14 LONG MARCH III: MONOPOLIZING THE MOSCOW CONNECTION
14 长征之三：独霸连接莫斯科之路
(1935 AGE 41)
1935 年 41 岁
WHEN THE TWO Red armies joined up in June 1935, Mao's force—known as the Central Red Army, as it came directly under the Party leadership—was in a state of ruin. It had started the Long March with 80,000 men. Now it was down to some 10,000—one-eighth its original strength. The surviving remnant was on the verge of collapse. It had lost nearly all its heavy weapons, and its rifles had an average of only five bullets each. As Zhu De lamented to Chang Kuo-tao, who was an old friend, this army “had been a giant before, but now it's only a skeleton. It can no longer fight.”
当一九三五年六月两支红军会师时，毛率领的中央红军处在悲惨的境地。剩下的这一万来人身体拖垮了，重武器差不多丢光了，步枪平均每支只有五颗子弹。曾是张国焘老朋友的朱德私下对张说：中央红军“过去曾是一个巨人，现在全身的肉都掉完了，只剩下一副骨头。”
In contrast, Kuo-tao's army, 20,000 at the outset of their own march, had quadrupled to an impressive 80,000. They were well fed, well equipped with machine-guns and mortars and ample ammunition, and superbly trained.
作为鲜明的对照，张国焘统率下的红四方面军在他们自己的长征初期只有两万人，现在增长到八万多人。队伍身强力壮、训练有术，机关枪、迫击炮一应俱全，是支真正的劲旅。
It was thus from a position of considerable strength that Kuo-tao met his colleagues. He was “a tall, stately man about forty,” Otto Braun recalled, who “received us as a host would his guests. He behaved with great self-confidence, fully aware of his military superiority and administrative power … His cadres … controlled most of the area's meager resources, which were essential for the care of tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers … He was every bit as ambitious as Mao …”
以这样的实力作后盾，李德写道：张国焘“接待我们好似主人见客，举止充满自信，很清楚自己军事上、行政上的优越……他的干部控制了这个地区可怜的出产，几万大军的衣食都得靠他”。“他大约四十岁，个子高高的，身材魁梧”，“野心不比毛小”。
The moment had arrived when Kuo-tao had to be given a job, and he had an extremely strong case for being made head of either the Party or the army. Mao did not want him to have either. It was showdown time. Mao seemed to be at an overwhelming disadvantage, and yet he emerged from the link-up with Kuo-tao as the victor, thanks to the three political figures who had been with him and formed the core Party leadership, the Secretariat—Lo Fu, Chou En-lai and Po Ku.
毛一直担心的时刻到了，得跟张国焘“排座次”了。张国焘无论从实力还是从资历讲都应该不掌党权也掌军权，但毛无意让出任何位子。看上去，毛跟张摊牌，似乎处在不利的地位。可是，毛却占了上风，因为书记处的三个书记--张闻天、周恩来、博古--此时都站在他这一边。
As far as Lo Fu was concerned, he had no hope of holding on to his position as Party No. 1 without Mao. Moreover, when Mao had decided to drag the army off on a detour, Lo had given his consent rather than risk losing his newly won position. Chou En-lai had colluded with Mao all the way. The one who on the face of it might seem to have had the least to lose by switching sides was Po Ku, who had been elbowed out of his No. 1 position by Mao and Lo Fu. But he too was heavily compromised in the destruction of the army; he had put up no effective struggle on its behalf, and was now very much a broken man.
张闻天没有毛就当不了第一把手，当初不让红军進四川，他是点了头的。周恩来一再出于怕毛而由毛摆布。博古照理说是被毛逼下台的，现在应该弃毛而跟张国焘联手。但元气大伤的他在毛拖垮中央红军时，没有对毛進行抗争，现在才出来说话，未免太不像领导人的样子。总之，中央红军被拖垮，整个书记处都有责任。对张闻天、周恩来、博古等人最有利的，还是继续与毛站在一起。结果是张国焘在书记处里处于一比四的劣势。
So, although there was now a chance to gang up with Kuo-tao and ditch Mao, the top men chose not to do so, out of personal interest. If they now blamed Mao for everything that had gone wrong, this was bound to raise the question: Where were you? This would imply that there had been a better alternative which they had failed to grasp. It would make them seem unfit to be leaders. Out of self-protection, they stuck with a simple story-line: that the Central Army had been wrecked by more powerful Nationalist forces. To bolster the image of their own resilience, they tried to denigrate Kuo-tao's army, which had been highly successful, in spite of the heavy fighting it had faced. As they could hardly fault its military performance, they resorted to political smear tactics, saying it suffered from “warlordism” and “political backwardness,” and had “a bandit style.”
为了推卸责任，毛等人众口一词地说中央红军是国民党打垮的。但至今仍强大的红四方面军也备受国民党打击，而且在蒋介石削弱红军的方针下，比中央红军所受的打击厉害得多。为了压制红四方面军的“兴师问罪”，毛等人扣政治帽子，指责红四方面军是“军阀主义”、“政治落后”、“土匪作风”。
These accusations enraged Kuo-tao's army. The two camps descended into a mud-slinging contest, in which Kuo-tao's men had a virtual walkover. The wretched state of the Central Red Army was plain for all to see, and the scorn poured on it clung to the whole of the leadership.
这些帽子激怒了红四方面军，两军开始互相争吵。看着中央红军的状况，红四方面军问：“这样的中央和毛泽东还能领导我们吗？”
“How can such a Centre and Mao Tse-tung lead us?” was the widely voiced sentiment. This resentment was directed against the entire Center, not just Mao, and this was a key factor in throwing the three core leaders—Lo Fu, Chou En-lai and Po Ku—together with Mao, which gave him a majority in the Secretariat of 4 to 1 against Kuo-tao.
The trio felt it was “sink or swim” with Mao as their own officers and soldiers started to vent their outrage as well. There was a flood of complaints about military “incompetence” and indifference to the welfare of the rank-and-file. “They didn't know where they were running … so aimlessly,” officers told Kuo-tao, and “should have let the army rest and recover.” The rank-and-file, in turn, voiced bitter feelings about the way their leaders had abandoned the wounded, and turned ordinary soldiers into “sedan-chair bearers” for the VIPs and their wives.
中央红军的干部、战士也纷纷诉苦。干部指责领导无能，“老是乱跑”，“不知道跑到哪里去”，“应使全军得到休息整理”。战士抱怨“沿途抛弃伤病员，却要抽调战士来做轿夫，抬那些要人们和他们的妻子”。
This charge—that Mao and the other leaders had “sat in sedan chairs” all through the March—was the sorest issue of them all. A Long Marcher told us how angry the ordinary soldiers had felt: the leaders “talked about equality, but they lounged about in litters, like landlords. We talked in whispers …” The soldiers were told that “the leaders have a very hard life. Although they don't walk, nor carry loads, their brains and everything have it much rougher than we do. We only walk and eat, we don't have cares.” Not surprisingly, this low-level sophistry failed to assuage the rank-and-file.
中共领导“坐轿子”是长征中最激起愤怒的事。一位长征老战士在六十多年后说起来还气得胸脯起伏：“他们说是说平等，自己坐担架，地主作风。我们小声悄悄说，不敢说出来。不过还是有少数人大声说。”领导给他们“做工作”：“说中央首长很辛苦，虽然他们不走路，没有背东西，他们的脑筋比我们苦。我们光走路，吃东西，不管事。”这样的强词夺理当然不能服人。
Not having to walk made the difference between life and death. Not a single one of the wounded or the weak with a high enough rank to qualify for the Cadres' Convalescent Company died on the March. Nor did any of the leaders who were carried, even those who were badly wounded. While the elite all survived, sheer exhaustion killed many of their much younger litter-carriers, nurses and bodyguards, who were often in their teens—and some as young as twelve or thirteen. One statistic reveals the stony-hearted hierarchy and privilege under Mao's dominion: the Central Red Army now had almost more officers than soldiers.
“走路不走路”是生死攸关的大事。干部休养连里的受伤的、生病的、年老的高干，没有一个人死，被人抬着走的中央领导没有一个人死，哪怕受重伤的也没有一个人死。相反，比他们年轻得多的担架夫、护士，警卫员、在长征中累死的比比皆是。中央红军如今到了干部多，战士少的地步。
WITH THE CONNIVANCE of his three Party allies, Mao offered Kuo-tao only the token position of deputy chairman of the Military Council, which was now a hollow shell, not even a rubber stamp. Kuo-tao and his subordinates demanded that he must lead the army. Mao responded with a stony silence. During the stand-off, the troops began to run out of food. The two armies, totaling about 90,000 men, were crowded into a Tibetan highland region that was just able to sustain its own population, but whose economy was completely thrown out of kilter by the advent of this huge force. “We were reduced to fighting for food with the local population,” one Red Army officer recalled. Marchers cut down fields of barley, depriving the locals of their livelihood for the coming year. Mao, characteristically, treated this plundering—which probably made the difference between life and death for many thousands—as a joke: “This is our only foreign debt,” he said to his American spokesman Edgar Snow, in a manner that Snow described as “humorous.”
“排座次”的过程中，毛只给了张国焘一个军委副主席的象征性职位。军委那时形同虚设。张国焘不满，他手下的人坚持要求让张统率红军，毛避而不答。双方相持不下，中央调不动红四方面军。九万人的两支大军，挤在贫瘠的藏区高原一隅，开始断粮。当地老百姓不可能支撑这么多外来人口。红军自己说，他们是在“与民争食”。田里未熟的青稞也被大量割去，使藏民来年无粮。毛把这掠夺当作笑话讲，对斯诺说：“这是我们唯一的外债。”斯诺说毛“很幽默”。
The Tibetans, not surprisingly, hated the Reds. Excellent marksmen, they launched guerrilla attacks from the forests. Long March diaries recorded: “There were a lot of corpses along the way, mostly stragglers killed by the barbarians.” “Came across three stragglers (cut down by barbarian cavalry).”
藏民一有机会就钻出树林袭击红军。后来中共出版的长征日记里时有这样的记载：“沿途死尸甚多，大部是掉队被番子所害的。”
In the end, Mao had to let Kuo-tao have the top army job. On 18 July, Kuo-tao was appointed Chief Commissar of the Red Army, “directly commanding all the armies.” But Mao kept control of the Party leadership.
毛考虑来考虑去给张国焘什么职位。张闻天提出把他的党中央第一把手位置给张国焘。毛不同意。他宁愿给张国焘军权，然后用党的名义来指挥张国焘。实力地位固然要紧，但在共产党的世界里，名正言顺还是“党指挥枪”。七月十八日，张国焘被任命为红军总政委，任命说他将“直接统率指挥”“一切军队”。
AT THE BEGINNING of August 1935, a detailed plan was agreed for going north—in order, as Mao put it, to be “close to the Soviet Union, where we can receive help … planes and artillery.” The plan envisaged going first to Gansu, and then sending a unit on to Xinjiang, which was a Soviet satellite, “and building airports and arsenals.” It was during this operation to move north that Mao machinated to scupper Kuo-tao's chances of making contact with the Russians before he himself did.
八月初，中共制定“夏洮战役计划”：全军北上，先到甘肃的夏河、洮河一带，然后向苏联的卫星地区新疆行進，按毛泽东的话说，“地理靠近苏联，政治上物质上能得到帮助，军事上飞机大炮。”“派支队到新疆，造飞机场，造兵工厂。”就是在这个北上的战役行动中，毛泽东捣了个鬼，把张国焘从这条成功之路上甩掉。
The agreed plan involved dividing the army: the main force under Kuo-tao and Zhu De would seize the town of Aba and then go on north, while a smaller force, known as the Right Column, was to take a different route farther east, via Banyou. By Mao's choice, he and the Center went with the Right Column, which contained the bulk of his old troops, under Lin Biao and Peng De-huai, though these now answered to two of Kuo-tao's commanders.
按“夏洮战役计划”，红军分为两支，主力由张国焘和朱德率领出阿坝北上；另一支叫右路军，由张国焘手下大将徐向前、陈昌浩统领，走东边的路经班佑北上。毛自己选择他和中央部随右路军走，中央红军主力林彪、彭德怀部也在右路军里，受徐、陈指挥。
Nine days after Kuo-tao and his force had departed, on 15 August, Mao cabled Kuo-tao in the name of the Politburo, dictating a total change of course: “the main force must go via Banyou,” i.e., follow the same route as the Right Column.
张国焘和他那支部队出发后九天，毛开始搞名堂。八月十五日，他以中央的名义发电报给张国焘，要张不攻阿坝了，改变路线，靠到右路军这边来，“即以主力从班佑向夏河急進”。
Mao was thus tearing up the agreed plan and demanding that Kuo-tao and the many tens of thousands of troops in the other column reverse course and come to him.
毛就这样一手更改了刚刚制定的“夏洮战役计划”， 要张国焘跟他的几万大军骤然改变行程。
Kuo-tao replied on 19 August that he was very near Aba, where there was plenty of food, and that he planned to take the town in a couple of days. He argued hard for sticking to the Aba route, pointing out that there were “three or four parallel roads to the north, with plenty of people and food,” whereas “the road to Banyou is totally unknown.”
张国焘八月十九日回电说他已经在阿坝附近，一两天内即可攻下，那是条阳光大道，“有三四条平行路向阿坝北進，人粮甚多”， 而班佑那条路是个未知数：“至班佑路更不知”。
Mao used his control of the political leadership to put pressure on Kuo-tao. Next day he sent Kuo-tao a resolution in the name of the Politburo, saying that his forces were too far to the west. The route Kuo-tao had taken by a unanimous decision was suddenly described as “extremely disadvantageous,” and Kuo-tao himself was accused of being “opportunist”—for “choosing the road with fewest obstacles.” Using a label like “opportunist” was a way of threatening to condemn him with a political charge.
毛利用他控制的中央给张国焘施加压力。第二天，政治局作出决议说张国焘走得太靠西，本来那条路是大家都同意的，现在成了“机会主义之投降困难，走抵抗最小的道路”，“是不适当的，是极不利的”，“客观上正适合敌人的要求”。
Mao's aim in all this was to keep himself always ahead of Kuo-tao. This would also mean that Kuo-tao and his army would be dragged through calamitous conditions.
毛用如此荒唐的谴责，要叫张国焘改道，是因为他发现张国焘走的路线是一条坦途，完全可能比他早到北边，跟苏联先取得联系。毛决不能让这样的事发生。毛要张国焘跟在他后面走。
By now Mao had discovered that, whilst Kuo-tao's route was plain sailing, his own route, via Banyou (which he had chosen himself), was actually a dire one. It went through the most murderous terrain, a huge swampland that would take at least a week to cross and whose hazards included: no inhabitants—and therefore no food and shelter; an atrocious climate—dark fogs, lashing storms and hail; few trees, so really hard to make a fire; and treacherous, quicksand-like, and often poisonous mud that could swallow a person up with one false step. All this at an altitude of over 3,000 meters, and a night-time temperature below zero even in August.
这时毛也了解到，他本人选择的经班佑的路极其难走，将穿过一片险恶的大草地，走完它要一个星期。草地是积满水的低洼沼泽地，一步不小心，有毒的泥淖会把人整个吸進去。这里杳无人烟，吃住无着。气候恶劣多变，一会儿是瘴气满目，一会儿是冰雹暴雨，而且树木稀少，很难生堆像样的篝火取暖烤衣。八月的夜间温度也在摄氏零度以下。所有这些艰难困苦，外加海拔三千多公尺的高原气候，使过草地如穿地狱。张国焘的主力跟在毛屁股后面将会更惨，因为连野菜也被前面的部队吃光，灌木也被前面的部队烧完。
Instead of trying to conserve the strength of the Red Army, Mao insisted that Kuo-tao must face the same evil conditions—after him. Having fired off his menacing ultimatum, Mao floated into the swamps on his litter, sacrificing a huge pile of books, including the complete set of his favorite Twenty-four Histories, before departing. By the end of the first day, Long March records show that the troops had trudged “with not a single person in sight, crossed 5 rivers, 3 of which had no bridges,” and were “soaked to the skin … sitting huddled in the rain for the night.” Braun has left a vivid description of what most endured:
在把政治局谴责张国焘的决议发给张后，毛坐着担架上了路，走前轻装扔下一堆他最喜欢的《二十四史》。第一天行军后林彪的总结是：“途中无人烟，须过五次河，有三次无桥”，“三百余人全无雨具，通身透湿”，“今晚各部均在雨中拥坐”。
A deceptive green cover hid a black vicious swamp, which sucked in anyone who broke through the thin crust or strayed from the narrow path … We drove native cattle or horses before us which instinctively found the least dangerous way. Grey clouds almost always hung just over the ground. Cold rain fell several times a day, at night it turned to wet snow or sleet. There was not a dwelling, tree, or shrub as far as the eye could see. We slept in squatted positions on the small hills which rose over the moor. Thin blankets, large straw hats, oil-paper umbrellas or, in some cases, stolen capes, were our only protection. Some did not awaken in the morning, victims of cold and exhaustion. And this was the middle of August!… Outbreaks of bloody dysentery and typhus … again won the upper hand.
李德留下了一幅生动的画画：“草地看上去是一张诱人的绿被，但下面是杀机四伏的黑色沼泽。谁要是失脚离开那狭窄的小径而踏上绿地，薄薄的一层便在脚下断裂，人被吸了下去……我们赶着当地的牛马，他们能直觉地找到危险最小的途径。地面上总是挂着灰色的雾，一天总有好几次冷雨纷纷，晚上又变成湿漉漉的雪或冻雨。没有屋子，没有树，眼睛望穿也望不见灌木丛。我们都在小丘似的地面上蹲坐着睡觉。薄薄的毛毯，宽沿的草帽，蜡纸伞，还有个别偷来的披风，这些就是我们唯一的防护。早上总有些醒不来的--寒冷和疲惫的牺牲品。这还是八月中呢！……赤痢、伤寒，又开始了它们的征服……”
Another Long Marcher remembered: “I once saw several men under a blanket and thought they were stragglers. So I tried to rouse them.” The men were dead. There was little to eat: “When a horse died, we ate it: the troops at the front ate the meat, the ones at the back gnawed the bones. When everything ran out, we ate the roots of grass, and chewed leather belts.”
李维汉回忆道：“过草地时，红军没有东西吃，马死了就剥掉皮吃。前面的部队吃马肉，后面的部队啃骨头。实在没有东西吃，就吃草根，嚼皮带。”“我看见一条毯子盖着几个战士，怕他们掉队，就赶快下马，揭开毯子想喊他们起来一起走，仔细一看，四个同志已停止了呼吸。”
Mrs. Lo Fu saw the corpses of friends all the time … On the sixth day, I got dysentery. I couldn't worry about embarrassment and just squatted down and shat all the time. Then I would tie my trousers and rush to catch up. I spent two days like this, and gritted my teeth to get through.
刘英说：好多人支持不住，倒下去，牺牲了。走到第五、六天，每天早晨起来走，周围不断见到同伴的尸体。长征的一路上我没有犯过病，但第六天，也开始泻肚子了。那时也顾不得害羞，随时蹲下来就拉，系好裤带又赶快赶部队。一直拉了两天，我咬着牙挺过来了。
For seven days and nights, it was a world of no human beings. On the eighth day, when I walked out of the swamp and saw villages, people, cattle, and smoke coming out of chimneys, when I saw turnips in the fields, my happiness was beyond words … Those seven days and nights were the hardest time in the Long March. When I arrived in Banyou, I felt as if I had just returned to the human world from the world of death.
在草地走了七天七夜，那完全是一个杳无人烟的世界。第八天，走出了草地，看到了村庄，看见了群众，看到了牛羊和炊烟，看到了田里有大萝卜，真是高兴极了。过草地牺牲最大。这七个昼夜是长征中最艰难的日子。到班佑，我觉得彷佛是从死亡的世界回到了人间。
A night at Banyou, in a hut made of dried yak droppings plastered over wicker, able to dry one's clothes by a bonfire of the all-purpose dung, was the lap of luxury for those who survived. In Lin Biao's corps alone, 400 had died—some 15 percent of its complement.
在只有一二十间屋子的小村落班佑过一夜，住進以犁牛屎为墙，以犁牛屎为屋顶的牛屎房，在犁牛屎作燃料的火堆上烤干衣裳，是不可思议的豪华，只有幸存者才能享受到的豪华。仅林彪的一军团就有四百人死亡，占全军团人数百分之十五。
This was the ordeal that Mao was demanding that Kuo-tao's tens of thousands of troops should go through, instead of marching along proper roads on the route first assigned. Invoking the name of the Politburo, Mao kept piling on the pressure, urging Kuo-tao to “move fast to Banyou.” In one cable written after he had emerged from the swampland and knew full well what it was like, Mao lied through his teeth: “From Maoergai [where he had started] to Banyou, it is short in distance and plentiful in shelter.” He then advised Kuo-tao: “Suggest you … bring all the wounded and sick who can manage to walk, plus the matériel and equipment …” On the surface, this seemed to be telling Kuo-tao: Don't abandon your wounded, but its real intention was to cause maximum suffering.
这就是毛泽东要张国焘的数万大军放弃平坦的大道，转兵前来经历的折磨。以政治局的名义，毛给张国焘打了一封封电报，要他迅速走班佑路。在一封他出草地后发的电报里，毛谎称路不长，可供宿营的处所也多：“毛儿盖通班佑，路短棚多，提议以三至四个团掩护能行之伤病员及资材，从卓克基经毛儿盖缓缓前進”。
If Kuo-tao refused to obey, Mao could get him formally condemned and removed from command. Reluctantly, Kuo-tao agreed to come to Mao, and directed his huge army into the swampland. A couple of days' taste of what lay ahead made him even less keen than before. On 2 September his force reached a river in spate. He cabled Mao: “We have reconnoitred 30 li [15 km] up and down the river, and cannot find anywhere we can ford. Difficult to find bridge-making material. Have food for only 4 days …”
毛要张国焘把伤病员、辎重都统统带上！表面上他说这是使他们“免致抛弃”， 实际上是让张的队伍加倍受苦。毛是以中央的名义下命令，张国焘只好服从，带着数万大军开進草地。一两天后，草地的滋味他就领教够了。九月二日，部队来到一条涨水的河前。他给毛发电报说：“侦察上下三十里，均无徒涉点，架桥材料困难，各部粮食只有四天……现在继续侦察徒涉点，并设法架桥”。
A day later, he decided to go no further. “Have reconnoitred 70 li [35 km] upstream, and still cannot ford or build a bridge,” he told Mao. “There is food for only 3 days for all the units … The swampland looks boundless. Impossible to go forward, and seem to be waiting for our death. Cannot find guide. Sheer misery. Have decided to start back to Aba from tomorrow morning.” He barely hid his fury against Mao: “The whole strategy is affected. Last time … the troops ran out of food and suffered great damage. This time, you force us to move to Banyou, and get us into this …” Kuo-tao turned back.
第二天仍无法过河，他决定不再前進，电告毛：“(甲)上游侦察七十里，亦不能徒涉和架桥。各部粮只能吃三天，二十五师只两天，电台已绝粮。茫茫草地，前進不能，坐待自毙，无向导，结果痛苦如此，决于明晨分三天全部赶回阿坝。(乙)如此，已影响整个战局，上次毛儿盖绝粮，部队受大损；这次又强向班佑進，结果如此，” 张国焘打马回程了。
By now, Kuo-tao and the main body of the army had been shunted around for a month, thanks to Mao. Moreover, in these highlands, murderous weather was setting in. Kuo-tao now made a decision that was just the one Mao had been angling for: to suspend the journey north and stay put until spring the next year. “The window of opportunity to go north has been lost,” he told Mao. Two-thirds of his troops had contracted foot infections and could hardly walk. If they were to embark on the long march north, nearly all the wounded and sick would have to be abandoned.
在这样的周折下，一个月过去了。寒冷的季节在高原来得格外早，张国焘做出了一个毛泽东想要他做的决定：停止北上等待来年春天。他电告毛：北進“时机已失”。他的部队中三分之二的人患了脚病，行走困难，再行军“减员将在半数以上”，而且“阿西以南彩病号尽需抛弃”。
Mao, of course, knew all this; indeed, the whole point of hustling Kuo-tao's army from pillar to post was to reduce it to this state. Mao had now achieved his key objective: he had made sure he would get to the Russians first, knocking Kuo-tao out of the running by penning him up in the south till the following year.
张国焘推迟北上，毛抢先与莫斯科取得联系的意图可以实现了。
ONCE KUO-TAO GAVE the order not to go on north, Mao faced a major problem. Kuo-tao had issued this order as military supremo. Mao could issue orders in the name of the Party, but he was not at all sure that he could take any of the army, even his own troops, with him, if they were allowed a choice. Crisis time came on 8 September when Kuo-tao ordered his two commanders with Mao to bring the Right Column down south to him.
但问题来了：张国焘要毛所在的右路军也停止北進，南下跟他会合。张在九月八日命令右路军指挥徐向前、陈昌浩，率领所有部队南下。
Aware that he lacked prestige among the troops, Mao ducked a straight confrontation. He did not dare challenge Kuo-tao's order openly, even in the name of the Party. Instead, he kidnapped his own troops, using false pretenses. On the night of 9–10 September, he and Lo Fu told a select few an egregious lie—that Kuo-tao had ordered his men to harm the Party leaders; so, Mao said, they must secretly muster their subordinates and decamp that night.* Mrs. Lo Fu remembered being woken up in the middle of the night and told: “ ‘Get up! Get up! Set off at once!' We asked: ‘What happened?' ‘Where are we going?' [and were told]: ‘No questions, just get a move on and go!… No noise, no torches … follow me!' We rushed for about 10 li [5 km] and did not pause to catch our breath until after we crossed a mountain pass.”
徐、陈决定服从张国焘。毛当然不可能南下，但他担心右路军中的中央红军会被带走，于是悄悄用一个谎言拉走了他们。在九月九日到十日的夜晚，他和张闻天对少数几个人说张国焘命令右路军负责人加害中央，因此他们必须连夜把部队带走。*刘英记得她是在半夜被叫醒的。“起来，起来！马上出发！”大家问：“出什么事啦？”“到哪儿去啊！”……[答]说：“不要出声，不打火把，一个跟着一个，跟我走！”一口气急行军十来里路，过了一个山口，才停下来喘口气。”
At the same time as he was abducting his own troops, Mao got one of his top men to extract the 2nd Bureau, which handled radio communications, from HQ, and steal the detailed maps.
同时，毛派他信得过的叶剑英，带走负责通讯联系的二局，把指挥部的军用地图也偷了出来。
* 那天晚上，这个谎撒得很含混，而且是对少数几个人说的。十八个月以后，毛才在较大范围内宣布说张国焘叫他的人“解决”中央。那是一九三七年三月三十日，毛着手清洗张国焘的时候。在那之前，尽管也有中央决议谴责张国焘“分裂红军”，这个指控并不在其中。毛张之间无数的电报也没提这件事。甚至毛在一九三六年六月跟莫斯科恢复电台联系后给莫斯科的谴责张的电报也没提这事。一九三八年四月，毛向莫斯科报告开除张国焘出党，也没提这件事。这一切都证明，张国焘没有下令伤害毛。
On this occasion, Mao had help from a crucial new ally—Peng De-huai. Just over three months before, Peng had challenged Mao for the military leadership, and had been friendly towards Kuo-tao, who had tried to cultivate him. But now Peng sided with Mao. The reason was not only that Mao controlled the Party leadership, but that he had also grabbed pole position for the Russian connection.
在带领中央红军出走上，毛的关键同盟是彭德怀。不久前，彭才反对过毛的指挥：跟张国焘会师后，他也不是对拉拢他的张无动于衷。彭决定跟毛走，原因不仅是毛代表中央，还在于北上意味着打通苏联。彭很清楚，这是唯一的成功之路。
At dawn on 10 September, Kuo-tao's commanders with the Right Column woke up to find Mao and Co. gone, as well as the maps. Moreover, they were told that the rear guard of Mao's escape party had their guns cocked and would open fire on any pursuers. Officers stationed along the route the escapers were taking rang to ask whether they should use force to stop Mao and his band, as it was obvious that they were leaving surreptitiously. Kuo-tao's commanders decided that “Red Army must not shoot Red Army,” so Mao was allowed to get away.
九月十日清晨，徐、陈两位指挥官早上起来，大吃一惊地发现毛等人不见了，中央红军不见了，军用地图也不见了。接着营地外围的部队报告，毛一行人在后面放了警戒哨，端着枪准备向任何追兵开火。部队请示徐陈打不打？他们决定：红军不打红军。毛得以顺利离去。
As Mao and his men went on their way, a propaganda team from Kuo-tao's army appeared and began to wave and shout: “Don't follow Big Nose! Please turn back!” “Big Nose” meant foreigner, in this case Otto Braun. Braun had also been told the lie that Kuo-tao had given an order “to break the resistance of the Central Committee, by force if necessary.” The shouting disclosed for the first time to the rank-and-file that there was a split in the army, and caused great confusion and anxiety. Mao's political department immediately sent staff to urge the soldiers on, in case some took the opportunity to go with Kuo-tao.
队伍走了一阵子，看见红四方面军的宣传队在远处山坡上招手喊话：“同志们！不要跟高鼻子走！赶快回头呀！”高鼻子指李德，他也接到那个谎言，说张国焘下令“在必要时解决中央”。喊话使被偷偷带走的官兵第一次听说他们跟红四方面军分道扬镳了，红军分裂了。惶恐不安的情绪笼罩着部队。政治部立即派人到连队督促士兵们快走，怕动摇的人往回跑。
At this point, Mao had fewer than 8,000 troops, and they were desperately bewildered men, who had not chosen to take his side. Most unusually for him, he now appeared in front of the troops. He did not address them, but just stood in silence by the roadside, watching them go by, counting their strength, trying to gauge their mood. He made sure to have Peng stand beside him, to lend authority. For most, even quite senior officers, this was the only time they got this close to Mao, who preferred to wield power in the shadows.
这时毛手下的部队不到八千。毛站在路边，默默地看着他们走过，计算兵力，观察情绪。他特意让彭德怀站在身旁，以示对他的支持。大多数红军战士，甚至高级军官，都难得离毛这样近。长征以来，这是毛第二次在部队前露面，第一次是在遵义群众大会上。
Mao's next move was to make sure that Chiang Kai-shek gave his contingent no trouble. By now there could be no doubt that Chiang had been letting him through, but would allow only a weakened army to reach its destination. During the Long March, while Mao's force had been given little trouble, Kuo-tao's had had to fight every inch of the way—and the reason was that it was too large and too powerful.
毛的下一步是让蒋介石不给他找麻烦。为此他得设法通知蒋，现在往北去的只是一支被严重削弱的小部队，内含中共中央。果不其然，出走后几个小时，国民党就知道了这些情况，知道有哪些部队跟毛走，知道他们是如何的筋疲力尽。九月十一日，毛出走那天，蒋介石电告毛将通过的甘肃省的省主席：“据报，北窜之匪毛、彭、林等均在内，饥疲不堪”。
It was thus to Mao's advantage for Chiang to know that only a small branch was now going north, and that the CCP leadership was with it. Sure enough, within hours of Mao's splitting, the Nationalists knew both these facts, and exactly which troops had gone with Mao, and how debilitated they were. On 11 September, the day after Mao bolted, Chiang told his governor in the area that he had “received information that Mao, Peng, Lin and their bandits are fleeing north, and they are all totally starved and worn out …”
Kuo-tao seems to have had no doubt that the information was deliberately leaked by Mao, as a cable he sent to Mao and Co. next day read: “The morning after you left, [the enemy] knew straight away that Peng De-huai's unit had fled northward. Please beware of reactionaries … leaking secrets. No matter what differences we have, we must not reveal military movements to our enemy.”
张国焘显然认为这是毛有意透露给国民党的，第二天他给毛等发电报说：“兄等走后，次晨胡[宗南]敌即知彭德怀部北窜，请注意反动[派]乘机告密，党中央无论有何争执，决不可将军事行动泄之于敌。”
This leak ensured Mao a smooth run for himself all the way to his destination—the Yellow Earth Plateau. There in North Shaanxi the only secure base in the whole of China awaited him, courtesy of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao and the core leaders had known about this base before the Long March, and Moscow had told them to expand it as far back as 3 May 1934, well before the March set off.
泄密使毛余下的一千公里一路顺风。只在一个叫腊子口的山隘处有一场小小的遭遇战。虽然参与的人只有十来个，后来被吹嘘成“突破天险腊子口”的大仗。如李德所记：“除了几个放冷枪的以外，这一截没有敌人。”中央军像影子一样跟着他们，在他们南边平行，目的是不让他们折回中国腹心地带。
MAO ENJOYED A helping hand from Chiang, and the next thousand kilometers were virtually obstacle-free, militarily. “Except for native snipers,” Braun recorded, “this stretch was void of enemies.”* Chiang's forces shadowed them, but only to prevent Mao straying back into the heartland of China.
与红四方面军分裂的次日，在甘肃南部的俄界，毛宣布去陕北红区。毛跟中共核心早就知道陕北，莫斯科在长征前的一九三四年五月三日就电告他们要大力发展这块根据地。
This final stretch was a cakewalk compared with before. Instead of snow and hail, and Tibetans sniping from the woods, here in south Gansu the Reds saw golden ears of grain in glorious sunshine, sheep at pasture and farmers tending fields. The locals were friendly, and Mao made an effort to keep them that way. He did not want another reception like the one from the Tibetans, and enjoined “strict discipline.” Muslims made up 60 percent of the population, and the Red Army was forbidden to slaughter or eat pigs, and ordered not to rob any Muslims, even the rich.
甘南沿途是灿烂阳光下的金色谷穗，绿色草原上的柔顺绵羊，农夫荷锄徐行的田园风光。好客的当地人把红军迎進家里。官兵们多少个月来第一次洗到热水澡，刮了胡子理了发，吃着由羊、鸡、大蒜、花椒跟面条烙饼组成的美味佳肴。
The locals allowed the Red Army into their homes, where the men had a hot bath for the first time in months, enjoyed a shave and a haircut, and ate hearty Muslim meals, with pancakes and noodles, mutton and chicken, garlic and pepper. The hospitality, Braun remembered, “astonished me greatly.”
为了不把当地人变成敌人，毛泽东发布了严格的命令，要“严整纪律”、“违者严处”。当地人中六成是回民，红军禁止杀猪吃猪肉，回民中的有钱人也不能当土豪打。
But this friendly atmosphere became the cause of a major headache for Mao, as desertions soared. A Nationalist report showed that while Mao's troops were in one county alone, Minxian, over 1,000 Red Army men gave themselves up. On 2 October Mao ordered the security forces to “collect” stragglers. “Collect” often meant execution. One senior officer (later army chief of staff in Communist China) recalled: “During the march to north Shaanxi, there were continual stragglers. The army political security organization … adopted cruel means of punishment again.” He was scared: “I followed the troops carefully, worried all the time that I might fall behind and be dealt with as a straggler.” “Deal with” was akin to the Mafia's “take care of,” a euphemism for killing. One day, “on the verge of collapse,” he thought he might not make it: “my heart only settled back to its place when I got to quarters at 11 o'clock at night.”
友善的结果是红军大量逃亡。国民党电报说岷县一地就有一千多红军战士自首。毛要政治保卫部门“注意收容落伍人员”。未来中共军队的总参谋长黄克诚回忆道：“在向陕北進军途中，掉队的人一路不断。部队政治保卫机关认为掉队和情绪不振作有关系，怀疑掉队的人会投敌叛变，于是，又采取残酷的惩罚措施。”他本人“小心翼翼地跟着部队行军，生怕掉队而遭到处理”。“处理”是处决的委婉说法。黄又写道：一天行军“走了很远的路才停下来宿营。我虽然疲劳已极，但硬是咬紧牙关挣扎着往前走，直到夜里十一点钟赶到宿营地才安下心来。”
When Mao finally arrived at the Red area in north Shaanxi that was to be his base, his army was down to well below 4,000. In the last—and easiest—month of the journey, he actually lost more than half his remaining men, between deserters, stragglers, and deaths both from illness and at the hands of his own security men. His force was just about the same size as when he had left the outlaw land back in January 1929, seven years earlier. And the troops were in the worst possible shape. One officer recalled:
最后这一个月的旅途是最轻松的，但毛丧失了一半人：逃亡、掉队、死于疾病与政保部门之手。到达陕北吴起镇时，部队只剩下不足四千人了，跟他七年前离开井冈山时数量相当。从外表看更凄惨。一位过来人说他们，在服装上破烂得不成样子。没有鞋袜，很多人用毡子包在脚上，有人还穿草鞋。”吴起镇已经是个很穷的地方了，但是当地人还都觉得中央红军“实在像一群叫花子”。
We were famished and exhausted. Our clothes, in particular, were in shreds. We had no shoes or socks, and many people wrapped their feet with strips of blanket … Wuqi [where they arrived] was already a very poor place, but even the … local comrades kept questioning me: how come you got into such a sorry state? You really looked like nothing but a bunch of beggars.
But Mao was not feeling at all defeated when he set foot in the Red territory on 18 October 1935. “The darkest moment” in his life—as he described the threat from Kuo-tao—was over, and he was the winner. The Red Army might be on its last legs after a trek of some 10,000 km, lasting an entire year, of which four months were extra, thanks to him, but the Party was now, to all intents and purposes, his.
看似对毛更不利的是，张国焘在毛等出走以后，宣布另立中央。然而，一九三五年十月十八日，毛泽东踏上陕北红区的土地时，他的心情远远不是失落沮丧。与张国焘相比，他与苏联的距离是“一步之遥”。莫斯科来人找中共非他莫属。用他后来的话说，他“一生中最困难的日子”以胜利告终。
HIS ENVOY, Chen Yun, had reached Moscow, and delivered his message to the Comintern on 15 October. With Mao the clear winner on the ground, Moscow accepted, for the first time, that he was now the boss of the CCP. In November the Russians published a carefully edited version of Chen Yun's report, proclaiming Mao by name as “the tried and tested political” leader of the Chinese Party. Two weeks later, Pravda published a feature article entitled “The leader of the Chinese people, Mao Tse-tung,” which portrayed Mao in florid, tear-jerking language as an almost Chekhovian invalid struggling heroically against illness and privation.
十一月中旬，一年多来的第一位莫斯科使者到来了。他叫张浩，本名林育英，林彪的堂兄。他穿着羊皮袄化装成货郎，穿过戈壁滩跋涉而至，头脑里装着跟莫斯科联系的通讯密码，那是他经过反覆背诵而刻在脑子里的。张浩还带来一名苏联培训的报务员。不久，跟莫斯科的无线电通讯重新建立起来，控制通讯的是毛。
In mid-November a messenger arrived in North Shaanxi from Moscow, the first direct liaison for well over a year. He had traveled through the Gobi Desert disguised as a trader wearing a sheepskin coat. In his head he carried codes for resuming radio contact with Moscow, and he brought a radio operator with him. Within a matter of months, the radio link with Moscow was restored, and the person who controlled it at the Chinese end was Mao.
张浩带来斯大林的话，红军可以通过外蒙古“接近苏联”接受军援。中共长期追求的战略目标--“打通苏联”--可以开始行动。
The messenger brought Stalin's word that the Chinese Reds should “get close to the Soviet Union” by making for the border with Russia's satellite, Outer Mongolia. The move “to link up with the Soviet Union” could now start.
毛的使者陈云此时已在莫斯科，十月十五日向共产国际作了亲毛的汇报。十一月，苏联出版了经过仔细审改的陈云的报告，称毛为中国共产党“久经考验的政治领袖”。《真理报》发表文章，以天花乱坠的辞藻，把毛描绘成好似契诃夫(Anton Chekhov)笔下的主人公，病体歪歪但意志坚强地奋斗。标题赫然为：“中国人民的领袖：毛泽东”。自中共成立以来，莫斯科首次正式认可毛为中共领袖。
CHIANG KAI-SHEK WAS less successful in achieving his private agenda. On 18 October, the day the Long March ended for Mao, Chiang saw Soviet ambassador Bogomolov for the first time since just before the March had started. Chiang proposed a “secret military treaty” with Russia. This could only be aimed against Japan, which had stepped up its efforts to detach five provinces from northern China by offering them bogus “independence.” The Russian response was that Chiang must first “regulate relations with the CCP.” The Generalissimo's close associate and founder of the Chinese FBI, Chen Li-fu, began secret talks straightaway with Bogomolov and Soviet military attaché Lepin on the nuts and bolts of a deal with the CCP—even referring to “cooperation” with the Reds.
长征结束当天，蒋介石约见苏联大使鲍格莫洛夫。这是长征开始后蒋第一次见鲍大使。蒋提议跟苏联签订一个针对日本的秘密军事同盟。日本这时对中国的侵略又升了级，在华北策动五省“自治独立”。苏联人对蒋说，要订同盟他得先“跟中共调整关系”。蒋介石的亲密助手、“中统”创始人陈立夫随即秘密跟鲍格莫洛夫和武官雷邦谈判与中共打交道的具体问题，用的词是与中共“合作”。
During these talks Chen Li-fu asked Bogomolov for the release of Chiang's son Ching-kuo. Chen told us: “I said to him: We two countries are signing a treaty now, and we are on very good terms. Why do you still detain our leader's son? Why can't you release him?” (Loyally, Chen added that he was acting without telling Chiang—“He would not have wanted me to make this request.” This remark reflects the understanding among the few people in on Chiang's Reds-for-son exchange that the deal must never be attributed to him, or allowed to leak out.)
谈判中，陈立夫向苏联大使要求释放蒋介石的儿子经国。陈立夫对我们说：“我给他讲：我们两国签订协议，弄得很好了，你为什么要扣住我们领袖的儿子呢？为什么不能放他回来呢？”陈立夫补充一句，说他这样做“没得到蒋公的同意”。看来作为蒋介石以“红军换儿子”的知情人，他知道这交易绝对不能说是蒋要办的。
But Stalin still refused to free his hostage. Ching-kuo had by now been separated from his parents for exactly ten years. In March that year, in his heavy machinery plant in the Urals, love had softened the young man's bleak life when he married a Russian technician called Faina Vakhreva. In December they were to have their first child, born into the same captivity that Ching-kuo himself would endure for many more moons, as Mao's fortunes rose, and rose again.
但是斯大林仍然扣住蒋经国不放。经国做人质迄今已有十年。那年三月，在乌拉山的重机器厂中，爱情给这个二十五岁年轻人的黯淡生活带来了一束光明，他跟俄国姑娘、技术员方良(Faina Vakhreva)结了婚。十二月，他们的第一个孩子出世。为了毛和中共，经国的人质生涯还得继续下去。
*At the time, the lie was told in very vague words to only a few people. Mao later embellished it into a vivid story about how Kuo-tao had sent a cable to his men ordering them to “liquidate” him and the Center. And this became the official version. But Mao did not produce this claim until eighteen months later, on 30 March 1937, when he was trying to purge Kuo-tao. Until then, although there had been a Party resolution denouncing Kuo-tao for “splitting the Red Army,” it did not include this charge. Nor was the accusation mentioned in any of the many subsequent telegrams to Kuo-tao from Mao and his armies. Even Mao's cable to Moscow denouncing Kuo-tao as soon as radio links were restored in June 1936 did not have a word about it. All this proves that there was no order from Kuo-tao to harm Mao.
*There was one small skirmish at a pass called Lazikou, on 17 September. Although this involved only a handful of men, it was later blown up into a major battle—and a major victory. The reason for this fabrication was that, for Mao to validate his split from Kuo-tao, he had to show at least one feat of arms in the period after he broke away from him. In fact, Mao was simply let through at Lazikou.