PART THREE BUILDING HIS POWER BASE
15 THE TIMELY DEATH OF MAO'S HOST
15 刘志丹的命运
(1935–36 AGE 41–42)
1935-1936 年 41-42 岁
MAO'S HOME for the next decade was the Yellow Earth Plateau in northwest China, near the Yellow River, the second biggest in China after the Yangtze, and the cradle of Chinese civilization. The base had a population of nearly one million, occupying well over 30,000 sq km, mainly in northern Shaanxi, and straddling the border with Gansu province to the west. Far from the country's heartland, in those days it was the only secure Red territory in the whole of China.
长征后的未来十年里，毛泽东的“家”安在中国西北部的黄土高原上，傍着黄河。这里是望不尽的黄土天地，单调而又悲壮的苍凉。流水切割成的沟壑像满脸皱纹，峡谷像锯齿般裂开，深长几百公尺。住宅多是依山挖進的窑洞。
The landscape was dominated by vast stretches of loess, yellow earth, that looked bleak and barren, broken only by long jagged gorges, often hundreds of meters deep, slicing dramatically through the soft substrate formed with the passage of time by minuscule particles of dust blown in from the nearby Gobi Desert. Most of the dwellings were carved into the yellow hillsides. One could gaze far into the distance and often not see a single soul. Wuqi, the first “town” Mao saw on arrival, had only some thirty residents. This area was unique in being relatively underpopulated, and enjoyed something unheard-of elsewhere in China—arable land to spare. Chiang Kai-shek had picked the locality to keep the Red Army alive, but small.
The founder of the base was a local Communist called Liu Chih-tan, who had an army of 5,000 men—more than Mao. For the local Red sympathizers, Chih-tan was a hero. For the Spanish Catholic bishop of the area, whose brand-new cathedral and other properties were seized by Chih-tan's men in July 1935, he was “daring, and a conspirator in everything that was subversive.”
全国剩下的唯一红区陕北，是刘志丹创立的。毛到达时，刘有五千人马，比毛的还多。在本地同情红军的人眼里，他是个英雄。但当地的西班牙天主教主教，不喜欢他剥夺教堂和富人的财产，称他为“天不怕地不怕的、浑身上下都是反骨的密谋家”。
As Mao approached Chih-tan's base, he pointedly remarked that Chih-tan's leadership “does not seem to be correct,” meaning Chih-tan was politically unsound. And it seems that Mao gave secret orders to the Party bureau whose jurisdiction covered Chih-tan's area (the Northern Bureau) to carry out a purge there. In mid-September Party envoys descended on the base, where they were joined on the 15th by a Red Army unit 3,400 strong which had been driven there from a different part of China. Together, these new arrivals struck out in a savage purge. Although Chih-tan's forces were superior in strength, he offered no resistance either to the takeover or to the purge. When he was recalled from the front, and discovered on the way that he was going to be arrested, he turned himself in.
毛朝刘志丹的根据地出发时，一九三五年九月十二日，对高层说，刘在“领导上不一定正确”。九月中旬，主管根据地的中共北方局奉命前去“肃反”。北方局的人一到就跟刚被蒋介石从南方赶到这里来的红二十五军联起手来，向刘和刘的战友们开刀。红二十五军人数三千四百，不如刘志丹的武装力量强。但刘没有抵抗。当他从前线被召去后方，途中得知是要逮捕他时，他仍自己走進了班房。
The Party envoys condemned Chih-tan for being “consistently right-wing” (newspeak for moderate), and charged him with being an agent of Chiang's who had “created a Red Army base in order to wipe out the Red Army.” His willingness to submit to Party authority, far from being appreciated as an act of loyalty, was twisted against him, and he was accused of being “cunning, in order to deceive the Party into trusting him.” Hideous torture was applied. A colleague of Chih-tan's had his right thigh pierced to the bone by a red-hot wire. Many were buried alive. One survivor wrote in 1992: “We were imprisoned in heavy leg-irons … We heard that the pit to bury us alive had already been dug …” Between 200 and 300 people are estimated to have been killed.
中共大员谴责刘志丹“一贯右倾”，说他是“为消灭红军而创造红军根据地的反革命”。他服从党的行为不但不被赞赏为对党忠诚，反而被歪曲来作罪证，说他明知要被捕，“反而不跑”是狡猾的以此使党对其信任”。监狱里，刘志丹戴着沉重的脚镣，后来长期走路都成问题。酷刑是家常便饭，烧红的铁丝曾捅進他一个战友的大腿直到骨头上。许多人被活埋。幸存者习仲勋后来说，他被关在瓦窑堡的一个监狱里，“埋人的土坑已经挖好，我们随时都有被活埋的危险。”
It was at this moment that Mao arrived—in time to play the benign arbiter. He ordered arrests and executions to be suspended, and released Chih-tan and his comrades at the end of November. The purge against them was ruled to have been “a serious error.” Two scapegoats were reprimanded.
这个时候毛泽东来了-- 来扮演一个英明的仲裁者角色。毛传令停止捕人杀人，十一月底释放了刘志丹等人，肃反被定性为“严重错误”，两个替罪羊受到处分。
Mao thus managed both to sabotage the local Red leadership and to present himself as the man who saved them. This put him in a position to take over their base. Thanks to the purge, Chih-tan and his comrades were already sufficiently intimidated by the time Mao turned up (Chih-tan could barely walk after being heavily shackled), and Mao was able to exclude them from decision-making positions and from key military jobs without prompting major resistance. Chih-tan, the founder of the base, was given a lowly post as commander of a detachment titled “the 28th Army,” which was really just a bunch of new recruits, onto whom Mao foisted a trusted man of his own as commissar, and therefore Chih-tan's boss. Chih-tan did not demur; he endorsed Mao's authority publicly, and asked his comrades who had been victimized to put the interests of the revolution before their personal sufferings.
毛成了救命恩人，这使他接管陕北根据地时，处在一个再理想不过的地位。那场血腥的肃反使刘志丹和他的战友们大受损害，无职无权，毛得以轻而易举地把他们排斥在领导圈之外。刘志丹作为根据地的创始人，只分给很低级的职务：做由一帮新兵组成的红二十八军军长。毛派亲信做政委，以掌握刘。刘志丹没有怨言，他公开表态支持毛的权威，还要受害的战友们也都听中央的。
Mao did not want to be seen to be purging Chih-tan, as he meant to exploit his name to lend legitimacy and prestige to his own rule. But nor did he intend to retain him—because he was a local. Mao was going to be involved in extorting food, money, soldiers and laborers out of the population, as the CCP had done in other bases before; and, as in the case of virtually all other Red bases, he knew that these policies were sure to meet resistance from local leaders, who might well lead a popular uprising against the Party. Mao had a different method for dealing with Chih-tan from those he used against other potential threats.
毛不想把刘志丹作为敌人消灭，他想借助刘的巨大声望来统治。毛也不想留着刘志丹。刘是本地领袖。毛知道中共迟早要从本地人身上挤榨粮食、金钱、士兵和劳工，这类政策必将引起本地人的反抗，土生土长的干部因为与当地有千丝万缕的联系，容易成为这些反抗的带头人。毛要除掉刘志丹，不过办法跟解决过去根据地里的当地领导人不同。
AS SOON AS he settled down, Mao went ahead with his project of trying to open a passage to a Russian-controlled border where he could pick up supplies, and especially arms. His plan involved crossing the Yellow River into the much richer province of Shanxi to the east, to acquire new manpower and provisions, even possibly to build a base, before turning north towards Russian-controlled Outer Mongolia.
在陕北安顿下来不久，毛着手实行打通苏联、接收军火的战略方针。毛的计划是东渡黄河，到富裕的山西省去，在那里招兵筹款，如有可能建立根据地，再向北去苏联卫星国外蒙古边界。
The expedition began in February 1936.* It garnered some spoils and recruits, but was rapidly driven back west of the Yellow River by Chiang's troops, without getting anywhere near the Mongolian border. During this brief operation Chih-tan met his death, at the age of thirty-three. According to history books, he died in combat, but the overwhelming evidence points to murder.
东征于一九三六年二月开始。就像长征一样，中共宣传说东征是去打日本。其实一个日本人也没打，连日本人的边也没沾。毛招了些兵，掠夺了些财物，但不等靠近外蒙古，就被蒋介石的军队赶回了黄河以西。在这场短短的征途中，刘志丹死去，年仅三十三岁。中共说他死在战场上，但他死的前后一切细节都说明他是被谋杀的。
Chih-tan was shot on 14 April 1936, at a place called Sanjiao, a ferry town on the Yellow River. The official account claimed that an enemy machine-gun that had engaged an advancing Red Army unit put a round in his heart. Chih-tan was not with the assaulting unit, nor caught in cross-fire. He was about 200 meters away, up a small hill from which he was observing through a telescope. The machine-gun that reportedly killed him was firing in a totally different direction, and if the official story is to be believed, it suddenly swiveled round and loosed a single burst that miraculously hit Chih-tan in the heart—at 200 meters. This machine-gun seems to have had a sniper's accuracy.
死的那天是四月十四日，在黄河渡口三交。中共说一挺敌人的机关枪，在扫射進攻的红军时，打中了他的心脏。但刘志丹并没有在進攻的红军行列里，也没有在两军的交叉火力线上，他在两百公尺外的一座小山上用望远镜观战。如果打死他的真是一挺机关枪，那挺机关枪也太神奇了：它本来在朝一个完全相反的方向射击，突然一下子转了个大弯，就那么一颗子弹，从两百公尺外准准地射在刘志丹的心脏上，精确度真能使神枪狙击手汗颜。
Only two people were with Chih-tan when he was hit. One was the Political Security man in his unit, whose name was Pei, a star of the Chinese KGB. On the Long March, he had been given the crucial job of watching over the porters carrying the assets of the regime's bank. The other man present was a bodyguard. After Chih-tan was shot, Pei sent the bodyguard to “fetch a doctor,” according to his own account, leaving himself the only man around when Chih-tan “completely stopped breathing.” There seems little doubt that Chih-tan was killed by Pei.
刘志丹中弹时，有两个人在身旁，一个是政治保卫局的特派员，姓裴，长征时他负责看守红军的金银财宝。另一个是刘的警卫员。根据裴自己的描述，刘志丹中弹后，他叫警卫员去找医生，“当医生来到时，他[刘]已完全停止了呼吸”。也就是说，刘志丹死时，身边只有裴一个人。这样的死法太使人怀疑刘志丹是被裴或警卫员暗杀的。暗杀是政治保卫局工作的重要部分，给“不可靠”的“首长”派的警卫员通常也是政保部门的人。前红七军军长李明瑞就是在被怀疑企图率兵逃走时，被警卫员打死的。红军将领龚楚在计划逃亡时，最担心的也是身边的警卫员。
The sequence of events surrounding Chih-tan's death strongly suggests that it was choreographed by Mao. A week before, Mao cabled Chih-tan that the 28th Army unit, “from now on comes directly under this HQ.” There was no discernible reason for this order—except, of course, that this way whatever happened to Chih-tan from then on would not be reported through the normal chain of command, but directly to Mao. Two days after that, Mao appointed Chih-tan to the Military Council, from which he had previously been excluded. This amounted to Chih-tan's elevation to a major military position. If he died now, he would have the status of a hero and his men would be kept happy. Finally, on the 13th, it was Mao himself who ordered Chih-tan to go to Sanjiao, where he was killed the very next day.
刘志丹死前的一系列事件显示要他死是毛泽东的意思。死前八天，毛下令：“二十八军以后直属于本部指挥”。这意味着，刘志丹一旦死亡，向上面报告就是直接对毛。两天以后，毛任命刘志丹为他迄今一直被排斥在外的“军事委员会”委员。这等于刘获得全面平反，進入军事决策机构。这样刘死后会被当作英雄对待，他手下的人不会愤怒造反。最后，十三日那天，是毛亲自下令刘志丹去三交的，去的第二天刘就被打死了。
When Chih-tan was buried, his widow was kept away from the interment. “You are not well,” Chou En-lai told her, “and seeing him will make you sadder.” This was an order. Seven years were to pass before she was allowed to have him exhumed, by which time the corpse had decomposed. The coffin was opened, at her request, when Chih-tan was given a public burial in a special shrine. Mao wrote an inscription, calling Chih-tan's death “a surprise.” This was at a time when Mao particularly needed to ensure that there would not be any trouble in the base, and he was using the dead Chih-tan to lend himself authority.
刘志丹下葬的时候没让他的遗孀看遗体。她回忆说：“我要开棺看他一眼，周恩来副主席劝说道：“刘嫂子，你身体不好，见了更难过。”所以没看到。”七年以后终于让她开棺看了，但那时遗体已经腐烂。那一年毛泽东整饬在延安的中共干部，特别需要根据地的稳定，需要利用刘志丹的名字。他为刘志丹举行隆重公葬仪式，把保安县改名为志丹县，毛亲笔题词，说刘志丹的“英勇牺牲，出于意外”。
Chih-tan was the only top leader of a Red base ever to die at the front. In addition, his former left- and right-hand commanders both fell dead in quick succession within weeks of him being killed—Yang Qi in March, and Yang Sen at the beginning of May. Within a few months of Mao arriving, all three top Shaanxi commanders were killed—a fate that befell none of the commanders from any other Red Army unit.
在中共史上，刘志丹是唯一一个死在前线的根据地最高领袖。不仅他，他在陕北的左右手都在他死的几个星期内先后被打死：杨琪死于三月，杨森死于五月初。也就是说，毛到陕北几个月内，当地的三个红军最高指挥官都“死在战场”。这样的命运在红军里绝无仅有。
With the deaths of Chih-tan and these two top colleagues, any serious potential danger of rebellion against Mao's rule over the base was removed. Thereafter, although there were small-scale revolts among the locals, there was no uprising big enough to threaten Mao's regime.
这三个人死了，潜在的对毛造反的本地领袖不复存在。后来，虽然陕北人有过一些小规模反抗，但都不足以威胁中共政权。毛泽东于是安全地在陕北住了十一年。
*As with the Long March, the Reds pretended that the goal was to fight the Japanese, and called it the “Anti-Japanese Vanguard,” with slogans like “Going east to fight Japan.” But this was pure propaganda. Mao's force did not even try to get near the Japanese.