17 A NATIONAL PLAYER
17 西安事变之未：毛泽东杀蒋不成
(1936 AGE 42–43)
1936 年 42 岁
WHEN THE NEWS reached Party HQ that Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped, jubilant leaders crowded into Mao's cave. Mao was “laughing like mad,” a colleague recalled. Now that Chiang was caught, Mao had one paramount goal: to see him dead. If Chiang was killed, there would be a power vacuum—and therefore a good opportunity for Russia to intervene and help to bring the CCP, and himself, to power.
捉蒋的消息传来，中共领导人群聚在毛的窑洞，大家一片欢腾。毛大声狂笑。笑完后他一心一意要做一件事：除掉蒋介石。蒋一旦死去，中国就会出现权力真空，那就是莫斯科插手的绝好机会。
In his first cables to Moscow after the event, Mao implored the Russians to get seriously involved. Choosing his words with care, he solicited their consent to killing Chiang, saying that the CCP wanted to “demand that Nanjing sack Chiang Kai-shek and deliver him to the people for trial.” This was a euphemistic expression, unmistakably implying a death sentence. Knowing that his own goals were different from Stalin's, Mao pretended not to have heard about the kidnapping until after it had happened, and promised that the CCP “would not issue public statements for a few days.”
在他给共产国际的首批电报中，毛恳求莫斯科卷入：“请你们赞助我们”，“用大力援助中国”。他拐弯抹角地请莫斯科准他杀蒋，问可不可以“要求南京罢免蒋介石，交人民审判”。在共产党的辞典里，这就等于判死刑。毛很清楚他的目标跟斯大林有矛盾，所以装作他也是在捉蒋之后刚听说，向莫斯科保证中共“在数日内不发表公开宣言”。
Meanwhile, he was maneuvering busily behind Moscow's back to get Chiang killed. In his first cable to the Young Marshal after the kidnapping, on 12 December, Mao urged: “The best option is to kill [Chiang].” Mao tried to dispatch his ace diplomat, Chou En-lai, to Xian at once. Chou had negotiated with the Young Marshal earlier in the year, and they seemed to have hit it off. Mao wanted Chou to persuade the Young Marshal “to carry out the final measure” (in Chou's words), i.e., to kill Chiang.
背着莫斯科，毛想方设法地要张学良杀蒋。十二月十二日捉蒋后他立刻给少帅发电报说，对蒋“紧急时诛之为上”。同时他派在外交方面初露才华的周恩来去西安。周曾跟张学良谈判过，两人似乎一见如故。派周去的目的是说服张学良杀蒋，用周到西安后给毛的第一封电报中的话，就是对蒋“行最后手段”。
Without spelling out the real purpose of Chou's mission, Mao solicited an invitation for Chou from the Young Marshal. At the time, the Reds' HQ was several days' ride on horseback from Xian, at Baoan, nearly 300 km to the north; so Mao asked the Young Marshal to send a plane to collect Chou at the nearby city of Yenan (then held by the Young Marshal), where there was an airstrip which Standard Oil had built when it was prospecting in the area earlier in the century. To encourage the Young Marshal to act quickly, Mao made him a spurious promise on the 13th: “We have made arrangements with the Comintern, the details of which we will tell you later.” The clear implication was that Chou would be bringing news of a plan coordinated with Moscow.
中共总部保安离西安三百公里，骑马要几天，毛请张学良派飞机到附近的延安接周恩来。延安这时在张学良手中，有一个飞机场。为了鼓动少帅尽快派飞机，十三日，毛暗示周恩来会带去莫斯科支持他的话：“国际方面弟等已有所布置，详容后告。”
What the Young Marshal needed was not off-the-record promises relayed by the CCP, but Russia's public endorsement. Yet on the 14th, front-page articles in the two main Soviet papers, Pravda and Izvestia, strongly condemned his action as helping the Japanese, and unambiguously endorsed Chiang. Two days into the kidnapping, the Young Marshal could see that the game was up.
但张学良这时需要的不是中共私下传话，而是莫斯科的公开支持。十四日，苏联的两大主要报纸《真理报》、《消息报》 (Izvestia)都在头版刊登文章，强烈谴责他，说他的政变是为日本服务，并且毫不含糊地支持蒋介石。劫持蒋两天之内，张学良就明白莫斯科欺骗了他，中共不守信用，他赌输了，他完了。 这一击沉重非常。
He turned a deaf ear to Mao's suggestion to send Chou. But Mao dispatched Chou anyway, telling the Young Marshal on the 15th that Chou was coming, and asking for a plane to pick him up in Yenan.
少帅拒绝邀请周恩来，对毛要周去西安、请他派飞机接周的若干电报，一概置之不理。毛只得在十五日径直派了周去，一面电告少帅：“恩来本晨出发，明十六日晚到肤施[延安]。请派飞机于十六日上午到肤施机场视察，见有“天下”二字即降下接周。”
When Chou reached Yenan, there was no plane, and the city gate was closed to him; he had to wait all night outside the walls, in sub-zero temperatures. “The guards refused to open the gate and refused to listen to reason,” Mao wired the Young Marshal, exhorting him to do something. The Young Marshal was literally freezing Chou out, an indication of how bitter he felt about the Reds misleading him over Moscow's attitude.
周到达延安时，不但没有飞机接他，连城门都关得死死的，他只好在严冬的城外过了一夜。这是张学良把他的一肚子火都发泄在周恩来身上。毛十七日不得不两次打电报给张学良：“恩来昨到肤施城外，肤施民团守城不开，交涉不听。”“恩来在肤施城外等候，请速饬肤施民团让出该城。”
On the 17th he relented. He was looking for a way to end the fiasco, so he sent his Boeing to fetch Chou. His American pilot, Royal Leonard, was shocked to find he was carrying Reds (who had only recently been peppering his plane). En route back that snowy afternoon, he played a trick on his passengers. “I deliberately picked rough air,” he wrote in his memoirs. “Occasionally, I peeked back into the cabin and enjoyed watching the Communists … holding their black beards aside with one hand and vomiting into a can held in the other.”
这天的张学良已冷静下来打定了主意--放蒋。为此他需要中共的合作。中共之所以能起作用，是因为少帅周围一大群关键人物在中共掌握之下，没有他们的认可就放不了蒋，秘密离开会有生命危险。
少帅派利奥纳多驾飞机下午去接周。天下着雪，利奥纳多一看他接的是共产党人，傻了眼，不久前他的飞机还挨了他们的枪弹。他决定捉弄他们：“我有意专挑颠簸的气流飞。不时地，我转过头去看机舱里的那些共产党人，看到他们一手揪开黑长胡子，一手端着个罐子发吐，我心里直乐。”
The Young Marshal accepted Chou through gritted teeth, though he presented an amicable façade and played along with his guest.* When Chou urged him to kill the Generalissimo, he pretended he would do so “when civil war is unavoidable and Xian is besieged” by government forces.
张学良表面上好像一点事也没有，还跟周挺热络，顺着周说话。当周劝他杀蒋时，他也装作同意。周向毛报告说：“张同意在内战阶段不可避免围攻西安前行最后手段。”
Mao had in fact been trying to provoke a war between Nanjing and Xian. He hoped to trigger this off by moving Red troops towards Nanjing. On the 15th he secretly ordered his top commanders to “strike at the enemy's head: the Nanjing government …” But he had to scrap the plan, as it would have been suicidal for the Red Army, and there was no guarantee it would set off a Nanjing–Xian war. To his delight, on the 16th Nanjing declared war on the Young Marshal, moving armies towards Xian and bombing the Young Marshal's troops outside the city. Mao urged the Young Marshal not just to fight back, but to broaden the fighting into a major war by striking out towards Nanjing. The following day, Mao cabled him, saying: “The enemy's jugulars are Nanjing and [two key railway lines]. If 20 to 30 thousand … troops can be dispatched to strike these railway lines … the overall situation will change at once. Please do consider this.” Mao's hope was that by taking such action, the Young Marshal would burn his bridges with Nanjing and thus be more likely to kill Chiang.
为了使这样一个前提成为事实，毛希望挑起南京与西安的内战。他设想派红军向南京方向出击，十五日，曾秘密要他的军事指挥宫“迂回并击破敌头脑之南京政府”。但他不得不放弃这一打算，因为此举对红军来说无异于以卵击石，也没有把握能否挑起内战。十六日，南京对张学良宣战，派兵朝西安方向前進，还轰炸了西安城郊。这正中毛的下怀。他竭力劝张学良反击，打到南京去：“敌之要害在南京与京汉、陇海线，若以二、三万人之战略迂回部队突击京汉、陇海取得决定胜利，则大局立起变化，此点祈考虑。”毛盼着大战会断了张学良的后路，使他不得不杀蒋。
WHILE MAO WAS maneuvering to have Chiang killed, Stalin put his foot down to save the Generalissimo. On 13 December, the day after Chiang was seized, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Nanjing was summoned by acting prime minister H. H. Kung (Chiang's brother-in-law) to be told that “word was around” that the CCP was involved in the coup, and that “if Mr. Chiang's safety was endangered, the anger of the nation would extend from the CCP to the Soviet Union and could put pressure on [the Chinese government] to join with Japan against the Soviet Union.” Stalin understood that the kidnapping might pose an urgent threat to his strategic interests.
就在毛积极运动杀蒋之际，斯大林决心要救蒋。十二月十三日，蒋被捉的第二天，行政院长孔祥熙在南京召见苏联代办，对他说：“西安之事，外传与共党有关，如蒋公安全发生危险，则全国之愤恨，将由中共而推及苏联，将迫我与日本共同抗苏。” 斯大林着急了。
At midnight on the 14th, the phone rang in the office of Comintern chief Dimitrov. Stalin was on the line. “Was it with your permission that the events in China took place?” he asked. Dimitrov hastily answered: “No! That would be the greatest service anyone could possibly render Japan. Our position on these events is the same.” Using ominous language, Stalin went on to question the role of the CCP's delegate at the Comintern, who had submitted to Stalin the draft of a cable to be sent to the CCP in favor of executing Chiang: “Who is this Wang Ming of yours? Is he a provocateur? I hear he wanted to send a telegram to have Chiang killed.”
十四日午夜，共产国际总书记季米特洛夫的电话响了，是斯大林打来的。斯大林问：“中国发生的事是不是你决定的？”季米特洛夫赶紧答道：“不是！那是给日本帮最大的忙。我们的政策还是既定政策。”斯大林接着提起中共驻共产国际代表王明呈交给他的一份准备发往中共的电报草稿，赞成杀蒋。斯大林阴沉地说：“这个王明是什么人？他是不是个搞破坏的？听说他想发电报去支持杀蒋。”
At the time, Dimitrov's Chinese assistant recalled, “you could not find anyone” at Comintern HQ who did not think that “Chiang must be finished off.” Even Stalin's top man at the Comintern, the normally cool Manuilsky, “rubbed his hands, embraced me, and exclaimed: ‘Our dear friend has been caught, aha!' ”
当时在共产国际机关里，没有不想杀蒋的，甚至斯大林的亲信、通常冷冰冰的曼努伊尔斯基也搓着手，激动地拥抱季米特洛夫的助手说：“我们的亲爱的朋友给抓起来了，哈哈！”
Wang Ming pleaded that the draft cable had been suggested by the deputy head of the GRU, Artur Artuzov. Artuzov was soon arrested and accused of being a spy. Before he was shot, he protested his innocence in a letter written in his own blood, which, his jailer noted icily, had come “from his nose.” Stalin spared Wang Ming. And Dimitrov scrambled to clear himself and lay the blame on Mao. He wrote to Stalin: “in spite of our warnings, the … Chinese Party in fact entered into very close, friendly relations with [the Young Marshal].” More damningly, Dimitrov told Stalin: “it is hard to imagine [the Young Marshal] would have undertaken his adventurist action without coordination with them [Mao and his colleagues] or even without their participation.” This was clearly suggesting that Mao was lying about having no prior knowledge of the event, and that Mao had flouted Moscow's orders.
王明分辩说，那份电报草稿是根据前苏军情报局负责外国行动的阿图佐夫(Artur Artuzov)的建议写的。阿图佐夫被抓起来枪毙了。枪毙前他写了封血书申辩自己无辜，看管他的人冷冷地加上一句说：血“是鼻血”。斯大林放过了王明。季米特洛夫把一切责任都推到毛泽东身上，给斯大林写信说：“我们是一再警告了中共，可中共还是跟张学良建立了非常亲密的朋友关系。”“很难想像张学良干这样铤而走险的事没有跟他们协调，他们很可能甚至参与其事。”这些话等于说毛称他事先不知情的电报都是假话，毛公然无视莫斯科的命令。
Stalin was suspicious that Mao might be in cahoots with the Japanese. Stalin had already begun to have almost all the Soviet “old China hands” denounced and interrogated under torture. Four days after Chiang was kidnapped, a leading detainee “confessed” to being involved in a Trotskyist plot to provoke an attack by Japan (and Germany) on Russia. Mao's own name soon surfaced in confessions, and a hefty dossier on him was compiled, with accusations that he was an agent of the Japanese, as well as a Trotskyist.
大概就在这时候，斯大林开始怀疑毛泽东跟日本人有什么瓜葛。斯大林已经在怀疑、拷问几乎所有的苏联“中国通”。捉蒋四天之后，在押的一个人“供出”他被卷入托洛茨基派的阴谋，要挑起日本(跟德国)打苏联。毛的名字在他的口供里。毛被整了一大堆“黑材料”，随时可能用来指控他是日本奸细，外加“托派”。
Dimitrov sent a stern message to Mao on the 16th. It condemned the kidnapping, saying that it “can objectively only damage the anti-Japanese united front and help Japan's aggression against China.” Its key point was that “the CCP must take a decisive stand in favour of a peaceful resolution.” This was an order to secure the release and reinstatement of the Generalissimo.
季米特洛夫在十六日给毛拍了封措辞严厉的电报，谴责捉蒋，说这一行动“客观上只会有害于抗日统一战线，助长日本对中国的侵略”。电报重点是：“中共必须坚决采取以和平方式解决事端的立场”。这就是命令中共帮助释放蒋介石，恢复蒋的全国领袖地位。
WHEN THE CABLE arrived, Mao reportedly “flew into a rage … swore and stamped his feet.” His next move was to pretend that the message had never reached him. He kept it secret from his Politburo, from the Young Marshal, and also from Chou En-lai, who was en route to Xian to try to persuade the Young Marshal to kill Chiang.* Mao went on maneuvering for Chiang to be killed.
收到这封电报后，据宋庆龄说，毛“大发雷霆，跺脚咒骂”。他对付的办法是装作没收到莫斯科来电，对张学良和中共政治局都秘而不宣--连周恩来也没通报，因为周此时正在去西安劝张学良杀蒋的路上。* 毛继续努力要除掉蒋。 * 毛后来称莫斯科十六日的电报“勤务组弄错了，完全译不出”，称他十八日要求莫斯科重发。这不可能是事实。中共核心的收发报员告诉我们，电报译不出会马上要求莫斯科重发，不可能等两天。更何况在这样关键的时刻。毛十九日还对政治局说：“国际指示还未到。”
This was a high-risk tactic vis-à-vis Moscow. Mao was not simply withholding from the Kremlin the fact that he had encouraged the kidnap plot, he was also suppressing—and defying—a direct order from Stalin. But for Mao, the vistas opened up by the elimination of Chiang outweighed the risks.
毛在跟莫斯科作危险的对抗。但对毛来说，除掉蒋以后给他开辟的天地值得冒这个风险。
But the Generalissimo was not about to disappear off the map. Once the Young Marshal knew he had no Moscow backing, which was immediately after the kidnap, he decided to keep Chiang safe. Mao had proved worthless. In spite of all its posturing in private communications, the CCP kept a public silence for three long days after the kidnapping, voicing no support for the Young Marshal. Its first official statement did not emerge till the 15th. It made no mention of backing the Young Marshal to be head of China, as Mao had specifically offered earlier. Instead, it recognized the authority of Nanjing.
The Young Marshal's only option was to stick with Chiang. That meant he had to set Chiang free. Moreover, he realized that the only way he himself could survive was to leave Xian with Chiang and place himself in Chiang's hands. There were many in Nanjing who wanted him dead and who were sure to send assassins after him. Chiang's custody was the only place where he could be safe. And by escorting Chiang out of captivity he could also hope to win the Generalissimo's goodwill. His gamble that Chiang would not kill him turned out to be a good bet. After house arrest under Chiang and his successors for over half a century, when he was both detained and protected, he was released, and died in his bed in Hawaii, aged 100, in 2001, having outlived Chiang and Mao by over a quarter of a century.
其实，一旦知道没有莫斯科作后台，张学良立即决定他不能杀蒋，必须把蒋介石保护起来：他还得当蒋介石的人。他不可能再信任中共。他只有一条路，就是放蒋，而且跟蒋一块儿走，做蒋的阶下囚。这是他生存的唯一希望。否则他定会死在许多因他捉蒋而痛恨他的人手上。送蒋回去会得到蒋的好感，使蒋宽恕他。这又是一场赌博，这回他赌对了。蒋跟蒋的继承人软禁带保护了他半个多世纪，最后他获准离开了台湾，二00一年以百岁高龄在夏威夷寿终正寝。
On 14 December, the day Moscow publicly condemned the coup, the Young Marshal went to see Chiang, and stood in front of him in silence, weeping. Chiang registered that his captor showed “considerable remorse.” Later that day the Young Marshal told Chiang he realized that the kidnap was “a foolish and ill-considered action” and wanted to release him, secretly. Chiang gave him active cooperation by making sure Nanjing did not rock the boat. When Nanjing declared war on the Young Marshal on the 16th, Chiang got a message out at once telling Nanjing to hold its fire. Nanjing suspended military operations, and sent Chiang's brother-in-law T. V. Soong (known as T.V.) “as a private citizen” to negotiate a deal, as Chiang himself could not be seen to be negotiating with his captors. T.V. arrived in Xian on the 20th, followed two days later by Mme Chiang.
十二月十四日，莫斯科谴责他政变的消息公开以后，张学良去见蒋介石，站在那里对着蒋默默地流眼泪，使蒋觉得他“若甚愧悔”。他半晌“无言自去”，以后又回来，对蒋说他已经体会到他的行为“轻率鲁莽”，他要“设法秘密送委员长回京”。蒋介石也很合作，南京政府十六日对西安宣战后，蒋马上派人带信出去，命令南京“万不可冲突，并即停止轰炸”。南京照办了。蒋介石明白，要获得自由，做样子的谈判是免不了的。他自己不便谈，南京表面上也做出决不同劫持者妥协的样子，但南京派蒋介石的妻兄宋子文以私人身分来西安交涉。宋二十日到达西安，蒋夫人宋美龄两天后也来了。
On the 20th, Moscow repeated its cable to the CCP, which Mao had been suppressing, ordering a “peaceful resolution.” Now, Mao had to forward the cable to Chou En-lai, with instructions to help “restore Chiang Kai-shek's freedom.”
二十日，莫斯科把它发给毛的和平解决西安事变的电报又发了一遍。毛无法再装作没收到任何电报了，只得把电报转给周恩来，要他帮助“恢复蒋介石之自由”。
MAO THUS BROUGHT his goals back into alignment with Stalin's. The CCP demanded that Chiang promise to “stop the policy of ‘exterminating Communists.' ” It also insisted that Chiang meet Chou, who was right there in Xian. For Chou to talk to Chiang would accord the CCP the status of a major player in national politics, an act whose modern-day equivalent would be for the top man in some notorious terrorist group suddenly to be received by the US president.
毛的目标此时与斯大林同调了。他们要蒋“停止“剿共”政策”，并且坚持要蒋见周恩来。蒋见周不是一件小事，等于政府承认中共是中国的一支政治力量，而不是必须剿灭的土匪。
At a talk on the 23rd between T. V. Soong, the Young Marshal and Chou, T.V. said he personally agreed to what Chou asked, and would convey the CCP's demands to the Generalissimo. But Chiang refused to talk to Chou directly, even though he was told he would not be released unless he saw Chou. The talks deadlocked.
二十三日，周恩来跟宋子文、张学良会谈。宋子文说中共的条件他个人没什么意见，他会向蒋介石转达。但是蒋介石拒绝见周。少帅非常焦急，蒋不见周，他们就走不了。蒋依然坚决拒绝。
Moscow knew what would get the Generalissimo to see Chou. Chiang's most recent signal to Moscow had been just before the kidnap, in November, when the Chinese Red Army had its back to the wall after failing to reach the Russian arms supplies. On that occasion, Chiang's ambassador in Moscow had asked for the return of Chiang's son, Ching-kuo, and Moscow had said “No.” Now it was ready to respond. Late on 24 December the former Party leader, Po Ku, arrived in Xian, bearing special news. This piece of news got Chou into Chiang's bedroom on Christmas Day. Chou told Chiang that his son Ching-kuo “would return.” It was only after receiving this promise from Stalin that Chiang agreed to the Reds' demands, and invited Chou “to come to Nanjing for direct negotiations.” From this moment on, the CCP stopped being officially regarded as bandits, and was treated as a proper political party.
莫斯科知道用什么作诱饵能让蒋见周。十二月二十四日圣诞节前夜，博古到了西安，带来莫斯科的话。圣诞那天，就是这句话使周恩来得以走進蒋介石的卧室。这句话是：莫斯科将释放蒋经国。正是得知了斯大林这一承诺，蒋才同意了中共的条件，要周在他回南京后“直接去谈判” 。
The Chiang–Chou meeting in Xian was brief, but it wrapped up the Reds-for-son deal that Chiang had been working on for years. This marked the end of the civil war between the CCP and the Nationalists.
蒋、周的西安会晤是简短的，但“以中共换儿子”的交易，就此达成协议。国共内战结束了。
THAT AFTERNOON the Chiangs left Xian. So did the Young Marshal, flying voluntarily into house arrest.* Chiang was at the peak of his popularity. When his car drove into Nanjing, spontaneous crowds lined the streets to hail him. Fireworks crackled all night long. People who experienced those days say that Chiang's prestige shone like the midday sun. Yet his triumph was short-lived, and the deal that regained his son rebounded against him. His calculation that he could contain Mao and outsmart Stalin was wishful thinking. Mao was uncontainable—and the small CCP had just been promoted to a major “opposition party.”
当天下午，蒋介石夫妇离开了西安。张学良跟他们同行，自愿飞去做阶下囚。蒋介石经过这一番磨难，声望如日中天。汽车开進南京时，民众报以热烈的夹道欢迎，鞭炮声响了一夜。他似乎是个赢家。但是输的前兆已经隐约可见。蒋一厢情愿地以为可以阻止毛的发展，他没料到，毛泽东是阻止不了的，斯大林是算不过的--小小的中共刚刚才被他本人提携成了主要在野党。
*The Young Marshal's bitterness against Moscow and the CCP flared briefly during our otherwise very friendly meeting with him fifty-six years later. When we asked him whether the Chinese Communists had told him about the real Soviet attitude towards him before the coup, he snapped back with sudden hostility: “Of course not. You ask a very strange question.”
*Mao later tried to claim that the Comintern's cable of 16 December “was garbled, and could not be decoded,” and that the CCP asked Moscow, on the 18th, to retransmit it. This has to be a fabrication. Radio operators at the core of CCP operations told us that the standard procedure was that if a cable was illegible, they would instantly ask Moscow to retransmit and would definitely not wait for two days—least of all at a time of crisis. Mao told his Politburo on the 19th: “Comintern instructions have not arrived.”
*Since then, he has become one of the biggest legends in Chinese history, the subject of endless books and articles, and both admired and denounced. But even his adversaries hardly mention his machinations with the Russians, or that these were the result of personal ambition. To the end of his long life he claimed that the kidnapping was inspired by “pure motives.” To us in 1993, he said: “Mme Chiang understood me well … she said I didn't want money, I didn't want territory, I only wanted sacrifice [sic].”