1890 total for the United States is given as only 40,000 by Wright,
which is clearly a mistake.
28. See pp. 188–89 above.
29. see Table 14 above. Italian history generally in this period is covered in D.
Mack Smith, Italy, A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1969), pp. 101ff; C. Seton
Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism (London, 1967), pp. 129–412. It is
noticeable that there is no “Italy” section in the New Cambridge Modern History,
vol. 11, 1870–98, and only a few pages, 482–87, in vol. 12, 1898–1945.
30. Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ch. 6.
31. See the references in A. Tamborra, “The Rise of Italian Industry and the
Balkans,” Journal of European Economic History, vol. 3, no. 1 (1974), pp. 87–
120. Other useful studies are G. Mori, “The Genesis of Italian Industrialization,”
Journal of European Economic History, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1975), pp. 79–94;
idem, “The Process of Industrialization in Italy: Some Suggestions, Problems
and Questions,” Journal of European Economic History, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring
1979), pp. 60–82; Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental Powers 1780–
1914, ch. 5; Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, pp. 229–32; Seton-Watson, Italy from
Liberalism to Fascism, pp. 284ff; S. B. Clough, The Economic History of Modern
Italy, 1830–1914 (New York, 1964); L. Cafagua, “The Industrial Revolution in
Italy 1830–1914,” in C. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol.
4, pt. 1, The Emergence of Industrial Societies, pp. 287–325.
32. A. S. Milward and S. B. Saul, The Development of the Economies of Continental
Europe 1850–1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 253ff; J. S. Cohen, “Financing
Industrialization in Italy, 1894–1914: The Partial Transformation of a Late-
Comer,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 27 (1967), pp. 363–82; V.
Castronovo, “The Italian Takeoff: A Critical Re-examination of the Problem,”
Journal of Italian History, vol. 1 (1978), pp. 492–510.
33. R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before
the First World War (Cambridge, 1979), p. 4.
34. See the interesting (and thoroughly depressing) collection of articles on “Italian
Military Efficiency” in Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (1982), pp.
248ff; J. Gooch, “Italy Before 1915: The Quandary of the Vulnerable,” in E. R.
May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World
Wars (Princeton, N.J., 1984), pp. 205ff; J. Whittam, The Politics of the Italian
Army 1861–1918 (London, 1977), passim; and idem, “War Aims and Strategy:
The Italian Government and High Command 1914–1919,” in B. Hunt and A.
Preston (eds.), War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War (London, 1977),
pp. 85–104.
35. P. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1971), ch. 7; A. J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power (Hamden, Conn.,
1964 reprint), pp. 174–75.
36. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers, passim. See also idem, Italy and
the Approach of the First World War (London, 1983); Lowe and Marzari, Italian
Foreign Policy, 1870–1940, passim.
37. P. Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” in S. E.
Miller (ed.), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton,
N.J., 1985), p. 15.
38. W. R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, pp. 14–15. For other general
accounts, see NCMH, vol. 12, ch. 12; I. Nish, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1869–1942
(London, 1978); R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894–1943
(London, 1979).
39. The political and economic modernization of Japan is briefly covered in R.
Storry, A History of Modern Japan (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1982 edn.), ch. 5;
and in much more detail in W. H. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford,
Calif., 1972); E. H. Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State (New York,
1940); T. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan:
Government Enterprise 1868–1880 (Stanford, Calif., 1955).
40. The economic aspects of Japanese modernization can be followed in G. S.
Allen, A Short Economic History of Japan (London, 1981 edn.), chs. 2–5; L. Klein
and K. Ohkawa (eds.), Economic Growth: The Japanese Experience Since the Meiji
Era (Holmwood, Ill., 1968); Rostow, World Economy, pp. 416–25; K. Ohkawa
and H. Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth (Stanford, Calif., 1973).
41. E. B. Potter (ed.), Sea Power: A Naval History (Annapolis, Md., 1981), pp. 166–
168; Glover, Warfare from Waterloo to Mons, pp. 181–84.
42. Quoted in Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, p. 30.
43. On which see now I. Nish, The Origin of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985),
passim. The conflict itself is best described in J. N. Westwood, Russia Against
Japan, 1904–5: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1986), and is
also covered in Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, chs. 4–5; S.
Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 1970);
J. A. White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton, N.J., 1964).
The war at sea is briefly covered in Potter (ed.), Sea Power, pp. 168ff, and P.
Padfield, The Battleship Era (London, 1972), pp. 167ff; on land, P. Waiden, The
Short Victorious War: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5 (New York,
1974).
44. See A. J. Sherman, “German-Jewish Bankers in World Politics: The Financing of
the Russo-Japanese War,” Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, vol. 28 (1983), pp. 59–
73.
45. Cited in Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 464.
46. For general accounts of Germany’s economic growth, see Fisher, War of
Illusions, pt. 1; Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered, ch. 4; N. Stone, Europe
Transformed 1878–1919 (London, 1983), pp. 159ff; W. G. Hoffmann, Das
Wachstum der Deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, (Berlin,
1965); W. O. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834–1914,
(Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1972), pt. 3; M. Kitchen, The Political Economy of
Germany 1815–1914 (London, 1978).
47. I took this figure from p. 2 of John Gooch’s paper “Italy During the First World
War,” for the forthcoming first volume of Military Effectiveness, eds. A. Millett
and W. Murray.
48. See the figures in Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, pp. 66, 68.
49. Quoted in J. Steinberg, “The Copenhagen Complex,” Journal of Contemporary
History, vol. 1, pt. 3 (1966), p. 26.
50. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 96; and see again Gollwitzer, Geschichte des
weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 2, pp. 83–252; idem, Europe in the Age of
Imperialism (London, 1969), passim; W. Baumgart, Imperialism: The Idea and
Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion 1880–1914 (Oxford, 1982), pt.
3.
51. For these quotations, see respectively, Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German
Antagonism, p. 311; J. C. R?hl, “A Document of 1892 on Germany, Prussia, and
Poland,” Historical Journal, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 144ff; Fisher, War of Illusions, ch.
3.
52. I take this term from H.-U. Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Cologne,
1969), pt. 3, pp. 112ff.
53. See the assessments in A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Period, vol. 1, The Road to War 1904–1914 (London,
1961), ch. 13; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, chs. 8–9.
54. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 160.
55. B. F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee (Düsseldorf, 1977); V. R. Berghahn, Germany
and the Approach of War in 1914 (London/New York, 1974), chs. 1 and 6. For
good examples of the many fatuous underestimations of German military
power (especially as compared with Russia and France), see P. Towle, “The
European Balance of Power in 1914,” Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, vol.
104 (1974), pp. 333–62.
56. All of these figures from Wright, Study of War, pp. 670–71.
57. J. K. Tanenbaum, “French Estimates of Germany’s Operational War Plans,” in
May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, p. 162.
58. Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, introduction.
59. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 311.
60. See again Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, passim.
61. For compelling evidence of this, see the articles in J.G.C. R?hl and N. Sombart
(eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge, 1982).
62. Quoted in G. A. Craig, Germany 1866–1965 (Oxford, 1978), p. 336. There is
good evidence of this confusion of purpose in I. N. Lambi, The Navy and
German Power Politics 1862–1914 (London/Boston, 1984).
63. Fisher, War of Illusions, passim; Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War,
passim.
64. This is explored further in P. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers
1880–1914 (London/Boston 1979), introduction.
65. Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, p. 5.
66. Quoted in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 157.
67. See the charts for France, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary’s “Relative
Power” in C. F. Doran and W. Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 74 (1980), p. 956.
68. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. xxviii.
69. There is a brief coverage in Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 461ff; a
good survey in Milward and Saul, Development of the Economies of Continental
Europe 1850–1914, pp. 271ff; and a more sophisticated analysis, comparing the
empire with Italy and Spain, in Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental
Powers, ch. 5.
70. Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product 1800–1975,” p. 287.
71. L. L. Farrar, Arrogance and Anxiety: The Ambivalence of German Powers 1849–
1914 (Iowa City, Iowa, 1981), ch. 3, fns. 9 and 18. Farrar calculates “power”
by multiplying population and manufacturing production. The early section of
this present chapter should indicate that power is a much more complex
phenomenon.
72. For comparative growth rates, see Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg
Empire 1750–1914, p. 239; for industrial potential, see Table 17 above.
73. Figures from Good, Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 150.
74. For what follows, see the brilliant description in Stone, Europe Transformed, pp.
303ff; Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, ch. 8; C. A. MacArtney, The
Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (London, 1969), chs. 14–17; A. J. May, The
Habsburg Monarchy 1862–1916 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 343ff.
75. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, ch. 9; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp.
596–98; and espec. C. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente
Cordiale (London, 1968), pp. 127ff.
76. Quoted in Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 316–17; see also Rothenberg, Army of
Francis Joseph, p. 106.
77. Wright, Study of War, pp. 670–71, columns 10–12; also useful is Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 125–26, 148, 160, 172.
78. For the state of the Austro-Hungarian navy, see Halpern, Mediterannean Naval
Situation, ch. 6. The state of the army prior to 1914 is covered in Rothenberg’s
excellent Army of Francis Joseph, chs. 9-l2; N. Stone, “Moltke and Conrad:
Relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs 1909–
1914,” in Kennedy (ed.), War Plans of the Great Powers 1880–1914, pp. 222ff;
idem, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London, 1975), ch. 4; idem, “Austria-
Hungary,” in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 37ff.
79. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 159, also pp. 152, 163.
80. Ibid., p. 159. And see also Stone, “Moltke and Conrad,” in Kennedy (ed.), War
Plans of the Great Powers.
81. Stone, “Austria-Hungary,” p. 52.
82. See here P. W. Schroeder’s powerful and elegant plea that the Great Powers
(Britain especially) should have preserved the Austro-Hungarian Empire in
order to save the status quo: “World War I as a Galloping Gertie,” Journal of
Modern History, vol. 44, no.3 (1972), pp. 319–45. It is not unlike pleading that
after 1945 the United States and USSR should have tried to preserve the British
Empire in order to avoid subsequent instability in the Third World.
83. For French foreign policy, see the older work E. M. Carroll, French Public
Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1880–1914 (London, 1931); G. F. Kennan, The
Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890
(Princeton, N.J., 1979); Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the
Entente Cordiale; J.F.V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War
(London, 1983).
84. There is no comprehensive history of French defense policy in this period; but
there are useful details in D. Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army
1871–1914 (Cambridge, 1981); P.M. de la Gorce, The French Army: A Military
Political History (New York, 1963), chs. 1–5; R. D. Challenor, The French Theory
of the Nation in Arms 1866–1939 (New York, 1955); as well as the references in
notes 88–89 below.
85. Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 71–3, 86–7, 107–9, 124ff; and the
references in Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, ch. 11, fn. 27.
86. French colonialism and the French colonial empire are covered in A. S. Kanya-
Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military
Imperialism (Cambridge, 1969); R. Betts, Tricouleur: The French Empire (London,
1978): H. Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871–1916: Myths and Realities
(London, 1966); R. Girardet, L’idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (Paris,
1972); J. Ganiage, L’expansion coloniale de la France sous la Troisième Republique
1871–1914 (Paris, 1968).
87. For a good summary of this argument, see A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “French
Expansion in Africa: The Mythical Theory,” in R. Owen and R. Sutcliffe (eds.),
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 285ff.
88. French naval policy is covered briefly in Jenkins, History of the French Navy, pp.
303ff; Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 227ff; Halpern, Mediterranean
Naval Situation, pp. 47ff; and T. Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy:
French Naval Policy 1871–1904 (Annapolis, Md., 1987), passim.
89. This may also explain why so many historians have tended to focus upon civilmilitary
relations in France rather than military policy per se. For examples, in
addition to the works listed in note 84 above, see R. Girardet, La société
militaire dans la France contemporaine (Paris, 1953); G. Krumeich, Armaments
and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War (Leamington Spa, 1986).
90. For what follows, see Milward and Saul, Development of the Economies of
Continental Europe 1850–1914, ch. 2; Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-
Century Europe, ch. 3; idem, Economic Forces in French History, ch. 9; Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers, ch. 3 (an excellent and
sophisticated survey); Rowley, Evolution économique de la France du Milieu du
XIXe siècle à 1914, passim; Caron, Economic History of Modern France, pt. 1; J.
H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815–1914
(Cambridge, 1948); R. Price, The Economic Modernization of France (London,
1975).
91. Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe, pp. 71–72.
92. The literature upon French banking and overseas investment is enormous; for a
brief summary, see Kindleberger, Financial History of Western Europe, pp. 225ff;
Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental Powers, pp. 173ff; R. Cameron,
France and the Economic Development of Europe (Princeton, 1961), passim. The
Russian loans and Franco-Russian diplomacy are covered in R. Girault,
Emprunts russes et investisements fran?ais en Russie, 1887–1914 (Paris, 1973); and
Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France, ch. 6.
93. Trebilcock, Industrialization of the Continental Powers, p. 182.
94. Ibid., p. 158.
95. Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product,” p. 281; idem, “International
Industrialization Levels,” p. 297; Wright, Study of War, pp. 670–71. See also the
careful comparisons in V. Hentschel, “Produktion, Wachstum and Productivit?t
in England, Frankreich and Deutschland von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis
zum Ersten Weltkrieg,” Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte,
vol. 68 (1981), pp. 457–510. All this quite contradicts Stone, Europe
Transformed, p. 282.
96. See the overwhelming evidence in Mitchell, Victors and Vanquished, chs. 1–5,
espec. pp. 109–11.
97. Porch, March to the Marne, p. 227.
98. For repeated examples of these sort of claims, see E. Weber, The Nationalist
Revival in France, 1905–1916 (Berkeley, Calif., 1959); H. Contamine, La
Revanche, 1871–1914 (Paris, 1957); Krumeich, Armament and Politics in France,
passim.
99. Ibid. See also Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, chs. 5 and 8; B. H. Liddell
Hart, “French Military Ideas Before the First World War,” in M. Gilbert (ed.), A
Century of Conflict, 1850–1950 (London, 1966), pp. 133–48.
100. For what follows, see Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente
Cordiale, passim; Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War, chs. 1
and 4.
101. J. J. Becker, 1914: Comment les Fran?ais sont entrés dans la guerre (Paris, 1977);
J. Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London/New York, 1984), ch. 8.
102. J. Remak, “1914—The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” reprinted in
Koch (ed.), Origins of the First World War, pp. 89–90.
103. The phrase used first in R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, with A. Denny, Africa
and the Victorian: The Official Mind of Imperialism (2nd edn., London, 1981). For
a discussion of this term, and their other ideas, see P. Kennedy, “Continuity
and Discontinuity in British Imperialism 1815–1914,” in C. C. Eldridge (ed.),
British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1984), pp. 20–38.
104. See again Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, passim. For
the settlement of these differences, and other aspects of the relationship, see B.
Perkins, The Great Rapprochement (New York, 1969).
105. Gillard, Struggle for Asia, passim; F. Kazemzadeh, Russian and Britain in Persia,
1864–1914 (New Haven, Conn., 1968); E. H?lzle, Die Selbstentmachtung
Europas, pp. 85ff.
106. L. K. Young, British Policy in China 1895–1902 (Oxford, 1970); P. Lowe, Britain
in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present (London, 1981) chs. 3–4.
107. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 150. See also P. J. Cain, Economic
Foundations of British Overseas Expansion 1815–1914 (London, 1980), ch. 9; W.
G. Hynes, The Economics of Empire: Britain, Africa and the New Imperialism,
1870–95 (London, 1979), passim; Cain and Hopkins, “Political Economy of
British Expansion Overseas,” pp. 485ff.
108. For details, see the early chapters of Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy.
109. Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, passim; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery, chs. 7–8; and J. Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and
British Military Strategy c. 1900–1916 (London, 1974), cover naval and military
planning.
110. In consequence, the literature is enormous and grows each year. Hobsbawm,
Industry and Empire, pp. 136–53, 172–85; Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp.
326–58; and Mathias, First Industrial Nation, pp. 243–52, 306–34, 365–426, are
still very instructive. Crouzet, Victorian Economy, pp. 371ff, is a succinct new
survey.
111. Cited in Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 315.
112. Quoted in N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London, 1969), p. 134.
113. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 307, and passim, for similar
quotations.
114. Quotation in G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency 1899–1914 (Oxford,
1971), p. 5, with a wealth of further detail on this mood.
115. Porter, Lion’s Share, pp. 353–54.
116. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. xxix; Peacock and Wiseman, Growth of
Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, p. 166; Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-
German Antagonism, ch. 17.
117. Figures from W. Woodruff, “The Emergence of an Industrial Economy 1700–
1914,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, pt. 2, The
Emergence of Industrial Societies, p. 707.
118. On which theme see Porter’s excellent Britian, Europe and the World, passim.
119. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 195ff.
120. Mansergh, Commonwealth Experience, ch. 5; D. C. Gordon, The Dominion
Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914 (Baltimore, Md., 1965).
121. On which see J. Ehrman, Cabinet Government and War 1890–1940 (Cambridge,
1958); F. A. Johnson, Defense by Committee (London, 1960).
122. See note 102 above.
123. Superbly analyzed in M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972),
passim.
124. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, passim; Kennedy, “Strategy
versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Britain,” in Strategy and Diplomacy, pp.
89–106; and the stimulating treatment in Porter, Britain, Europe and the World,
ch. 3.
125. Cited in Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 402.
126. The words are those of Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, as quoted in K.
Wilson, “British Power in the European Balance, 1906–1914,” in D. Dilks (ed.),
Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, 2
vols. (London, 1981), vol. 1, p. 39.
127. Which are, respectively, the rough subtitle and the main title of R. Ropponen,
Die Kraft Russlands: Wie beurteilte die politische und militarische Führung der
europ?ischen Grossm?chte in der Zeit von 1905 bis 1914 die Kraft Russlands?
(Helsinki, 1968), an extraordinarily rich compilation.
128. The following section on the Russian economy prior to 1914 is. based upon G.
Grossman, “The Industrialization of Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Cipolla
(ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 486ff; R. Munting,
The Economic Development of the USSR (London, 1982), ch. 1; O. Crisp, Studies
in the Russian Economy Before 1914 (London, 1976), espec. ch. 1, “The Pattern
of Industrialization in Russia, 1700–1914”; Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, pp.
506ff, 647ff; Blackwell, Industrialization of Russia, ch. 2; M. E. Falkus,
Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914, chs. 7–9; Milward and Saul, Development
of the Economies of Continental Europe, pp. 365–423; the comparisons in Black
(ed.), Modernization of Japan and Russia, passim; and the many statistics in the
older work of M. S. Miller, The Economic Development of Russia, 1905–1914
(London, 1926).
129. Crisp, “Pattern of Industrialization,” pp. 40–41.
130. Munting, Economic Development, p. 34; Girault, Emprunts russes et Investisements
fran?ais en Russie, passim; and J. P. Machay, Pioneer for Profit: Foreign
Entrepreneurs and Russian Industrialization (Chicago/London, 1970), passim. For
indigenous entrepreneurs, see R. Portal, “Muscovite Industrialists: The Cotton
Sector 1861–1914,” in W. L. Blackwell (ed.), Russian Economic Development
from Peter the Great to Stalin (New York, 1974), pp. 161–96.
131. Munting, Economic Development, p. 31. More generally, A. Gershrenkon,
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); M.
Falkus, “Aspects of Foreign Investment in Tsarist Russia,” Journal of European
Economic History, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 14–16. For the latest, very
sophisticated (but therefore very complex) diagnosis, see P. Gatrell, The Tsarist
Economy, 1850–1917 (London, 1986), passim.
132. See Tables 14–18 above; and A. Nove’s excellent comparative statistics in An
Economic History of the USSR (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1969), pp. 14–15.
133. Munting, Economic Development, pp. 27; Trebilcock, Industrialization of the
Continental Power, pp. 216ff, 247ff.
134. Grossman, “Industrialization of Russia and the Soviet Union,” p. 489.
135. Ibid., p. 486.
136. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, p. 4. Chs. 1 and 5 of
Lieven’s book are compelling in this respect, as is T. H. von Laue, Sergei Witte
and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1963).
137. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, p. 13; H. Rogge, Russia in
the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881–1917 (London, 1983), pp. 77ff;
Falkus, “Aspects of Foreign Investment,” p. 10.
138. Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 257ff, is especially good here. See also Seton-
Watson, Russian Empire, pp. 541ff; Milward and Saul, Development of the
Economies of Continental Europe, pp. 397ff; J.H.L. Keep, “Russia,” in NCMH, vol.
9, p. 369.
139. Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 212–13. See also Blackwell, Industrialization of
Russia, pp. 32ff.
140. Stone, Europe Transformed, p. 244.
141. Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, pp. 485ff, 607ff, 643ff; Rogge, Russia in the Age
of Modernization and Revolution, ch. 9. For the army’s dislike of internal-police
roles, see J. Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of
1905–1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), pp. 32ff.
142. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, ch. 5; Joll, Origins of the
First World War, pp. 102ff.
143. See Tables 14–18 above.
144. K. Neilson, “Watching the ‘Steamroller’: British Observers and the Russian
Army before 1914,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 1985), p.
213.
145. And not surprising, since the War Office’s “Military Reports” on foreign
countries covered “geography, topography, ethnography, defences, trade,
resources, communications, political condition, etc.”—see T. G. Ferguson,
British Military Intelligence, 1870–1914 (Frederick, Md., 1984), p. 223.
146. O. Crisp, quoted in Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, p. 9;
and see the details in J. Bushnell, “Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a
Peasant Society,” Journal of Social History, vol. 13 (1980), pp. 565–76. See also
A. K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army (Princeton, 1980), chs. 1–
2.
147. The quotation is from Fuller, “The Russian Empire,” in May (ed.), Knowing
One’s Enemies, p. 114, and passim. Also important here is J. Bushnell, “The
Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881–1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiencies,” American
Historical Review, vol. 86 (1981), pp. 753–80; P. Kenez, “Russian Officer Corps
Before the Revolution: The Military Mind,” Russian Review, vol. 31 (1972), pp.
226–36. Bushnell’s study Mutiny and Repression contains further eye-opening
details, as does W. C. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 18810–
1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1985).
148. Fuller, “Russian Empire,” passim; A. K. Wildman, End of the Russian Imperial
Army, chs. 1–2; W. B. Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon: The Russians in the
War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York, 1986), pp. 52ff.
149. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 149–50; Stone, Eastern
Front, p. 134 (from where the quotation comes).
150. The confusions of prewar Russian planning are covered in Stone, Eastern Front,
pp. 30ff; Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, ch. 5; L.C.F.
Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” rev. version, in Kennedy, War
Plans of the Great Powers, pp. 252–62; Fuller, “Russian Empire,” pp. 111ff.
151. Mitchell, History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 279.
152. Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” p. 956.
153. D. M. Pletcher, “1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustments,”
in W. H. Becker and S. F. Wells (eds.), Economics and World Power: An
Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 (New York, 1984), p. 120. For
other surveys of this growth, see M. L. Eysenbach, American Manufactured
Exports 1897–1914: A Study of Growth and Comparative Advantage (New York,
1976); H. G. Vatter, The Drive to Industrial Maturity: The U. S. Economy, 1860–
1914 (Westport, Conn., 1975 edn.).
154. Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 211ff; cf. R. M. Robertson, History of American
Economy (New York, 1975 edn.), ch. 13.
155. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, p. 51.
156. Taken from Q. Wright, Study of War, pp. 670–71, with my calculations on per
capita income.
157. See Tables 15–16 above—but cf. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. xxx.
158. Farrar, Arrogance and Anxiety, p. 39, fn. 168.
159. Ibid.; D. H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street: The International Economy in
the 1920s (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1977), p. 98, Table 4.
160. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, p. 39; cf. Crouzet, Victorian Economy, p. 342,
fn. 153.
161. Woodruff, America’s Impact on the World, p. 161.
162. W. LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–
1898 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963); W. A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American
Empire (New York, 1969). For more general surveys of American foreign policy,
see T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1974,
edn.); R. D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New
York/Oxford, 1984), chs. 2–3.
163. Pletcher, “1861–1898,” pp. 124ff; T. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest
for Informal Empire (Chicago, 1967); D. G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar
Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900–1921 (Princeton, N.J., 1964); E. R. May,
Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York,
1961), pp. 5–6; Perkins, Great Rapprochement, pp. 122ff.
164. For a critical analysis, see M. de Cecco, Money and Empire: The International
Gold Standard 1890–1914 (Oxford, 1974), pp. 110–126; for the 1907 crisis, see
J. H. Clapham, The Economic History of Modern Britain, 3 vols. (Cambridge,
1938), vol. 3, pp. 55ff.
165. The literature upon the motives and actions of American imperialism between
1895 and 1914 is colossal. Apart from the references in notes 162 and 163.
above, see also R. Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York,
1983), chs. 1–3; E. R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New
York, 1968); G. F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the
Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1974); Howard K. Beale, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York, 1962 edn.).
166. Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, p. 23
167. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, passim;
Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, ch. 2; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy
in the Twentieth Century, pp. 24–38.
168. See especially the criticisms in G. F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago,
1984 edn.), chs. 1–3; and Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, passim.
169. U.S. naval growth and naval policy in this period are now very well covered.
Apart from Potter (ed.), Sea Power, chs. 15 and 17–18, see K. J. Hagan (ed.), In
Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1978 (West-port,
Conn., 1978), chs. 9–10; W. R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 2
vols. (Austin, Texas, 1958 and 1971); and the older works H. and M. Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1946 edn.), and
W. Mills, Arms and Men (New York, 1956), ch. 2.
170. Apart from Braisted’s important works, see R. D. Challenor, Admirals, Generals
and American Foreign Policy 1898–1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1973); J.A.S. Grenville
and G. B. Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign
Policy, 1873–1917 (New Haven, Conn., 1966).
171. Challenor, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, passim; H. H.
Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889–
1941 (New York, 1976). For the improvement in Anglo-American relations, see
C. S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great
Britain, 1783–1900 (New York, 1974), chs. 13–14.
172. Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, chs. 9–10. For further details,
see D. F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York, 1981); and G. A.
Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American
War (Columbia, Missouri, 1971). Also useful on the change of attitudes is J. L.
Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century (New York, 1981); R. Weigley,
History of the United States Army, chs. 13–14.
173. See again Tables 14–20 above.
174. F. Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (3rd edn., New York,
1984), p. 110. For detailed analyses of these decades, see Taylor, Struggle for
Mastery in Europe, pp. 325ff; Bridge and Bullen, Great Powers and the European
States System, chs. 6–8; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe Since the
Congress of Vienna, pp. 207ff; Bartlett, Global Conflict, chs. 2–3.
175. B. Waller, Bismarck at the Crossroads: The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy
After the Congress of Berlin 1878–1880 (London, 1974), p. 195. See also Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery, pp. 258ff; and Kennan, Decline of Bismarck’s European
Order, pp. 73ff.
176. Kennan, Decline of Bismarck’s European Order, passim; and idem, The Fateful
Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York,
1984), passim. The German side is well covered in N. Rich, Friedrich von
Holstein, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1965), vol. 1, passim.
177. The argument that the European scene was “stabilized” in the 1890s,
permitting the turn toward colonial issues, is best covered in W. L. Langer, The
Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902 (New York, 1951 edn.), passim.
178. Langer’s phrase: see ibid., ch. 13; and, more generally, Padfield, Battleship Era,
ch. 14.
179. On this transformation, see again Perkins, Great Rapprochement, passim;
Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement, ch. 14.
180. The standard work here is I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (London,
1966); but see also C. J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy
1878–1902, 2 vols. (London, 1967), vol. 1, ch. 10.
181. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, ch. 18; Andrew, Delcassé and the Making
of the Entente Cordiale, passim; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History, pp. 232ff.
See also the comments in M. Behnen, Rüstung-Bündnis-Sicherheit (Tübingen,
1985).
182. This is best covered in Andrew, Delcassé, passim; and G. L. Monger, The End of
Isolation; British Foreign Policy 1900–1907 (London, 1963).
183. O. J. Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution 1904–1906 (Philadelphia,
Pa., 1931); Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, ch. 14.
184. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 268ff; further details in B.
Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik, 1900–1906 (Düsseldorf, 1973).
185. The complicated events are covered in the works by Taylor, Monger, Andrew,
Rich, and Kennedy, cited above. See also H. Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und
Imperialismus: Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904–5 (Düsseldorf, 1976); and
Lambi’s excellent Navy and German Power Politics 1862–1914, ch. 13.
186. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, ch. 19; Z. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First
World War (London, 1977), ch. 2 et seq. For the Russian response to the 1909
humiliation, see Lieven, Russia and the Origin of the First World War, pp. 36ff.
187. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 200ff; Williamson,
Politics of Grand Strategy, passim, espec. ch. 7.
188. The most detailed study of these events is L. Albertini, The Origin of the War of
1914, 3 vols. (London, 1952–57); but there are good succinct accounts in L.C.F.
Turner, Origins of the First World War (London, 1970); J. Joll, Origins of the First
World War, chs. 2–3; and Langhorne, Collapse of the Concert of Europe, chs. 6–7.
189. The literature upon pre-1914 war plans is immense; for surveys, see P.M.
Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880–1914 (London/Boston,
1979); S. E. Miller (ed.), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War
(Princeton, N.J., 1985); J. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.,
1984).
190. Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, ch. 9; B. E. Schmitt and H.
C. Vedeler, The World in the Crucible 1914–1919 (New York, 1984), pp. 62ff.
191. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, ch. 9.
192. For this argument, see L. L. Farrar, The Short-War Illusion (Santa Barbara, Calif.,
1973), passim.
193. On which see, briefly, Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 62ff; and, in more detail, D. M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United
States and World War I, 1914–1920 (New York, 1965); P. Devlin, Too Proud to
Fight: Woodrow Wilsons Neutrality (New York, 1975); E. R. May, The World War
and American Isolation (Chicago, 1966 edn.); A. S. Link, Wilson, 5 vols. to date
(Princeton, N.J., 1947–65), vols. 3–5.
194. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers, is best here.
195. On which distractions, see P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914–1918
(Oxford, 1965); Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol. 1, ch. 5; and D. French, British
Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London/Boston, 1986), passim.
196. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, chs. 12–14, is an excellent analysis of
Austro-Hungarian military policy—including both strengths and weaknesses—
during the war.
197. For this argument, see Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, ch.
9; Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 458ff.
198. For a more extended argument on these lines, see Kennedy, British Naval
Mastery, ch. 9.
199. Ibid.
200. Strachen, European Armies and the Conduct of War, ch. 9; and see also the
excellent analysis of the problem in S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power:
British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (London, 1982), chs. 4–
8. For a succinct survey, see B. Bond, “The First World War,” in NCMH., vol.
12, ch. 7.
201. For excellent examples, see Stone, Eastern Front, p. 265 and passim.
202. Van Creveld, Supplying War, ch. 4, is convincing here. See also the critique in
G. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (New York, 1958), and in L.C.F. Turner, “The
Significance of the Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy (ed.), War Plans of the Great
Powers, pp. 199–221.
203. For further details, see Stone, Eastern Front, chs. 3–8; Schmitt and Vedeler,
World in the Crucible, chs. 4–5; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War
(London, 1970 edn.), chs. 4–5; Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon, chs. 2–4.
204. Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, ch. 6; J. L. Stokesbury, A Short
History of World War I (New York, 1981), chs. 11–12.
205. See, for example, Stone on Russia, in Eastern Front, ch. 9; Barnett on Britain, in
Collapse of British Power, pp. 113ff; McNeill on France, in Pursuit of Power, pp.
318ff.
206. Apart from McNeill’s excellent general survey, see also G. Hardach, The First
World War 1914–1918 (London, 1977), espec. chs. 4 and 6; and A. Marwick,
War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century (London, 1974), chs. 2–3.
207. See again Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, chs. 12–14; for the internal
problems, Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, ch. 9; A. J. May, The Passing of
the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914–1918, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1966), passim.
208. See especially the paper by J. Gooch, “Italy During the First World War,” in the
forthcoming collection A. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness.
209. J.A.S. Grenville, A World History of the Twentieth Century 1900–1945 (London,
1980), vol. 1, pp. 218–19.
210. Stone, Eastern Front, passim, has excellent details (even if his case for Russia’s
industrial successes begs certain questions). See also Seton-Watson, Russian
Empire, pp. 698ff; and D. R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Armed Forces at War,
1914–1918: An Analysis of Combat Effectiveness,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness. The role of the Moscow industrialists and their quarrels
with the ministries is detailed in L. H. Siegelbaum, The Politics of Industrial
Mobilization in Russia, 1914–1917 (New York, 1984); and there is further
massive detail in A. L. Sidorov, The Economic Position of Russia During the First
World War (Moscow, 1973 trans.). The czar’s own efforts are examined in D. R.
Jones, “Nicholas II and the Supreme Command,” Sbornik, vol. 11 (1985), pp.
47–83.
211. Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, pp. 188–99. This quotation is from
N. Golovine, Russian Army in the World War (New Haven, 1932), p. 281. For
the casualty numbers, and the discontents at the “second-category” call-up, see
Wildman, End of the Russian Imperial Army, ch. 3; and the nice survey in
Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon, passim.
212. G. Pedrocini, Les mutineries de 1917 (Paris, 1967), is the best of a number of
studies on this crisis.
213. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 322, with a good synthesis of the literature. See
also Hardach, First World War, pp. 86ff, 13Iff.
214. See the older work M. Ange-Laribé, L’agriculture pendant la guerre (Paris, 1925),
as well as the coverage in Hardach and McNeill.
215. Figures from Stokesbury, Short History of World War I, p. 289.
216. Kennedy, “Great Britain Before 1914,” in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp.
172–204; French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, passim.
217. See again Barnett, Collapse of British Power, pp. 113ff; Hardach, First World
War, pp. 77ff; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 325ff; R.J.Q. Adams, Arms and the
Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions, 1915 (London, 1978),
passim.
218. Figures from Hardach, First World War, p. 87.
219. Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 146, with the figures drawn from tables
in Peacock and Wiseman, Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom.
220. Bond, “First World War,” passim in NCMH, vol. 12; Guinn, British Strategy and
Politics, passim: Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, chs. 6–8; D. R.
Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, N.J., 1983).
221. Quoted in Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol. 1, p. 255. For full details, see now K.
Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914–1918 (London/Boston,
1985).
222. F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers (London,
1966), p. 623.
223. Well covered in T. Lupfer, “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German
Tactical Doctrine During the First World War,” Leavenworth Papers, no. 4 (Fort
Leavenworth, Kans., 1981); and Van Creveld, Command in War, pp. 168ff.
224. Hardach, First World War, pp. 55ff; G. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in
Germany 1914–1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1966).
225. See the nervous consideration of this in Beloff, Imperial Sunset, pp. 239ff, 246ff,
271.
226. Hardach, The First World War, pp. 63ff; McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 338ff;
Bond, “The First World War,” pp. 198–99, in NCMH, vol. 12.
227. Full details are in A. Skalweit, Die Deutsche Kriegsn?hrungswirtschaft (Berlin,
1927), with a summary in Hardach, First World War, pp. 112ff. For the impact
of the war upon the German people, see J. Kocka, Facing Total War: German
Society 1914–1918 (Leamington Spa, Warwick, 1984), chs. 2 and 4; McNeill,
Pursuit of Power, p. 340, for the quotation.
228. See the references in note 193 above. For a historiographical summary, see D.
M. Smith, “National Interest and American Intervention, 1917: An Historical
Appraisal,” Journal of American History, vol. 52 (1965), pp. 5–24.
229. The American contribution is ably summarized in Millett and Maslowski, For
the Common Defense, ch. 11; Weigley, History of the United States Army, ch. 16;
T. K. Nenninger, “American Military Effectiveness in World War I,” in Millett
and Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness (forthcoming).
230. Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 148. See also the useful
details in Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, 4 vols. (London, 1975), vol. 4, pp.
119ff, 229ff.
231. Bond, “First World War,” NCMH, vol. 12, p. 199, which provides these figures;
Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, p. 261. For detailed studies of the
1918 campaigning, see J. Toland, No Man’s Land: The Story of 1918 (London,
1980); H. Essame, The Battle for Europe, 1918 (New York, 1972); B. Pitt, 1918—
The Last Act (New York, 1962).
232. For details, see Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, p. 255ff, 376ff; A. J.
Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918 (Cambridge, 1967), passim.
233. J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1978), passim; J.
Williams, The Home Fronts: Britain, France and Germany, 1914–1918 (London,
1972); A. Marwick, The Deluge—British Society in the First World War (London,
1965); idem, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century, chs. 2–3.
234. This theme runs through Kennan’s books; for example, see Decline of Bismarcks
European Order, p. 3. In a similar vein is H?lzle, Die Selbstentmachtung Europas.
For surveys of the psychological-cultural impact, referring to the more detailed
literature, see Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, pp. 476ff, and J. Joll,
Europe Since 1870 (London, 1973), espec. ch. 11.
235. War expenditure figures from Hardach, First World War, p. 153; total mobilized
forces from Barraclough (ed.), Atlas of World History, p. 252.
236. See the anecdotes in M. Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918
(London, 1978).
CHAPTER SIX
The Coming of a Bipolar World and the Crisis of the “Middle Powers”: Part
Two, 1919–1942
1. For the 1919–1923 settlements, see the general treatments in NCMH, vol. 12,
ch. 8; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, pp. 360ff; G. Ross, The Great
Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914–1945 (London, 1983),
ch. 3; R. J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919–1939 (New York, 1971), chs. 1 and 4;
M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace
Conferences 1919–23 (London, 1981), passim; S. Marks, The Illusion of Peace:
International Relations in Europe 1918–1933 (London, 1976), ch. 1.
2. Ross, Great Powers, ch. 4; Marks, Illusion of Peace, ch. 3; A.J.P. Taylor, The
Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1964 edn.), ch. 3; J.
Jacobsen, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West 1925–1929 (Princeton, N.J.,
1972); and G. Grun, “Locarno, Ideal and Reality,” International Affairs, vol. 31
(1955), pp. 477–85, are best here.
3. The literature upon reparations and war debts has now turned into a flood.
Among the more important recent works are M. Trachtenberg, Reparation in
World Politics: France and European Diplomacy 1916–1923 (New York, 1980); W.
A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy 1914–1924 (Princeton, N.J., 1978);
H. Rupieper, The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922–1923 (London, 1979);
S. A. Shuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of
1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976); D. P.
Silverman, Reconstructing Europe After the Great War (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
Marks, Illusion of Peace, ch. 2, is also useful, and there is a good summary in
Kindleberger, Financial History of Western Europe, pt. 4.
4. D. H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929 (London, 1977), p. 13.
This is a good summary of all of the post-1919 studies (often sponsored by the
Carnegie Foundation) on “the costs of the war,” as well as the more recent
literature.
5. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, p. 14.
6. Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914–1980 (London, 1978), p. 19.
7. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, pp. 34–35, 98ff.
8. Rostow, World Economy, pp. 194–200, has a good summary; but see also
Kenwood and Lougheed, Growth of the International Economy, ch. 11; A. S.
Milward, The Economic Effects of the World Wars in Britain (London, 1970),
passim; Landes, Unbound Prometheus, ch. 6.
9. I. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, (Geneva, 1954),
pp. 204–05.
10. Farrar, Arrogance and Anxiety, p. 39, fn. 17.
11. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, ch. 1 and pp. 99–101: Kenwood and
Lougheed, Growth of the International Economy, pp. 176ff. For details of the
collapse in American farm prices after 1919, see Robertson, History of the
American Economy, p. 515.
12. For a good summary, see Hardach, First World War, ch. 6; also Aldcroft, From
Versailles to Wall Street, pp. 30ff.
13. See the references in note 3 above; and Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street,
ch. 4.
14. See here the essays in Rowland (ed.), Balance of Power or Hegemony: The Inter-
War Monetary System; C. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929–1939
(California, 1973), passim, but especially chs. 1 and 4; A. Fishlow, “Lessons
from the Past: Capital Markets During the 19th Century and the Interwar
Period,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 3 (1985), especially pp. 415–27.
There is also a very good analysis in Kennedy, Over Here, pp. 334–47.
15. For an analysis of these events, see Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, chs.
7–11; Kindleberger, World in Depression, chs. 3–9; idem, Financial History of
Western Europe, ch. 20.
16. Kindleberger, World in Depression, p. 231; Rowland, “Preparing the American
Ascendancy: The Transfer of Economic Power from Britain to the United States,
1933–1944,” in Rowland (ed.), Balance of Power or Hegemony, pp. 198ff. For
Chamberlain’s quote, see D. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American
Alliance, 1937–61 (London, 1981), p. 16 and passim; also C. A. MacDonald, The
United States, Britain and Appeasement 1936–1939 (London, 1980).
17. A. J.P. Taylor, The Trouble-Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1789–1939
(London, 1969 edn.), chs. 4–6; Z. S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign
Policy 1898–1914 (Cambridge, 1969), passim; G. A. Craig and A. L. George,
Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Oxford, 1983), ch. 5.
18. See, for example, L. Martin, Peace Without Victory—Woodrow Wilson and the
English Liberals (New York, 1973 edn.); Taylor, Trouble-Makers, ch. 5.
19. A. J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy (New York, 1970 edn.),
passim; S. R. Grabaud, British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917–1924
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956); F. S. Northedge and A. Wells, Britain and Soviet
Communism: The Impact of a Revolution (London, 1982), ch. 8.
20. G. Schmidt, “Wozu noch politische Geschichte?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
B17/75 (April 1975), pp. 32ff.
21. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter
Revolution at Versailles 1918–1919 (London, 1968); Joll, Europe Since 1870, ch.
9, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution.” There is also good detail upon these
fears of revolution in C. S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, N.J.,
1975), espec. ch. 1.
22. Joll, Europe Since 1870, chs. 9–12; Sontag, Broken World, pp. 24ff.
23. Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, pp. 476ff; B. Bengonzi, Heroes
Twilight (New York, 1966); P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New
York, 1975); cf. Barnett, Collapse of British Power, pp. 426ff.
24. See again Joll, Europe Since 1870, pp. 262ff; Gollwitzer, Geschichte des
Weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 2, pp. 538ff.; A. Hamilton, The Appeal of Fascism
(London, 1971): P. Hayes, Fascism (London, 1973), passim; R.A.L. Waite,
Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany (Cambridge,
Mass., 1952), passim; J. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany
(Bloomington, Ind., 1977).
25. D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers (London, 1973); Northedge and Wells, Britain
and Soviet Communism, chs. 6–8.
26. For what follows, see the excellent analysis in Barraclough, Introduction to
Contemporary History, ch. 6, “The Revolt Against the West”; and the maps in
Barraclough (ed.), Atlas of World History, pp. 248, 260–61. See also Gollwitzer,
Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 2, pp. 575ff; NCMH, vol. 12, chs. 10–
12; H. Bull and A. Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford,
1984), espec. pt. 3; R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918–1981 (London,
1985), ch. 1; H. Griml, Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch, and Belgian
Empires 1919–1963 (London, 1978) chs. 1–3.
27. For a good example on the British side, see B. R. Tomlinson, The Political
Economy of the Raj 1914–1947 (Cambridge, 1979), passim; more generally,
Tomlinson, “The Contraction of England: National Decline and the Loss of
Empire,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 58–
72; Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, chs. 4–6; Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol.
1, ch. 6.
28. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, pp. 156–58.
29. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, pp. 107ff; Grenville, World
History of the Twentieth Century, pp. 117ff; Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, pp.
229ff; Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, vol. 2, pp. 575ff.
30. A. Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921–1931
(New York, 1978 edn.), passim.
31. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, ch. 13; NCMH, vol. 12, pp.
319, 324–25; C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Climax of French
Imperial Expansion 1914–1924 (Stanford, Calif., 1981), p. 246.
32. Howard, Continental Commitment, pp. 56ff; B. Bond, British Military Policy
Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), chs. 1, 3–4.
33. For discussions of this “continuity” in German policy after 1919, see the
general treatments in Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, passim; Gruner, Die
deutsche Frage, pp. 126ff; Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, passim.
See also two important new works: G. Stoakes, Hitler and the Quest for World
Dominion: Nazi Ideology and Foreign Policy in the 1920s (Leamington Spa,
Warwickshire, 1986); M. Lee and W. Michalka, German Foreign Policy 1917–
1933: Continuity or Break? (Leamington Spa, Warwickshire, 1987).
34. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 48.
35. Ibid. For other surveys of the post-1919 “balance,” see DePorte, Europe Between
the Super-Powers, ch. 3; Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, pp. 622ff.; Ross, Great
Powers and the Decline of the European States System, chs. 3–6.
36. E. M. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933 (Princeton, N.J.,
1979), pp. 92ff, is best here.
37. P. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies 1919–25 (Minneapolis, Minn., 1962),
passim; and the classic older work A. Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two
Wars (New York, 1966 edn.), especially ch. 8. Later French efforts to contain
Germany in eastern Europe are explored in L. Radice, Prelude to Appeasement,
East Central European Diplomacy in the early 1930s (New York, 1981), chs. 3–4.
38. W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919–1963 (London,
1968), pp. 61–63; Ross, Great Powers, p. 57; A. Orde, Britain and International
Security 1920–1926 (London, 1978), passim. For the continuity of this policy,
see P. W. Schroeder, “Munich and the British Tradition,” Historical Journal, vol.
19 (1976), pp. 223–43.
39. A. Teichova, An Economic Background to Munich (Cambridge, 1974) passim; D.
Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War (Princeton,
N.J., 1980), passim; B. J. Wendt, “England und der deutsche ‘Drang nach
Südosten,’ ” in I. Geiss and B. J. Wendt (eds.), Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des
19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 483–512.
40. Quoted in Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 220. There is a good and succinct
survey of the League’s activities in NCMH, vol. 12, ch. 9; and in Ross, Great
Powers, ch. 7.
41. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939 (London, 1939); Sontag, Broken
World, passim; A. Adamthwaite, The Lost Peace: International Relations in Europe
1918–1939 (London, 1980), passim.
42. D. Mack Smith, Mussolini: A Biography (New York, 1982) is a good portrayal of
the man, though less so of Italian politics and economy under him. For those
aspects, see M. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939–1941 (Cambridge, 1982), ch. 1;
J. Whittam, “The Italian General Staff and the Coming of the Second World
War,” in A. Preston (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World
War (London, 1978), pp. 77–97; A. Raspin, “Wirtschaftliche und politische
Aspekte der italienischen Aufrüstung Anfang der dreissiger Jahre bis 1940,” in
F. Forstmeier and H. E. Volkmann (eds.), Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend
des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf, 1975), pp. 202–21; B. R. Sullivan, “The
Italian Armed Forces, 1918–1940,” in Millett and Murray (eds.), Military
Effectiveness, vol. 2 (forthcoming).
43. S. Ricossa, “Italy,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 272ff; R. Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (Manhattan, Kan.,
1984 edn.), p. 48; J. W. Thompson, Italian Civil and Military Aircraft 1930–1945
(Fallbrook, Calif., 1963).
44. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 20.
45. Quoted from Ricossa, “Italy,” p. 266; see also, Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp.
30–31, 43.
46. Ricossa, “Italy,” p. 270.
47. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, ch. 1; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, ch. 13;
Raspin, “Wirtschaftliche und Politische Aspekte,” passim; W. Murray, The
Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939 (Princeton, N.J., 1984),
pp. 110ff.
48. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 48.
49. Ibid., p. 73. More generally, see McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 350ff; W.
Murray, “German Air Power and the Munich Crisis,” in B. Bond and I. Roy
(eds.), War and Society, vol. 1 (1976), pp. 107–18.
50. The figures with neither parentheses nor brackets come from Hillman,
“Comparative Strength of the Powers,” in A. J. Toynbee and F. T. Ashton-
Gwatkin (eds.), The World in 1939 (London, 1952), Table VI, p. 454, with
currency conversions at the exchange rates he gives in the footnote. The figures
in parentheses come from the “Correlates of War” print-out. One suspects that
currency changes are responsible for some of the discrepancies, as are different
national accounting practices. In Japan’s case the matter is further complicated
by the distinctions made between regular and “extraordinary” defense
spending, and between “forces in homeland” and “others” (e.g., China War).
The figures in brackets are from K. Ohkawa and M. Shinohara (eds.), Patterns of
Japanese Economic Development (New Haven, Conn., 1979), and do not include
“others.”
51. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, pp. 177–78.
52. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 9–16; idem, “Conquest, Foreign and Domestic,
in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany”, Journal of Modern History, vol. 56 (1986),
pp. 1–57.
53. On this, Mack Smith, Mussolini, is overwhelming.
54. See below, pp. 340–41.
55. These racial/cultural attitudes are nicely covered in Thome, The Issue of War:
States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945 (London, 1985),
passim. See also Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, passim.
56. Howarth, Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, pp. 199ff.
57. Allen, Short Economic History of Modern Japan, pp. lOOff.
58. League of Nations, World Economic Survey (Geneva, 1945), Table III, p. 134.
59. Allen, Economic History, pp. 101–13; Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in
Asia, p. 115.
60. On this important theme, see espec. J. B. Crowley, Japans Quest for Autonomy:
National Security and Foreign Policy 1930–1958 (Princeton, N.J., 1966), passim;
M. A. Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific
War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (1981), pp. 105–24; J. W. Morley
(ed.), Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton, N.J., 1971).
61. Allen, Economic History of Modern Japan, p. 141.
62. Howarth, Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, pt. 4; H. P. Willmott, Empires in the
Balance (Annapolis, Md., 1982), ch. 3; A. J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies:
The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (Oxford, 1981), ch. 11; S. E.
Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), espec. pts. 1 and 5; C.
Bateson, The War with Japan (East Lansing, Mich., 1968), ch. 2.
63. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, pp. 89ff; R. H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun:
The American War with Japan (New York, 1985), chs. 2 and 4; S. Hayashi with
A. Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Westport, Conn., 1978
reprint), ch. 1.
64. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 55; P. M. Kennedy, “Japan’s Strategic
Decisions, 1939–45,” in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945, pp. 182ff;
C. Boyd, “Military Organizational Effectiveness: Imperial Japanese Armed
Forces Between the World Wars,” in Millett and Murray (eds.), Military
Effectiveness, vol. 2. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, ch. 12, is very good on the armynavy
quarrels. The China War itself is covered in F. Dorn, The Sino-Japanese
War 1937–1941 (New York, 1974).
65. Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security,” pp. 112–16.
66. Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security,” p. 114, from where the quote comes.
See also B. Martin, “Aggressionspolitik als Mobilisierungsfaktor: Der
milit?rische und wirtschaftliche Imperialismus Japans 1931 bis 1941,” in F.
Forstmeier and H.-E. Volkmann (eds.), Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des
Zweiten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf, 1975), pp. 234–35.
67. Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp. 14–17; M. A. Barnhart, “Japanese Intelligence
Before the Second World War,” in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 435–
37; and espec. A. Coox, Nomonhan, 2 vols. (Stanford, Calif., 1985), passim.
68. Wright, Study of War, p. 672; Overy, Air War, p. 151; Bairoch, “World
Industrialization Levels,” p. 299.
69. For the decision itself, see Willmott, Empires in the Balance, ch. 3; Hayashi and
Coox, Kogun, pp. 19ff; Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security,” pp. 116ff; I.
Nobutaka (ed.), Japan’s Decision for War (Stanford, Calif., 1967), passim;
Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, ch. 4; R. J. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War
(Princeton, N.J., 1961).
70. For general surveys, see Craig, Germany 1866–1945, pp. 396ff; A. J. Nicholls,
Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (London, 1979 edn.), passim. For summaries of
the massive historiography, and hotly contested debates upon Germany in the
Nazi era, see I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (London, 1985); and K.
Hildebrand, The Third Reich (London/Boston, 1984).
71. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, passim; J. Hiden, Germany and Europe
1919–1939 (London, 1977), espec. ch. 7; F. Fischer, Bündnis der Eliten
(Düsseldorf, 1979). For details of the “continuity” among the armed forces, see
G. Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben (Stuttgart, 1978), passim; J.
Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939
(Düsseldorf, 1973); M. Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit (Wiesbaden, 1980).
Also important for what follows is Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg,
vol. 1, Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik, eds. W. Deist et
al. (Stuttgart, 1979).
72. A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962 edn.); A. Hillgruber,
Germany and the Two World Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), espec. chs. 5 and
8; N. Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 2 vols. (London, 1973–74); G. Weinberg, The
Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1970 and 1980); and the
literature in M. Hauner, “A Racial Revolution?” Journal of Contemporary
History, vol. 19 (1984), pp. 669–87; Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered,
pp. 85–95; Gruner, Die deutsche Frage, pp. 145ff; A. Kuhn, Hitlers
aussenpolitisches Programm (Stuttgart, 1970); E. Jackel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung
(Middletown, Conn., 1982).
73. The term comes from E. N. Petersen, The Limits of Hitler’s Power (Princeton,
N.J., 1969); but see also Craig, Germany 1860–1945, ch. 17; Kershaw, Nazi
Dictatorship, chs. 4 and 7; Hildebrand, Third Reich, pp. 83ff, 152ff; also I.
Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933–
1945 (Oxford, 1983).
74. Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, pp. 20–21; Hillman,
“Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” p. 454.
75. Quoted in A. Seaton, The German Army 1933–45 (London, 1982), p. 55. See
also Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 397ff.
76. Seaton, German Army 1933–45, chs. 3–4, covers this breakneck expansion, as
does W. Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981), chs. 3
and 6, with references to the extensive further literature.
77. For more details, see Deist, Wehrmacht, ch. 4; Overy, Air War, p. 21; W.
Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore, Md., 1985), ch. 1; E. L. Homze, Arming the
Luftwaffe (Lincoln, Neb., 1976); K.-H. Volker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933–1939
(Stuttgart, 1967).
78. Deist, Wehrmacht, p. 81; with much more detail in Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und
die Marine, passim; and M. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, 3
vols. (Frankfurt, 1970–75).
79. R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932–1938 (London, 1932), pp. 19ff.
80. Ibid., pp. 28ff. Overy’s brief work contains full references to further studies on
the German economy under the Nazis.
81. Deist, Wehrmacht, pp. 89–91 and passim; A. S. Milward, The German Economy
at War (London, 1965), pp. 17–24.
82. Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, pp. 4ff, is the best summary
here; but see also Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Powers,” pp. 368ff.
83. Murray, Balance of Power, p. 15*.
84. Ibid., pp. 15–16. See also the important chapter by H.-E. Volkmann, “Die NSWirtschaft
in Vorbereitung des Krieges,” in Deist, et al., Ursachen und
Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik, espec. pp. 349ff.
85. Deist, Wehrmacht, p. 90; Seaton, German Army, pp. 93–96.
86. Quoted in Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 20; idem., “German Air Power and the Munich
Crisis,” in Bond and Roy (eds.), War and Society, vol. 1, passim; Deist,
Wehrmacht, pp. 66–69.
87. B. R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany
Between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), passim; W. Murray, “German
Army Doctrine, 1918–1939, and the Post-1945 Theory of Blitzkrieg Strategy,”
in C. Fink et al. (eds.), German Nationalism and the European Response 1890–
1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), pp. 71–94; Dupuy, Genius for War, ch. 15.
88. Murray, Balance of Power, pp. 150–51; and Volkmann, “Die NS-Wirtschaft in
Vorbereitung des Krieges,” pp. 323ff. Details of the relationship between
Germany’s economic difficulties and Hitler’s “forward” policy are in B. A.
Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague,
1968); T. W. Mason, “Innere Krise und Angriffskrieg 1938/39,” in Forstmeier
and Volkmann (eds.), Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des zweiten
Weltkrieges, pp. 158–88; J. Dulffer, “Der Beginn des Krieges 1939,” Geschichte
und Gesellschaft, vol. 2 (1976), pp. 443–70.
89. T. W. Mason, “Some Origins of the Second World War,” p. 125, in E. M.
Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1971); idem,
“Innere Krise und Angriffskrieg 1938/39,” passim. Murray, Balance of Power,
pp. 290ff, details the 1938 and 1939 plunder.
90. R. J. Overy, “Hitler’s War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation,”
Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 35 (1982), pp. 272–91, is important
here.
91. Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, passim; Deist, Wehrmacht, ch. 7;
Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 81ff; M. Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?”
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 13, pp. 15–32; J. Thies, Architekt der
Weltherrschaft: Die “Endziele” Hitlers (Düsseldorf, 1976), passim; and see the
historiographical discussion in Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, ch. 6.
92. On which see the two older works A. Wolfers, Britain and France Between the
Wars (New York, 1940); and W. M. Jordan, Britain, France and the German
Problem (London, 1943); as well as the essays in N. Waites (ed.), Troubled
Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (London, 1971); and
N. Rostow, Anglo-French Relations 1934–1936 (London, 1984), passim.
93. C. Fohlen, “France,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 80–86; T. Kemp, The French Economy 1913–39: The History of a
Decline (New York, 1972), chs. 5–7; G. Ziebura, “Determinanten der
Aussenpolitik Frankreichs 1932–1939,” in K. Rohe (ed.), Die Westm?chte und
das Dritte Reich 1933–1939 (Paderborn, 1982), pp. 136ff. There are lots of
details (also prejudiced commentary) in A. Sauvy, Histoire économique de la
France entre les deux guerres, 2 vols. (Paris, 1965–67); and more balance in
Histoire économique et sociale de la France, vol. 4, pt. 2,1914–1950, eds. F.
Braudel and E. Labrousse (Paris, 1980).
94. Fohlen, “France,” p. 88.
95. Ibid., pp. 86–91; Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp. 388ff; Kemp, French Economy
1913–39, chs. 8–12 (with very good details); Caron, Economic History of Modern
France, pp. 258ff.
96. The best source here is R. Frankenstein, Le Prix du réarmement fran?ais 193–
1939 (Paris, 1939), passim, but p. 303 for the spending totals. The nationalincome
figure is taken from A. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the
Second World War (London, 1977), p. 164. See also B. A. Lee, “Strategy, Arms
and the Collapse of France 1939–1940,” in R.T.B. Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy
and Intelligence During the Second World War (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 63ff.
97. R. J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning
1933–1940 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), ch. 1; see also the essays in Les Relations
franco-allemandes 1933–1939 (Paris, 1976).
98. Frankenstein, Le Prix du réarmement fran?ais, p. 317; idem, “The Decline of
France, and French Appeasement Policies 1936–9,” in Mommsen and
Kettenacker (eds.) Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, p. 238;
Overy, Air War, p. 21. The relatively generous treatment of the navy—and that
service’s ingratitude—is detailed in R. Chalmers Hood, Royal Republicans: The
French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars (Baton Rouge, La., 1985).
99. Frankenstein, Le Prix des réarmement fran?ais, p. 319; Murray, Change in the
European Balance of Power, pp. 107–8. The navy’s strength by then is assessed
in P. Masson, “La Marine fran?aise en 1939–40,” Revue historique des armées,
No. 4 (1979), pp. 57–77.
100. No attempt will be made here to cover all the literature upon French politics
and society in the 1930s and its relationship to the 1940 “strange defeat.”
There are important surveys in J. B. Duroselle, La Décadence 1932–1939 (Paris,
1979); R. Hohne, “Innere Desintegration und ?usserer Machtzerfall: Die
franz?sische Politik in den Jahren 1933–36,” in Rohe (ed.), Die Westm?chte und
das Dritte Reich, pp. 157f?; H. Dubief, Le Déclin de la IIIe République 1929–1938
(Paris, 1976); J. Joll (ed.), The Decline of the Third Republic (New York, 1959).
There is also a useful summary in J. C. Cairns, “Some Recent Historians and the
‘Strange Defeat’ of 1940,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 46 (1974), pp. 60–85.
101. For details, see A. Home, The French Army and Politics 1870–1970 (London,
1984), ch. 3; P.C.F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in
Modern France (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); the more technical details in
Frankenstein, Le Prix du réarmement fran?ais, and H. Dutailly, Les Problèmes de
l’Armée de terre fran?aise 1933–1939 (Paris, 1980); and the more cautionary
comments in R. A. Doughty, “The French Armed Forces, 1918–1940,” in Millett
and Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, vol. 2.
102. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, p. 166; Gorce,
French Army: A Military-Political History, pp. 270ff; Young, “French Military
Intelligence and Nazi Germany,” in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 271–
309.
103. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, ch. 4; Doughty, “French Armed Forces,
1918–1940,” passim; Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, pp. 97ff;
L. Mysyrowicz, Autopsie d’une Défaite; Origines de l’effondrement militaire fran?ais
de 1940 (Lausanne, 1973). But the most thorough analysis is now R. A.
Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919–
1939 (Hamden, Conn., 1985).
104. French diplomacy in these critical years is best covered in Adamthwaite, France
and the Coming of the Second World War, passim; Duroselle, La Décadence,
passim; and P. Wandycz, The Twilight of the French Eastern Alliances, 1926–1936
(forthcoming).
105. See R. Girault, “The Impact of the Economic Situation on the Foreign Policy of
France, 1936–9,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.), Fascist Challenge and the
Policy of Appeasement, pp. 209–26.
106. In particular, see Young, “La Guerre de Longue Durée: Some Reflections on
French Strategy and Diplomacy in the 1930s,” in Preston (ed.), General Staffs
and Diplomacy Before the Second World War, pp. 41–64; and Posen, Sources of
Military Doctrine, pp. 112ff, 127ff. For full diplomatic details, see Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War, especially pt 3; the
contributions to Les Relations Franco-Britanniques 1935–39 (Paris, 1975); and
Young, In Command of France, chs. 8–9.
107. Apart from the details in Adamthwaite’s and Young’s books, see also Barnett,
Collapse of British Power; Howard, Continental Commitment; and last but not
least, J. C. Cairns, “A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France,”
American Historical Review, vol. 79 (1974), pp. 710–43.
108. Figures from Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 240. It is impossible to list
even one-tenth of the studies upon British “appeasement” policies in the 1930s;
but there are very useful summative essays in Mommsen and Kettenacker
(eds.), Fascist Challenge and the Power of Appeasement, chs. 6–13 and 19–25; and
massive detail (and an enormous bibliography) in G. Schmidt, England in der
Krise: Grundzüge und Grundlagen der britischen Appeasement-Politik, 1930–1937
(Opladen, 1981).
109. See especially R. Ovendale, Appeasement and the English-Speaking World
(Cardiff, 1975), as well as his ch. 23 in Mommsen and Ketternacker (eds.),
Fascist Challenge; R. F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918–
1939 (London, 1981).
110. B. Bond, British Military Policy Between Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), espec.
chs. 1 and 4, is best here.
111. R. Meyers, “British Imperial Interests and the Policy of Appeasement,” and W.
R. Louis, “The Road to Singapore: British Imperialism in the Far East 1932–
1942,” both in Mommsen and Kettenacher (eds.), Fascist Challenge; A. J.
Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese
Navy (Oxford, 1981); L. R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s
Mediterranean Crisis (London, 1975); S. W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the
Wars, vol. 2 (London, 1976).
112. Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, ch. 10. For details of the policy implications,
see the varying assessments in G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury
1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1979); R. P. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties:
Politics and Profits (Princeton, N.J., 1977); Barnett, Collapse of British Power, ch.
5; and N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol. 1 (London, 1976), passim.
113. For the economic recovery and newer industries, see Pollard, Development of the
British Economy, ch. 3; H. W. Richardson, Economic Recovery in Britain, 1932–
1939 (London, 1967); B.W.E. Alford, Depression and Recovery: British Economic
Growth 1918–1939 (London, 1972).
114. Cited in Howard, Continental Commitment, p. 99. For fuller details, see Peden,
British Rearmament and the Treasury, chs. 3–4; see also R. Meyers, Britische
Sicherheitspolitik 1934–1938 (Düsseldorf, 1976); and Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol.
1, ch. 4.
115. Howard, Continental Commitment, pp. 120–21.
116. Details in U. Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British
Politics 1932–1939 (London, 1980); M. Smith, British Air Strategy Between the
Wars (Oxford, 1984), espec. pt. 2.
117. For this argument, see especially Barnett, Collapse of British Power, and Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power.
118. D. C. Watt, Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach of
the Second World War (London, 1975), is the key work here.
119. See again Dehio, Precarious Balance. For good surveys of the British Cabinet’s
awareness of the country’s strategical dilemmas, see Barnett, Collapse of British
Power; Howard, The Continental Commitment; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine,
ch. 5; D. Dilks, “The Unnecessary War? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in
Great Britain 1931–1939,” in Preston (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy Before
the Second World War, pp. 98–132; and G. Schmidt’s thoughtful essay in Rohe
(ed.), Die Westm?chte und das Dritte Reich, pp. 29–56.
120. Schmidt, in Rohe (ed.), Die Westm?chte, pp. 46ff; C. A. MacDonald, United
States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936–1939, passim.
121. Schmidt, England in der Krise, ch. 1, is best here; but see also the above-named
works by Howard, Bond, Barnett, Dilks, Gibbs, and Meyers; and the good
summary in G. Niedhart, “Appeasement: Die Britische Antwort auf die Krise
des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,”
Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 226 (1978), pp. 68–88.
122. Barnett, Collapse of British Power, passim; Murray, Change in the European
Balance of Power, passim; Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp. 290ff; A.
Adamthwaite, “The British Government and the Media, 1937–1938,” Journal of
Contemporary History, vol. 18 (1983), pp. 281–97.
123. Cited in Barnett, Collapse of British Power, p. 564.
124. Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939, pp. 439, 446.
125. For more details of this argument, see Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in
Twentieth-Century Britain,” in Strategy and Diplomacy, pp. 100–6; and for an
even more deterministic view, Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, pp. 86ff,
95ff.
126. Figures from Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, p. 294; but see also Munting, Economic
Development of the USSR, pp. 45ff; Nove, Economic History of Russia, chs. 6–10;
and the interesting discussion in Grossman, “The Industrialization of Russia
and the Soviet Union,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol.
4, pt. 2, pp. 50Iff.
127. S. H. Cohn, Economic Development in the Soviet Union (Lexington, Mass., 1970),
pp. 70–71; F. D. Holzmann, “Financing Soviet Economic Development,” in
Blackwell (ed.), Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin, pp.
259–76; Kochan and Abraham, Making of Modern Russia, pp. 361ff. See also M.
Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power (Evanston, 111., 1968).
128. W. A. Lewis, Economic Survey 1919–1939 (London, 1949), p. 131; Nove,
Economic History, ch. 7; Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 99; H. J.
Ellison, “The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture,” in Blackwell (ed.), Russian
Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin, pp. 241–55.
129. On which see Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, pp. 106ff.
130. Nove, Economic History, p. 232; Lewis, Economic Survey, p. 133; M. McCauley,
The Soviet Union Since 1917 (London, 1981), pp. 85–87.
131. Munting, Economic Development of the Soviet Union, p. 93; Nove, Economic
History, pp. 187ff; Blackwell, Industrialization of Russia, pp. 132ff; Lewis,
Economic Survey, p. 125.
132. See Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939, pp. 439, 446; Black et al., Modernization of Japan and
Russia, pp. 195–97; S. H. Cohn, “The Soviet Economy: Performance and
Growth,” in Blackwell (ed.), Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great
to Stalin, pp. 321–51.
133. Nove, Economic History, p. 236. For further details, see Kochan and Abraham,
Making of Modern Russia, pp. 382ff; R. Conquest, The Great Terror (London,
1968).
134. Nove, Economic History, p. 236.
135. Figures from Overy, Air War, p. 21. The Italian figures for the years 1932–37
(not available in Overy) were provided by my colleague Brian Sullivan, but are
only rough estimates; the same is true of the 1932–34 French figures, generally
thought to be about 50 a month—see Young, In Command of France, p. 164.
Relative neglect of the navy is covered in Mitchell, History of Russia and Soviet
Sea Power, ch. 17.
136. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 350, fn. 77. For the subsequent comments on
Soviet military development generally, see J. Erickson, The Soviet High
Command, 1918–1941 (London, 1962), passim; E. F. Ziemke, “The Soviet
Armed Forces in the Interwar Period,” in Millett and Murray (eds.), Military
Effectiveness, vol. 1; B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Red Army (New York, 1956),
chs. 3–9. Russian defense expenditures are detailed in Nove, Economic History,
pp. 227–28; and Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 114.
137. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, chs. 5–6; J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the
Struggle for Collective Security in Europe 1933–39 (New York, 1984); and J.
Hochmann, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security 1934–1938
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), are best here.
138. Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” p. 446.
139. M. Mackintosh, “The Red Army 1920–36,” in Liddell Hart (ed.), Red Army, p.
63.
140. Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 532ff, 542ff; K. Dittmar and G. J. Antonov,
“The Red Army in the Finnish War,” in Liddell Hart (ed.), Red Army, pp. 79–92.
Above all, Coox, Nomonhan, passim.
141. Erickson’s works—The Soviet High Command; The Road to Stalingrad, early
chapters; and “Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet
Union, 1930–1941,” in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 375–423—are
best here. For diplomatic background, see W. Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor
(London, 1985), chs. 3–4.
142. Figures from Nove, Economic History, p. 228.
143. Quoted in Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 86; see also Ziemke,
“Soviet Armed Forces,” passim, for the frantic preparations in 1939–1941.
144. Rostow, World Economy, p. 210.
145. See the excellent analysis in M. P. Leffler, “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic
Constraints, 1921–1932,” in Becker and Wells (eds.), Economics and World
Power, pp. 246–48.
146. Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939, pp. 421–22.
147. Ibid., p. 422.
148. Leffler, “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” in Becker and Wells
(eds.), Economics and World Power, p. 258.
149. For a good, succinct survey of American defense policy between the wars, see
Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, ch. 12.
150. H. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York, 1931), pp. 262–63.
151. See above, pp. 281–82.
152. R. M. Hathaway, “Economic Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis,” in Becker and
Wells (eds.), Economics and World Power, pp. 277–78.
153. L. Silk, “Protectionist Mood: Mounting Pressure,” New York Times, Sept. 17,
1985, p. Dl; Robertson, History of the American Economy, pp. 516ff.
154. Kindleberger, World in Depression, ch. 12 and pp. 280–87.
155. Table from Hillman, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee
(ed.), World in March 1939, p. 439.
156. Hathaway, “Economic Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis,” in Becker and Wells
(eds.), Economics and World Power, p. 285.
157. Ibid., pp. 309, 312. For a brief survey, Schulzinger, America Diplomacy in the
Twentieth Century, pp. 147ff.
158. This is well covered in MacDonald, United States, Britain and Appeasement
1936–1939, passim; and Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, ch. 1. See also D.
Reynolds, Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–1941, chs. 1–2; A.
Offner, American Appeasement. United States Foreign Policy and Germany 1933–
1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); and N. Graebner, America as a World Power
(Wilmington, Del., 1984), ch. 2.
159. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, pp. 386ff; Mills, Arms and Men,
pp. 237ff; J. A. Iseley and P. A. Crowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War
(Princeton, N.J., 1945); M. H. Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt (Harrisburg, Pa.,
1947); M. S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations
(Washington, D.C., 1950); J. Major, “The Navy Plans for War, 1937–1941,” in
Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War, pp. 237ff; Weighley, History of the United States
Army, pp. 416ff.
160. Robertson, History of the American Economy, pp. 709ff. The steel statistics come
from Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939, p. 443 and fn.
161. Figures from Wright, Study of War, p. 672.
162. Figures from Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in
Toynbee (ed.), World in March 1939, p. 446.
163. M. S. Kendrick, A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures (New York, 1955),
p. 12.
164. The extensive literature upon Hitler’s views of the United States are
conveniently summarized in Herwig, Politics of Frustration, pp. 179ff. See also
the commentaries in Weinberg, Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany, vols. 1–2;
idem, World in the Balance (New Hampshire/London, 1981) pp. 53–136.
165. Cited in Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 62; see also Pelz, Race to Pearl
Harbor, pp. 217–18, 224.
166. Cited in Thome, Limits of Foreign Policy, p. 90—a book which makes
superfluous all previous studies of the Manchurian crisis.
167. Ibid., pp. 148ff, 23Iff.
168. Ibid., passim; Crowley, Japans Quest for Autonomy, pp. 161ff; A. Rappaport,
Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931–1933 (Chicago, 1963); Schulzinger, American
Diplomacy, pp. 148ff.
169. Crowley, Japans Quest for Autonomy, ch. 2; Storry, History of Modern Japan, pp.
186ff.
170. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, is best here.
171. See above, pp. 315–20; and Howard, The Continental Commitment, ch. 5. The
1934 arguments for and against an Anglo-Japanese understanding are nicely
covered in W. R. Louis, “The Road to Singapore: British Imperialism in the Far
East 1932–42,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.), Fascist Challenge and the
Policy of Appeasement, pp. 359ff.
172. Ross, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, pp. 85–87;
Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, ch. 5.
173. This is now most fully covered in Rostow, Anglo-French Relations 1934–36,
espec. ch. 5; but see also Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, ch. 5; Ross,
Great Powers, pp. 90ff. The Anglo-German naval agreement is treated in E.
Haraszti, Treaty-Breakers or “Realpolitiker”? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement
of June 1935 (Boppard, 1974).
174. F. Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis (London, 1974), passim; A. J. Marder, “The
Royal Navy in the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–36,” American Historical Review,
vol. 75 (1970), pg. 1327–56; R.A.C. Parker, “Great Britain, France and the
Ethiopian Crisis 1935–1936,” English Historical Review, vol. 89 (1974), pp. 293–
32; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, ch. 5; F. D. Laurens, France and the
Italio-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935–6 (The Hague, 1967); G. Baer, Test Case: Italy,
Ethiopia, and the League of Nations (Stanford, Calif., 1976).
175. Pelz, Road to Pearl Harbor, pt. 4.
176. Now covered in J. T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London, 1977), and E.
Haraszti, The Invaders: Hitler Occupies the Rhineland (Budapest, 1983). See also
Rostow, Anglo-French Relations 1934–36, pp. 233ff.
177. See again Rohe (ed.), Die Westm?chte und das Dritte Reich, passim.
178. Ross, Great Powers, p. 98; see also MacDonald, The United States, Great Britain,
and Appeasement, passim.
179. See above, pp. 313–14.
180. Although we still await the second volume of D. Dilks’s authoritative
biography, the literature upon Chamberlain and “appeasement” is already
enormous. For surveys, see the relevant chapters in Mommsen and Kettenacher
(eds.), Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement; K. Middlemas, Diplomacy
of Illusion: The British Government and Germany 1937–39 (London, 1972); M.
Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policies 1933–1940,
passim; Barnett, Collapse of British Power, ch. 5. Also very important is M.
Gilbert, Winston Churchill, vol. 5, 1922–1939 (London, 1976).
181. By far the most comprehensive analysis is now T. Taylor, Munich: The Price of
Peace (New York, 1979); but see also A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World
War, ch. 8; Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 21 Iff; Weinberg, Foreign Policy
of Hitler’s Germany, vol. 2, chs. 10–11; K. Robbins, Munich, 1938 (London,
1968).
182. W. Murray, “Munich, 1938; The Military Confrontation,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, vol. 2 (1979), pp. 282–302; Barnett, Collapse of British Power, pp. 505ff;
Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp. 291–93.
183. The unfolding of events in 1939 is covered in Murray, Change in the European
Balance of Power, chs. 8–10; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, chs. 9–11;
S. Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London, 1973); Weinberg,
Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany, vol. 2, pp. 465ff; Barnett, Collapse of British
Power, pp. 554ff; H. Graml (ed.), Summer 1939: Die Grossm?chte und der
europ?ische Krieg (Stuttgart, 1979); D. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the
Origins of the Second World War, pp. 263ff.
184. For the overall strategical dimension in 1939–1940, see Kennedy, Rise and Fall
of British Naval Mastery, pp. 300ff; Murray, Change in the European Balance of
Power, pp. 310ff; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London,
1970), pp. 16ff; Grand Strategy, vols. 1 (Gibbs) and 2 (Butler).
185. Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, pp. 314–21; cf. Pratt, East of
Malta, West of Suez, ch. 6; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, pp. 664ff; G. Schreiber et al.,
Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa, vol. 3 of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1984), ch. 1.
186. K. A. Maier et al., Die Errichtung des Hegemonie auf dem europ?ischen Continent,
vol. 2 of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), passim;
Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, ch. 10; idem, Luftwaffe, ch. 2;
Overy, Air War, pp. 26–30; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, ch. 3; J. A.
Gunsberg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of
the West, 1940 (Westport, Conn., 1979). For a good analysis of the reasons for
the Allied inertia and the German decision to attack, see also J. Mearsheimer,
Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983), chs. 3–4.
187. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, is best on those repeated Italian disasters; but see
also Schreiber et al., Mittelmeerraum, pts. 2–3 and 5. For a more sympathetic
account of Italy’s weaknesses, see J. L. Sadkovich, “Minerals, Weapons and
Warfare: Italy’s Failure in World War II,” accepted for Storia contemporanea.
188. Overy, Air War, p. 28; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 309.
189. Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, pp. 99ff; Reynolds, Creation of the Anglo-American
Alliance, pp. 108ff. See also J. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American
Naval Relations 1937–1941 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977).
190. J. Lukacs, The Last European War, September 1939/December 1941 (London,
1977); H. Baldwin, The Crucial Years 1939–41 (New York, 1976); Carr, Poland
to Pearl Harbor, passim. For the German side, A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie:
Politik und Kriegsfuhrung 1940–41 (Frankfurt, 1965).
191. Van Creveld, Supplying War, ch. 5; Murray, Luftwaffe, chs. 3–4; Milward,
German Economy at War, pp. 39ff. For full details of the early campaigning, see
H. Boog et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, vol. 4 of Das Deutsche Reich und
der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1983); and A. Clark, Barbarossa: The Russo-
German Conflict 1941–1945 (London, 1965), pp. 71–216. For the Russian side,
Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, passim; A. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941–45
(London, 1971).
192. Erickson, Stalingrad, pp. 237ff; Carr, From Poland to Pearl Harbor, pp. 150ff.
193. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, pp. 68ff, is best here; but see also J. Morley
(ed.), The Fateful Choice: Japans Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941 (New
York, 1980).
194. Dupuy, Genius for War, appendix E.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Stability and Change in a Bipolar World, 1943–1980
1. Quoted in Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 123.
2. For a brief summary, Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, pp. 230–33;
J. Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defense of Britain’s Eastern Empire
1919–41 (Oxford, 1981), ch. 8; Barclay, Empire Is Marching, chs. 8–9.
3. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, chs. 8–12; Liddell Hart, History of the Second
World War, chs. 23 and 29.
4. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, chs. 20–22, and 25.
5. Ibid., ch. 24; S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 3 vols. (London, 1954–1961); F. H.
Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 2 (London, 1981),
ch. 26.
6. By far the best survey now is Murray, Luftwaffe, chs. 5–7; but see also N.
Frankland, The Bomber Offensive Against Germany (London, 1965).
7. Quoted in Ropp, War in the Modern World, p. 336.
8. Ibid., p. 334. For much fuller details, see Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, passim;
idem, The Road to Berlin (London, 1983), passim; E. F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to
Berlin: The German Defeat in the East 1942–1945 (Washington, D.C., 1968);
Clark, Barbarossa, passim; and Seaton, Russo-German War 1941–45, passim.
9. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 272.
10. Dupuy, Genius for War, p. 343.
11. Clark, Barbarossa, chs. 17–18; Erickson, Road to Berlin, ch. 4.
12. These rivalries come out clearly in Clark, Barbarossa, passim; and are covered
in more detail in Milward, German Economy at War, espec. ch. 6; Speer’s own
Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1982 edn.), pts. 2–3; Seaton, German Army,
1933–45, chs. 9–11; Hildebrand, Third Reich, pp. 49ff.
13. Kennedy, “Japanese Strategic Decisions, 1939–45,” in Strategy and Diplomacy,
pp. 181–95; C. G. Reynolds, “Imperial Japan’s Continental Strategy,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, vol. 109 (August 1983), pp. 65–71; Spector, Eagle Against
the Sun, passim; and the excellent survey by A. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the
Japanese Military Establishment in World War II,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness, vol. 3.
14. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 89.
15. R. Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Cyphers and the Defeat of Japan (New
York, 1982), is the best synthesis.
16. Clark, Barbarossa, p. 228; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, ch. 6. For Soviet war
production, see Nove, Economic History of the USSR., ch. 10; Munting, Economic
Development of the USSR, ch. 5; A. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939–
1945 (Berkeley, Calif., 1979), pp. 94ff.
17. see Table 34 below; and Overy, Air War, pp. 49ff.
18. Erickson, Road to Berlin, p. 447. See also the figures in Liddell Hart (ed.), Red
Army, ch. 13.
19. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 559.
20. For this trend, see such works as Dupuy, Genius for War, passim; M. van
Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945
(Westport, Conn., 1982), passim; M. Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for
Normandy (London, 1984), pp. 14, 370, and passim.
21. Ropp, War in the Modern World, p. 342. For details of the Japanese
“overstretch,” see Hayashi and Coox, Kogun. More generally, see the similar
argument in A. J. Levine, “Was World War II a Near-Run Thing?” Journal of
Strategic Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1985), pp. 38–63.
22. Figures from Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 98.
23. Ropp, War in the Modern World, p. 328, quoting from S. E. Morison, History of
United States Naval Operations, vol. 10, The Atlantic Battle Won (Boston, 1956),
p. 64. For further details, see Roskill, The War at Sea, 3 vols., passim; Liddell
Hart, History of the Second World War, ch. 24; Potter (ed.), Sea Power, ch. 24;
Levine, “Was World War II a Near-Run Thing?” pp. 46ff.
24. For comparisons, see Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 309–
10; Seaton, German Army 1933–45, p. 239 (Seaton includes self-propelled guns
with these tank totals).
25. Overy, Air War, p. 150. Overy’s figures for Italian production in the first half of
the war are much less than those given in Table XVIII of James J. Sadkovich’s
article “Minerals, Weapons and Warfare: Italy’s Failure in World War II,” Storia
contemporanea (forthcoming).
26. Overy, Air War, p. 150.
27. Murray, Luftwaffe, chs. 6–7.
28. See Tables 30 and 32 above.
29. Hillman, “Comparative Strength of the Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.), World in
March 1939, pp. 439, 446; Wright, Study of War, p. 672. See also R. W.
Goldsmith, “The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II,” Military
Affairs, vol. 10 (Spring 1946), pp. 69–80.
30. Figures from R. Wagenführ, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945 (Berlin,
1963), pp. 34, 87. The Italian figures are my own very rough “guestimates,”
based upon the size of its economy relative to those of the other Powers. For
further comparisons, see F. Forstmeier and H. E. Volkmann (eds.),
Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939–1945 (Düsseldorf, 1977).
31. Milward, German Economy at War, pp. 72ff; Wagenführ, Die deutsche Industrie in
Kriege, ch. 3; and for more general comparisons, Aldcroft, European Economy
1914–1980, pp. 124ff.
32. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, ch. 23; L. Giovannetti and F. Freed, The Decision
to Drop the Bomb (London, 1967), passim; H. Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End
of World War II (Princeton, N.J., 1966 edn.), passim; G. Alperowitz, Atomic
Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (London, 1966); M. J. Sherwin, A World
Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975).
33. Cited in M. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944
(Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 523–24.
34. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers, ch. 4.
35. W. Ashworth, A Short History of the International Economy Since 1850 (London,
1975), p. 268. See also the figures in Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939–
1945, p. 63.
36. Rowland (ed.), Balance of Power or Hegemony, p. 220.
37. Ashworth, Short History of the International Economy Since 1850, p. 268.
38. Apart from the early chapters of L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
(London, 1981), see also D. A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security, vol. 7, no.
4 (Spring 1983); M. Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and
Nuclear Weapons 1946–1976 (New York, 1979).
39. Figures from W. P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe
(Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 8.
40. R. Steel, Pax Americana (New York, 1977), ch. 2. For the parallels with Britain
after 1815, see above, pp. 151–58; and T. Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The
United States, Great Britain and the Late-Industrializing World Since 1815
(Cambridge, 1981), pp. 182ff.
41. M. Balfour, The Adversaries: America, Russia, and the Open World, 1941–62
(London, 1981), p. 14.
42. G. Kolko, The Politics of War 1943–1945 (New York, 1968), passim; Becker and
Wells (eds.), Economics and World Power, chs. 6–7; R. Keohane, “State Power
and Industry Influence: American Foreign Oil Policy in the 1940s,” International
Organization, vol. 36 (Winter 1982), pp. 165–83; A. E. Eckes, The United States
and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin, Texas, 1979).
43. Balfour, Adversaries, p. 15.
44. On which see R. N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1969),
passim.
45. The phrase used in Steel, Pax Americana, p. 10.
46. Quoted by R. Dallek, “The Postwar World: Made in the USA,” in S. J. Ungar
(ed.), Estrangement: America and the World (New York, 1985), p. 32.
47. Cited in J. W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (London,
1972 edn.), p. 26. See also R. A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of
Internationalism in America During World War II (New York, 1971), passim.
48. Thorne, Issue of War, p. 206. See also M. P. Leffler’s recent writings: “The
American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War,
1945–48,” American Historical Review, vol. 89 (1984), pp. 349–81; and his
Lehrman Institute paper “Security and Containment Before Kennan: The
Identification of American Interests at the End of World War II,” passim.
49. Erickson, Road to Berlin, p. ix.
50. G. Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union (London, 1985), p. 296.
51. Nove, Economic History of the USSR, p. 285.
52. See the figures in Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 118.
53. McCauley, Soviet Union Since 1917, p. 138. For further details, see Nove,
Economic History of the USSR, pp. 140–42.
54. McCauley, Soviet Union Since 1917, pp. 140–42.
55. For details, see M. A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,”
International Security, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982–83), pp. 110–38.
56. Mackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 272–73.
57. Ibid. See also the relevant chapters in Liddell Hart (ed.), The Red Army, pt. 2;
D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn., 1983),
pp. 15ff; Mitchell, History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, pp. 469ff.
58. Hosking, History of the Soviet Union, ch. 11, is best here. See also McCauley,
Soviet Union Since 1917, ch. 5; Nove, Economic History, pp. 266ff; Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 467ff.
59. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 3; G. Challiand and J.-P.
Rageau, Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the Worlds Powers (New
York, 1985), pp. 18ff; J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, 1982),
pp. 57ff; and the comments in A. K. Henrikson, “America’s Changing Place in
the World: From ‘Periphery’ to ‘Center’?” in J. Gottman (ed.), Center and
Periphery (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1980), pp. 73–100.
60. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 405.
61. Cited in H. Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1967), p. 462.
62. Landes, Unbound Prometheus, p. 488, fn. 1.
63. Allen, Short Economic History of Modern Japan, pp. 187ff, and the relevant
tables in appendix B.
64. Ricossa, “Italy 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 240.
65. Ibid., p. 316.
66. Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 264.
67. Fohlen, “France 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 92, 109.
68. Ibid., p. 100.
69. De Gaulle’s attitude toward the Anglo-Saxon powers is superbly brought out in
F. Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle (London, 1981), as well as in de Gaulle’s
own Memoires de Guerre, 3 vols. (Paris, 1954–59). For French colonial policy
during and after the war, see L. von Albertini, Decolonization (New York, 1971
edn.), pp. 358ff; and—with British comparisons—Smith, Pattern of Imperialism,
ch. 3.
70. Barnett, Collapse of British Power, pp. 587–88; and, in a similar tone, Porter,
Britain, Europe and the World 1850–1982, pp. 11 Iff.
71. Cited in Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 318, with further details of
Britain’s economic position. See also Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, pp. 356ff;
Barnett, The Audit of War (London, 1986), passim.
72. The best of these is K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945–1951 (Oxford, 1984),
passim, and also appendices 3–5. But see also the relevant chapters in K.
Harris, Attlee (London, 1982), and A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary
(Oxford, 1983). Economic policy is detailed in A. Cairncross, Years of Recovery:
British Economic Policy 1945–51 (London, 1985), and summarized in D. H.
Aldcroft, The British Economy, vol. 1 (London, 1986), ch. 8.
73. See especially H. M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936–1954 (London,
1972); W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951 (Oxford,
1984); and H. Rahman, “British Post-Second World War Military Planning for
the Middle East,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 5, no. 4 (December 1982), pp.
511–30, for details of the enhanced importance of the region. The post-1945
economic value of the empire is summarized in Porter, Lion’s Share, pp. 319ff.
74. On this cooperation, see T. H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the
Cold War, 1944–1947 (Columbia, Mo., 1981), for early interchanges; J. Baylis,
Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939–1980 (London, 1981), for a general
assessment; and Bartlett, Global Conflict, pp. 269ff.
75. See the details in Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product, 1800–1975,” pp.
291–92.
76. See Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 304, cf. p. 296.
77. The per capita GNP figures for 1950 are taken from S. H. Cohn, Economic
Development in the Soviet Union (Lexington, Mass., 1970), appendix C, Table C-l.
To obtain the national GNP figures, I multiplied by the population size given in
“The Correlates of War” print-out.
78. “Correlates of War” print-out data.
79. Quotations from Sherwin, World Destroyed, p. 314.
80. On which see Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, passim; and the very
useful survey in A. L. Friedberg, “A History of U. S. Strategic ‘Doctrine,’ 1945–
1980,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (December 1983), pp. 40ff. For
some early published examples of these ponderings, see B. Brody, The Absolute
Weapon (New York, 1946); idem, Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.,
1959); H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J., 1960); J. Slessor,
Strategy for the West (London, 1954); P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb
(New York, 1948).
81. Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, ch. 2; J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate:
U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, 1982), pp.
17ff; R. L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1958), passim;
H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (London, 1962 edn.), especially chs.
1–6.
82. Prados, Soviet Estimate, pp. 17–18; Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, ch. 5
et seq.; T. B. Larson, Soviet-American Rivalry (New York, 1978), pp. 178ff.
83. M. Growing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952,
2 vols. (London, 1974), vol. 1, p. 184. See also L. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear
Weapons (London, 1980); A. Pierce, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with
an Independent Strategic Nuclear Force, 1939–1970 (London, 1972); and J.
Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974).
84. See below, p. 401; and Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, ch. 21; W. Kohl,
French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J., 1971), passim, with fuller
references.
85. Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, p. 130.
86. Ibid., p. 152.
87. Quoted in Balfour, Adversaries, p. 71. For the changes in American policy and
opinion, see also Anderson, United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–
1947, chs. 6–7; J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,
1941–1947 (New York, 1972); and B. R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War
in the Near East (Princeton, N.J., 1980), passim.
88. Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, p. 170.
89. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 437.
90. G. Lichtheim, Europe in the Twentieth Century (London, 1972), p. 351.
91. Balfour, Adversaries, pp. 8ff; and for fuller details, L. E. Davis, The Cold War
Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton, N.J., 1974); Feis,
Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, passim; B. Dovrig, The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore,
Md., 1973); A. Polonsky, The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941–1945
(London, 1976); V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–47 (London,
1982), espec. ch. 3; R. Douglas, From War to Cold War 1942–1948 (London,
1981), passim.
92. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, chs. 7–9; T. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe,
1945–1970 (Baltimore, Md., 1970); M. McCauley (ed.), Communist Power in
Europe, 1944–1949 (London, 1977); W. Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From
Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York, 1982), passim.
93. Nor is it proposed to give a full bibliography of the enormous literature upon
the Cold War. Balfour, Adversaries; Larson, Soviet-American Rivalry; Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence; and Bartlett, Global Conflict, chs. 10–11, all provide
surveys with references to the further literature. See also note 87 above.
94. Balfour, Adversaries, p. 94; M. Balfour and J. Mair, Four-Power Control in
Germany and Austria 1945–1946 (London, 1956); Rothwell, Britain and the Cold
War, ch. 6. See also the very important collection J. Foschepoth (ed.), Kalter
Krieg und deutsche Frage (G?ttingen, 1985), espec. pt. 3.
95. A reference to Gaddis’s excellent survey, Strategies of Containment.
96. Ibid., p. 30.
97. Ibid., p. 31.
98. Ibid., p. 30.
99. Anderson, United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, passim; Bullock, Ernest
Bevin: Foreign Secretary, espec. ch. 10; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the
Near East, passim; Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, pp. 270–71.
100. Apart from Ulam’s book, see also the references in note 92 above; and M. D.
Shulman, Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York, 1969); M. Kaser,
Comecon (London, 1967); J. K. Hoensch, Sowjetische Osteuropa-Politik 1945–
1974 (Düsseldorf, 1977).
101. See the references in R. Poidevin, “Die Neuorientierung der franz?sischen
Deutschlandpolitik in 1948/9,” in Foschepoth (ed.), Kalter Krieg und deutsche
Frage; J. W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–51 (Leicester,
1984), especially ch. 5; Douglas, From War to Cold War, pp. 167ff; and, for
British ambivalences, see S. Greenwood, “Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the
Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 6, no. 4
(December 1983), pp. 49–65.
102. Bullock, Bevin, pp. 57Iff; W. P. Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton, N.J.,
1958); the relevant chapters in R. Morgan, The United States and West Germany
1945–73 (London, 1974); J. H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of
Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York, 1983), ch. 10; M. Bell, “Die Blockade Berlins-
Konfrontation der Allierten in Deutschland,” in Foschepoth (ed.), Kalter Krieg
und deutsche Frage, pp. 217ff.
103. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reconsidered,” passim; W. LaFeber,
America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1975 (New York, 1976), pp. 83ff; Lord
Ismay, NATO—the First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Utrecht, 1954); Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment, pp. 72ff; A. K. Henrikson, “The Creation of the North
Atlantic Alliance, 1948–1952,” Naval War College Review, vol. 32, no. 3
(May/June 1980), pp. 4–39; L. S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The
Formative Years (Lexington, Ky., 1984), passim.
104. On which see A. Grosser, West Germany from Defeat to Rearmament (London,
1955); R. McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Urbana, 111., 1971);
D. Lerner and R. Aron, France Defeats EDC (New York, 1957); DePorte, Europe
Between the Superpowers, pp. 158ff; and T. Schwarz, “The Case of German
Rearmament: Alliance Crisis in the ‘Golden Age,’ ” Fletcher Forum (Summer
1984), pp. 295–309.
105. Bartlett, Global Conflict, p. 312.
106. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 544ff; D, J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy
After Stalin (Philadelphia, Pa., 1961); R. A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
107. On which see again Kolko, Politics of War, passim; and Thorne, Issue of War.
108. Kolko, Politics of War, pp. 298ff; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near
East, passim; Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, pp. 53ff.
109. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 428; and see also Anderson, United States,
Great Britain and the Cold War, pp. 103ff.
110. Cited in Bartlett, Global Conflict, p. 261 (my emphasis); and see again the
works by Anderson, Louis, and Kuniholm above.
111. Griml, Decolonization, pp. 183ff, is a good summary; also, Kiernan, European
Empires from Conquest to Collapse, pp. 210ff; Holland, European Decolonization
1918–1981, pp. 86ff.
112. M. Heald and L. S. Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience
(Westport, Conn., 1977), chs. 5 and 8; P. A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and
Diplomats … 1890–1952 (Princeton, N.J., 1952); A. Iriye, Across the Pacific
(New York, 1967); and, more specifically, B. W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the
American Experience in China (New York, 1971); H. Feis, The China Tangle
(Princeton, N.J., 1953), passim; N. B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-
American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949–50 (New York, 1983).
113. M. Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in
Asia (New York, 1985), which places U.S. policy toward Japan in a much wider
East Asian and Cold War context; and W. S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance
(Madison, Wis., 1984), passim.
114. Cited in Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, p. 232; see also Smith, The
Pattern of Imperialism, pp. 193–94. American policy in the region is well
covered in W. W. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981);
R. M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of American Containment Policy in East
Asia (New York, 1982); B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton,
N.J., 1981); N. Yonosuke and A. Iriye (eds.), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia
(New York, 1977). See also R. Dingman, “Strategic Planning and the Policy
Process: American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945–50,” Naval War College
Review, vol. 32, no. 6 (1979), pp. 4–21.
115. There is a succinct account of the Korean War in Millett and Maslowski, For the
Common Defense, pp. 484ff; and much more detail in D. Rees, Korea: The
Limited War (New York, 1966); F. H. Heller, (ed.), The Korean War: A 25-Year
Perspective (Kansas, 1977); as well as the U. S. official histories.
116. N. A. Graebner, America as a World Power (Wilmington, Del., 1984), ch. 7,
“Global Containment: The Truman Years”; Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, passim;
D. Borg and W. Heinrichs (eds.), Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations,
1947–50 (New York, 1980), passim; Schaller, American Occupation of Japan,
chs. 11–15; E. M. Irving, The First Indochina War: French and American Policy,
1945–1954 (London, 1975).
117. For the stiffer mood, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, chs. 5–6. See also
the thoughtful piece by R. Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563–
92.
118. “Correlates of War” print-out data.
119. See also the chart in R. W. DeGrasse, Military Expansion, Economic Decline
(Armonk, NY, 1983), p. 119.
120. Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 43, 115ff. It is, of course,
impossible to obtain reliable Soviet spending figures, and the “explicit”
defense-expenditure share of the budget is much too low; see F. D. Holzman,
Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures (Lexington, Mass., 1975), passim.
121. Cited in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 100. See also S. F. Wells,
“Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security,
vol. 4 (Fall 1979), pp. 116–38, and Paul Nitze’s reply, “The Development of
NSC-68,” International Security, Spring 1980, pp. 159–69; Paul Y. Hammond,
“NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament,” in W. R. Schilling et al., Strategy, Politics,
and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962), pp. 267–378.
122. See Bartlett, Global Conflict, pp. 303ff; and the details on NATO’s build-up in
Ismay, NATO, passim; T. P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (London,
1981); and Kaplan, United States and NATO, pp. 143ff.
123. Mackintosh, Juggernaut, pp. 292ff; the various essays in Liddell Hart (ed.), Red
Army, pt. 2; Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, passim; A. Lee, The Soviet Air Force
(London, 1961); R. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (London, 1962).
124. Reynolds, Command of the Sea, pp. 530–43; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery, ch. 11.
125. Reynolds, Command of the Sea, pp. 545ff; Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War:
Interpretations of American Naval History 1775–1978, chs. 15–16; Potter (ed.),
Sea Power, chs. 31–32; J. Woods (pseud.), “The Royal Navy Since World War
II,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 108, no. 3 (March 1982), pp. 82ff.
126. Mitchell, History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chs. 21–22, covers the post-
1945 buildup. See also N. Polmar, Soviet Naval Developments, 1982 (4th edn.,
Annapolis, Md., 1981), pp. 3–13; R. W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy
(Annapolis, Md., 1968); L. L. Whetton, “The Mediterranean Threat,” Survival,
no. 8 (August 1980), pp. 252–58; G. Jukes, “The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval
Policy,” Adelphi Papers, no. 87 (May 1972). Very important in this connection
are the works of M. MccGwire, Soviet Naval Developments (New York, 1973),
Soviet Naval Policy (New York, 1975), and Soviet Naval Influence (New York,
1977), summarized in idem, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet
Seapower,” in J. Baylis and G. Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy (London, 1981), pp.
210ff.
127. On which see G. Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War
1945–1950 (New York, 1980); Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 38ff;
but see also H. R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and
Containment before Korea (Westport, Conn., 1982). For implications and
comparisons, M. Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics
Before and After Hiroshima (New York, 1981).
128. Prados, Soviet Estimate, ch. 4, is best here.
129. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, chs. 4–5, gives the overall context. See also D.
A. Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,”
Journal of American History, vol. 66 (June 1979), pp. 62–87; idem, ‘ “A
Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents on American
Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–55,” International Security,
vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 3–38; Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear
Strategy, ch. 6; Weigley, The American Way of War, ch. 17.
130. Prados, Soviet Estimate, chs. 5–8; also E. Bottome, The Missile Gap (Rutherford,
N.J., 1971), passim.
131. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 175ff; Friedberg, “A History of the
U.S. Strategic ‘Doctrine,’ 1945 to 1980,” pp. 41ff. Also very useful is John
Gaddis, “The Origins of Self-Deterrence: The United States and the Non-Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1958” (ms.). The strategic thinkers are discussed in G.
Herken, Counsels of War (New York, 1985), and F. Kaplan, The Wizards of
Armageddon (New York, 1983).
132. R. V. Daniels, Russia, The Roots of Confrontation (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), p.
234; McCauley, The Soviet Union Since 1917, pp. 155ff; Ulam, Expansion and
Coexistence, chs. 9–10.
133. Steele, Pax Americana, p. 9; and, in more detail, R. E. Osgood, NATO: The
Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 111., 1962), passim; DePorte, Europe Between the
Superpowers, pp. 115ff; Kaplan, United States and NATO.
134. Steele, Pax Americana, p. 134. See also R. Aron, The Imperial Republic (London,
1975); D. Horowitz, The Free World Colossus (New York, 1971 edn.);
Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, chs. 11–12.
135. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, p. 375; J. L. Gaddis, “The Strategic
Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Defensive Perimeter’ Concept,” in Borg
and Heinrichs (eds.), Uncertain Years, pp. 61–118; and—with some very good
quotations—Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp. 279ff.
136. Quoted in Woodruff, Americas Impact on the World, p. 65.
137. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 539ff; McCauley, Soviet Union Since 1917,
pp. 198ff; Daniels, Russia: The Roots of Confrontation, pp. 333ff.
138. The literature on this topic is now overwhelming. Among the more important
studies are G. Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Berkeley, Calif., 1973); H. D.
Cohn, Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa (New York, 1972); R. H. Donaldson,
Soviet Policy Toward India (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); R. Kanet (ed.), The Soviet
Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore, Md., 1974); E. Taborsky,
Communist Penetration of the Third World (New York, 1963).
139. P. Lyon, “The Emergence of the Third World,” in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.),
The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984), pp. 229ff, as well as the
other essays in sec. 3; Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, ch. 6;
R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and
African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), passim.
140. Lyon, “Emergence of the Third World,” in Bull and Watson (eds.), Expansion of
International Society, p. 229; idem, Neutralism (Leicester, 1963); G. H. Jansen,
Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London, 1966).
141. Apart from the works in note 139 above, see also L. S. Stavrianos, Global Rift:
The Third World Comes of Age (New York, 1981); R. A. Mortimer, The Third
World Coalition in International Politics (New York, 1980); R. L. Rothstein, The
Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International
System (New York, 1977); idem, The Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy
(Boulder, Colo., 1981).
142. Balfour, Adversaries, pp. 157ff; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 46Iff; D.
Rusinov, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (London, 1977); Lyon,
“Emergence of the Third World,” passim.
143. McCauley, Soviet Union Since 1917, p. 204. More generally, see the references
in note 138 above, and R. C. Horn, The Soviet Union and India: The Limits of
Influence (New York, 1981); R. H. Donaldson (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Third
World: Successes and Failures (Boulder, Colo., 1981); M. H. Haykal, The Sphinx
and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East
(London, 1978); K. Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (London,
1979), passim.
144. McCauley, Soviet Union Since 1917, p. 210; Donaldson (ed.), Soviet Union in the
Third World: Successes and Failures, passim; A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds.),
The Soviet Union in the Middle East (New York, 1982).
145. “Correlates of War” print-out data, which is more reliable than Military Balance
(see following note) figures for the early 1970s.
146. The Military Balance 1974–75 (London, 1974), pp. 7, 10; cf. pp. 19, 22.
147. H. Pemsel, Atlas of Naval Warfare (London, 1977), p. 159.
148. Military Balance 1974–75, pp. 75–77; for China, pp. 48–49.
149. See the references in note 126 above.
150. For Soviet-American relations in the 1970s, see Keylor, Twentieth-Century
World, pp. 364ff, 405ff; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth
Century, pp. 299ff; S. Hoffman, Primacy or World Order (New York, 1978),
passim; Lawson, Soviet-American Rivalry, passim; McCauley, Soviet Union Since
1917, pp. 238ff; Daniels, Russia: The Roots of Confrontation, pp. 32Iff, and the
full bibliography on pp. 394–96. Above all, there is now R. L. Garthoff, Détente
and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington,
D.C., 1985), with enormous detail.
151. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, p. 371.
152. For what follows see R. C. Thornton, The Bear and the Dragon (New York,
1972); R. C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford, Calif. 1953);
R. R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance (New York, 1975); G. Ginsburgs and C. F.
Pinkele, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949–64 (New York, 1978); D.
Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York, 1964); A. D. Low, The Sino-Soviet
Dispute (Rutherford, N.J., 1976); and a good brief summary in Bartlett, Global
Conflict, pp. 325ff.
153. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 693; O. E. Clubb, China and Russia: The
“Great Game” (New York, 1971), passim, gives more details, as does J. Camil-
Ieri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Seattle, Wash.,
1980).
154. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, p. 398.
155. H. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, 1979), pp. 172ff; and the
important analysis in D. L. Strode, “Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations,”
Orbis, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 163–88.
156. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 210, fn.
157. W. E. Griffith (ed.), Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change and the Sino-Soviet
Dispute, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1964–66); J. G. Whelan, World Communism,
1967–1969: Soviet Attempts to Reestablish Control (Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C., 1970); Z. Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1967 edn.).
158. See the nice, brief survey by C. Bell, “China and the International Order,” in
Bull and Watson (ed.), Expansion of International Society, ch. 17; more detailed
in M. B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York, 1978).
159. Cited in W. L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J., 1971), p. 103.
See also W. Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the
Context of National Policy, 1945–1969 (London, 1970); M. M. Harrison,
Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, Md., 1981); and espec. E.
Kolodziej, French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics
of Grandeur (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974).
160. Kolodziej, French International Policy, passim; A. Grosser, The Western Alliance:
European-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1980), pp. 183ff, 209ff.
161. See below, pp. 427–28.
162. There is a succinct survey of de Gaulle’s policies in De Porte, Europe Between
the Superpowers, pp. 229ff; and Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, pp. 346ff.
163. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 304.
164. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, pp. 354ff, 408ff; A. Bronke and D. Novak
(eds.), The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971–1977 (Oakville, Ont.,
1979); R. L. Tokes, Euro-Communism and Detente (New York, 1978); G. B.
Ginsburgs and A. Z. Rubinstein (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Western
Europe (New York, 1978); L. L. Whetten, Germany’s Ostpolitik (London, 1971);
and W. E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge,
Mass., 1978), cover the German aspects.
165. H. Salisbury, The Coming War Between Russia and China (London, 1969),
passim.
166. Some of these concerns are discussed in E. Morton and G. Segal (eds.), Soviet
Strategy Toward Western Europe (London, 1984).
167. Bartlett, Global Conflict, p. 355. See also G. Segal, The Great Power Triangle
(London, 1982); R. Sutter, China Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation
(Baltimore, Md., 1978), passim; and the essays in R. H. Solomon (ed.), The
China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene (New York, 1981),
and G. Segal (ed.), The China Factor: Peking and the Superpowers (London,
1982), espec. B. Garrett, “The United States and the Great Power Triangle,” pp.
76–104.
168. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 249–50, 259.
169. A. Kendrick, The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945–1974
(Boston, 1974); T. Powers, The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People,
1964–1968 (New York, 1973); F. Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and
the Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972); W. O’Neill, Coming Apart (New York,
1971); R. J. Lifton, Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans (New York, 1973); L.
Baskir and P. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The War, The Draft, and the
Vietnam Generation (New York, 1978); and G. Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of a
War, 1940–1975 (New York, 1986), are among some of the welter of good
books on these themes.
170. Again, the literature on the American strategy and conduct of the war is
already overwhelming. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, ch. 17,
is a good summary. H. G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the
Vietnam War (New York, 1972) examines the war through Clausewitzian
spectacles. B. Palmer, The 25-Year War: Americas Military Role in Vietnam (New
York, 1984), espec. pt. 2, “Assessment”; S. Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New
York, 1984); G. C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and
Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New York, 1979), are all important.
171. Figures from Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 359; see also Millett and
Maslowski, For the Common Defense, pp. 565ff.
172. See again Ungar (ed.), Estrangement: America and the World, passim; but
especially G. Hodgson, “Disorder Within, Disorder Without.”
173. This may be seen, inter alia, in the titles of many American studies on the
international system and the United States’ place in it. Apart from Ungar (ed.),
Estrangement, see also K. A. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy
in a Complex World (New York, 1979); R. D. Keohane, After Hegemony
(Princeton, N.J., 1974); J. Kwitny, Endless Enemies (New York, 1984); and the
important earlier work S. Hoffman, Gullivers Troubles (New York, 1968).
174. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 275. And see again the references in note
167 above, and the very useful survey in Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation,
pp. 24ff.
175. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 179. See also Kissinger’s own White House
Years; and H. Starr, Henry Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics
(Lexington, Ky., 1982), passim. Dallek, American Style of Foreign Policy, ch. 9, is
much more critical.
176. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 284, 297.
177. Compare Kennan, Decline of Bismarck’s European Order, with Kissinger, “The
White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” Daedelus, vol. 97 (Summer
1968), pp. 888–924.
178. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 280–82; and, in more detail, two fine
studies: C. Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (New York, 1977);
and R. S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the
Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1975 (Cambridge, 1984).
179. Apart from the (often contradictory) memoirs of Carter, his secretary of state,
Vance, and his national security adviser, Brzezinski, see the coverage in
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 563ff; and, much more briefly,
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, ch. 15; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy, pp. 316ff;
and John Gaddis’s final thoughts in the “Epilogue” to Strategies of Containment.
Above all, see G. Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the
Carter Years (New York, 1986), passim, but espec. pp. 241ff.
180. B. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The United States and Iran (New York,
1980), passim; G. Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New
York, 1985); and Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, ch. 9, are best here.
181. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, chs. 26–27, is best here.
182. See, inter alia, J. S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1980),
passim; J. Fallows, National Defense (New York, 1981), especially ch. 3; R. W.
DeGrasse, Military Expansion, Economic Decline (Armonk, N.Y., 1983); J. Coates
and M. Kilian, Heavy Losses (New York, 1985 edn.), passim.
183. See the biting comments in Schulzinger, American Diplomacy, pp. 339ff; S.
Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear
Arms Control (New York, 1984), with revealing details; Haig’s own memoir,
Caveat (New York, 1984); E. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War (New
York, 1985).
184. Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics 1970–1982 (New
York, 1983), p. 39.
185. D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1984, 2nd ed.),
pp. 134ff; and the more technical analysis is A. Bergson, “Technological
Progress,” in Bergson and H. S. Levine (eds.), The Soviet Economy: Toward the
Years 2000 (London, 1983), pp. 34–78.
186. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 887ff, is excellent here. See also H. S.
Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C., 1983), passim; and
T. T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan (Boulder, Colo., 1984), passim.
187. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 982ff. See also the works cited in note
167 above, as well as B. Garrett, “China Policy and the Constraints of
Triangular Logic,” in K. A. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign
Policy in the 1980s (Boston, 1983), espec. pp. 245ff.
188. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 280 (my emphasis).
189. This is most critically the case, of course, in respect to Russian data: see F. D.
Holzmann, “Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game,”
International Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 78–101, which is a good
introduction to this subject.
190. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 276.
191. Rostow, World Economy, p. 662. (The chief difference is that Rostow uses a
1913 = 100 baseline, whereas Bairoch has chosen 1900.)
192. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 273.
193. Ibid., p. 276.
194. From Rostow, World Economy, p. 669.
195. Ashworth, Short History of the International Economy, pp. 287–88.
196. Ibid., p. 289; and the more detailed discussion in Bairoch, The Economic
Development of the Third World Since 1900 (Berkeley, Calif., 1975), passim.
197. Foreman-Peck, History of the World Economy, p. 376.
198. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 304.
199. See the table in Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, p. 8.
200. G. Blackburn, The West and the World Since 1945 (New York, 1985), p. 96; and
Bairoch, Economic Development, passim, with a good bibliography on pp. 250–
52.
201. R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1985), espec. ch. 7; and
M. Smith et al., Asia’s New Industrial World (New York, 1985).
202. See Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, p. 289.
203. Of which perhaps the most important study has been E. F. Vogel, Japan as
Number One: Lessons for America (New York, 1980 edn.).
204. Smith et al., p. 18; C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, Calif.,
1982), passim.
205. Vogel, Japan as Number One, pp. 9–10 (my emphasis). Allen, A Short Economic
History of Modern Japan, pt. 2, is very valuable here. The automobile statistics
come from The Economist, November 2, 1985, p. 111.
206. Most of the writings upon China after 1945 seem to have focused upon Mao or
upon cultural/ideological issues, rather than its external policy: but there is
Bell, “China and the International Order,” in Bull and Watson (eds.), The
Expansion of International Society, pp. 255–67; H. Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign
Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, Conn., 1984), espec. chs. 1 and 5–6; A. D.
Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C., 1977); M.
Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York, 1978); P. Van Ness, Revolution
and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1971); and R. H. Solomon (ed.), The
China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1981), with some very useful chapters.
207. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” pp. 299, 302.
208. Rostow, World Economy, pp. 525ff; and D. H. Perkins (ed.), China’s Modern
Economy in Historical Perspective (Stanford, Calif., 1975), passim.
209. Blackburn, West and the World Since 1945, p. 77.
210. Ibid.; and Bairoch, Economic Development of the Third World, pp. 188ff, 201ff,
which comments approvingly on the attention the Chinese gave to agriculture.
211. “Correlates of War” print-out data for 1980.
212. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 304.
213. D. H. Perkins, “The International Consequences of China’s Economic
Development,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, pp. 114–136, is important here.
214. Some of Europe’s dilemmas are discussed in DePorte, Europe Between the
Superpowers, passim; J. R. Wegs, Europe Since 1945 (New York, 1984, 2nd
edn.), espec. chs. 8–15; S. Holt, The Common Market: The Conflict of Theory and
Practice (London, 1967).
215. Aldcroft, European Economy 1914–1980, p. 161.
216. Ibid.; and see also Landes, Unbound Prometheus, ch. 7; Pollard, Peaceful
Conquest, ch. 9; Maddison, “Economic Policy and Performance in Europe 1913–
1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, pt. 2, pp.
476ff. For the early period, there are detailed studies: M. M. Postan, An
Economic History of Western Europe, 1945–1964 (London, 1967); and A. S.
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (London, 1984).
217. Aldcroft, European Economy, pp. 161–62.
218. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, p. 8, and notes in Table 1–1.
219. For this argument, see again Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, passim.
220. Ibid., p. 305
221. Ibid., p. 171.
222. Aldcroft, European Economy, p. 161.
223. See the data in Wegs, Europe Since 1945, ch. 9; A. S. Deaton, “The Structure of
Demand 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol.
5, pt. 1.
224. Ricossa, “Italy, 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 290ff; G. Scimone, “The Italian Miracle,” in J.
Hennessy et al., Economic “Miracles” (London, 1964); G. H. Hildebrand, Growth
and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
225. See above, pp. 367–68.
226. Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, ch. 5; Kennedy, Realities behind Diplomacy,
chs. 7–8.
227. The literature on Britain’s post-1945 relative economic decline is enormous.
See, inter alia, Gamble, Britain in Decline, passim; Kirby, Decline of British
Economic Power Since 1870, ch. 5; F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialization
(London, 1979), passim; W. Beckerman (ed.), Slow Growth in Britain: Causes and
Consequences (Oxford, 1979); J. Eatwell, Whatever Happened to Britain?
(London, 1982), passim.
228. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 303.
229. Wegs, Europe Since 1945, p. 161. The figures for world manufacturing
production are from Bairoch, those for shares of world trade from Kirby,
Decline, p. 149, Table 15.
230. V. Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt, 1985),
passim; K. Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century
(Berkeley, Calif., 1980), pp. 140ff.
231. For fuller details, Hardach, Political Economy of Germany, pp. 178ff; L. Ersatisfied
account, The Economics of Success (Princeton, N.J., 1963), passim;
Hardach, “Germany 1914–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol 6., pt. 1, pp. 217ff; Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp. 502ff, 531ff;
Balfour, Adversaries, pp. 122ff.
232. Hardach, “Germany 1914–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 221.
233. Wegs, Europe Since 1945, p. 161.
234. The Federal Republic’s diplomatic and security concerns, and the attitude of
other Powers to them, are examined in DePorte, Europe Between the
Superpowers, pp. 1180ff; C. M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear
Weapons (New York, 1975); W. F. Hanrieden, West German Foreign Policy 1949–
1963 (Stanford, Calif., 1967); Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe,
passim; Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered, pp. 16Iff; P. Windsor, German
Reunification (London, 1969), passim; Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in
Transition, passim; Gruner, Die deutsche Frage, pp. 176ff.
235. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 302.
236. Fohlen, “France 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of
Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. lOOff; E. Malinraud, La Croissance fran?aise (Paris,
1972), passim; M. Parodi, L’économie et la société fran?aise de 1945 à 1970
(Paris, 1971); Caron, Economic History of Modern France, pp. 182ff; R. F. Kuisel,
Capitalism and the State in Modern France (Cambridge, 1981), chs. 7–9; and
Kindleberger, “The Postwar Resurgence of the French Economy,” in S. Hoffman
(ed.), In Search of France (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).
237. See again Kolodziej, French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou:
The Politics of Grandeur.
238. See the statistics in the CIA’s Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, pp. 16ff.
239. See, for example, Hosking, History of the Soviet Union, appendix C (“Selected
Indices of Industrial and Agricultural Production”), p. 483; Munting, Economic
Development of the USSR, p. 133; Nove, Economic History of the USSR, pp. 340,
387; J. P. Nettl, The Soviet Achievement (London, 1967), ch. 6.
240. Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 133.
241. The problems of Soviet agriculture have been the focus of massive attention in
the scholarly literature; see, in particular, the useful essays 4 and 5 in Bergson
and Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000; D. M. Schooner,
“Soviet Agricultural Policies,” in Soviet Economy in a Time of Change
(Washington, D.C., 1979; Papers, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress),
pp. 87–115; and Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, pp. 142ff, 160ff.
242. CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, p. 27.
243. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 476ff, and
vol. 6, pt. 2, pp. 593ff; N. Spulber, The State and Economic Development in
Eastern Europe (New York, 1966), passim; Kaser, Comecon, passim; and an
excellent summary in Aldcroft, European Economy 1914–1980, ch. 6.
244. Nove, Economic History, pp. 330ff, 363ff; Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet
Economy: Toward the Year 2000, p. 148.
245. Details in M. I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum (London/Boston,
1980), which has a rosier view of the future of Russian oil production than the
CIA, but acknowledges the problem of waste.
246. Much of this will be discussed again in the final chapter, but see Bergson and
Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000, espec. pp. 402ff; H. S.
Rowen, “Living with a Sick Bear,” National Interest, no. 2 (Winter 1985–86), pp.
14–26; M. I. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System (New
York, 1983); P. Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Super-power (London,
1985), ch. 3; T. J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York,
1984), passim. For eastern Europe’s problems, see the “Cracks in the Soviet
Empire?” issue of International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82).
247. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 304.
248. see Table 43 below; and cf. CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, p. A—
which (being computed in U.S. dollars) will presumably have quite altered
figures for 1987, because of the decline in the value of the American currency.
249. Balfour, Adversaries, p. 204.
250. Ibid., p. 193.
251. L. Thurow, “America Among Equals,” in Ungar (ed.), Estrangement, pp. 159—
78; idem, The Zero-Sum Game (New York, 1980), passim, but espec. chs. 1 and
4; DeGrasse, Military Expansion, Economic Decline, espec. ch. 2.
252. See, in particular, Grosser, Western Alliance, pp. 217ff; J. J. Servan-Schreiber,
The American Challenge (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1969 edn.), espec. pt. 2;
R. Barnet, Global Reach (New York, 1974), passim; S. Rolfe, The International
Corporation (Paris, 1969); as well as Woodruff, America’s Impact on the World,
ch. 4.
253. Becker and Wells (ed.), Economics and World Power, chs. 7–8; D. Calleo, The
Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), passim; J. Gowa, Closing the Gold
Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983); G.
Epstein, “The Triple Debt Crisis,” World Policy Journal, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1985),
pp. 628ff; Economist, October 5, 1985, “Monetary Reform” Survey, p. 11.
254. Thurow, “America Among Equals,” in Ungar (ed.), Estrangement, p. 163.
255. Idem, Zero-Sum Society, pp. 3–4. (The U.S. figures presumably looked better
with the dollar’s rise, 1983–1985, and worsened again with the currency’s post-
1985 decline.)
256. Calleo, “Since 1961: American Power in a New World,” in Becker and Wells
(eds.), Economics and World Power, pp. 391–93.
257. Oye et al. (eds), Eagle Defiant, p. 8 (with a note about the sources used).
258. I have taken the population and GNP per capita figures from Chaliand and
Gageau, Strategic Atlas, pp. 214–20, which bases its figures on the World Bank’s
Report on World Development, 1982. The total GNP is my extrapolation.
259. Given the assertion by Perkins, in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, pp. 118–119,
that China’s per capita GNP in 1979 was more likely between $400 and $500
than the official conversion figure of $266, I have included a calculation for
1980 based on $450 per capita.
260. Cited in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 76–77.
CHAPTER EIGHT
To the Twenty-first Century
1. Keylor, Twentieth-Century World, p. 405.
2. The classic statement here is E. H. Carr, What Is History? (Harmondsworth,
Mddsx., 1964), ch. 1, “The Historian and his Facts”; but see also D. Thomson,
The Aims of History (London, 1969), ch. 4.
3. See, inter alia, Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; G. Modelski, “The Long
Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,” Comparative Studies in Society and
History, vol. 20 (April 1978), pp. 214–35; Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars,
Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” passim; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, passim;
Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics, passim.
4. As in the well-known quotation in Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science
(London, 1936), p. 188.
5. The political-science literature here is overwhelming. For a sampling, see M.
Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1979); K. Waltz, Man, the State
and War (New York, 1959); H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977).
6. See, for example, P. F. Drucker, “The Changed World Economy,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 768–91—a remarkable article. See also the
figures given in “Beyond Factory Robots,” Economist, July 5, 1986, p. 61.
7. Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” pp. 771–72; “China and India,”
Economist, Dec. 21, 1985, pp. 66–67.
8. Again, the literature on this theme is immense. For good general introductions,
see S. B. Linder, The Pacific Century (Stanford, Calif., 1986); J. W. Morley (ed.),
The Pacific Basin (New York, 1986); M. Smith et al., Asia’s New Industrial World
(London, 1985); K. E. Calder, “The Making of a Trans-Pacific Economy,” World
Policy Journal, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 593–623.
9. Linder, Pacific Century, pp. 13–14.
10. Ibid., pp. 6, 15.
11. P. Drysdale, “The Pacific Basin and Its Economic Vitality,” in Morley (ed.),
Pacific Basin, p. 11.
12. Mathias, First Industrial Nation, p. 44.
13. M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (London, 1982), p. 18. For further examples—
from a quite different source—see F. Cooper, “Affordable Defense: In Search of
a Strategy,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, vol.
130, no. 4 (December 1985), p. 4. Also very useful is the special survey
“Defense Technology,” Economist, May 21, 1983.
14. The key work here (by an in-house expert) is J. S. Gansler, The Defense Industry
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980).
15. On which see McNeill, Pursuit of Power, passim; and Kaldor, Baroque Arsenal,
passim.
16. The Military Balance 1985–86, pp. 170–73; and the SIPRI (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute) publication The Arms Race and Arms
Control (London, 1982), especially chs. 2–3.
17. L. Brown et al., State of the World, 1986 (New York, 1986), p. 196.
18. “Excessive” is, of course, a haphazard term; for if a country feels under acute
pressure from foreign foes (e.g., Israel), it seems inappropriate to employ that
term. On the other hand, the historical record suggests that if a particular
nation is allocating over the long term more than 10 percent (and in some cases
—when it is structurally weak—more than 5 percent) of GNP to armaments,
that is likely to limit its growth rate.
19. For some examples of this, see Cipolla (ed.), Economic Decline of Empires,
passim; Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, ch. 3; F. Lewis, “Military Spending
Questioned,” New York Times, Nov. 11, 1986, pp. Dl, D5.
20. Reported in “The Elusive Boom in Productivity,” New York Times, April 8,
1984, business section, pp. 1, 26. See also “Richer Than You,” Economist, Oct.
25, 1986, pp. 13–14.
21. See T. Fingar (ed.), China’s Quest for Independence (Boulder, Colo., 1980),
passim; G. Segal and W. Tow (eds.), Chinese Defense Policy (London, 1984);
Chaliand and Rageau, Strategic Atlas, p. 143; and the important essays in R. H.
Solomon (ed.), The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1981); and J. Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The
Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Seattle, Wash., 1980).
22. G. Segal, Defending China (London, 1985), covers in detail the decline in
Chinese combat effectiveness; see also H. W. Jencks, From Missiles to Muskets:
Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army 1945–1981 (Boulder, Colo.,
1982).
23. See D. H. Perkins, “The International Consequences of China’s Economic
Development,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, p. 118.
24. See the important article “A New Long March in China,” Economist, Jan. 25,
1986, pp. 29–31; J. T. Dreyer, “China’s Military Modernization,” Orbis, vol. 27,
no. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 1011–26; Military Balance 1985–1986, pp. 111–15; M.
Y. M. Kan, “Deng’s Quest for Military Modernization and National Security,” in
Mainland Chinas Modernization: Its Prospects and Problems (Berkeley, Calif.,
1982), pp. 227–44.
25. Dreyer, “China’s Military Modernization,” p. 1017.
26. Ibid., p. 1016. See also J. D. Pollack, “China as a Nuclear Power,” in W. H.
Overholt (ed.), Asia’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, Colo., 1977), passim.
27. For a brief survey of these weaknesses, see again Dreyer, “China’s Military
Modernization,” pp. 1017ff. On submarine developments, see New York Times,
April 1, 1986, pp. Cl, C3.
28. “As China Grows Strong,” Economist, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 11; and espec. G. Segal,
“Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 8,
no. 2 (June 1985), pp. 180–98, with fuller references.
29. B. Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” in H. Harding (ed.), China’s
Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, Conn., 1984), p. 75.
30. D. H. Perkins, “The International Consequences of China’s Economic
Development,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, pp. 115–16; and for more detail,
Perkins (ed.), China’s Modern Economy in Historical Perspective (Stanford, Calif.,
1975), passim; and A. D. Barnett, China’s Economy in Global Perspective
(Washington, D.C., 1981), passim.
31. New York Times, March 27, 1986, p. A14; Rostow, World Economy, pp. 532ff.
32. Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, p. 128.
33. Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” in Harding (ed.), China’s
Foreign Relations in the 1980s, p. 87.
34. Quoted in Brown et al., State of the World, 1986, p. 19; and see also, “China and
India: Two Billion People Discover the Joys of the Market,” Economist, Dec. 21,
1985, pp. 66–67.
35. “China and India”; and see the amazing eyewitness details of the recent
transformation in O. Schell, To Get Rich Is Glorious: China in the 80s (New York,
1985).
36. New York Times, March 27, 1986, p. A14; and, more generally, K. Lieberthal,
“Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign
Relations in the 1980s, pp. 58ff. See also the CIA report “China: Economic
Performance in 1985” (Washington, D.C., 1986); and, finally, the extremely
intelligent article by A. D. Barnett, “Ten Years After Mao,” Foreign Affairs, vol.
65, no. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 37–65.
37. See again the important article “China and India,” Economist, Dec. 21, 1985,
pp. 65–70, espec. p. 68; and Ramses, 1982, The State of the World Economy
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 286–87.
38. Perkins, “International Consequences,” pp. 130–31.
39. Military Balance 1985–86, p. 112; Perkins, “The International Consequences
…”, in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, p. 132.
40. See the table in Brown et al., State of the World, 1986, p. 207.
41. Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, pp. 132–
33; Economist, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 29.
42. Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor, p. 120.
43. This projection assumes that “the four largest economies in Western Europe
grow in 1985–2000 at the same pace as they did in 1970–82” (which the paper
admits may be too pessimistic): “China and India,” p. 69.
44. Ramses, 1982, p. 285; the figures in Morley (ed.), Pacific Basin, p. 13; Reynolds,
“China in the International Economy,” pp. 73–74. By comparison, see again
Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, passim.
45. See again Segal, “Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations,” passim.
46. But note R. Taylor, The Sino-Japanese Axis (New York, 1985).
47. “Russia and China,” Economist, March 29, 1986, pp. 34–35. This does not,
however, make it automatically a member of an “anti-Soviet united front,” as is
argued in C. D. McFetridge, “Some Implications of China’s Emergence as a
Great Power,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies,
vol. 128, no. 3 (September 1983), p. 43.
48. On which see J. G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America
(New York, 1978), passim; Solomon (ed.), China Factor, passim; Segal (ed.),
China Factor, passim; and Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s,
passim, espec. ch. 6.
49. Pollack, “China and the Global Strategic Balance,” in Harding (ed.), Chinas
Foreign Relations in the 1980s, pp. 173–74.
50. “A New Long March in China,” Economist, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 31.
51. For this policy, see in particular E. A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A
Neo-Internationalist View (Stanford, Calif., 1985), passim; the remarks on Japan
in R. A. Scalapino, “China and Northeast Asia,” in Solomon (ed.), China Factor,
pp. 193ff.; Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, Calif.,
1977); T. J. Pempel, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy,” ch. 5 of P. J.
Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of
Advanced Industrial States (Madison, Wis., 1978).
52. This is perhaps best argued in Vogel, Japan as Number One; but see also his
article “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 752–
67; and H. Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (London, 1971). For a
contrary argument, see “High Technology: Clash of the Titans,” Economist, Aug.
23, 1986, pp. 318ff, which points to the U.S. advantages.
53. See again Smith et al., Asia’s New Industrial World; and Linder, Pacific Century,
passim.
54. For what follows, see Linder, Pacific Century, pp. 107ff; E. Wilkinson,
Misunderstanding: Europe versus Japan (Tokyo, 1981); “Is It Too Late to Stop the
Slide to Protectionism?” Times (London), Jan. 14, 1982, p. 15; Olsen, US.-Japan
Strategic Reciprocity, ch. 4.
55. “Japan Frets About Tomorrow,” New York Times, April 30, 1986, pp. D1-D2.
56. “Obstacles to Change in Japan,” New York Times, April 29, 1986, p. Dl.
57. See the figures in the CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, pp. 50–54; the
weekly Economist index on commodity prices; and Drucker, “Changed World
Economy,” passim.
58. See the useful summary in R. B. Reich, “Japan in the Chips,” New York Review
of Books, July 5, 1985; and “Silicon Valley Has a Big Chip About Japan,”
Economist, March 20, 1986, pp. 63–64.
59. “Big Japanese Gain in Computers Seen,” New York Times, Feb. 13, 1984, pp. Al,
A19; “Will Japan Leapfrog America on Superfast Computers?” Economist,
March 6, 1982, p. 95.
60. “Japan Sets Next Target,” Sunday Times (London), Nov. 29, 1981.
61. “Westinghouse/Mitsubishi,” Economist, Feb. 6, 1982, p. 65.
62. R. B. Reich, “A Faustian Bargain with the Japanese,” New York Times, April 6,
1986, business section, p. 2; “Japanese All Set for Take-off,” Times (London),
Nov. 11, 1981; Smith et al., Asia’s New Industrial World, pp. 21–24.
63. The quotation is from Vogel, “Pax Nipponica,” p. 753. More generally, see
“Japanese Technology,” Times (London), June 14, 1983, “Special Report,” pp. iviii.
The more successful Japanese exploitation of robotics technology is
outlined in B. J. Feder, “New Challenge in Automation,” New York Times, Oct.
30, 1986, p. D2.
64. “Reconsider Japan,” Economist, April 26, 1986, pp. 19–22; but see again
Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Vogel, Japan as Number One, pp. 70ff.
65. Vogel, “Pax Nipponica,” p. 754.
66. See the tables in Economist, July 9, 1983, “Japan Survey” section, p. 7; and
Pempel, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy,” pp. 171–72.
67. Economist, April 26, 1986, p. 22; Vogel, “Pax Nipponica,” p. 753; idem, Japan
as Number One, ch. 7; Smith et al., Asia’s New Industrial World, pp. 13ff.
68. For example, S. Kamata, Japan in the Passing Lane (New York, 1984); J. Taylor,
Shadows of the Rising Sun: A Critical View of the “Japanese Miracle” (New York,
1984); “There Can be Clouds Too,” Economist, July 9, 1983, “Japan Survey.”
69. D. Halberstam, “Can We Rise to the Japanese Challenge?” Parade, Oct. 9, 1983,
pp. 4–5; and the even more alarming piece by T. H. White, “The Danger from
Japan,” New York Times Magazine, July 28, 1985.
70. “The New Global Top Banker: Tokyo and Its Mighty Money,” New York Times,
April 27, 1986, pp. 1, 16.
71. F. Marsh, Japanese Overseas Investment (Economist Intelligence Unit, London,
1983); Times (London), April 22, 1983.
72. For these figures and forecasts, see “Japan Investing Enormous Sums of Cash
Abroad,” New York Times, March 11, 1986, pp. Al, D12; “The New Global Top
Banker,” New York Times, April 27, 1986, pp. 1, 16.
73. “Japan’s Investment Bankers Head for the Big Wide World,” Economist, April
19, 1986, pp. 91–94; D. Burstein, “When the Yen Leaves the Sky It May
Capture the Earth,” New York Times, Sept. 3, 1986, p. A27.
74. “New Global Top Banker,” p. 1.
75. See the table in Linder, Pacific Century, p. 12, quoting the Japan in the Year
2000 study.
76. See CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, p. 33, fn. b.
77. “The Yen Also Rises,” New York Times, March 5, 1986, p. D2.
78. See again the very pertinent study by Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity,
passim.
79. See the figures in Military Balance 1985–86, pp. 170–72.
80. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, passim; Z. Brzezinski, “Japan Should
Increase Spending for Defense,” New Haven Register, Aug. 16, 1985, “Forum,” p.
15.
81. There is a good flavor of the Japanese antiwar movement in Storry, History of
Modern Japan, ch. 11. See also Economist, Aug. 16, 1985, pp. 21–22.
82. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, p. 149.
83. See the discussion in Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” in
Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s, ch. 3 (and espec, p. 86,
from where the quotation comes); Scalapino, “China and Northeast Asia,” in
Solomon (ed.), China Factor, espec. pp. 193ff. On the other hand, see Taylor,
Sino-Japanese Axis, passim.
84. Scalapino, “China and Northeast Asia,” p. 200. See also the comments on
Japanese external policy in “Japan Survey,” Economist, Dec. 7, 1985, pp. lOff.
85. See again Gruner, Die deutsche Frage, espec. ch. 4.
86. I take these totals from The Military Balance 1985–86, pp. 40–43, 46–54.
87. CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, p. 37.
88. The unemployment figures were taken from The Economist Diary, 1984, p. 44.
For the rising social expenditures, see the OECD report of March 1985, Social
Expenditures 1960–1990.
89. Quoted in Linder, Pacific Century, p. 108.
90. See the review article, “Down to Earth: A Survey of the West German
Economy,” Economist, Feb. 4, 1984.
91. Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, and Gruner, Die Deutsche Frage, are best
here; but see also DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers, pp. 180ff.
92. W. Gruner, “Der Deutsche Bund—Modell fur eine Zwischenl?sung?” Politik und
Kultur, vol. 9 (1982), no. 5.
93. P. Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower (London, 1986), pp. 43–
44.
94. The literature on European defense and nuclear weapons is enormous. I have
relied upon A. J. Pierre (ed.), Nuclear Weapons in Europe (New York, 1984); the
debate provoked by M. Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 753–68; and by
Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s (New
York, 1983); J. D. Steinbrunner and L. V. Segal (eds.), Alliance Security: NATO
and the No-First-Use Question (Washington, D.C., 1983); G. Prins (ed.), The
Nuclear Crisis Reader (New York, 1984).
95. Military Balance 1985–86, p. 49.
96. “West German Defense: Early Warnings,” Economist, June 29, 1985, p. 46.
97. See again the good discussion in Calleo, German Problem Reconsidered, chs. 8–9;
and J. Dean, “Directions in Inner-German Relations,” Orbis, vol. 29, no. 3 (Fall
1985), pp. 609–32; and G. F. Treverton, Making the Alliance Work: The United
States and Europe (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), passim.
98. “When the Oil Runs Out,” Economist, Oct. 19,1985, p. 65; “After the Oil Years,”
Economist, March 6, 1985, p. 57.
99. “Manufacturing,” Economist, Sept. 28, 1985, p. 57.
100. See again Gamble, Britain in Decline; Kirby, Decline of British Economic Power
Since 1870; Eatwell, Whatever Happened to Britain; and S. Pollard, The Wasting
of the British Economy (London, 1982).
101. “After the Oil Years,” Economist, March 6, 1986, p. 57.
102. A. Walters, Britain’s Industrial Renaissance (London, 1986)—Walters having
been, of course, Mrs. Thatcher’s economic adviser.
103. “Scientists’ Lament,” Economist, Jan. 18, 1986, p. 16.
104. See again the statistics in Military Balance 1985–86.
105. The share of world GNP is calculated from CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics,
1984, p. 32. For a devastating attack upon this attempt to maintain an
overextended defense posture, see A. Barnett, “The Dangerous Dream,” New
Statesman, June 17, 1983, pp. 9–11. Less critical, but equally sobering, is “Yes,
But How Do We Pay for It?” Times (London), June 15, 1983.
106. “Navy Wins War of the Frigates,” The Sunday Times (London), Oct. 17, 1982; C.
Wain, “The Navy’s Future”, The Listener, Aug. 19, 1982.
107. See The Economist’s frequent assaults upon it for that reason: e.g., “Trident: Bad
Money After Bad,” Nov. 3, 1984, p. 34; “Not Trident,” Feb. 9, 1985, p. 16. The
government’s rationale for Trident is in Statement on the Defense Estimates,
1985, vol. 1 (Cmnd. 9430–1).
108. “Message to the New Defense Secretary: Think Small,” Sunday Times (London),
Jan. 12, 1986, p. 16; see also “Defense Budget Costs Go over the Top,” Daily
Telegraph, Dec. 10, 1985. There are excellent surveys of the problem—and
various proposals to deal with it—in J. Baylis (ed.), Alternative Approaches to
British Defense Policy (London, 1983), passim.
109. For French defense policy, see generally M. M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally:
France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, Md., 1981); R. F. Laird, France, the
Soviet Union, and the Nuclear Weapons Issue (Boulder, Col., 1985); and D. S.
Yost, Frances Deterrent Posture (Adelphi Papers, nos. 194 and 195).
110. “France” survey, Economist, Feb. 9, 1985, p. 8.
111. See, in particular, the work by P. Lellouche, L’avenir de la guerre (Paris, 1985),
nicely discussed in D. S. Yost, “Radical Change in French Defense Policy,”
Survival, vol. 28 (Jan./Feb., 1986), pp. 53–68; R. F. Laird, “The French
Strategic Dilemma,” Orbis, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 307–28.
112. R. S. Rudney, “Mitterrand’s New Atlanticism: Evolving French Attitudes toward
NATO,” Orbis, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1984), p. 99, citing Aron.
113. Ibid., passim.
114. “Chirac Is Pledged to Stick with NATO and Bonn,” New York Times, April 6,
1986, “The Week in Review” section p. 2.
115. H. Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West (New Haven, Conn., 1985), pp. 41–
43, 55–57. See also J. P. Pigasse, Le bouclier d’Europe (Paris, 1982).
116. See the discussion in Yost, “Radical Change in French Defense Policy”; as well
as idem, France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe (Boulder, Colo.,
1985).
117. “The French are Ready to Cross the Rhine,” Economist, July 13, 1985, pp. 43–
44; “French Defence: Count on Us,” Economist, Oct. 25, 1986, pp. 50–51.
118. P. Stares, “The Modernization of the French Strategic Nuclear Force,” Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute, vol. 125, no. 4 (December 1980), p. 37.
119. See again Laird, “French Strategic Dilemma,” passim; and P. Lellouche, “France
and the Euromissiles,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983–84, pp. 318–34.
120. See the analysis in L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 1, The
Founders (Oxford, 1981 edn.), ch. 13, “The Contradictions of Capital”; and
Engels’s discussion of contradictions in “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” in
The Essential Left (London, 1960), pp. 130ff.
121. “Excerpts from Gorbachev’s Speech to the Party,” New York Times, Feb. 26,
1986. See also “Making Mr. Gorbachev Frown,” Economist, March 8, 1986, p.
67; S. Bialer, “The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 59, no. 5 (Summer 1981), pp. 999–1020.
122. Brown et al., State of the World, 1986, pp. 14–19; “Focus: Food,” Economist,
April 12, 1986, p. 107.
123. M. I. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System (New York,
1983), p. 86. For further analyses, see Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet
Economy: Toward the Year 2000, chs. 4–5. How swiftly (relatively) the USSR’s
position has been worsened can be seen by rereading the rosier assessment of
the gap between it and the United States being closed by the year 2000 in
Larson’s very sober Soviet-American Rivalry (written in 1976–77?), p. 272.
124. As reported in “Soviet Is Facing Sixth Poor Harvest in a Row,” New York Times,
Aug. 28, 1985, pp. Al, D17. More generally, R. E. M. Mellor, The Soviet Union
and Its Geographical Problems (London, 1982); Larson, Soviet-American Rivalry,
pp. 17ff.
125. For what follows, see Hosking, History of the Soviet Union, pp. 392ff; J. R.
Millar, “The Prospects for Soviet Agriculture,” in M. Bornstein (ed.), The Soviet
Economy: Continuity and Change (Boulder, Colo., 1981), pp. 273–91 (more
optimistic than most); Goldman, USSR in Crisis, ch. 3.
126. “The Soviet Economy,” New York Times, March 15, 1985, pp. Al, A6.
127. Goldman, USSR in Crisis, p. 81.
128. Ibid., p. 83; and the remarks in Nove, Economic History of the USSR, pp. 362ff.
129. Reprinted from Brown et al., State of the World, 1986, p. 18.
130. See again Goldman, USSR in Crisis, pp. 70–71; and, more broadly, R. W.
Tucker, “Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin’s Legacy to Brezhnev’s Russia,”
Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 415ff.
131. Brown et al., State of the World, 1986, p. 18.
132. Ibid., p. 11.
133. See the comparative figures in CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984, pp.
28–30.
134. Goldman, USSR in Crisis, p. 40, has some remarkable figures on that
inefficiency. See also the extremely thoughtful piece by J. S. Berliner,
“Planning and Management,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy:
Toward the Year 2000, pp. 350–89.
135. The phrase comes from Daniels, Russia: The Roots of Confrontation, p. 289.
136. Taken from “Inputs Misused,” Economist, July 6, 1985, p. 12, which (itself
employing the words “used to produce even an alleged $1,000-worth of GDP”)
clearly suspects that the real figures could be worse.
137. This is best discussed in M. I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half-
Full or Half-Empty (London, 1980), passim; but see also L. Silk, “Soviet Oil
Troubles,” New York Times, June 5, 1985, p. D2.
138. “Russia Drills Less Oil, OPEC Keeps It Cheap,” Economist, June 8, 1985, p. 65.
139. Economist, May 3, 1986, pp. 55–57; more generally, see R. W. Campbell,
“Energy,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000,
pp. 191ff.
140. Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, p. 93.
141. Campbell, “Energy,” pp. 213–14, in Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy:
Toward the Year 2000; see also L. Dienes, “An Energy Crunch Ahead in the
Soviet Union?” in Bornstein (ed.), Soviet Economy, pp. 313–43.
142. See below, pp. 500–502.
143. Goldman, “A Low-Tech Economy at Home,” New York Times, Feb. 19, 1984,
business section, p. 2; and the interesting details in R. Amann and J. Cooper
(eds.), Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union (New Haven, Conn., 1982).
144. “Losing Battle,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1984.
145. Apart from Goldman, USSR in Crisis, p. 131, see R. Amann et al. (eds.), The
Technological Level of Soviet Industry (New Haven, Conn., 1977).
146. Goldman, USSR in Crisis, ch. 6; “Shadows over Comecon,” Economist, May 29,
1982, pp. 84–85; Comecon Survey, Economist, April 20, 1985. pp. 3–18.
147. See again Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” passim; “Oil’s Decline Seen
Curbing Soviet Plans,” New York Times, March 10, 1986; “East European
Trade,” Economist, Oct. 26, 1985, p. 119. The implications for eastern Europe
are also analyzed in T. Gustafson, “Energy and the Soviet Union,” International
Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 65–89.
148. M. Feshbach, “Population and Labor Force,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.),
Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000, p. 79. See also Goldman, USSR in Crisis,
pp. lOOff; and T. J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New
York, 1984), pp. 15ff.
149. “Sick Men of Europe,” Economist, March 22, 1986, p. 53.
150. Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 92–93.
151. Feshbach, “Population and Labor Force,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet
Economy: Toward the Year 2000, passim.
152. See the argument in J. W. Kiser, “How the Arms Race Really Helps Moscow,”
Foreign Policy, no. 60 (Fall 1985), pp. 40–51.
153. Munting, Economic Development of the USSR, p. 208.
154. “Gorbachev’s Plans: Westerners See a Lot of Zeal, but Little Basic Change,” New
York Times, Feb. 23, 1986, p. 16; “Russia Under Gorbachev,” Economist, Nov.
16, 1985, p. 21.
155. “The Soviet Economy,” New York Times, March 15, 1985, pp. Al, A6, quoting
Leonard Silk; Colton, Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, ch. 3; Daniels,
Russia: The Roots of Confrontation, pp. 273ff; J. F. Hough and M. Fainsod, How
the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
156. This is best covered by F. D. Holzman’s articles “Are the Soviets Really Outspending
the U.S. on Defense?” International Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (Spring
1980), pp. 86–104, and “Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers
Game,” International Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 78–101; as well as
idem, Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures (Lexington, Mass., 1975).
See also Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 114ff; Dibb, Soviet
Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 80ff.
157. This point is made both by Colton, Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, p. 91;
and Bond and Levine, “An Overview,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.), Soviet
Economy: Toward the Year 2000, pp. 19–21.
158. Ibid., p. 20, the source of this quotation; see also; “Can Andropov Control His
Generals?” Economist, Aug. 6, 1983, pp. 33–35.
159. L. H. Gelb, “A Common Desire for Guns and Butter,” New York Times, Nov. 10,
1985, “The Week in Review” section, p. 2.
160. See the table in Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 114; and the
discussion in Military Balance 1985–86, pp. 17–20; Holzman, “Soviet Military
Spending,” passim; W. T. Lee, The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures
1955–75 (New York, 1977), passim; G. Adams, “Moscow’s Military Costs,” New
York Times, Jan. 10, 1984, p. A23.
161. For details, one can consult the somewhat bloodcurdling annual publication of
the U.S. Defense Department Soviet Military Power, and the Committee on the
Present Danger’s Can America Catch Up?—views contested by such critics as T.
Gervasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy (New York, 1986), and A.
Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York, 1984 edn.).
For details presented nonpolemically, see the annual Military Balance, and the
annual report by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). A
good general work is J. Steele, Soviet Power (New York, 1984), but see also
Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower; and Holloway, Soviet Union and
the Arms Race, as well as the references following.
162. A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York, 1970). See also
M. Garder, L’Agonie du régime en Russie soviétique (Paris, 1966), and the
subsequent debate in the journal Problems of Communism; and Colton, Dilemma
of Reform in the Soviet Union, passim.
163. See the comparative tables in Bergson, “Technological Progress,” in Bergson
and Levine (eds.), Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000, pp. 51ff; Rostow,
World Economy, p. 434; Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 134ff.
164. “Soviet Arms: Their Quality Is Upgraded,” New York Times, Feb. 12, 1984;
Cockburn, The Threat, pp. 455–56.
165. Alex Gliksman, “Behind Moscow’s Fear of ‘Star Wars,’ ” New York Times, Feb.
13, 1986.
166. Quoted in Flora Lewis, “Soviet SDI Fears,” New York Times, March 6, 1986, p.
A27.
167. Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 5 Iff; J. Kazokins,
“Nationality in the Soviet Army,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for
Defense Studies, vol. 130, no. 4 (December 1985), pp. 27–34. For a rosier
picture, E. Jones, “Manning the Soviet Military,” International Security, vol. 7,
no. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 105–31.
168. On which see Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 44ff, “The
Nationality Problem”; Hosking, History of the Soviet Union, ch. 14; Daniels,
Russia, The Roots of Confrontation, pp. 315ff; as well as the more detailed
studies, like H. Carrere d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire (New York, 1979); M.
Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge (New York, 1982); A. Bennigsen and M.
Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London, 1983); and S. E.
Wimbush (ed.), Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective (New York, 1985).
169. J. Anderson, “Ukraine a Hotbed of Dissent, Nationalism” (syndicated article),
New Haven Register, June 13, 1985; but see also P. T. Potichny (ed.), The
Ukraine in the Seventies (Oakville, Ont., 1982); Hosking, History of the Soviet
Union, pp. 432ff.
170. Apart from Kazokins, “Nationality in the Soviet Army,” passim, see the eyeopening
details in Cockburn, Threat, pp. 74ff; E. Jones, “Minorities in the
Soviet Armed Forces,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 3, no. 4 (1982), pp. 285–318;
and the Rand Corporation studies S. Curran and D. Ponomoreff, Managing the
Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview
(Santa Monica, Calif., 1982); and E. Brunner, Jr., Soviet Demographic Trends and
the Ethnic Composition of Draft Age Males, 1980–1985 (Santa Monica, Calif.,
1981).
171. On which term see, for example, the coverage in D. Leebaert (ed.), Soviet
Military Thinking (London, 1981), espec. the essays in pt. 1; J. Baylis and G.
Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy (London, 1981), espec. essays 4 and 5.
172. Military Balance 1985–86, p. 180.
173. For example, Gervasi, Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, passim, but espec. pp.
116–18.
174. For examples: J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York, 1982); H. Caldicott,
Nuclear Madness (Brookline, Mass., 1979); E. P. Thompson, Zero Option
(London, 1982).
175. There is a good brief survey of these strategic ideas in E. Bottome, The Balance
of Terror (Boston, Mass., 1986 edn.), chs. 4–7 (and a glossary of terms, pp.
243–54); A. W. Garfinkle, The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze (Philadelphia, Pa.,
1984); and T. Powers, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1983).
176. Of the vast array of studies on this problem, I prefer M. Mandelbaum, The
Nuclear Future (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983); R. Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear
Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); and S. Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality
(London, 1982). Also useful is S. M. Keeny and W.K.H. Panofsky, “MAD vs.
NUTS: the Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 287–304.
177. See again “In Battle of Wits, Submarines Evade Advanced Efforts at Detection,”
New York Times, April 1, 1986, p. C1; and the comments in McGwire,
“Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” passim, on the difficulties
the USSR has had with integrating American SLBMs into its strategic planning.
178. The quote is from Jervis, Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. For an example of
“war-fighting” writers, see C. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of
Victory,” International Security, vol. 4 (Summer 1979), pp. 54–87.
179. See especially P. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons (New
Haven, Conn., 1983); also N. Calder, Nuclear Nightmares (Harmondsworth,
Mddsx., 1981).
180. On which theme, see in particular J. C. Snyder and S. F. Wells (eds.), Limiting
Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Mandelbaum, Nuclear Future,
ch. 3; G. Quester (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison, Wis.,
1981). By contrast, K. N. Waltz, “Toward Nuclear Peace,” Wilson Center,
International Security Studies Program, Working Paper no. 16.
181. D. L. Strode, “Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations,” Orbis, vol. 28, no. 1
(Spring 1984), espec. p. 168ff.
182. The Economist, 9 February, 1985, “Not Trident,” p. 16. See also, Gervasi, The
Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, p. 171.
183. “France Tests Longer-Range Sub Missile,” New York Times, March 6, 1986, p.
A3. See also the table outlining the buildup of French nuclear warheads in New
York Times, April 6, 1986, “The Week in Review” section, p. 2.
184. For example, “Powell Derides Nuclear ‘Last Resort,’ ” Times (London), June 1,
1983, p. 4; Lord Carver, “Why Britain Should Reject Trident,” Sunday Times
(London), Feb. 21, 1982.
185. See again Yost, “Radical Change in French Defense Policy?”
186. Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, p. 161. By contrast, see Gervasi,
Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, ch. 26, which argues that NATO numbers are
in fact superior. Also important are the International Security essays edited by S.
E. Miller, Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton, N. J.,
1986).
187. Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1985, vol. 1 (Cmnd 9430), summarized in
Survey of Current Affairs, vol. 15, no. 6 (June 1985), p. 179.
188. As pointed out by F. D. Holzman, “What Defense-Spending Gap?” New York
Times, March 4, 1986.
189. See Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, p. 162; Military Balance
1985–86, pp. 186–87; R. L. Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of
Forces (Adelphi Papers, no. 127, London, 1976).
190. This is a tricky (and highly disputed) topic. For the optimists’ view—with
which, for what it is worth, this author agrees—see J. Mearsheimer, “Why the
Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” pp. 121–57, and B. R. Posen,
“Measuring the European Conventional Balance,” pp. 79–120, both in Miller
(ed.), Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. See also Steele, Soviet
Power, pp. 76ff; and C. N. Donnelly, “Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet
Army: Recent Debates in the Soviet Military Press,” International Defense
Review, vol. 11, no. 9 (1978), pp. 1405–12. More sobering assessments are
provided by R. A. Mason, “Military Strategy,” in E. Moreton and G. Segal
(eds.), Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe (London, 1984), pp. 175–202; P.
A. Peterson and J. G. Hines, “The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater
Strategy,” Orbis, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 1983), pp. 695–739; and—calling attention
to the possibility of Soviet use of dual-purpose missiles (i.e., tactical nuclear
missiles)—D. M. Gormley, “A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy,”
Orbis, vol. 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 537–69. There is a good recent survey,
“NATO’s Central Front,” in Economist, Aug. 30, 1986.
191. This is now best treated in Treverton, Making the Alliance Work, passim; but see
also J. Joffe, “European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 59 (Spring 1981).
192. V. Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a
Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 1
(Winter 1985), pp. 13–28. See also the articles on “Cracks in the Soviet
Empire?” in International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82); D. R.
Herspring and I. Volgyes, “Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw
Pact Armies,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980), pp. 270–
96; A. R. Johnson et al., East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact
Northern Tier (New York, 1982).
193. D. A. Andelman, “Contempt and Crisis in Poland,” International Security, vol. 6,
no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 90–104.
194. Herspring and Volgyes, “Political Reliability,” passim; B. S. Lambeth,
“Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner,” in Miller (ed.), Conventional Forces
and American Defense Policy, pp. 181–82; W. E. Griffith, “Superpower Problems
in Europe: A Comparative Assessment,” Orbis, vol. 29, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp.
748–49.
195. See the controversial proposal of S. P. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence
and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” in Miller (ed.), Conventional Forces
and American Defense Policy, pp. 251–75. And for a wide-ranging consideration
of all these issues, see E. R. Alterman, “Central Europe: Misperceived Threats
and Unforeseen Dangers,” World Policy Journal, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1985), pp.
681–709.
196. See the discussion in Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 165–
66; Segal, Defending China, passim; idem, “Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet
Relations,” passim; and pp. 449–51 above.
197. Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, pp. 147ff; Segal, “The China
Factor,” in Moreton and Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe,
pp. 154–59; Strode, “Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations,” passim.
198. See Steele, Soviet Power, ch. 8, “Asian Anxieties”; also T. B. Millar, “Asia in the
Global Balance,” in D. H. McMillen (ed.), Asian Perspectives on International
Security (London, 1984); Segal (ed.), The Soviet Union in East Asia (Boulder,
Colo., 1983); M. Hauner, “The Soviet Geostrategic Dilemma” (ms. article for
Foreign Policy Research Institute).
199. See again McGwire, “Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” in
Baylis and Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy, pp. 210–54; Polmar, Soviet Naval
Developments, passim.
200. Figures from Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, p. 172.
201. The quotation is from ibid., p. 171; but see also Steele, Soviet Power, pp. 33–36;
and Cockburn, Threat, ch. 15.
202. McGwire, “The Rationale,” pp. 226ff; Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete
Superpower, pp. 167–74.
203. See the comparative statistics in Smith, Pattern of Imperialism, p. 215; the
argument in Steele, Soviet Power, chs. 9–12; F. Fukuyama, “Gorbachev and the
Third World,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 715–31; K.
Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World (New York, 1985).
204. Quoted in Dibb, Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, p. 160. Note also, N.
Eberstadt, “ ‘Danger’ to the Soviet,” New York Times, Sept. 26, 1983, p. A21,
which argues how weak the USSR’s influence would be if nuclear weapons did
not exist.
205. “If Gorbachev Dares,” Economist, July 6, 1985.
206. Quotations from Bialer, “Politics and Priorities,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.),
Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000, pp. 403, 405.
207. For considerations of Russia’s problems and future, see H. S. Rowen, “Living
with a Sick Bear,” National Interest, no. 2 (Winter 1985–86), pp. 14–26;
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, chs. 29–30; Colton, Dilemma of Reform in
the Soviet Union, passim; Goldman, USSR in Crisis, ch. 7; Dibb, Soviet Union: The
Incomplete Superpower, ch. 8; and the entire issue of Orbis, vol. 30, no. 2
(Summer 1986).
208. B. Rubin, “The Reagan Administration and the Middle East,” in Oye et al.,
(eds.), Eagle Defiant, p. 367—a good survey. See also H. Saunders, The Middle
East Problem in the 1980s (Washington, D.C., 1981). For particular problems,
see P. Jabber, “Egypt’s Crisis, America’s Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no.
5 (Summer 1986), pp. 960–80; and R. W. Tucker, “The Arms Balance and the
Persian Gulf,” in The Purposes of American Power (New York, 1981), ch. 4.
209. A. F. Lowenthal, “Ronald Reagan and Latin America: Coping with Hegemony in
Decline,” in Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, pp. 31 Iff; R. Bonachea, “The United
States and Central America,” in Kaplan, Global Power, pp. 209–41; P. A.
Armella et al. (eds.), Financial Policies and the World Capital Markets: The Place
of Latin American Countries (Chicago, 111., 1983).
210. “An Economy Struggles to Break Its Fall,” New York Times, June 8, 1986, p. E3;
“Hard Times in Mexico Cause Concern in U.S.,” New York Times, Oct. 19, 1986,
pp. 1, 20.
211. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, on Fiscal
Year 1984 Budget (Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 17.
212. “NATO: Burdens Shared,” Economist, Aug. 4, 1984, p. 3. See also the discussion
of this in Calleo, Imperious Economy, pp. 169–71, and in fns. 16–17 on pp. 256–
57; E. Conine, “Do the Interests of the U.S. Really Cover the World?”
(syndicated column), New Haven Register, Feb. 7, 1985, p. 11; M. Kahler, “The
United States and Western Europe,” in Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, ch. 9;
and, especially, Treverton, Making the Alliance Work, passim.
213. There are useful discussions in Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of
Central Europe, passim; Treverton, Making the Alliance Work, passim; L. Sullivan,
“A New Approach to Burden-Sharing,” Foreign Policy, no. 60 (Fall 1985), pp.
9Iff; K. Knorr, “Burden-Sharing in NATO: Aspects of U.S. Policy,” Orbis, vol. 29,
no. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 517–36.
214. Report of the Secretary of Defense … Fiscal Year 1984, p. 17.
215. “Military Forces Stretched Thin, Army Chief Says,” New York Times, Aug. 10,
1983, pp. Al, A3.
216. “U.S. Forces: Need Arising for More Troops, Ships and Planes,” New York Times,
Oct. 26, 1983, p. A16 (with map).
217. See, for example, the map in the endpapers of Barnett, Collapse of British Power,
and of Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power.
218. C. W. Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 4
(Spring 1986), p. 678. In this connection, see also B. R. Posen and S. Van
Evera, “Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from
Containment,” in Miller (ed.) Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy,
pp. 19–61.
219. For the statistical evidence of this, see Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, ch. 1;
Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” passim.
For other measurements, see A. Bergeson and C. Sahoo, “Evidence of the
Decline of American Hegemony in World Production,” Review, vol. 8, no. 4
(Spring 1985), pp. 595–611; and S. D. Krasner, “United States Commercial and
Monetary Policy,” in Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty, pp. 58–59,
68–69.
220. Military Balance 1985–86, p. 13.
221. For a good example, see E. A. Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips Power—
American Strategy and Statecraft,” Public Interest, no. 75 (Spring 1984), pp. 3–
19.
222. Luttwak, Pentagon and the Art of War, p. 256.
223. See especially E. A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemma of Military Service
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), chs. 7–9; and Canby’s interesting remarks on the European
experience, in “Military Reform and the Art of War,” Wilson Center,
International Security Studies Program, working paper no. 41, pp. 8ff.
224. For a sampling, see G. Hart with W. S. Lind, America Can Win (Bethesda, Md.,
1986); Kaufman, Reasonable Defense, passim; Luttwak, Pentagon and the Art of
War, passim; J. Record, “Reagan’s Strategy Gap,” New Republic, Oct. 29, 1984,
pp. 17–21; J. Fallows, National Defense (New York, 1981); idem, “The Spend-
Up,” Atlantic, July 1986, pp. 27–31; Gansler, Defense Industry, passim; S. L.
Canby, “Military Reform and the Art of War,” passim; “Forum: Military Reform
and Defense Planning,” Orbis, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 245–300. Also
very important in this connection is the powerful exposé of A. T. Hadley, The
Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure: Americas Armed Forces (New York, 1986).
225. Kaufman, Reasonable Defense, p. 35; “Bungling the Military Build-Up,” New
York Times, Jan. 27, 1985, business section, pp. 1, 8; Gansler, Defense Industry,
passim; Fallows, “The Spend-Up,” passim; but see also Luttwak, Pentagon and
the Art of War, ch. 5, for interesting correctives.
226. Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” p. 694; but see the doubts expressed in
Record, “Reagan’s Strategy Gap”; Fallows, “The Spend-Up”; and Canby,
“Military Reform and the Art of War;” as well as the reasoned defense of hightechnology
weapons by K. N. Lewis in the Orbis forum “Military Reform.”
227. Among which I would include Luttwak, Pentagon and the Art of War; Canby,
“Military Reform and the Art of War”; and Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips
Power.”
228. See, for example, R. W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?
(Cambridge, Mass., 1984), passim, and the debate in 1986 in journals such as
International Security upon the Reagan administration’s “maritime strategy.”
229. Recently spelled out again in Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” pp. 684ff.
See also “Schultz-Weinberger Discord,” New York Times, Dec. 11, 1984, pp. Al,
A12.
230. See, for example, L. C. Thurow, “Losing the Economic Race,” New York Review
of Books, Sept. 27, 1984, pp. 29–31; cf. W. D. Nordhaus, “On the Eve of a
Historic Economic Boom,” New York Times, April 6, 1986, which followed
shortly after P. G. Petersen’s article in the same paper, “When the Economic
Valium Wears Off.”
231. S. M. Bodner, “Our Trade Gap Is Really a Standard of Living Gap,” New York
Times, May 6, 1986 (letters); and “Why America Cannot Pay its Way,”
Economist, July 13,1985, p. 69, both cover the problems facing traditional
industries. For the debate upon future technologies, see “High Technology:
Clash of the Titans,” Economist, Aug. 23, 1986. For the congressional study, see
“A Disturbing New Deficit,” Time, Nov. 3, 1986, p. 56.
232. For example, while The Global 2000 Report to the President (Washington, D.C.,
1980), vol. 1, pp. 18–19, referred to absolute increases in world grain
production, it forecast increasing deficits in China, South Asia, and western
Europe.
233. “Farmers’ Slipping Share of the Market,” New York Times, May 26, 1986; “Farm
Imports Rise as Exports Plunge,” New York Times, April 20, 1986; “Elephant-
High Farm Debts,” Economist, Sept. 14, 1985, p. 17.
234. For a good brief survey, see P. Cain, “Political Economy in Edwardian England:
The Tariff-Reform Controversy,” in A. O’Day (ed.), The Edwardian Age,
(London, 1979), pp. 34–59.
235. Petersen, “When the Economic Valium Wears Off,” passim; F. Rohatyn, “The
Debtor Economy: A Proposal,” New York Review of Books, Nov. 8, 1984, pp. 16–
21; J. Chace, Solvency, the Price of Survival (New York, 1981), chs. 1–2.
236. Presidents Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, report, as reprinted in “Of Debt.
Deficits, and the Death of a Republic” (Figgie International advertisement),
New York Times, April 20,1986, p. F9. This advertisement misprints the 1985
total of interest as $179 billion; it is in fact $129 billion.
237. Ibid.
238. “Cost of Paying Interest Eases Dramatically for U.S.,” New York Times, Dec. 28,
1986, pp. 1, 24.
239. The quotation is from Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” p. 782. See also M.
Shubik and P. Bracken, “Strategic Purpose and the International Economy,” in
McCormick and Bissell (eds.), Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behaviour, p.
212.
240. Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” passim; S. Marriss, Deficits and the Dollar:
The World Economy at Risk (Washington, D.C., 1985); and the comments in “As
America Diets, Allies Must Eat” (lead article), New York Times, Jan. 17, 1986;
“A Nation Hooked on Foreign Funds,” New York Times, Nov. 18, 1984, business
section, pp. 1,24; “U.S. as Debtor: A Threat to World Trade,” New York Times,
Sept. 22, 1985, business section, p. 3.
241. See again Nordhaus, “On the Eve of a Historic Economic Boom”; the
uncharacteristically rosy argument in “America Manufactures Still,” Economist,
April 19, 1986, p. 81; and L. Silk, “Can the U.S. Remain No. 1?” New York
Times, Aug. 10, 1984, p. D2 (a question, incidentally, which would not have
been asked ten to twenty years ago).
242. Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,”
passim; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, passim.
243. This is best described in G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study
in British Politics and British Political Thought, 1899–1914 (Oxford, 1971).
244. Quoted in ibid., p. 101.
245. See above, p. 228–29.
246. See the Brookings study by J. Grunwald and K. Flamm, The Global Factory:
Foreign Assembly in International Trade (Washington, D.C., 1985); and P. Seabury,
“International Policy and National Defense,” Journal of Contemporary
Studies, Spring 1983.
247. See, for example, the British experience in the late 1930s, as detailed in Gibbs,
Grand Strategy, vol. 1, p. 311.
248. Gansler, Defense Industry, pp. 12ff; and especially R. W. DeGrasse, Military
Expansion, Economic Decline (Armonk, N.Y., 1985 edn.); G. Adama, The Iron
Triangle (New York, 1981); Thurow, “How to Wreck the Economy,” New York
Review of Books, May 14, 1981, pp. 3–8; Kaufmann, A Reasonable Defense, pp.
33–34; more generally, G. Kennedy, Defense Economics (London, 1983), espec.
ch. 8; S. Chan, “The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A
Survey of Evidence and Problems,” Orbis, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp.
403ff; B. Russett, “Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being,” American
Political Science Review, vol. 76, no. 4 (December 1982), pp. 767–77.
249. Kaldor, Baroque Arsenal, passim; DeGrasse, Military Expansion, Economic
Decline, passim; Thurow, “How to Wreck the Economy,” passim; Chace,
Solvency, ch. 2; E. Rothschild, “The American Arms Boom,” in E. P. Thompson
and D. Smith (eds.), Protest and Survive (Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1980), pp.
170ff; Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, chs. 6 and 10.
250. E. Rothschild, “The Costs of Reaganism,” New York Review of Books, March 15,
1984, pp. 14–17.
251. See again Cipolla, Economic Decline of Empires; and Rasler and Thompson,
“Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” passim.
252. The quip is from Misalliance (1909), and in the original reads “Hindhead’s turn
will come.” As Hobsbawm notes, in Industry and Empire, p. 193, this was an
obvious jibe at the stockbroker townships south of London, prospering while
other parts of the economy were coming under pressure.
253. See above, p. 357. Also useful in this connection is B. Russett, “America’s
Continuing Strengths,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985),
pp. 207–31.
254. W. Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, Mass., 1943),
pp. 7–8; and see again Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips Power”; and the
conclusions in E. Bottome, The Balance of Terror (Boston, Mass., 1986 edn.), pp.
235–42.
255. P. Hassner, “Europe and the Contradictions in American Policy,” in R.
Rosecrance (ed.), America as an Ordinary Power (Ithaca, N.Y., 1976), pp. 60–86.
See also Helmut Schmidt’s insistence, in Grand Strategy for the West, p. 147,
that “the leadership role can only be assumed by the United States.”
EPILOGUE
1. See again Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” passim;
G. Modelski, “Wars and the Great Power System,” passim; idem, “The Long
Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,” passim. See also J. Levy, War in
the Modern Great Power System (Lexington, Ky., 1983).
2. Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,”
passim.
3. L. E. Davis and R. A. Huttenback, “The Cost of Empire,” in R. L. Ransom et al.
(eds.), Exploration in the New Economic History (New York, 1982), pp. 41–69; R.
Taagepera, “Size and Duration of Empires: Systematics of Size,” Social Science
Research, vol. 7 (1978), pp. 108–27; idem, “Growth Curves of Empires,” General
Systems, vol. 13 (1968), pp. 171–75.
4. I am thinking here of the various scholars influenced by Wallerstein’s “worldsystem”
ideas. For example, A. Bergesen, “Cycles of War in the Reproduction of
the World Economy,” in P. M. Johnson and W. R. Thompson (eds.), Rhythms in
Politics and Economics (New York, 1985); E. Friedman (ed.), Ascent and Decline
in the World-System (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982); Bergesen (ed.), Studies in the
Modern World-System (New York, 1980); McGowan and Kegley (eds.), Foreign
Policy and the Modern World-System, passim.
5. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 93.
6. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, passim.
7. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 158–59, has a very good
discussion of this point.
8., See the analysis in Wight, Power Politics, ch. 3.
9. Quoted by McCormick, on p. 19 of his article “Strategic Considerations in the
Development of Economic Thought,” in McCormick and Bissell (eds.), Strategic
Dimensions of Economic Behavior.
10. Ibid.
11. Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth Century Britain”; and also J.
H. Maurer, “Economics, Strategy, and War in Historical Perspective,” in
McCormick and Bissell (eds.), Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behavior, pp. 59–
83.
12. Gilpin’s term; see War and Change in World Politics, p. 162.
13. Cited in Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, p. 17.