21 MOST DESIRED SCENARIO: STALIN CARVES UP CHINA WITH JAPAN
21 盼望苏日瓜分中国
(1939–40; AGE 45–46)
1939～1940 年 45～46 岁
ON 23 AUGUST 1939 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, and the following month the two countries invaded Poland and divided it up between them. Many in China were outraged by Stalin's deal with Hitler. These feelings were perhaps best articulated by the founding father of the CCP, Chen Tu-hsiu, the man who had set Mao on the path of communism, but had been expelled from the Party for being too independent. After years imprisoned by the Nationalists, he had been released with other political prisoners when the Nationalist–Communist “United Front” was formed in 1937. Now he penned a poem expressing his “grief and anger,” comparing Stalin to “a ferocious devil,” who strides imperiously into his neighbouring country … And boils alive heroes and old friends in one fell swoop …
一九三九年八月二十三日，苏联跟纳粹德国签订互不侵犯条约，瓜分了波兰。对斯大林与希特勒(Adolf Hitler)的勾搭切齿痛恨的中国人中有中共的创始人陈独秀。陈因观点独立被中共开除，在国民党监狱里坐过几年牢。在一个“无月的黑夜”， 他悲愤之余，写下一首长诗，用古传说中的大疫厉鬼比喻斯大林，谴责斯大林“是非旦暮变，黑白任其情。云雨翻覆手，信义鸿毛轻。”
Right and Wrong change like day and night,
Black and White shift only at his bidding …
The Stalin–Hitler Pact opened up the prospect that Stalin might do a similar deal with Japan, with China a second Poland. Indeed, at this very moment, the Kremlin signed a ceasefire with Japan, bringing to a halt fighting that had been going on between the Soviet Red Army and the Japanese on the border of Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo. The Poland scenario caused Chiang Kai-shek acute concern, which he raised with Moscow. Mao's reaction, however, was one of delight. His whole strategy for the war with Japan was aimed at prevailing on Russia to step in. Now a real chance appeared that Stalin might occupy part of China, and put Mao in charge.
苏德条约的签订打开了通向苏日条约的大门。蒋介石担心中国可能成为另一个波兰，就此警告苏联。毛泽东却非常高兴。毛在整个抗日战争中的战略基点就是希望苏联卷入，现在柳暗花明，终于有了实现的可能。
In late September that year, when Edgar Snow asked Mao how he felt about a Soviet–Japanese pact, Mao's reply was enthusiastic. He said that Russia might sign such a pact “as long as this does not hinder its support for … the interest of the world liberation movement [i.e., Mao himself and the CCP].” Asked whether “Soviet help to China's liberation movement may take a somewhat similar form” to Russian occupation of Poland, Mao gave a very positive reply: “It is quite within the possibilities of Leninism.” The Poland scenario was now Mao's model for China.*
这年九月底，斯诺问毛对苏日条约可能签订的反应，毛答道：“可以签订”，如果不妨碍“世界解放运动的利益”，“半殖民地，殖民地的民族革命的利益”。这些利益在中国除了指中共的利益，还有什么呢？当斯诺问：苏联对中共的帮助是否会采取占领半个波兰那样的形式？毛积极肯定地答覆：“按照列宁主义，这种可能性是存在的”。波兰模式是毛的期待。* 斯大林要是跟日本瓜分中国，毛本人自然会当上半壁江山的统治者。
* 毛关于波兰模式跟苏日条约的这段谈话引起了莫斯科的不满。季米特洛夫给毛打电报说：“这个访问记的破坏性实质必须揭穿。我们紧急要求毛泽东和其他中国同志不要对外国记者发表像对斯诺那样的谈话，因为这已经被用来为搞破坏服务。”毛也明白他说漏嘴了，从此不再接近斯诺，直到中苏公开分歧的一九六0年要再利用斯诺时，才让他重访中国。
Similarly, Mao hailed Russia's seizure of eastern Finland in early 1940, though not for public consumption. In a secret directive on 25 June, he claimed that the Soviet–Finnish peace agreement, under which Moscow annexed large swaths of Finnish territory, “guarantees the victory of the world and the Chinese revolution” (italics added). After France was divided between a German-occupied half and a puppet regime based at Vichy, Mao again drew a comparison. He wrote in coded language in a circular issued to top commanders on 1 November 1940: “There is still the possibility of the Soviet Union stepping in to adjust China–Japan relations.” Referring to a partition of the kind imposed on France, he went on to talk about the Reds “getting a better deal [relying on] the Soviet Union stepping in to do the adjustment, and us keeping trying.” Again, Mao was hoping that Russia would partition China with Japan.
第二年，毛为苏联通过苏芬条约夺取芬兰一大块领土而兴奋。他在给中共高层的秘密指示中说：苏芬条约“保证了世界革命和中国革命的胜利”。在法国被划分为德国占领区跟维琪政府时，毛又看到了把一个国家一分为二的可能。在十一月一日给高级军事领导人的指示里，他用隐晦的语言说：“苏联出面调整中日关系的可能性仍是有的，中国要争得比较法国优胜的地位，只有苏联出面调整与我们坚持努力才有可能。”毛设想的一个前景是：日本扶持国民党傀儡政府，苏联出兵，帮助中共，“国共划界而治”，以长江为界，“隔江而治”，搞“南北朝”。
Mao even had an ideal demarcation line, the Yangtze, which flows across the middle of China. To his inner circle, Mao dreamed of “drawing a border … at the Yangtze, with us ruling one half …”
Replicating the Poland scenario was indeed at the front of Stalin's mind, and Russia began talks with Japan in September 1939, right after the signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact, with the future of China very much at the center of the negotiations. Stalin thus had a very direct interest in the expansion both of the Chinese Red Army and of Red territory, as that would strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis Japan, and further his long-term goals for the postwar period.
按波兰模式跟日本瓜分中国，正是斯大林此时的中国政策。苏德条约签订后，苏联开始了跟日本的谈判，中国问题是中心。谈判中，中共实力越强，占地越多，斯大林讨价还价的空间就越大。
Over the winter of 1939–40 there was a marked shift in what Mao told Moscow about the armed clashes between the Chinese Reds and Chiang's forces. He became much more candid about the level of fighting. Before Stalin's pact with Hitler, Mao had been presenting the clashes as the result of Nationalist attempts to wipe out Communist forces, claiming that the Reds were acting in self-defence. After the Nazi–Soviet Pact, he began to seek Stalin's approval for expanding aggressively at Chiang's expense. On 22 February 1940 he sent a highly belligerent report to Moscow, saying that in fighting Chiang's forces, “victory is generally ours.” “We wiped out 6,000 [Nationalists] in Hebei, 10,000 … in Shanxi,” he reported.
毛泽东看准了他的扩展对斯大林的好处，一九三九到一九四0年之交，他给莫斯科的报告在调子上有了明显的转变，开始直言不讳地谈论跟蒋介石军队的内战。苏德条约签订前，毛总是把火并说成是国民党要歼灭中共，中共都是自卫。而现在，他火药味儿十足，一九四0年二月二十二日报告说，在内战中，“胜利一般都是我们的”，“在河北我们歼灭了六千人，山西一万人。”
Stalin did not say “Stop!” On the contrary, three days later he authorized the huge sum of US$300,000 per month for the CCP. When Chou En-lai left Moscow shortly afterwards, he brought with him a new radio system for communicating with Moscow, which he delivered to Mao.* Mao's Russian-language aide noted: “Chairman Mao alone had the right to use it. He kept all communications personally, and decided to whom he would show the information.”
斯大林没有制止他，相反地，他用实际行动表示了对毛的默许。三天后他批准了给中共每月三十万美金的资助。周恩来离开莫斯科回国时，带给毛一座新电台专为跟莫斯科联系。毛的助手师哲回忆道：“我们同莫斯科建立了非常可靠的空中联络，但只有毛主席一人有权使用”，“往来的电讯，不但都由毛主席亲自处理，而且全存在他那里，向谁传达或传阅，也由他决定。”
AFTER THE Nazi–Soviet Pact and the prospect that Stalin might do a similar deal with Japan, in September 1939 Mao initiated a long, close and little-known collaboration with Japanese intelligence, in the hope of further sabotaging Chiang—and preserving his own forces. The CCP operation was headed by a man called Pan Han-nian, who worked with the Japanese vice-consul in Shanghai, Eiichi Iwai, a senior intelligence officer. Pan was given a special Japanese ID, addressed: “To all Japanese military, gendarme and police personnel: any enquiry regarding the bearer, please contact the Japanese Consul-General.” A radio operator from Yenan was installed in Iwai's house, for direct contact with Yenan, though in the end this channel was not used, as it was considered “too risky.”
有了苏日条约签订的前景，毛开始了同日本情报机关的合作，目的是打击蒋介石，保存、发展中共。负责这项工作的是潘汉年，他联系的对象有日本驻上海的副总领事、高级情报官员岩井英一。岩井给了潘汉年一张日本驻上海总领事馆签发的特别证件，上面明确写着：凡日本军、宪、警如对持证件人有所查询，请先与日本总领事馆联系。延安派去的情报干部一度还在岩井公馆里架设了电台，以便直接同延安联系，后因“困难太大”而没有使用。
Pan supplied Iwai with information about Chiang's ability to resist the Japanese, his conflicts with the CCP and his relations with foreign powers, as well as about US and British agents in Hong Kong and Chongqing. This intelligence rated high with the Japanese: one item reportedly sent the Japanese ambassador to China “wild with joy.” Before Japan invaded Hong Kong in December 1941, Iwai helped arrange the evacuation of CCP agents. As Pan assured Iwai, some of the agents would continue to collect intelligence for the Japanese, while others would come to Shanghai to “help with our ‘peace movement.' ” The “peace movement” was Japan's chief non-military drive to force China to surrender. One prominent organization in this scheme was the “Revive Asia and Build the Country Movement,” which Pan helped to start, funded by Tokyo and largely manned by secret Communists.
潘汉年给岩井提供蒋介石的抗战能力、他与中共的矛盾冲突，以及他与列强的关系等情报，还有英美情报人员在香港、重庆的活动讯息。日本方面对这些情报评价很高，其中一份曾让日本驻华大使“高兴得发狂”。日本侵占香港时，岩井派专人把中共在那里的情报人员安全撤走。潘汉年对岩井说：这些人将“一部分去内地，继续帮助我搜集那边的情报，一部分转到上海来帮助我们搞和平运动。”所谓“和平运动”是日本胁迫中国投降的非武力运动。有个着名的“兴亚建国运动委员会”， 由潘汉年参与组织，里面主要成员都是中共派去的。
The Reds used the Japanese to stab the Nationalists in the back. “At the time,” one CCP intelligence man recalled, our Party's tactic with the Japanese and collaborators was: “Use the hand of the enemy to strike the other enemy …” Comrade Kang Sheng told us this many times … Collaborators' organisations were filled with our comrades, who used the knives of the Japanese to slaughter Nationalists … Of the things I knew personally, the Japanese annihilation of the [Nationalist underground army] south of the Yangtze [was one of the] masterpieces of cooperation between the Japanese and our Party.*
日本人的手被用来更直接地打击国民党。一位当时的中共情报人员回忆说：““用敌人的手，来打击敌人，瓦解敌人，这是最机动最巧妙的革命策略。”康生同志过去曾屡次对我们这么说。然而，只有这次在杭州，我才看到如此生动的例子：在敌人的伪组织机构中，大量的充斥着我们的同志”，“据我直接知道的，上海两次破获三民主义青年团的组织和一次在江南日本人对忠义救国军的围剿，都是我们的党在日本人的合作之下的杰作。” *
* 据现有资料，中共没跟日本人在战场上具体合作。只有一份苏军情报局驻延安组长对莫斯科的报告说：一九四三年夏天一次中共军队在山东“与日军配合”進攻国民党军队。
Apart from sabotaging Chiang, Pan's other task was to get the Japanese to allow the Reds to operate unmolested, and this went as far as floating the idea of a secret ceasefire in northern China to Japan's highest intelligence officer in China, Major-General Sadaaki Kagesa.
除了打击蒋介石以外，潘汉年的另一项任务是使日本人放过中共。经岩井介绍，他会见了日本在华最高情报首脑影佐祯昭，向他建议在华北停火。这一建议终因日方没有反应而无结果。
In east central China, a deal was struck under which the Communist New 4th Army left the railways alone in return for the Japanese leaving the N4A alone in the countryside. For years, Japanese trains ran smoothly, and the N4A expanded quietly. The underlying reasoning behind leaving the Reds in peace was spelled out to us by Emperor Hirohito's brother, Prince Mikasa, who was an officer in China at the time. He told us that the Japanese view was that while the Communists could be a nuisance, they had no strategic importance. The Japanese considered Chiang Kai-shek to be their main enemy.
但在华中，潘汉年与日本方面(通过日本华中派遣军谋略科长都甲大佐)达成默契：新四军保证铁路交通线的畅通安全，日本人对新四军在乡间发展睁一只眼，闭一只眼。数年来，日本火车通行无阻，新四军也成长壮大。日本人为什么要容忍中共？我们问日本天皇的弟弟三笠宫崇仁，他曾是日本侵华军队的军官。他答道：日本认为中共不具备战略重要性，只能捣乱。日本始终把蒋介石作为主要敌人。
BY SPRING 1940, huge tracts of countryside in northern China were in Communist hands. In one series of battles in March, immediately after Stalin's tacit go-ahead, the Communists concentrated 30,000–40,000 troops, and destroyed over 6,000 Nationalists. Having established a strong position in northern China, 8RA commanders Zhu De and Peng De-huai felt it incumbent on them to do something against the Japanese, and on 1 April they ordered preparations for large-scale sabotage operations against Japanese transportation lines. Mao refused to permit the attack. Instead, he ordered all available troops to be moved to east central China to seize more territory there. Zhu and Peng were forced to abandon their plan.
一九四0年春，华北的大片土地都掌握在中共手里。三月份在斯大林的默许下，八路军集中三四万兵力，全歼六千国民党部队，在华北占据了绝对优势。这时，朱德、彭德怀感到他们也应该打打日本了，不然说不过去，四月一日，他们准备大规模破坏日本运输线。毛对这个要求拒不批准，反而令他们把部队调到华中去抢地盘。朱彭的破路计划只好作罢。
At this point, Chiang invited Zhu, who minded about the continuing internal strife, to Chongqing to discuss a solution. En route, Zhu stopped in Yenan, as Mao had told him that a Party congress was about to convene. Zhu found no congress—and no sign of one. Nonetheless, he was prevented from proceeding to Chongqing, and was in effect detained in Yenan for the rest of the war. Even though he was the C-in-C of the 8RA, he played no role in the war, and Mao basically used him as a rubber stamp.
朱德心里是不愿意继续打内战的。这时，蒋介石因为想解决华北内战问题，邀请他去重庆谈判。途中毛坚持要他回一趟延安，理由是开“七大”。到了延安，不但没有“七大”的影子，重庆也不让他去，这位八路军的总司令连部队也回不去了，只能待在延安。毛把朱的名字签在自己的指示上，作橡皮图章。
Mao sent someone else to Chongqing—Chou En-lai, who was now the exclusive channel with Chiang. Mao had completed his stranglehold on communications with the two places that counted—Moscow and Chongqing.
毛另派周恩来去重庆。从现在起毛规定中共任何人跟蒋介石联系都要通过延安转周。就这样，莫斯科和重庆这两个关键通路都彻底攥在毛的手中。
At this time, in May 1940, the Sino-Japanese war entered a critical phase. The Japanese began to intensify their bombing of Chongqing, which soon became the most heavily bombed city in the world to date; over the next six months, the tonnage dropped on it equaled one-third of what the Allies dropped on all Japan throughout the Pacific War; up to 10,000 civilians died in one raid. The Japanese army meanwhile advanced up the Yangtze towards Chongqing. Tokyo demanded that France close the railway from Vietnam, and that Britain shut down the Burma Road—the only routes into now landlocked China other than from Russia. Both Western states acquiesced, on 20 June and 18 July, respectively (although Britain's closure was only for three months). In Chongqing, sentiment strengthened for a deal with Japan. Chiang—and China—were facing a momentous crisis.
一九四0年五月，抗日战争到了紧急关头。日本对战时首都重庆加强了轰炸，山城成为世界上被炸得最厉害的城市。在六个月的时间里，重庆承受的炸弹吨位是整个太平洋战争中日本全国承受的炸弹的三分之一。一场空袭下来，成千上万的平民死去。日军同时沿长江逼近重庆。日本要法国关闭滇越铁路，要英国关闭滇缅铁路，以封锁中国对外交通，断绝军用物资的接济。除苏联外，这是仅有的两条通向外国的陆运要道。六月二十日跟七月十八日，英法两国先后照办(尽管英国的闭路只持续了三个月)。在重庆，悲观失望、要求跟日本媾和的空气比这个着名雾都的雾还要浓。蒋介石和中国都面临前所未有的危机。
To Mao the crisis was a godsend—the worse the better. He said later that he “had hoped they [the Japanese] would go as far as … Chongqing.” That way, he reckoned, Russia would have to intervene.
对毛来说，这简直是天赐良机。他后来对斯诺透露他“希望他们[指日本人]一直打到重庆去”。他企望的是，那样苏联将不得不出兵干预。
But Peng De-huai, now de facto chief of the 8RA after Zhu's quasi-detention in Yenan, wanted to take some of the heat off Chongqing, and resuscitated his plans for a large operation to sabotage Japanese transportation lines in northern China, calling it by the resounding name of “Operation 100 Regiments.” On 22 July he ordered the 8RA to get ready to launch on 10 August, and radioed the plan to Mao, twice. There was no reply. When Peng got no answer to a third cable, he gave the go-ahead for the 20th.
然而，朱德走后统领八路军的彭德怀不这么想。彭想帮重庆一把，帮蒋介石减轻些压力。彭在华北发动了一场大规模破路战役，给它取了个响亮的名字：百团大战。七月二十二日，他命令八路军准备于八月十日起事，并把计划两次电报给毛。毛没有回答，毛惯用的手法是“默否”。彭第三次电毛仍无回音，就不再等，下令在八月二十日动手。
Peng knew that Mao would dislike his operation. Not only would it help Chiang, it would also hurt the Reds, as Tokyo was bound to retaliate against Red territories. Peng was putting country before Party.
彭知道毛会对这场战役深恶痛绝，因为它“帮了蒋介石”，损害中共的利益，日本一定会加强对八路军根据地的扫荡。彭预先就考虑到这一点，但他把民族利益置于一党利益之上。
The operation, which lasted about a month, mainly involved attacks on installations, not on Japanese troops. It took the Japanese “totally by surprise,” in their own words. Damage to railways and highways in some sections was reported as “extremely serious” and “on an indescribably large scale” (the sabotage work was carried out partly by corvée labor). The Jingxing coal mines, which supplied the key Anshan iron and steel works in Manchuria, were badly hit, and the main mine put out of action “for at least half a year.” The Japanese had to pull back one division from the front against Chiang, and briefly delay plans to capture two railways into southern China.
百团大战進行了一个月，它主要不是打日本军队，而是破坏交通要道、战略经济设施。日本“华北方面军作战记录”称：“此次袭击，完全出乎我军意料之外，损失甚大”。供应东北鞍山钢铁厂的井陉煤矿遭到严重破坏，“至少半年以上不能出煤”。日本不得不把進攻蒋介石的一个师调回来，暂停夺取通向华南的两条铁路。
The main effect was on Chinese morale, especially in heavily bombed Nationalist areas. The Nationalist press there praised the 8RA for taking the offensive, and for “dealing a deadly blow to enemy rumours that we are split and sunk in internal strife.” From Chongqing, Chou cabled Mao that the operation had had “an extremely big impact.” “We are publicising it and propagating it everywhere … now is the time to spread our Party's influence …” Mao milked the fall-out to the hilt.
百团大战的主要影响是提高中国的士气，特别是在被日机炸得苦不堪言的国民党地区。报纸纷纷赞扬八路军主动出击，《大公报》说这是对日本人谣言攻势的“致命的打击”，“敌人不是常在造谣说我们分裂互讧吗？把这铁的事实给你们看。”周恩来从重庆给毛打电报说：“华北百团大战影响极大，蒋也说最好。”“我们在此到处鼓吹，连日报纸登大字新闻。”百团大战为毛争光不小。
But in private he was seething, partly because the operation led to heavy Red casualties—90,000, according to Zhu De. The Japanese took extremely harsh reprisals against Red-controlled territory, which was soon reduced by about half; the population under Red rule fell from about 44 to some 25 million. But Peng soon got the 8RA and the bases back on their feet. In slightly over two years, the 8RA more than recovered its pre-1940 strength, to 400,000 men, and Peng had rebuilt its base areas.
但毛愤怒已极。一方面是因为八路军遭受了沉重打击--据朱德说伤亡九万。日本人说他们“由痛苦的经验中取得了宝贵的教训，改变了对共产党的认识，从而采取各项治安施策，使华北的治安肃正效果得到空前提高”。根据地被压缩成一半，人口由四千四百万降到两千五百万。但这还不是毛最生气的原因，彭德怀不久便重建根据地，在两年多的时间里，八路军军力超过百团大战前，达四十万人。
But what most infuriated Mao was that the initiative lessened the chances of Chiang's defeat—and hence of Russia intervening. In future years, Mao was to make Peng pay dearly for this, the only large-scale operation carried out by any Communist forces during the whole eight years of the Japanese occupation.
使毛最生气的是百团大战减少了蒋介石被打垮的可能性，也就减少了苏联出兵干预的可能。彭德怀打乱他的战略部署。这一场八年抗战中中共军队打的唯一的大仗，成了彭在以后的岁月里挨整的罪名。
MEANWHILE, IN SPITE of Japanese bombing, Chongqing still stood, and Chiang did not collapse. Mao had to find another way to try to draw the Russians in. Chiang now came up with a plan to end the Nationalist–Communist fighting by separating the two forces physically. By this time, the 8RA had control over most of the territories they could expect to lay their hands on in northern China, so fighting there had died down. The main theater of civil war had moved to the Yangtze Valley in east central China near Shanghai and Nanjing. Chiang's plan called for the Red N4A to move out of the Yangtze region and join the 8RA in the north, in return for letting the Reds keep virtually all of the territory seized in northern China. On 16 July 1940, Chiang offered this trade-off, couched in the form of an “order,” and gave the N4A a deadline of a month.
日本人的大举進攻没有能使蒋介石投降、垮台，毛还得想别的办法把苏联人拉進来。蒋此时为了停止国共火并，计划把两党的军队分开，让他们驻在不同区域。这时八路军在华北已经占领了所有能占的地方，跟国民党已没什么仗好打，内战的焦点移到了长江流域的华中，新四军活动之地。蒋介石要新四军撤出长江流域，北上到八路军的地盘去，他允许中共在那里基本保留所占的土地。一九四0年七月十六日，蒋正式发布这一计划，用词是“中央提示案”，要新四军一个月内到位。
Mao had no intention of giving up the rich and strategic heartland. He turned Chiang's order-offer down flat. Actually, he positively hoped that Chiang would use force to remove the N4A, and that there would be all-out civil war. “Mao's calculation,” Russian ambassador Panyushkin wrote, was that “if there is a civil war, the Russians would back the CCP,” and Mao wanted to “nudge such a development.”
毛一口回绝了蒋介石。他不想放弃富庶重要的长江流域，更想要蒋介石用武力强行赶走新四军。这样一来，全面内战就可能爆发。苏联大使潘友新当时写道：“毛的打算是，如果内战打起来，俄国人会援助中共。”毛就是想把事态朝这个方向推。
In his many cables to Moscow that summer, Mao kept urging the Russians to help him deal “serious blows” to the Nationalists. Instead of moving north, the N4A launched its biggest-ever attack on the Nationalists at the beginning of October, at a place called Yellow Bridge, wiping out 11,000 Nationalist troops and killing two generals. Chiang did not order any retaliation, and kept quiet about the defeat, as he had after many other defeats at the hands of the Reds. Unlike Mao, Chiang was afraid of igniting an all-out civil war, which would doom China's chances against Japan. He only reiterated on 19 October that the N4A must move to the “appointed areas” within one month.
那年夏天毛给莫斯科发了许多电报，不断要求莫斯科帮助他“重创”国民党。新四军不但没有北移，反而于十月初在黄桥歼灭了一万一千国民党部队，击毙两名将领。蒋介石一声不吭，就像对其他同类事件一样。蒋怕事情暴露出来闹大了，引起全面内战。他只在十月十九日再次重申，新四军必须在一个月内北移到规定地区。
Mao met this second deadline with silence. He wanted to goad the Generalissimo into resorting to force, so that an all-out civil war could start and, as Mao told Chou, “the Soviet Union would step in.” Again Chiang took no action. Mao knew the Generalissimo's weak spots. He wrote to Chou on 3 November: “What Chiang fears most is civil war, and the Soviet Union. So we can bully him on this.”
毛充耳不闻。他想激怒蒋介石，促蒋采用武力，展开全面内战。他对周恩来说，这时苏联就会“出来调整”。蒋介石怕的也就是这个，怕苏联進来同日本瓜分中国。“一个月”期限到了，蒋仍然没有采取行动。毛清楚蒋的弱点，十一月三日给周恩来的电报说：“蒋介石最怕的是内乱，是苏联，故我们可以这点欺负他”。
On 7 November 1940, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mao appealed to Moscow with his most overtly bellicose proposition yet. Signed by himself, the cable was addressed to Dimitrov and Manuilsky, Mao's main backer in the Comintern. Copies were sent to Stalin and defense minister Semyon Timoshenko. Mao's plan was to dispatch 150,000 soldiers “to deliver a blow” at Chiang's rear. He called this a “preventive counter-offensive,” i.e., he would fire the first shot.
十一月七日，“十月革命”节，毛向莫斯科空前强烈地恳求批准他大打内战。电报由毛本人署名，收电人不仅是通常的季米特洛夫，而且加上毛在共产国际内的主要支持者曼努伊尔斯基，特地注明抄送斯大林和国防部长铁木辛哥(Semyon Timoshenko)。毛报告说他的计划是，出十五万精兵抄到他[蒋介石]后方，打几个大胜仗”，把这一行动称为“预防性的先发制人”。
Mao was asking Moscow to endorse his starting a full-scale civil war, in the thick of the Sino-Japanese War. The reason he felt able to venture this far now was his perception that the latest developments might cause Stalin to favor a strike at Chiang. The Kremlin was considering joining the Tripartite Pact of which Japan was a member, together with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. If Mao struck now, in effect forming a pincer attack with Japan on Chiang, Chiang might well collapse. If Mao contributed to the defeat of Chiang, this would greatly strengthen Stalin's hand at the negotiating table with Tokyo.
毛这样不加掩饰地要求主动挑起全面内战，源于形势的最新发展。苏联正加紧了同日本的谈判。毛的主张等于是同日本合作，对蒋介石两面夹攻。这样一来，蒋很可能垮台，按波兰模式瓜分中国就成了现实。
Mao's entreaty to Moscow to allow him to enter this unholy de facto alliance with Japan arrived as Soviet foreign minister Molotov was about to set off for Berlin, where one of his goals was to get Hitler to help Moscow muscle in as a major interested party in the Sino-Japanese War. Molotov's agenda stated: “Discuss the necessity of reaching an honorable [sic] peace for China (Chiang Kai-shek), in which the USSR may with the participation of G[ermany] and I[taly] be ready to take on mediation … (Manchukuo stays for J[apan]).” Molotov then told the Führer: “[We] must find a compromise exit from the situation prevailing between China and Japan … in this regard the USSR and Germany could play an important role.” But the Führer was not interested.
这时苏联外交部长莫洛托夫(Vyacheslav Molotov)正要起程去柏林，目的是请希特勒帮助莫斯科介入中日战争。莫洛托夫的议程写道：“讨论在中国(蒋介石的中国)实现光荣和平的必要。为了实现这一和平，苏联准备同德国、意大利一道做调解人(满洲国归日本)”。莫洛托夫对希特勒说：“我们必须在中日两国之间给目前这种局势找条出路。在这个问题上，苏联和德国可以起重要作用。”但希特勒对这件事不感兴趣。
The terms Japan offered on China did not begin to match Stalin's expectations. Tokyo would agree only to “a Russian sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang,” which was hardly alluring to Stalin, as these two places were already in his pocket. Japan also considered “recognising and accepting the three northwestern provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia) remaining a Chinese Communist base”—on condition that Russia agreed to “restrain the anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese Communists.” But this idea was again not nearly enough for Stalin, as the CCP was already occupying a much larger territory than these three provinces.
日本无意与苏联分享中国。这年十月二日起草的日方文件显示，日本只同意“外蒙古和新疆为俄国的势力范围”。这说了等于没说。日本考虑“承认、接受西北三省(陕甘宁)继续作中共根据地”，但有个条件，苏联必须“约束中共的抗日行为”。只给陕甘宁对斯大林当然远远不够，中共已拥有的地盘早就大得多。
Moscow's failure to strike a deal with Tokyo meant that Stalin's priority remained staving off the possibility of a Japanese attack on Russia—and that meant Mao could not have his all-out war on Chiang yet. Stalin wanted a united China which could continue to bog down the Japanese. When Stalin dispatched General Chuikov as his new military adviser to Chongqing at this time, Chuikov asked why he was being sent “to Chiang Kai-shek, not the Chinese Red Army.” Stalin answered: “Your job is firmly to tie the hands of the Japanese aggressor in China.”*
莫斯科无法同日本达成协议。这意味着日本仍然可能掉过头来進攻苏联，斯大林的当务之急仍然是国共合作拖住日本，毛泽东也就不能打全面内战。刚派往蒋介石处的军事顾问崔可夫问斯大林为什么派他去“帮蒋介石，而不是帮中国红军”。斯大林答道：“你的任务是把日本侵略者的手牢牢地拴在中国。”
So the Kremlin line to Mao was: hold your fire. An order went off to him on 25 November: “for the time being, play for time, manoeuvre, and bargain with Chiang Kai-shek in every possible way over removing your forces from Central China … It is essential you do not initiate military action [i.e., against Chiang] …” But Moscow did authorize Mao to fight back if attacked: “However, if Chiang Kai-shek … attacks [you], you must strike with all your might … In this case, the responsibility for the split and civil war will fall entirely on Chiang …”
十一月二十五日，克里姆林宫命令毛：“目前暂时不要动，争取时间，在华中地区军队北移问题上，与蒋介石尽量周旋，讨价还价……绝对关键的是你不要首先挑起军事行动”。同时，莫斯科同意毛一旦被蒋攻击时实行自卫反击：“如果蒋介石進攻你，你必须全力反击。在这种情况下，分裂、内战的责任就都落在蒋介石头上。”
This left Mao with one hope: that Chiang would fire the first shot. But as deadlines for the N4A to move north came and went, Mao reached the conclusion that “Chiang launching a big assault is not a possibility …”
这份命令带给毛的既是失望，也有希望：蒋介石放第一枪，他就可以动手。问题是蒋介石坚决不肯开火。新四军北移的期限来了又去，蒋介石没有动武。毛得出结论：蒋“大举進军是不可能的”。毛泽东决心制造一种局势，使蒋介石的手不得不扣动扳机。
Having failed to provoke Chiang into firing the first shot, Mao now set up a situation in which Chiang's finger would be forced to pull the trigger.
*Mao's remarks about the Polish model and a Soviet-Japanese pact did not go down well in Moscow. They were too unvarnished, and a harsh reproof ensued. “The provocative essence of this statement must be unmasked,” Comintern chief Dimitrov cabled Mao. “We urgently request that Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese comrades refrain from giving interviews to foreign correspondents like the interview with Edgar Snow, as this is being used for provocative purposes.” Mao kept his mouth shut in public, and Snow was barred from Red-held China until the Sino-Soviet split, in 1960.
*The new system was highly effective. The Japanese could not even locate the radios, much less break the codes.
*Mao's deal does not seem to have extended to actual military cooperation in the field, though the Russian GRU chief in Yenan reported one occasion when Communist troops attacked Nationalist forces in Shandong in summer 1943 “in coordination with Japanese troops.”
*Chuikov's other role, which he did not mention in his memoirs, was to give Moscow an expert assessment of whether the Chinese Reds could take power after Japan was defeated.