10 TROUBLEMAKER TO FIGUREHEAD
10 从夺实权到丢实权
(1931–34 AGE 37–40)
1931～1934 年 37～40 岁
WHEN MAO WAS inaugurated as president of the Red state, he had in fact lost his former absolute control over the area, and especially over the Red Army. Moscow had appointed Zhu De the army chief. Moreover, as Party secretary, Chou En-lai was the No. 1. Mao refused to fit into a collective leadership and tried intimidation. His colleagues fought back and accused him of a multitude of sins, even of adopting a “kulak line,” an accusation Mao himself had used to send many Jiangxi Reds to their deaths. Now he was up against a steel wall. At a meeting after Chou arrived, Mao took the chair and started behaving as though he were still in charge. The others intervened to unseat him, and put Chou in the chair. Very soon Mao asked for “sick leave,” which was happily granted, and he left Ruijin in a sulk at the end of January 1932.
国中之国成立前后，毛身边来了一批由苏联培训的高官。毛在他们面前依然摆出独裁作风，这些人不吃他那一套。“外交部长”王稼祥说：“老毛骂人，不行，要找个机会斗争他。”会上他们给他扣大帽子，甚至说他是“富农路线”。这是个可怕的罪名，毛当初曾用它把许多江西共产党人送上刑场。现在虽说他掉不了脑袋，但他说话不再说一不二了。周恩来刚来时，一次开苏区中央局会议，毛照旧拿出主持人的架式，在座的人请他让位，由周主持。毛没法子，请“病假”。同事们巴不得，马上同意，毛就在一九三二年一月生着闷气上了东华山。
He went off to a commandeered Buddhist temple called Donghua Hill, one of many giant rocks rising out of the plain round Ruijin. Covered with metasequoias, cypresses and pines, and dotted with smooth black stones, the hill sheltered the ancient temple in its luxuriant midst. Here Mao spent the days with his wife, Gui-yuan, and a detachment of guards. It was large and rang with echoes. Moss grew on the damp earthen floor. Outside Mao's monastery room, leaves fell in the winter wind and rain sank into the cracks of the stone courtyard, bringing out more chill. It was a mournful scene.
东华山是瑞金附近的一座石头山。此起彼伏的大黑石深处坐落着一所庙宇，掩映在浓郁的水杉松柏中。伴随毛住在这里的只有妻子贺子珍和一个班的警卫。庙堂又大又空，透出湿冷的阴气。毛的卧室狭小，泥地上长着幽幽的青苔。门外，冬天的风卷落残存的树叶，不绝的雨滴進石板上的裂缝里，带出渗人的寒气。毛的心情也同样阴暗丧气。
Mao had brought with him two iron-clad cases filled with documents, newspaper cuttings, notes, and poems he had composed over the years. When it was sunny, the bodyguards would set out these cases in the courtyard, one on top of the other, and Mao would sit on a makeshift stool reading and rereading the contents, pondering how to reclaim his lost power.
偶遇天晴，毛搬一把板凳，坐在院子里。他带来两只铁皮箱子，里面装着文件、剪报、笔记，跟多年的诗作。警卫员把箱子摞起来，毛读着箱子里的珍藏，思考着下一步怎么办。
He still received top-level documents daily, along with his beloved newspapers, both Nationalist and Communist. It was from these newspapers that he spotted a golden opportunity—which he may in fact have created himself. Between 16 and 21 February, a “recantation notice” appeared in major Nationalist newspapers, bearing Chou En-lai's then pseudonym, renouncing communism and condemning the Communist Party, especially for its subservience to Moscow. The CCP office in Shanghai went to considerable lengths to counter the impact, and put it about that the notice was a fake, circulating leaflets to this effect and trying to place statements in the newspapers.
高层的机密文件仍定时给毛送来，同时还有他钟爱的报纸，包括国民党的报纸。这些报纸上常有共产党员脱党启事。二月十六日至二十一日，上海《申报》等主要报纸上出现了一个《伍豪等脱离共党启事》。 《伍豪启事》说“敝人等深信中国共产党目前所取之手段所谓发展红军牵制现政府军者无异消灭中国抗日力量，其结果必为日本之傀儡而陷中国民族于万劫不复之境地……”，说中共路线为苏联利益服务，“敝人本良心之觉悟特此退出国际指挥之中国共产党。”“伍豪”系周恩来的化名。
Although there is no doubt that the notice was a plant, Chou's name and authority were undermined. Mao was thus able to exploit this vulnerability. His strategy was not to try to unseat Chou, which would have been unrealistic, but to get Chou to back him to sideline Zhu De and regain control of the army.
(伍豪启事)毫无疑问是伪造的。直到今天，中共也说不清到底是谁伪造的，为什么不选他人，专选周恩来？为什么早不伪造晚不伪造，偏偏就在周取代毛作红区头号人物时伪造登出？这是巧合吗？而且，毛当时即以苏区主席名义发布告“辟谣”， 把（伍豪启事）扩散到根本看不到上海报纸的苏区。
In early March, Mao was invited to a crisis meeting 125 km west of Ruijin, outside the city of Ganzhou, which the Red Army had been trying in vain to capture. The minute the invitation arrived Mao hurried off, even though it was raining hard. Gui-yuan tried to get him to wait until it stopped, but he insisted on leaving at once, and was drenched in an instant. He raced on horseback through the night, and when he got to the meeting weighed straight in to criticize the military command. Most other leaders were in no mood to listen to a lecture from him, and no one suggested he should be reinstated as head of the army.
在共产党的世界里，启事使周的名字受到玷污，权威遭到质疑，周的惶惶不安可想而知。尤其是，周不能不怀疑，这不是巧合，是毛在搞鬼。周就这样对毛产生了惧怕心理。从事态的发展可以看出，毛利用周的这一心理，迫周对他言听计从。
But now that Mao was back with the army, he hung on there, and started to put his scheme into action. The Reds soon had to call off the siege of Ganzhou, and the majority agreed they should fight their way westwards to link up with another Red pocket on the Jiangxi–Hunan border. Mao, however, insisted they should go in the opposite direction. As he dug his heels in, it fell to Chou En-lai, as Party chief, to make a decision. Chou opted to endorse both plans, but to send only one-third of the army in the direction favored by the majority, while dispatching the greater part of the army with Mao in the direction Mao wanted. Chou thus allowed Mao to snatch back control of two-thirds of the army, against the wishes of most of the leadership.
这时毛要的是军权。红军那时正久攻赣州城不下，三月初在城下开最高层会议商讨怎么办。毛一得到通知，跳起来就走。天正下着瓢泼大雨，子珍让他等雨停了再走，他不听，出庙门顷刻就全身湿透。他连夜马不停蹄，到了会场便指责军事指挥。同事们并没有把军权给他，大家虽然都同意撤围赣州，但是仍作决议说：打赣州“在政治上完全是正确的”。
The most likely explanation for this extraordinary decision is that Chou felt it was better, probably vital, to placate Mao. He knew that Mao had threatened to frame both Peng De-huai and Zhu De (plus another Party leader who had opposed Mao, Xiang Ying) with accusations of being “AB.” Mao had not batted an eyelid about slaughtering tens of thousands of loyal Reds who had stood in his way. Mao, in fact, was quite capable of having planted the recantation notice himself. He had displayed a penchant for manipulating the press; for example, creating the rumor of his own death. And why did the fake recantation come right at the time when Chou had just supplanted Mao as the No. 1 in the Red state? Chou could not afford to make an enemy out of Mao.
大多数人一致同意向西发展，跟湘赣边区根据地连成一片。可是毛坚持去东北方向。争执不下，由周恩来拍板定案。周决定两个方向都去，但只派了三分之一的队伍往西，三分之二跟毛走，包括毛的老搭档林彪手下的红军主力一军团。
Chou's fear of Mao dated from now and was never to leave him. Mao was repeatedly to dangle the planted recantation over Chou, right up to Chou's death more than four decades later.
周可以不顾多数人的意志，做出这样一个奇怪的决定，显然是他不想树毛这个敌。就是从这时起，周恩来开始了持续一生的对毛的恐惧。毛呢，也一再把（伍豪启事）作为悬在周头上的利剑，一直到四十多年后周临死之际。
Mao had told Chou and the military leadership that he wanted to go northeast. After he set off, he suddenly changed route and led his two-thirds of the army to the southeast coast, only informing Chou when he was well on the way, making it impossible for Chou to say no. Later Mao's colleagues condemned the excursion as an interruption that had “delayed our plans.”
跟毛走的红军并没有照他在会上说的往东北方向去。上路后，毛突然改变行程，朝相反方向的东南海岸前進。毛通过林彪把这一既成事实电告中央军委，中央不得不再次开会，认可毛的新路线。后来毛的同事们谴责毛的海岸之行为浪费时间。
In making this detour, Mao had the collaboration of his old accomplice Lin Biao, the man who had ganged up with him before to sabotage Zhu De. Lin was the core commander of the force assigned to Mao. On 20 April this force took the prosperous city of Zhangzhou, very near the coast, which was feebly defended and which Mao had targeted for personal reasons.
四月二十日，毛夺取了靠近海岸的漳州城。毛瞅准了漳州守城兵力薄弱，他去那里是为了私人的目的。
One was to gain prestige in the wider world, as Zhangzhou was well connected internationally. Very much with newspaper coverage in mind, Mao entered the city on a white horse, looking uncharacteristically smart in a Sun Yat-sen suit and topee. The army marched in four columns, with bugles blowing. Mao sent his colleagues press cuttings that he collected about himself, reporting his exploits in terms like: “Red Army in Zhangzhou; whole coast shaken; over 100,000 flee”; “28 foreign gunboats gathering in Amoy.” Mao was well aware that the higher his profile, the more obliging Moscow would be. Indeed, when his exasperated colleagues moved to oust him later that year, Moscow restrained them, citing this very reason. As their representative in Shanghai, the German Arthur Ewert, reassured the Russians, he had immediately stressed to Ruijin that “Mao Tse-tung is already a high-profile leader … And so … we have protested against Mao's removal …”
其中之一是获得更大的名声。红军進城时排成四行，军号震天，毛特意骑了匹白马，头戴遮阳盔，一反常态地衣冠楚楚。毛收集了大量关于自己的新闻报导，寄给“战友”们，诸如“红军入漳，沿海大震，漳、泉逃厦者，十万余人……”“帝国主义兵舰集厦门者二十八艘”。毛算准了，他的名气越大，莫斯科越得依他。果然，当他的同事们后来气愤地撤了他的军职时，莫斯科在上海的代表艾威特(Arthur Ewert)告诉中共：“毛泽东是个知名度很高的领袖”：莫斯科反对解除毛的职务。
But the key reason for Mao to go to Zhangzhou was to amass a private fortune. A large number of crates marked with huge characters, “To be delivered to Mao Tse-tung personally,” went back to Jiangxi. They filled a whole truck, and when the road ran out they were carried by porters. They were said to contain books Mao had bought or looted, and some did. But many contained gold, silver and jewels. They were secretly carried to the top of a mountain by porters, and stored inside a cave by two trusted bodyguards, supervised by Mao's brother Tse-min. The entrance was sealed, and only these few knew about the haul. The Party leadership was kept in the dark. Mao had bought himself insurance in case he fell out with the Party—and with Moscow.
繁华的漳州还使毛得以聚敛一笔私财。一辆卡车满载着沉甸甸的箱子从漳州开到江西红区，箱子上写着大字：“毛泽东亲收”。公路开到尽头就由脚夫挑。“这是毛主席买的、缴获的书，”大家都这么说。有书，但更多的是金银财宝。挑夫在毛的大弟泽民的监督下把它们秘密挑到一个山顶，然后泽民和两个毛的贴身警卫员把它们搬進山洞。洞口密密封住。除了这几个人，再没别的人知道。毛就这样悄悄地给自己留下条后路。
WHILE MAO HAD been lingering in Zhangzhou, in May 1932 Chiang Kai-shek was gearing up for another “annihilation expedition,” his fourth, deploying half a million troops. The setting up of the Red state had convinced him that the Communists were not going to unite with him against Japan. On 28 January that year, Japan had attacked Shanghai, China's key commercial and industrial city, 1,000 km from Manchuria. This time, Chinese troops fought back, taking tremendous casualties. As Japan's military objectives in the Shanghai area at this stage were limited, the League of Nations was able to broker a ceasefire. Throughout the crisis, which lasted till late April, the Reds worked single-mindedly to expand their own territory.* After the crisis subsided, Chiang resuscitated his policy of “Domestic Stability First,” and geared up to attack the Red bases again.
一九三二年五月，当毛逗留在漳州时，蒋介石调集五十万兵力，准备发动第四次“围剿”。那年“一·二八”日本進攻上海，中国军队奋起抵抗。由于日本此时在上海地区的军事目标有限，国际联盟得以调停战火。在这场一直持续到四月下旬的危机中，中共继续攻城略地。四月十五日，中共口头上“宣布对日战争”，但宣言与其说是抗日不如说是倒蒋，称倒蒋“是直接与日本帝国主义作战的前提”。蒋介石明白中共不会跟他联合抗日，于是在上海危机结束后，重申“攘外必先安内”的政策，又开始進攻红色根据地。
When they received this intelligence, the CCP leadership cabled Mao to bring the army back to the Red base without delay. Mao replied that he did not believe Chiang would “launch an offensive like the third expedition last year,” and told the Party its “assessment and military strategy are utterly wrong.” He refused to leave Zhangzhou until nearly a month had elapsed and Chiang's intention was made public—and Mao proven wrong.
收到蒋介石即将围剿的情报后，中央令毛率部返回江西苏区以御敌。毛回电说他不相信蒋会大举進攻，中央的“估量和军事战略，完全是错误的”。毛拒绝离开漳州，又待了将近一个月，直到蒋的意图已公开，毛明显错了，这才不得不于五月二十九日动身。数万红军由于跟着毛绕了个大弯，现在不得不多走三百公里。南方的气候已酷热难当，不少人患病死去。路上他们还得跟新的敌人作战：粤军。粤军一向与蒋介石势不两立，迄今为止避免和红军作战。但毛打漳州震惊了他们，毕竟漳州离广东只有八十公里。他们于是向红军出击。在一个叫水口的地方，红军打了一场少见的恶战，伤亡惨重。*
On 29 May he had to return to Red Jiangxi. Thanks to Mao having led them into an isolated cul-de-sac, the tens of thousands of troops with him had to march back over 300 km, in searing heat, and a large number fell ill and died. En route, they had to fight an extra enemy—the Cantonese, who had previously avoided fighting the Reds. The Cantonese had adopted an independent position vis-à-vis Chiang—indeed, had been hatching a plot against him. But Mao's foray into Zhangzhou had alarmed them: it was only about 80 km from their own province, and the proximity of the danger goaded them into action. Near a town called Water Mouth, the Red Army had to fight one of its few really tough battles, suffering unusually high casualties. The Red soldiers who fought most impressively were some recent mutineers from the Nationalist army, who went into battle stripped to the waist and brandishing giant knives.†
* 打得最勇敢的是一九三一年十二月“宁都兵变”的将士们。这是自南昌起义以来的唯一兵变。他们的到来使中央苏区红军的兵力增长了三分之一，达五万多人。总指挥季振同把部队带進红军后，很快就后悔了，一再要求“到苏联去学习”。中共知道这是他想逃跑的藉口，把他扣了起来，后来处死。
In spite of causing all these unnecessary casualties and hardships for the Red Army, not only was Mao not reprimanded, he went on the offensive by demanding that he be given the highest post in the army, that of chief political commissar. Mao can only have been encouraged by Moscow's unbelievably indulgent attitude towards him. While Mao was dallying in Zhangzhou, the Party leadership, Chou included, had collectively cabled Moscow, calling Mao's actions “hundred percentage right opportunism” and “absolutely contrary to instructions of the C.I. [Comintern].” But Moscow's response was that they must at all costs keep Mao on board, and maintain his profile and status.
在毛不听指挥逗留漳州期间，包括周恩来在内的中央实在拿他没办法，曾集体给莫斯科去电，告毛是“百分之百的右倾机会主义”，“完全与国际指示唱反调”。但莫斯科回电说，他们无论如何得跟毛合作，维护毛的威信和地位。
It was clear that Moscow regarded Mao as indispensable, and the Kremlin consistently showed a regard for him that it did not bestow on any other leader. If it came to a showdown, Moscow would most likely take Mao's side.
显然，莫斯科认为毛是不可或缺的，其他人可有可无。毛有恃无恐，跟周恩来等会合后，反守为攻，伸手要权，提出红军中设立总政治委员，由他来担任。
On 25 July, Chou recommended meeting Mao's demands, “in order to facilitate battle command at the front.” His colleagues wanted to give the job to Chou, but Chou pleaded: “If you insist that Chou is to be the chief political commissar, this would … leave the government Chairman [Mao] with nothing to do … It is awkward in the extreme …” On 8 August, Mao was appointed chief political commissar of the army.
七月二十五日，周恩来提议答应毛的要求，“以毛任总政委”。在瑞金的领导们不同意，要把这个位子给周。周找出各种理由帮毛说话，恳求道：这样一来，“政府主席[毛]将无事可做”，“实在不便之至”。八月八日，毛当上了红军总政委。
MAO HAD REGAINED control of the army, but differences with his colleagues only deepened. In summer 1932, Chiang was focusing his attacks on two Red territories north of Jiangxi; on Moscow's instructions the Party ordered all its armies to coordinate their movements to help these areas. Mao's assignment was to lead his army closer to the two bases under assault and draw off enemy forces by attacking towns. He did this for a while, then when the going got tough simply refused to fight anymore. In spite of urgent cables asking for help, he basically sat by for a month while Chiang drove the Reds out of these other two bases.
毛就这样在莫斯科纵容下夺回了军权。一九三二年夏，蒋介石首先集中兵力進攻中央苏区以北的鄂豫皖和湘鄂西根据地。莫斯科指示所有红军协力支援这两个红区。毛的任务是率领中央苏区的红军北上進攻若干城镇，以牵制一部分敌军。毛遵命攻击了几个地方，但一遇强敌就停下来。中央要求毛积极出击，“呼应配合”，毛则保持观望，按兵不动。
Chiang's next target was Jiangxi. Moscow had decided that the best strategy here was to meet Chiang's attack head-on, but once again Mao just withheld his consent, insisting that it would be much better to disperse the Communist forces and wait and see. Mao did not believe that the hugely outnumbered Red Army could defeat Chiang, and seems to have set his hopes on Moscow bailing out the Chinese Reds. At the time, Moscow and Nanjing were negotiating to restore diplomatic relations, which Moscow had severed in 1929 over China's attempt to take control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. Mao's calculation seems to have been that Chiang would have to allow the Chinese Reds to survive as a gesture to Moscow.
蒋把红军赶出鄂豫皖和湘鄂西之际，下一个目标轮到中央苏区。莫斯科的战略是迎头反击。但毛再次拒绝执行，坚持要“分散”部队，躲避蒋军。*
* 毛不相信红军能打败蒋介石的数十万大军，他把希望寄托在莫斯科身上。那时莫斯科正跟国民党政府频繁接触要恢复外交关系(一九二九年苏联因为“中东路”事件跟中国断交)。毛认为蒋会向苏联作姿态，给红军留一条生路。中苏在一九三二年十二月复交。
Mao's colleagues regarded his passive delaying tactics as “extremely dangerous.” Mao would not budge. “Sometimes arguments became endless, endless,” as Chou put it; “it is impossible to know what to do.”
中共其他领导认为他的做法是“极危险的”。毛固执己见。用周恩来无可奈何的话说：“争论则不胜其争论”，“令人无所适从”。
An emergency meeting had to be convened at the beginning of October, which turned into a showdown with Mao. All the eight top men in the Red base gathered in the town of Ningdu for a meeting chaired by Chou. The anger that flared against Mao can be felt through the jargon the participants used to describe the scene, where, as they put it, they “engaged in unprecedented two-line struggle [“two-line” means as if against an enemy], and broke the previous pattern of yielding to and placating” Mao, which was a reference to Chou's kid-glove treatment of Mao.
一场紧急会议十月初在宁都召开，会议由周恩来主持，中央苏区的八个领导人都出席了。会上大家对毛的愤怒和谴责可以从会议文件里略见一斑。毛被指责不服从命令，擅自行动，犯了“不尊重党领导机关与组织观念的错误”。与会者“开展了从未有过的两条路线斗争[毛已形同敌人]，打破了过去迁就和平的状态”。要不是周恩来护着毛，对他的谴责还会更严厉。会后有几个成员向上海报告说：周“在结论中不给泽东错误以明确的批评，反而有些地方替他解释掩护”。在上海的博古等人，对毛的行为怒不可遏，超乎寻常地不征得莫斯科代表的同意，就给宁都会议发电报，称毛的行为“不可容忍”，再不能让毛继续指挥红军，甚至建议开除毛的党籍。
Mao was denounced for “disrespect for Party leadership, and lacking the concept of the Organization”—in other words, insubordination. The tone would have been harsher still if it had not been for Chou, who, as some of his colleagues reported, “did not criticise Tse-tung's mistakes unambiguously, but rather, in some places, tried to gloss over and explain away” his actions. The top cadres still in Shanghai, especially Po Ku, were so infuriated with Mao that they wired their colleagues in Ningdu without consulting Moscow's representatives (which was most unusual, and a sign of how angry they were), calling his actions “intolerable” and saying he must be removed from the army. There was even a suggestion that he should be expelled from the Party.
Giving Moscow no time to intervene, the leaders in Ningdu dismissed Mao on the spot from his army post, although in deference to Moscow's orders not to impair Mao's public image, the troops were told that he was “temporarily returning to the central government to chair everything.” Moscow was told that Mao had gone to the rear “owing to sickness.”
不等莫斯科出面保毛，宁都会议就一举拿掉了毛的军权，要他回后方。遵照莫斯科维护毛的声望的规定，向部队宣布时，只说毛是“暂时回中央政府主持一切工作”。莫斯科收到的报告则说毛回后方是“因为生病”。
During the conference, Mao cabled Shanghai twice from Ningdu, which was clearly an attempt to enlist Moscow's help. But Ewert, Moscow's man in Shanghai, who had also lost patience with Mao, chose to report to Moscow by courier, not cable, so the news of Mao's dismissal did not reach Moscow until the conference was over. Ewert found himself having to explain his failure to save Mao to Moscow. The “decision … to remove and criticise” Mao had been taken “without prior agreement with us” and Ewert said he disagreed with it: “a decision like this [should not] be taken without exhausting all other possibilities …” Although “there is no doubt whatever that … Mao Tse-tung is wrong … friendly persuasion must be used with Mao.”
宁都会议期间，毛两次给上海发电报，请求莫斯科干预。但莫斯科代表艾威特显然也对毛的行为不满，决定用信使，而不是电报，转告莫斯科。莫斯科不同意赶毛出军队，艾威特不得不为自己辩护说：“解除他军职以及谴责他的决定，我们事先都不知道。”
Moscow ordered the CCP: “Regarding your differences with comrade Mao Tse-tung, we repeat: Try to win him for the line of active struggle in a comradely way. We are against recalling Mao Tse-tung from the army at the present time if he submits to discipline.” On 2 November, Stalin was asked “urgently” for his opinion. Mao's colleagues were then told to explain why they had pushed Mao out of the army. Moscow criticized Mao's critics, and praised Chou's gentle handling.
莫斯科对中共说：“毫无疑问毛泽东是错的，但对毛只能用友善的劝说。”“关于你们与毛泽东的分歧，我们再次强调：努力友好地争取他接受积极反击的路线……我们反对在这个时候把毛泽东调离军队，要是他守纪律的话。”究竟对毛怎么办，莫斯科的主管十一月二日紧急请示斯大林。根据斯大林的意见，毛的同事们被责令写报告解释为什么把毛踢出红军。莫斯科批评那些谴责毛的人，赞赏周恩来对毛的和风细雨。
Russian backing came too late for Mao, who had left Ningdu on 12 October, his post as army commissar taken by Chou. Mao never forgave his opponents at Ningdu, and they were later made to pay, some of them dearly. The main butt of Mao's resentment was Chou, even though he had tried to safeguard Mao, the reason being that he ended up with Mao's job. In later life, Chou made more than 100 self-denunciations, and the fiercest self-flagellation was reserved for Ningdu. Forty years later, as prime minister, in spring 1972, right after being diagnosed with cancer of the bladder and in the middle of extremely demanding negotiations with the US, Japan and many other countries (at which he greatly impressed his foreign interlocutors), Chou was made to perform one groveling apology after another to groups of high officials. One topic that kept recurring was Ningdu.
莫斯科的力挺来迟了，毛十月十二日已经离开了宁都，也离开了红军。总政委一角由周恩来接任。毛一生都记恨宁都会议上那些反对他的人，特别不放过周恩来。尽管周为毛缓颊说好话，但他毕竟同意了撤毛的职，而且取代了毛。毛上台后，周作了一百多次检讨。四十年后，身为总理的周，刚被确诊膀胱癌，又正在跟美国、日本等国谈判，却不得不一次次严厉指责自己，罪状之一就是宁都会议。
CONFIDENT THAT HE mattered to Moscow, Mao adamantly refused to go and do his job in Ruijin, and went instead to “convalesce” in Tingzhou, where the former missionary Hospital of the Gospel provided the best medical care in the Red area (before Mao had it moved to Ruijin). He stayed in a sumptuous two-story villa which had formerly belonged to a rich Christian and had been commandeered for the Red elite. Cradled in a wooded hill and encircled on both levels by spacious loggias carved in dark wood, the villa afforded shade and breeze ideal for the southern heat, as well as scent and beauty from the orange trees and banana leaves in the subtropical garden.
毛坚决拒绝回瑞金去主持中央政府工作，他到汀州“养病”去了，進了苏区医疗条件最好的教会医院。住宅是一幢两层楼的别墅，原属于一个富有的基督教徒，如今被中共占用作疗养院。房子座落在郁郁葱葱的小山湾中，楼上一圈宽阔的木头平台，给楼下遮荫。平台上四面来风，风把几株芭蕉吹得像扇子一样扬来扬去，雨后闲坐正好看“芭蕉叶大栀子肥”。
From this elegant villa, Mao ran a competing HQ. He summoned various followers, and told them not to stand and fight when they came under attack from the Nationalists, but to evacuate front-line areas. The attitude he encouraged his coterie to adopt towards Party orders was: “carry them out if they suit you, and ignore them if they don't.”
这幢别墅现在成了毛泽东与瑞金抗衡的司令部。他把追随者们召来开会，叫他们在国民党打来时不要抵抗，而是撤离前线，要他们对中央指示：“合我口味就执行，不合就不执行。”
In January 1933, Po Ku, the 25-year-old who had been running the Party office in Shanghai (and who had just urged his colleagues at Ningdu to dump Mao), arrived in the Ruijin base.* Po Ku was fourteen years Mao's junior, and had only been in the Party seven years. He was extremely bright, and impressed Edgar Snow as having a mind “very quick and as subtle as, and perhaps more supple than Chou En-lai's.” He spoke good Russian and English, and knew Moscow's ways, having trained there for three and a half years (1926–30). Above all, he was exceptionally decisive, a quality much appreciated by his comrades, most of whom were exasperated by Chou, who was seen as far too accommodating towards Mao. Even though Po Ku was much younger and less experienced, the majority voted for him to take over the Party chair from Chou, who retained command of the military. Chou let this happen, as he had no thirst for personal power, nor did he yearn to be No. 1. In fact, he rather seems to have welcomed there being somebody above him.
一九三三年一月，负责上海机关的博古来到中央苏区。那时中共组织已不能在任何一个大城市秘密存在，原因是国民党治安的成功以及大批中共党员叛变。*二十五岁的博古，入党只有七年，但他聪明过人，跟他有过交往的斯诺称他的大脑“比周恩来更快、更微妙，也许更灵巧”。他的俄文、英文都很好，在苏联受训三年半。他最突出的特点是果断，敢做敢为，尽管他比周年轻得多，资历也差得远，一到瑞金大家仍公推他为中共第一把手。中共领导们对周在毛问题上的优柔寡断、姑息迁就非常失望。他们让周管军事，周并不介意，他没有当头号人物的野心，欢迎有个顶头上司作决策。
* 在有关中共历史的书上，中共在大城市的失败被莫名其妙地怪罪到几年前就下了台的李立三头上。
Po was incensed by what Mao had been doing, and decided to act at once, as Ruijin faced an imminent onslaught from Chiang. In addition, Po was receiving a lot of other complaints about Mao. Peng De-huai described Mao as “a nasty character” who “had insulted” Zhu De. He “likes to stir up squabbles,” Peng said. “Mao's methods are very brutal. If you do not submit to him, he will without fail find ways to make you submit. He does not know how to unite the cadres.”
博古决心对毛采取行动。面临蒋介石大军压境，他必须要做到令行禁止。博古也听到不少对毛的反映。彭德怀就说毛“心术不正”“侮辱”朱德，毛“喜欢挑起内斗”， 毛“手狠，要是你不服从他，他总有办法压服你，他不懂得怎样团结干部”。
Po's hands, however, were tied. When he left Shanghai, Moscow's agent Ewert had told him bluntly that he absolutely had to work with Mao. But this injunction did not extend to Mao's followers, and here Po took action. From February 1933 on, a string of Mao's acolytes—all low-level, including Mao's brother Tse-tan—was criticized in the press, though only the top few knew that Mao was the real target, and his reputation among the rank and file was carefully preserved. Moreover, Po did not use Mao's killer methods. Although the language was high-decibel (“smash into smithereens,” “cruelly struggle”), Mao's followers were treated as comrades who had erred, not as “enemies,” and some were allowed to retain important posts.
博古离开上海时，莫斯科代表艾威特一再叮咛他跟毛搞好关系。但莫斯科允许博古拿毛的追随者开刀。从二月起，这些人，包括邓小平、谭震林，毛的么弟泽覃，在瑞金报上被点名批判。当然只有少数人知道这实际上是针对毛，毛的公众形象并没有受丝毫影响。另外，博古也没有采用毛整人的办法。尽管批判的语言听起来怪吓人的，什么“打得粉碎”，什么“残酷斗争，无情打击”，但仅限于言辞而已，被批判的人并没被当敌人对待，批判完后还给了他们重要职务。
Po Ku was able to dismantle Mao's separate chain of command, and unite the Party to fight Chiang, with great success. For the first time, the Red Army defeated the Generalissimo's crack troops in battles involving tens of thousands of men. Chiang's latest annihilation expedition folded in March 1933.
博古打破了毛自立的体系，使全党听从指挥反击围剿。结果是出奇地成功，红军首次進行大兵团作战，在两场决定性的战斗中打垮蒋介石嫡系部队近三个师，使蒋的第四次围剿在三月以失败告终。
DURING THIS FOURTH campaign, Chiang had to fight the Reds against the background of a deepening national crisis. In February 1933 the Japanese had thrust out of Manchuria across the Great Wall into north China proper, threatening Peking. That same month the Japanese set up a puppet state called Manchukuo in the northeast.*
蒋的失败因素之一，是他不得不同时对付日益加深的民族危机。这年二月，日本侵略军从东北越过长城向关内進犯，直接威胁古都北平(北京)。日本人在东北成立了傀儡政权满洲国。苏联承认了满洲国，成为除日本、萨尔瓦多和梵蒂冈外，满洲国国旗飘扬的仅有国家。斯大林这样做目的是讨好日本，使日本不致進攻苏联。
Ruijin also won this fourth campaign thanks to great help from the Soviet Union, which had just restored diplomatic relations with Chiang, in December 1932. Restoring formal ties allowed Russia to get more intelligence officers back into China under diplomatic and press cover, to help the Chinese Communists. The Russian military attaché, GRU Major-General Eduard Lepin, played a central role, as he regularly saw Chiang and top Nationalist officers, and could pass high-level up-to-date information to the Chinese Red Army, also acting as liaison between it and the military advisory group for the CCP in Moscow. Moscow's secret military advisers in China also had a big hand in the war. When Mao later met one of them, the German Communist Otto Braun (the only one who got through to Ruijin), Mao paid him a compliment. After Mao greeted him “with stiff formality,” Braun recorded, “Mao acknowledg[ed] the successful counter-offensive … in the winter of 1932–33. He said he knew that the impetus for it came from me …”
中央苏区的胜利，像从前一样，还得益于苏联情报人员，苏联驻华武官雷邦(Eduard Lepin)是中心人物。莫斯科派来若干秘密军事顾问，其中一位德国人李德(Otto Braun)后来几经周折進入瑞金。毛见到他时曾对他表示恭维。李德写道：毛“提到一九三二、三三那个冬天的反击战，称赞它的成功，说他知道是我在上海出谋划策”。
The main military figure on the Chinese Red side during this fourth campaign was Chou En-lai, and the fact that the Reds were winning unprecedented victories under his leadership greatly boosted Chou's status and confidence. Mao knew that Moscow recognized winners, and Chou's military triumph could well tip Moscow in Chou's favor—especially as Mao had opposed Moscow's war strategy in the first place. So in February 1933 Mao moved back to Ruijin from his “convalescence,” and started to be cooperative. Moscow continued to accord him unique care and attention, repeatedly admonishing his colleagues that they “must incorporate Mao in work at all cost … Regarding Mao Tse-tung, you must try your utmost to adopt an attitude of tolerance and conciliation …”
打了前所未有的胜仗，周恩来的地位和安全感都大大增强。莫斯科爱的是成功者，毛紧张了，想到莫斯科也许会移情于周，尤其是毛还曾反对过莫斯科的战略。一九三三年二月，他病也不养了，从汀州搬回瑞金。莫斯科对他的态度一如既往，告诫毛的同事们“不管怎么说，必须团结毛工作……关于毛泽东，你们必须尽绝大努力对他取容忍和解的态度”。
Mao went on taking part in top meetings and chairing those to which his post entitled him. He was kept fully briefed and retained his elite privileges. But he knew that Moscow had reservations about him—not least from the way that his acolytes were denounced in the Red newspapers. He could also read the strength of the wind that was blowing against him in the startling degree of his own isolation. Hardly anyone came to visit him. His followers avoided him. Sometimes, his wife recalled, he did not exchange a word with anyone outside his family for days. Mao was to say decades later that it was as if he had been “soaked in a piss barrel, and been sloshed up and down several times, so I really stank.”
毛继续出席最高层会议，该他主持的他也主持，绝密消息没有瞒他。但毛知道莫斯科对他的青睐不那么靠得住了，报上在批判他的追随者，他十分孤立。几乎没有什么人来看他。“那时鬼都不上门，”毛说：“我是好比一个菩萨，被放在尿缸里，沉过几下，臭得很。”
A further indication of the way he had slipped in Moscow's favor came early in 1934, when he lost his position as “premier”—while retaining the grander one of “president.” The main duty of the premier was to run the administration, which Mao could not be bothered to do; and the Party wanted someone in the post who would actually do the job. An ambitious thirty-four-year-old called Lo Fu, who had been trained in Russia, took his place. Mao was compensated by being made a full member of the Politburo for the first time since 1923, but he did not get into the inner core of the Party, the Secretariat. He was not on the list approved by Moscow. Mao boycotted the Party plenum that implemented these decisions, claiming illness. Another “diplomatic disorder,” Po Ku remarked, but let him be.
毛果真是失宠了。一九三四年初，他丢了“总理”职位，尽管仍是“主席”。中共在莫斯科批准下把这个位子给了苏联训练的三十四岁的张闻天。作为对毛的补偿，他升任政治局正式委员。但他没能進入中共的核心：书记处(又称常委会)。莫斯科批准的单子上没有他。开中央全会公布任命时，毛拒绝出席，说是病了。“生的又是外交病，”博古说，但由毛去了。
Mao was still given a high profile and maximum exposure in CCP and Moscow publications. To the population in the Red area—and to the outside world, including the Nationalists—Mao was still “the Chairman.” But in private, Po Ku compared him to Russia's figurehead president. “Old Mao is going to be just a Kalinin now,” he told a friend. “Ha, ha!”
毛的知名度依然不减。中共和莫斯科的出版物还是继续宣传他。红区、白区、外部世界都知道这个“毛主席”。但在中共核心，博古把毛比作苏联的名誉主席：“老毛今后只是加里宁(Mikhail Kalinin)了，哈哈！”
*On 15 April the Communists issued a “declaration of war on Japan.” This was a pure propaganda stunt, and it was more than five years before the Red Army fired a shot at the Japanese (except in Manchuria, where the Party organization came under the control of Moscow, not Ruijin)—making this one of the longest “phoney wars” in history. In fact, the CCP's proclamation was more a declaration of war on Chiang Kai-shek than on Japan, as it asserted that “in order to … fight the Japanese imperialists, it is necessary first of all to overthrow the rule of the Nationalists.” In secret intra-CCP communications, there was not a single reference to Japan as the enemy.
†The mutineers belonged to a unit of 17,000 men whose commander had brought them over to the Reds from Ningdu in December 1931. This was the only mutiny in the Communists' favor since Nanchang in 1927—and for many years to come. These newcomers increased the Red Army's strength in the Fujian–Jiangxi theater by one-third, to over 50,000 men. Their commander, Ji Zhen-tong, quickly realized what he had let himself and his army in for, and asked “to go to the Soviet Union for studies”—the only pretext he could give to get away. He was soon arrested, and later executed.
*The Party was no longer able to operate underground in any city in the White areas, as a result of effective Nationalist policing plus massive defections. In history books this failure is blamed, unfairly, on Li Li-san, the all-purpose scapegoat.
*Apart from Japan, the only states that recognized it were El Salvador, the Vatican and the Soviet Union, where the Manchukuo flag flew over consulates at Chita and Vladivostok. This was part of an attempt by Stalin to appease Tokyo, to try to prevent it turning north to attack the Soviet Union.