23 BUILDING A POWER BASE THROUGH TERROR
23 延安整风：靠恐怖建立权力基础
(1941–45 AGE 47–51)
1941～1945 年 47～51 岁
ON 22 JUNE 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This event radically altered Mao's calculus. Soviet Russia was his sponsor and his hope; a seriously weakened—or diverted—Russia was unlikely to offer much help. Mao could not sleep for days.*
一九四一年六月二十二日，德国入侵苏联。这对毛泽东的打击非同小可。苏联是他的资助人、他的希望，一个被削弱的、自顾不暇的苏联显然不能对他像以往那样帮助了。多少天来，毛都睡不着觉。 *
* 毛事先就知道相当准确的德国入侵时间，也通报了斯大林。季米特洛夫在日记里写道：“德国将袭击苏联……日期 -- 一九四一·六·二十一 ！ [粗黑体为原文]” 这是季米特洛夫唯一记载的警告。情报是中共地下党员阎宝航等获取的。德国二十二日果然入侵苏联，克里姆林宫感谢了中共。
To start with, there was absolutely no chance now that Russia would step in and bail him out if fighting with Chiang's troops turned perilous. Mao immediately halted attacks. “Stop any assaults on all Nationalist units,” he ordered his armies.
首先，如果他跟国民党真的大打起来而又打不赢的话，毛不能指望苏联出马帮他。他马上命令：“对国民党敌后各部应停止任何攻击性行动”。
Self-preservation dominated his relationship with newly weakened Russia. As a result of the German invasion, Moscow wanted the CCP to commit to engage militarily with Japanese troops if Japan should attack the Soviet Union. Stalin's nightmare was a giant pincer assault by Japan from the east coordinated with Hitler's attack from the west. How many Japanese troops could the CCP “divert” if that happened? Moscow asked Mao. To encourage Mao to act, Dimitrov cabled on 7 July that he was sending US$1 million in installments. Two days later, the Comintern told the CCP to draw up “concrete steps.”
对日本，他是小心不去触犯。德国入侵以后，斯大林日夜担忧东西两面受敌，要中共牵制日本，保证在日本侵苏时帮苏联打日本。莫斯科来电问毛：如果日本進犯苏联，中共可能吸引多少日本兵力？为了鼓励毛行动，季米特洛夫七月七日发电报说，这就陆续寄一百万美金来。两天后，共产国际要中共订出“具体步骤”。
Most of Mao's colleagues thought they should take some action if Tokyo invaded the Soviet Union. The normally circumspect Liu Shao-chi wrote to Mao that if Japan attacked Russia, the CCP must launch offensives to tie up Japanese forces. Mao, however, was determined not to risk troops under any circumstances. On 18 July he told Liu that if Japan attacked Russia (which Mao had said on 2 July was “extremely likely”): “It is not a good idea … to undertake large-scale action … our armies are weak. Action will inevitably do irreparable damage.” His approach was to let the Russians do the fighting: “Everything depends on victory by the Soviet Union.”
大多数中共领导人都认为如果日本打苏联他们应该行动。一向谨慎的刘少奇给毛打电报说：要是日本向苏联進攻，八路军新四军必须反攻，以牵制日本。毛认为日本一定会打苏联：“日苏战争有极大可能爆发”。但即使如此，中共军队也不能打日本。七月十八日，他给刘覆电：“八路、新四大规模动作仍不适宜，还是熬时间的长期斗争的方针，原因是我军各种条件均弱，大动必伤元气，于我于苏均不利。” 他的政策是让苏联人自己去打：“全局决定于苏联打胜仗。”
Mao spelled this out to Peng De-huai, the acting commander of the 8th Route Army. Any coordination with the Russians was to be purely “strategic [i.e., in name only] and long-term—not in battles.” To his troops Mao repeatedly cautioned: “Do not excessively upset the [Japanese] enemy.”
他对八路军负责人彭德怀说，任何与苏军的作战配合，都只能“是战略的配合，是长期的配合，不是战役的配合与一时的配合”。对部队他一再下令：“不要过分刺激敌人[日本人]”。
To Moscow, Mao protested that his forces were too weak to be counted on: “our human and material resources [are diminishing], regions of operation [are contracting], ammunition is running out—and the situation is becoming more difficult by the day.” If his army acted, Mao argued, “there is a possibility that we will be defeated and will not be able to defend our partisan bases for long … Such an action will not be good for either of us …” He told Moscow not to expect much: “if Japan attacks the Soviet Union, our abilities in terms of coordinating military operations will not be great.”
不久以前，毛还在对莫斯科说他的军队如何强大，光八路军就有三十二万九千八百九十九人。可现在毛对莫斯科申辩说他的部队太弱，不能打仗：“人力物力都缺，根据地在缩小，弹药快没了-- 形势日益困难。”莫斯科不能指望他，“假若日本進攻苏联时，我们在军事上的配合作用恐不很大”。
Mao virtually admitted that his army had not been fighting the Japanese and would not start now. Only recently he had been telling Moscow he had a huge army, with 329,899 men in the 8RA alone; now he was saying his troops could hardly fire a shot.
Stalin personally cabled Mao several times asking him to keep the Japanese occupied, when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow in late 1941 and just before the battle of Stalingrad, in July 1942—in vain. Mao's refusal to help infuriated Moscow, and he further riled his patrons by advising them to retreat to the Urals and fight a guerrilla war. Some Russians claim that Mao's behavior was also motivated by lack of confidence in the Soviet Union, and even (according to General Chuikov) by the desire to exploit Hitler's attack to supplant Russia. Word got around that Mao said: “Stalin cannot beat Hitler” and “24-year-old socialism cannot compete with eight-year-old fascism.”
斯大林亲自给毛打过几次电报要他牵制日本人，其中一次是德国兵临莫斯科城下时，另一次是斯大林格勒大战前夕，几次毛都婉言拒绝。这激怒了莫斯科。更使苏联人怒不可遏的是毛建议他们诱敌深入，退到乌拉山脉去打游击。有人说毛拒绝帮忙是认为苏联快不行了，崔可夫将军甚至说毛想利用希特勒的進攻取代苏联。有流言说毛曾说：“斯大林打不过希特勒”，“二十四年的社会主义拚不赢八年的法西斯主义。”
Years later, Molotov was asked: “We knew [what Mao was doing to us] and we still helped Mao?” To which Molotov mumbled: “Right. Yes, yes. I know that is hard for you to understand. But you must not look at things in such a stark way.” “We looked like fools, but, in my opinion, we were not fools.”
多年后，有人问莫洛托夫：“我们明知毛这样对我们，我们怎么还要帮助他？” 莫洛托夫嗫嚅道：“是的，是这样，是这样。我知道这不好解释，但你不能这样看问题。”“我们看去是像傻瓜，但我们不是傻瓜。”
Indeed, even though they were at odds, Stalin and Mao understood each other perfectly. Their relationship was based on brutal self-interest and mutual use, and they shared the same long-term goals. However much Mao's actions displeased the Kremlin, Stalin never for one moment ceased doing business with him.
斯大林和毛泽东彼此是了解的，他们都是把自身利益放在第一位。这使他们不时发生冲突，但共同的长远利益把他们连在一起。不管斯大林对毛多么恼怒，他从来没停止过跟毛打交道。
WITH NO FIGHTING against either the Japanese or the Nationalists, and with Russia in trouble and in no position to intervene, Mao seized the opportunity to go to work on his Party and mold it into an unquestioning machine in preparation for the forthcoming all-out civil war against Chiang Kai-shek.
既不打日本人，又不打蒋介石了，毛有了闲暇。他着手整党，要把中共变成一架驯服的机器。
By late 1941, Party membership had grown to some 700,000. Over 90 percent of these were people who had joined up since the start of the war against Japan, and many were young enthusiasts who had come to the Communist bases from Nationalist areas. These young volunteers were vital to Mao because they were relatively well educated, and he needed competent administrators to staff his future regime. Most of the Long Marchers and rural recruits from within the Communist bases were illiterate peasants. It was the young volunteers who were Mao's target.
一九四一年下半年，中共共有七十万党员。九成以上是抗战以后加入的。他们中许多人是年轻热情的理想主义者，志愿从国民党管辖的城市来到中共根据地。这批年轻的志愿者对毛特别重要。长征老干部和根据地农村入党的人大多是文盲，而他们教育程度比较高，毛未来的政权需要有文化的管理人才。毛要整党，这批热血青年首当其冲。
These volunteers had almost all joined up in the late 1930s as the mood among the younger middle class swung significantly to the left. This was a time when Red Russia was China's main—and virtually only—ally and supplier of arms against Japan. Goodwill towards Russia rubbed off on the CCP. Many thought the Chinese Communists were truly dedicated to fighting Japan.
这些人之所以志愿参加中共，是因为在抗战开始后年轻的知识分子显着向左转。苏联那时是中国的主要、甚至仅有的同盟，向中国提供抗日的军火物资。爱屋及乌，人们也就认为中共全心全意打日本。
There was also widespread disenchantment with the Nationalists, who were seen as incapable of eradicating China's widespread poverty and injustice. The CCP's atrocities before the Long March were either unknown or forgotten, or dismissed as Nationalist propaganda. Some also believed the Party when it proclaimed that it had changed, and abandoned its old policies. And for awhile the Communists' behavior seemed to confirm that this change was real. Many foreigners, and even some missionaries, accepted Red claims. The mole Shao Li-tzu, the Nationalists' media overlord during the crucial period 1937–38, did much to erase the Party's bloody past and project a benign image of the Reds. So too did Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China. Mao assiduously peddled the line that the Communists had been slandered. The CCP “has always been pretty,” he told a group of new arrivals in Yenan; “it is just that it was painted badly …”
对国民党的失望弥漫在很多人心中。掌权多年。国民党没能铲除中国大地比比皆是的贫困和不公正。中共在长征前制造的惨剧人们要么不知道，要么忘了，要么不相信，归结于国民党的宣传。也有人以为中共改变了政策，就像它许诺的那样。抗战初期，中共的行为也让人觉得它真是变了，不少外国人，甚至传教士，都这么相信。邵力子主持国民党中宣部期间，为中共改头换面出了大力。斯诺书的影响就更不用说。
A large number of the young volunteers congregated in Yenan, Mao's capital. By the time Mao started his drive to condition them, some 40,000 had come there. Most were people in their late teens and early twenties who had joined the Party in the Nationalist areas, and then been sent on to Yenan.
集中在延安的热血青年大约有四万人，多是十几二十岁，由中共地下党把他们介绍到这块“革命圣地”来的。
They were tremendously excited when they first reached what had been portrayed as a revolutionary Mecca. One young volunteer described his feelings when he arrived: “At last we saw the heights of Yenan city. We were so excited we wept. We cheered from our truck … We started to sing the ‘Internationale,' and Russia's Motherland March.”
到达延安时，他们无一不是兴奋万状。有个青年回忆道：“我们终于见到延安的城头了，我们这时兴奋得几乎要流出泪来，我们在车上向着延安城不停的欢呼，歌颂这座庄严的古城……歌声开始激荡，我们高唱起《国际歌》和俄国的《祖国進行曲》。”
The new arrivals, he wrote, “really envied the stinking and dirty worn-out padded uniforms [of the veterans]. They found everything fresh, exciting and mysterious.”
青年们又慕煞干部们身上又臭又脏的烂军服，处处觉得新鲜、刺激和神秘，为之颠倒。《延安颂》的歌声响彻全城”。
The newcomers were mostly enrolled in various “schools” and “institutes” to be trained—and indoctrinated. But most very soon became disillusioned. The biggest letdown was that equality, the core of their idealism, was not only completely absent, but manifestly rejected by the regime. Inequality and privilege were ubiquitous. Every organization had three different levels of kitchen. The lowliest got roughly half the amount of meat and cooking oil allotted to middle-rankers, while the elite got much more. The very top leaders received special nutritious foods.
新来者被编入各种学校受训。但很快的，他们就或多或少失望了。他们来延安是冲着一个梦，这个梦与现实相差十万八千里。最使人失望的是“平等”问题。这个他们理想的核心，竟然在革命圣地无踪无迹，不平等、特权比比皆是。就吃来说，每个单位都有大、中、小三灶，中灶的肉、油大概是大灶的一倍，小灶就更多了。高级领导有特别的营养食品。
Likewise with clothes. The locally produced cotton was rough and uncomfortable, so softer cotton was imported for senior cadres. Mao, outwardly, dressed the same as the rest, but his underwear was made of fine material, as a servant who washed and mended for the Maos told us. The maid did not qualify for any underwear or socks at all, and kept getting colds as a result. Items like tobacco, candles and writing paper were similarly allocated by rank.
穿着也是一样。一般人穿当地自织自染的土布，粗且扎人。领导人穿国统区進口的舒服的斜纹布。毛的内衣内裤是极细的布。一个为毛家洗洗补补的佣人告诉我们，她本人不够穿内衣裤和袜子的资格，只能穿空心棉袄，经常都在感冒。
Children of the topmost leaders were sent to Russia, or had nannies of their own. Wives of senior cadres could expect to give birth in a hospital, and then have a personal nurse for a while. Officials on the next rungs down could send their children to an elite nursery. The relatively small number of ordinary Communists who were married either tended not to have children, or had to struggle if they did.
日用品像烟草、蜡烛、写字纸都按等级分配。说到孩子，中共领导人的可以送去苏联，或有自己的保姆。职位低一些的高干的妻子生产可以進医院，产后有专人服侍。再低一些的干部可以送孩子上保育院。有幸结婚的一般干部，要么不敢生孩子，要么自己想法子对付。
Spartan conditions and poor food led to many illnesses, but only high officials had access to scarce medicines, which were imported specially from Nationalist areas. Mao had a personal doctor from America, George Hatem, as well as Russian doctors. When he needed something—or somebody (like a physiotherapist)—he asked Moscow, or Chou En-lai in Chongqing. Senior cadres were given special hospital treatment, and no one could get into a hospital without authorization from their work unit. Food was graded in hospitals, too.
艰苦的生活条件使疾病常常发生，但是医药分配按等级。毛本人有美国医生马海德，还有两个苏联医生。如有什么需要，他直接向莫斯科要，或给重庆的周恩来打电报。医院分高干病房跟一般人病房，進医院得要介绍信，连病人的饭菜也分等级。
At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War there was a Red Cross team in Yenan, which had been sent by the Nationalists. It treated local residents as well as average Communists. But the regime set about driving it away. Rumors were put about that its medicines were poisonous, and that it had been “sent by the Nationalists to murder our comrades! And to poison our drinking water, to spread germs!” Most of the team soon left. The rest were forcibly kept behind, mainly to minister to the Red elite.
抗战刚开始时，延安有个国民政府派来的红十字会医疗队，给一般共产党员和老百姓看病。但不久它被赶走了，有谣言说它用的针药全是有毒的，还在食水里下毒，散播细菌。医疗队走后，个别医生被留了下来，主要为特权阶层服务。
The ultimate symbol of privilege in Yenan was highly visible—the only car, in fact an ambulance, which was a present from Chinese laundry workers in New York for carrying war wounded. But it never transported one injured soldier. Mao “privatised” it. It transported his guests as well, including Edgar Snow in 1939. Snow was blasé about it: “So this was Mao's extravagance that had shocked my missionary friend,” he wrote, asserting that it was one of “a number of these laundrymen's gifts [which] had accumulated in Yenan, where sometimes they were used to carry civilian air-raid victims to near-by hospitals.” In fact, it was the only car, and never carried any civilian wounded—and was known, appropriately, as “Chairman Mao's car.” Even people near the top thought Mme Sun Yat-sen had given the car to Mao “for his personal use.”
延安最显眼的特权标志是汽车，这里唯一的一辆汽车，是纽约洗衣房华侨捐赠来运送伤员的。但毛把它“私有化”了，做了他的专车。人人都知道这是“毛主席的小包车”，跟毛很接近的王稼祥夫人朱仲丽都以为这“是宋庆龄从国民党地区搞来，专门送给毛泽东用的”。年轻的司马璐看到毛和妻子江青乘车经过后说，江青穿着深红色的春装，“和毛泽东在车中双双风驰电掣，招摇过市，路人都为之侧目”。
Many were extremely put out. One young volunteer saw Mao in the car in spring 1939, driving with his wife, who sported “a dark red spring outfit. She and Mao Tse-tung raced by, drawing a lot of attention, and the passersby looked askance at the couple.”
Mao was well aware that his privileges were a sore point. One day an old devotee came to dine. Afterwards, Mao invited her to come back often, whereupon she blurted out: “So I”ll come to you every Sunday to treat myself to a good meal!” She noticed that “the Chairman's smile froze, and he looked a bit awkward. I knew I had said the wrong thing …”
延安盛传着一句笑话：“延安就三样东西--太阳、厕所、空气是平等的。”毛很清楚特权是人们耿耿于怀的敏感东西。一天，老朋友曾志来吃晚饭，饭后毛请她再来。她冲口而出：“那我以后每个星期天都到你这里来会餐！”毛收住了微笑，显得有些尴尬。
The Party tried to make a case for privilege: “it is not the leading comrades who ask for privilege themselves,” one leading ideologue opined. “It is the order of the Party. Take Chairman Mao, for example: the Party can order him to eat a chicken a day.”
党是这样向年轻的志愿者解释等级制度的：“同志们，并不是这些领导同志自己要求享受得好一点，而是党的命令，党因为这个同志对党的贡献和现在所负的责任，就有权利命令他，要他把健康保持得更好一点。比如，毛主席，党可以要他每天吃一只鸡。”
This sophistry failed to dissipate the widespread discontent. One crack doing the rounds went: “In Yenan, only three things are equal to all—the sun, the air and the toilets.” The privilege system even extended to the group of Japanese Communists and POWs. The only one of them officially allowed to have sex was their leader, Sanzo Nosaka. “Mao wanted to keep him in a good mood,” a former Japanese POW in Yenan told us, “so he gave him a woman comrade to keep him company … we didn't complain—not openly—people did have complaints, but they kept them to their own hearts.”
特权体制甚至延伸到日本在延安的共产党人和战俘，他们中只有一个人有权过性生活：最高领导野阪参三。一位当时的战俘对我们说：“毛泽东希望他过得心情愉快，所以给他找了个女同志作他的伴侣。我们没提意见，没公开提意见。大家是有意见，只是藏在心里。”
NO MATTER HOW disillusioned they might feel, the young volunteers realized that they could not leave Yenan: trying to leave was treated as desertion, with execution a distinct likelihood. The Yenan region was run like a prison. The rest of China, including other Red bases, was called “the Outside.” One volunteer described a scene he witnessed in a hospital. “We are not ill, why send us here?” two men were shouting. Their accents showed they were Long Marchers from Jiangxi. They were struggling and being pinned down by armed men.
尽管失望，年轻的志愿者却没法离开，他们進了延安就出不去了。其他地方，包括别的红色根据地，都一概叫做“外面”可望而不可及。过来人说：在延安的老干部中，新干部中，思乡病很流行。农家子弟往往直率地提出回家去，知识分子干部就聪明多了，他们不说“回家去”，而是编造一套谎言，说得天花乱坠，要求党调他们出外工作。当然绝大多数不会批准。
司马璐在医院里看到下面的一场戏：
“We've been asking for leave to go home to see our families, but we just don't get the permission. They insisted we were crazy, and sent us here.”
“我们没有病，为什么把我们送到这里。” 两个江西佬一面在咆哮着，一面在企图挣脱政治指导员的手。指导员对他们说：“同志，你安静一点。”又招呼几个武装同志把他们压住。…… 两个江西佬继续在诉说：“我们要回家看看双亲和儿女，一次再次请假不准，硬说我们有了神经病，送我们到这里来。”
The men wore the Long March veterans' medal. One cadre said: “Comrades, please remember your glorious revolutionary history!”
这时，有个好事的干部走过去，指指两个江西佬胸前挂的“长征纪念章”，对他们说： “同志，记得你们有光荣的革命历史呀！”
“Fart of use this thing. We were dead and wounded plenty of times. All we get is others become officials, and have good things to eat and wear. What's in it for us? It's better to go home and work on the land.”
“这个东西有屁用，我们死里逃生，受伤十几次了，现在人家升官的升官，有好吃好穿，我们为的什么，还不如回家种田去。”
“Ha, it seems you are not crazy. You are just wavering in your revolutionary stand.”
The eyewitness noticed that “among cadres in Yenan, old and new, homesickness was common.” Cadres of peasant origin “often asked straight out to go home, and were stopped by their superiors. Some tried to run away, and once caught were immediately executed. The educated were much cleverer. They wouldn't say they wanted to go home, they would make up some story and ask the Party to transfer them Out …”
对年轻的志愿者们来说，逃跑更是难于上青天，抓回来面临处决。大部分也就断了走的念头，留下来了。
Escape was easier for army men on the border of the region—and the rate of desertion was colossal. The target of one brigade alone, as of 29 September 1943, was to catch one thousand of its own deserters. But in the heart of the Red area, escape was virtually impossible, and most young volunteers just willed themselves to settle down.
THESE WERE THE people Mao had to depend on for his future power base. And to that end they were clearly poor material. They had come to Yenan for a dream. To make them fight for the real CCP, Mao would have to change them fundamentally, to remold them. This enormous human engineering project Mao began from early 1942.*
就是这批人毛得用来做他的权力基础。显然，他们不是权力基础的材料。要他们为中共冲锋陷阵，毛得从根本上改变他们，重新塑造他们。这个工程就是着名的“延安整风”，于一九四二年初揭幕。
His first step was to strike at the champion of the young volunteers, a 35-year-old writer called Wang Shi-wei, a dedicated Communist who had translated Engels and Trotsky. An essay by him called “Wild Lilies,” which was published in the main newspaper in Yenan, Liberation Daily, caught Mao's attention. In the first installment on 13 March, Shi-wei wrote:
首先，毛拿他们的带头人、三十五岁的共产党员作家王实味开刀。
王实味曾翻译过恩格斯(Friedrich Engels)、托洛茨基的著作。三月十三日，延安的主要报纸《解放日报》连载他的文章<野百合花>。毛一看就留了神。王实味写道：
Young people in Yenan seem to have lost steam in their life lately, and seem to have discontent in their stomachs.
延安青年近来似乎生活得有些不起劲，而且似乎肚子里装得有不舒服。
Why? What do we lack in our life? Some might answer: we lack nutrition, we lack vitamins … Others say: the male–female ratio in Yenan is 18 to 1, and many young men cannot find a wife … Still others will say: life in Yenan is too monotonous, too drab …
为什么呢？我们生活里缺少什么呢？有人会回答说：我们营养不良，我们缺少维他命，所以……。另有人会回答说：延安男女的比例是“十八比一”，许多青年找不到爱人，所以……。还有人会回答说：延安生活太单调，太枯燥，缺少娱乐，所以……。
These answers are not unreasonable. But … young people … have come here to be in the revolution, and they are committed to self-sacrifice. They have not come to seek the satisfactions of food and sex or the pleasures of life.
这些回答都不是没有道理的……但谁也不能不承认：延安的青年，都是抱定牺牲精神来从事革命，并不是来追求食色的满足和生活的快乐。
What had shattered their dreams, he said, was institutionalized privilege, accompanied by high-handedness and arrogance. He quoted a conversation he had overheard between two young women about their bosses:
王实味的答案是，延安青年失望了，对等级制度失望了，对革命队伍缺乏“爱和热”失望了。他引用路上听到的两个青年女子的一段对话：
He's always accusing you of petty bourgeois egalitarianism. Yet he himself … only looks out for his own privileges … and is completely indifferent to comrades under his charge …!
“动不动，就说人家小资产阶级平均主义；其实，他自己倒真有点特殊主义。事事都只顾自己特殊化，对下面同志，身体好也罢，坏也罢，病也罢，死也罢，差不多漠不关心！”
“哼，到处乌鸦一般黑，我们的XX同志还不也是这样！”
All fine words—class friendship and warmth. And it all boils down to—fart! They don't have even elementary human sympathy!…
“说得好听！阶级友爱呀，什么呀--屁！好象连人对人的同情心都没有！”……
There are just too damn few cadres who really care about us.
“真正关心干部爱护干部的，实在大少了。”
In the second installment ten days later, Shi-wei sharpened his key points:
《野百合花》继续连载时，王实味把话说得更单刀直入。
Some say there is no system of hierarchy and privilege in Yenan. This is not true. It exists. Others say, yes, there is, but it is justified. This requires us to think with our heads.
“一种人说：我们延安并没有等级制度；这不合事实，因为它实际存在着。另一种人说：是的，我们有等级制度，但它是合理的。这就须要大家用脑子想一想。”
SHI-WEI WAS calling on people to think for themselves. Moreover, his arguments were reasonable and eloquent:
王实味呼吁人们自己用脑子想，这就已经大逆不道了，他还提出了自己合情合理的观点：
I am no egalitarian. But I do not think it is necessary or justified to have multiple grades in food or clothing … If, while the sick can't even have a sip of noodle soup … some quite healthy big shots are indulging in extremely unnecessary and unjustified perks, the lower ranks will be alienated …
“我并非平均主义者，但衣分三色，食分五等，却实在不见得必要与合理”，“如果一方面害病的同志喝不到一口面汤，青年学生一天只得到两餐稀粥……另一方面有些颇为健康的“大人物”，做非常不必要不合理的“享受”，以致下对上感觉他们是异类，对他们不但没有爱，而且--这是叫人想来不能不有些“不安”的。”
When Mao read this, he slammed the newspaper on his desk and demanded angrily: “Who is in charge here? Wang Shi-wei, or Marxism?” He picked up the phone and ordered a shake-up at Liberation Daily.
毛看到这些话后，猛拍办公桌上的报纸，厉声问道：“这是王实味挂帅，还是马克思挂帅？”他立刻打电话给《解放日报》。报社受到整肃。
Shi-wei put some even sharper thoughts in a wall poster. Mao had tolerated these as a safety-valve for the young intellectuals. Wall posters had the advantage (for him) of having a restricted audience—and were easily torn down or erased. Shi-wei's poster proclaimed: “Justice must be established in the Party. Injustice must be done away with … Ask yourselves, comrades … Are you scared of telling the ‘big shots' what's on your mind …? Or are you the kind that is good at persecuting the ‘little men' with trumped-up crimes?” Shi-wei went far beyond the issue of privilege, to the heart of darkness in the Party.
王实味又把更尖锐的思想写到墙报上。毛泽东允许墙报存在，给青年知识分子一个透气阀门，说话的园地。对毛来说，它的好处是读者有限，又很容易消失：风吹雨打，撕去覆盖，不像印刷品可以留起来。王实味在墙报文章里大声疾呼：“党内的正气必须发挥起来，邪气必须消灭”。“我们还需要首先检查自己的骨头。向自己发问：同志，你的骨头有毛病没有？你是不是对“大人物”(尤其是你的“上司”)有话不敢说？反之，你是不是对“小人物”很善于深文罗织？要了解，软骨病本身就是一种邪气，我们必须有至大至刚的硬骨头！”王实味已经不光是反对特权等级，而是鼓动人们“造反”了。
The poster with Shi-wei's words was hoisted outside the South Gate, the busiest place in the city. People flocked to read these few sentences, which articulated what many wanted to say but did not dare. Shi-wei became a hero.
王实味的墙报被贴在布上，高高地悬挂在南门外，延安最热闹的地区。文章不长，但人们从四面八方川流不息地赶来，看的就是那短短的几行字，那几行他们想说而不敢说的话。王实味成了大家心目中的英雄。
One night, Mao crossed the river to read the poster by the light of a barn lantern. There he saw the eager crowds and registered Shi-wei's enormous popularity. He said at once: “I now have a target.” He later complained: “Many people rushed from far away to … read his article. But no one wants to read mine!” “Wang Shi-wei was the king and lord master … he was in command in Yenan … and we were defeated …”
一天晚间，毛泽东打着马灯去看了王实味的墙报。他看到激动的人群，感到了王实味极大的号召力，当即决定狠整王实味。他后来说：“不少的人，从很远的地方跑到小鞭沟看他的文章，但没人看我的呀！，“王实味称王称霸”，“王实味在延安挂帅，他出墙报，引得南门外各地的人都去看，他是“总司令”，我们打了败仗。”
Mao decided to condemn Shi-wei as a way of scaring his sympathizers, the young volunteers. As he could not confront Shi-wei's points head-on, he denounced him as a Trotskyist. Some remarks that Shi-wei had made in private about Trotsky and Stalin were made public. Trotsky, Shi-wei had said, was “a genius,” while Stalin was “an unloveable person” who had “created untold countless evils” in the purges. The Moscow Trials he described as “dubious.” Shi-wei was sent to prison.
毛理屈词穷，只好给王实味冠以“托派”的罪名。王实味从前私下说过一些关于托洛茨基和斯大林的话，如说托洛茨基是个“天才”，“斯大林人性不可爱”，在苏联清党时“不知造就了多少罪恶”。这些话现在被公开扯出来批判。王实味被关押。
He spent the last years of his short life in solitary, where he was subjected to crushing pressure. In 1944, when some journalists from the Nationalist areas were allowed into Yenan, he was wheeled out to meet them and produced a robotic confession. “He said over and over again: ‘I'm a Trotskyite. I attacked Mao. I deserve to be executed … But Mao is so magnanimous … I am extremely grateful for his mercy.' ” One reporter observed: “When he mentioned his past ‘mistakes,' his expression was severe to the point of frightening … In my observation, his mind had been badly disturbed …”
他短暂生命的最后几年是在单独囚禁中度过的。一九四四年，国民党地区的记者来访延安，王实味被弄出来见他们，他们见到的是一个机器人。记者魏景蒙写道：“他重复说：“我是个托派。我攻击毛主席应该被处死””，“毛主席宽宏大量……我对他的仁慈感激不尽。”记者赵超构注意到他：“谈话的神情完全像演讲，时刻舞着手势以加强他的语气，说到他过去的“错误”，他的表情严肃到可怕。有时，竟是声色俱厉的……据我的观察，他的精神上所受的刺激，就在和我们会面的时候，也还是掩饰不了的。”
His interrogator later revealed the background: “He said what he was told to say. Of course, he had no option. Afterwards, he lay in bed in great anguish. He clenched his fists and showed extreme bitterness.” When the Communists evacuated Yenan in 1947, he was taken along—and executed en route. One night he was hacked to death, and thrown into a dry well. He was forty-one.
王实味的审讯者之一后来透露王实味说这番话是奉命，出于无奈，“他见了记者回来以后，非常恼火躺在床上，握紧拳头，表示了极大的不满”。一九四七年中共撤离延安时，王实味被带上，途中被处决。那是个漆黑的夜晚，他被大刀砍死，扔進一座枯井。那年他四十一岁。
AFTER MAO DESIGNATED Shi-wei as his prime target, meetings were held throughout the rest of 1942, at which the young volunteers were told to denounce him. Mao noticed that they expressed a lot of resistance. They were not sufficiently scared. He had to find another way to terrorize them.
一九四二年，拿王实味开刀后，毛杀鸡儆猴，要年轻的志愿者们参加一场场批判王实味的会。但毛发现他们没有被吓住。王实味毕竟跟托洛茨基主义有些瓜葛，而这些青年人很多连这个名字都没听说过。延安刚开始批托洛茨基时，为了帮助人们记住这个俄国名字，康生说：“你们可以记作“兔子吃鸡”。”
So Mao and his KGB chief Kang Sheng devised a blanket accusation—that the vast majority of Communist organizations in the Nationalist areas were spy rings working for Chiang Kai-shek. This assertion turned virtually all the young volunteers into spy suspects, because they had either belonged to one of these organizations, or had come to Yenan under their auspices. To back this accusation there was one single piece of “evidence”—the confession of a nineteen-year-old volunteer who had been deprived of sleep and worked over by the security forces for seven days and nights, at the end of which he produced what he was told to say.
“托派”这顶帽子对年轻志愿者们没有恫吓力，毛和康生另辟蹊径。那年冬天，他们指控大部分国民党地区的中共地下党组织是“红旗党”，打着红旗反红旗，是为蒋介石服务的特务集团。这下，几乎所有在延安的年轻志愿者都成了特务嫌疑犯。他们都曾是这些地下党的成员，或者是由这些组织介绍来延安的。为这个可怕罪名作依据的，只有一条口供，出自从甘肃地下党来的十九岁的党员张克勤。在七天七夜不让他睡觉、轮番审讯的情况下，他终于说出了审讯者提示他说的话：地下党是特务机构。
By deploying this charge, Mao found a way to place all the young volunteers in Yenan in one form of confinement or another for “screening,” starting in April 1943. Thousands were arrested and thrown into prison-caves newly carved out of the loess hillsides. In one prison alone, in the ravine behind the Date Garden—the site of the Chinese KGB, where Mao also lived—cells were dug for over 3,000 prisoners. Most of the rest were detained in their own institutions, which now became virtual prisons, sealed off and patrolled by guards. Mao gave orders that every organization must “place sentries and impose a curfew. Ban visitors and freedom of movement in or out.” The roles of jailers and interrogators were filled by those in each institution who were not suspects. These were mainly people who had not come from Nationalist areas, who were often a minority of the personnel, sometimes as few as 10–20 percent in any given institution.
就这么个藉口，毛泽东把几乎所有志愿者都当作特务嫌疑犯关起来。一九四三年四月，数千人被逮捕，关進黄土山深处为监禁他们新挖的窑洞。一处监狱坐落在中共克格勃(此时叫“社会部”)所在地枣园的后山沟里，可关三千多人。(毛有一住处也在那里。)被捕的还是少数，大多数人被关押在各自的机关或学校。所有单位全成了准监狱，封闭起来，由卫兵把守。毛命令各单位“实行放哨戒严，禁止会客及出入的自由”。做“狱卒”的是本单位的人，往往来自非国统区，通常只占一个单位人数的一两成。
Turning ordinary organizations into virtual prisons was a significant innovation of Mao's, which he was to apply throughout his rule. Here he went far beyond anything either Hitler or Stalin achieved: he converted people's colleagues into their jailers, with former colleagues, prisoners and jailers living in the same premises. (In Communist China, people's workplaces and living quarters were often the same.) In this way, Mao not only drove a massive wedge between people working and living side by side, he greatly enlarged the number of people directly involved in repression, including torture, making the orbit significantly wider than either Stalin or Hitler, who mostly used secret elites (KGB, Gestapo) that held their victims in separate and unseen locales.
把一般工作单位变成准监狱是毛的重要发明。在他未来的统治下，整个中国都将采用这种模式。在这件事上，他更胜希特勒、斯大林一筹，使同事一夜之间变成囚犯与狱吏。用这种方式，毛不仅让人与人之间充满可怕的紧张关系，还增加了直接参与镇压的人数，甚至施用刑法的人数。希特勒、斯大林搞这些肮脏事大多用的是秘密警察盖世太保(Gestapo)、克格勃，地点在一般人看不到的铁门后面。而毛的方式，不仅卷入的人多得多，也公开得多。
In incarceration, the young volunteers came under tremendous pressure to confess to being spies, and to denounce others—not really in order to find spies, but for the sake of inducing terror. Genuine spy-hunting was conducted secretly all the time by the security forces, using conventional methods. Any real suspects were “taken care of without fuss,” Mao's security assistant Shi Zhe told us, which often meant a speedy, secret and noiseless execution.*
关押后，志愿者们被逼着承认自己是特务，还必须咬别人是特务。这不是真正抓特务，而是制造恐惧。延安也在真抓特务，那是不露声色地在暗地里随时進行。据毛的助手师哲说，真正的特务嫌疑者“稍微发现有疑点就把他处理了”，常常是迅速、秘密、无声无息地处死。*
* 处死后有的尸体还派了用场。师哲写到参观一所医院，看见一个大槽，槽内用福尔马林浸泡着一具年约三十余岁的男尸。医院护士长告诉他：“这是医学解剖用的。原来有三具”，“他们都是反革命分子，是由康生批准处理的。”问：“他们被送来时是活人？”回答：“当然。以医病的名义送来，然后处理。”
The fake spy-hunting created the excuse for torture. Sleep deprivation was the standard technique, sometimes lasting as long as two weeks on end. There were also old-fashioned tortures like whipping, hanging by the wrists, and wrenching people's knees to breaking point (the “tiger-bench”); as well as psychological torment—from the threat of having poisonous snakes put in one's cave to mock execution. At night, amid the quiet of the hills, from inside the rows of caves screams of lacerating pain traveled far and wide, within earshot of most who lived in Yenan.
对志愿者所施的刑讯逼供，最常见的是不许睡觉，有时长达两个星期。也有吊打、坐老虎凳一类传统办法。还有心理恐吓，如吓唬说不招就把毒蛇放進窑洞，甚至假枪毙。在沉寂的夜里，远远近近的山沟，一排排一层层的窑洞，受刑者的惨叫声传遍延安。
Mao personally gave instructions about torture (which the regime euphemistically called bi-gong-xin, meaning use “force” to produce a “confession,” which then provides “reliable evidence”): “it is not good to correct it too early or too late,” he decreed on 15 August 1943. “Too early … the campaign cannot unfold properly; and too late … the damage [to torture victims] will be too profound. So the principle should be to watch meticulously and correct at the appropriate time.” Mao wanted his victims to be in good enough shape to serve his purposes.
毛泽东亲自发出指示怎样用刑效果最佳，当然不是直说“用刑”，而是用委婉名词“逼供信”。一九四三年八月十五日，他说：运动中“一定会犯逼供信错误”，“纠正太早与纠正太迟都不好，太早则无的放矢，妨碍运动的开展，太迟则造成错误，损伤元气；故以精密注意，适时纠正为原则。”毛这样仔细，是因为他需要受刑者将来继续为他服务。
For month after month, life in Yenan centered on interrogations—and terrifying mass rallies, at which some young volunteers were forced to confess to being spies and to name others in front of large crowds who had been whipped into a frenzy. People who were named were then hoisted onto the platform and pressed to admit their guilt. Those who stuck to their innocence were trussed up on the spot and dragged away to prison, and some to mock execution, amidst hysterical slogan-screaming. The fear generated by these rallies was unbearable. A close colleague of Mao's remarked at the time that the rallies were “an extremely grave war on nerves. To some people, they are more devastating than any kind of torture.”
与关押受刑相结合的是歇斯底里的坦白大会。志愿者们一个个被推到台上，强迫承认自己是特务，“检举”他们的同志。被检举的跟着被揪上台去，逼着认罪。在台下一片震耳欲聋的凶狠的口号声中，不肯认罪的被当场捆起来拖走，押進监狱，或是上假枪毙的刑场。毛说这些坦白大会使人“恐慌到极度”。任弼时说，坦白大会“是一种极严重的神经战，在某种意义上对某些人来讲，甚至比任何刑法还厉害”。
Outside the interrogations and rallies, people were pounded flat at indoctrination meetings.* All forms of relaxation, like singing and dancing, were stopped. The only moments alone afforded no peace either, consumed as they were in writing “thought examinations”—a practice hitherto known only in fascist Japan. “Get everybody to write their thought examination,” Mao ordered, “and write three times, five times, again and again … Tell everyone to spill out every single thing they have ever harboured that is not so good for the Party.”
日复一日，月复一月，延安生活的中心是审讯和受审，一个接一个的坦白大会，还有各种改造思想会议。用开不完的洗脑会来摧毁人的意志，将成为毛泽东统治的一大组成部分。所有休闲娱乐，像唱歌跳舞，都被停止。仅有的一点点个人独处时间也不得安宁，那是写“思想检查”的时候。毛命令：“发动各人写思想自传，可三番五次地写，以写好为度”。“叫各人将一切对不住党的事通通讲出来。”
In addition, everybody was told to write down information passed unofficially by other people—termed “small broadcasts” by the regime. “You had to write down what X or Y had said,” one Yenan veteran told us, “as well as what you yourself had said which was supposed to be not so good. You had to dig into your memory endlessly and write endlessly. It was most loathsome.” The criteria for “not so good” were kept deliberately vague, so that out of fear, people would err on the side of including more.
毛还要知道每个人都从哪些管道听到了，或向谁传播了，什么非官方的消息，把这些统统叫作“小广播”，下令每人都要填“小广播”表。经历过延安整风的李锐告诉我们：“很讨厌的，你要写听说过对党不利的话没有，张三讲的，李四讲的，我自己跟谁讲过什么不好的话，也要交代清楚。而且不止填一次，不断挖，不断写，不断填。小广播表栏，起了很坏的作用。”表上到底填什么，何谓“不好的话”， 故意不下准确定义，使人们在害怕心理支配下尽量多写。有个人吓得填了足足八百条。
Many tried to resist. But any sign of doing so was considered “proof” that the person resisting was a spy, on the specious grounds that: “If you are innocent, there should be nothing that cannot be reported to the Party.” The concept of privacy could not be evoked, because a Communist was required to reject the private. One man at the Administration College, which was the place where aversion was most outspoken, took a small but brave step to protest by quipping: “Do we have to write down our pillow talk with our wives at night?,” which aroused chuckles all round. Naturally, the man and most others there were “found” to be spies. “Apart from one [sic] person, all teachers and administration staff are spies” in this college, Mao announced on 8 August 1943, and “many of the students are spies, too, probably more than half.” Under this kind of pressure, one man wrote down no fewer than 800 items of conversation in a frantic attempt to get off the hook.
抵制一概被当作特务的证据：“你既然没什么见不得人的，为什么不能向党汇报呢？”人们无法用隐私权来自卫，共产党人摒弃一切私有制。有个行政学院，里面的反抗情绪最高，在命令填“小广播”表的大会上有人发问：“是否晚上与老婆讲的话也要填？”引起全场窃笑。结果是发问者以及学院的大多数人都成了特务。毛泽东在一九四三年八月八日宣布：行政学院“除了一个人以外，教员、职员全部是特务”，“学生中很多是特务，恐怕是过半数。”
Through forcing people to report “small broadcasts,” Mao succeeded to a very large extent in getting people to inform on each other. He thus broke trust between people, and scared them off exchanging views not just at the time in Yenan, but in the future too. By suppressing “small broadcasts,” he also plugged what was virtually the only unofficial source of information, in a context where he completely controlled all other channels. No outside press was available, and no one had access to a radio. Nor could letters be exchanged with the outside world, including one's family: any communication from a Nationalist area was evidence of espionage. Information starvation gradually induced brain death—assisted vastly by the absence of any outlet for thinking, since one could not communicate with anyone, or put one's thoughts on paper, even privately. During the campaign, people were put under pressure to hand in their diaries. In many a mind, there also lurked the fear of thinking, which appeared not only futile but also dangerous. Independent thinking withered away.
通过填“小广播”表，毛成功地让人们互相告密，撕断了人与人之间的信任纽带，没人再敢对他人发表意见。人们既然不敢传播小道消息了，毛也就卡住了唯一的非官方讯息管道，而所有的官方管道都紧紧地攥在他的手中。在延安，外部世界的报纸、电台、信件都不允许，甚至跟家人通信也很危险。讯息的枯竭带来大脑的僵化，僵化又朝僵死变去。既不能同别人商讨，又不能诉诸白纸黑字，私下写一写也怕。为了表示清白，日记被纷纷交了出去。人们不仅不敢说，连想都不敢想。
Two years of this type of indoctrination and terror turned the lively young volunteers from passionate exponents of justice and equality into robots. When outside journalists were allowed into Yenan for the first time after many years in June 1944, a Chongqing correspondent observed an eerie uniformity: “if you ask the same question of twenty or thirty people, from intellectuals to workers [on any topic] their replies are always more or less the same … Even questions about love, there seems to be a point of view that has been decided by meetings.” And, not surprisingly, “they unanimously and firmly deny the Party had any direct control over their thoughts.”
经过两年的恐吓和洗脑，志愿者们脱胎换骨了，从前充满激情要为公正平等的理想献身，如今演变成机器人。一九四四年六月，当延安关闭多年后外面的记者第一次获准来访时，重庆记者赵超构观察到：“以同一的问题，问过二三十个人，从知识分子到工人，他们的答语，几乎是一致的。不管你所问的，是关于希特勒和东条，还是生活问题，政治问题，他们所答覆的内容，总是“差不多”。”“但是，他们一致坚决否认党和政府对他们的思想有直接的管制”。
The journalist felt “stifled” by “the air of nervous intensity.” “Most people,” he noticed, “had very earnest faces and serious expressions. Among the big chiefs, apart from Mr. Mao Tse-tung who often has a sense of humour, and Mr. Chou En-lai who is very good at chatting, the others rarely crack a joke.”
赵感到延安的空气“几乎使人窒息”。在边区时从无机会使我们解放开来大笑一场。我们看到的延安人大都是正正经经的脸孔，郑重的表情，要人之中，除了毛泽东先生时有幽默的语调，周恩来先生颇善谈天之外，其余的人就很少能说一两个笑话来调换空气的。”
Helen Snow, wife of Edgar Snow, told us that in 1937, when she was in Yenan, people could still say things like “There goes God” behind Mao's back. But seven years on, no one dared to say anything remotely so flippant. Mao had not only banned irony and satire (officially, since spring 1942), but criminalized humor itself. The regime invented a new catch-all offense—“Speaking Weird Words”—under which anything from skepticism to complaining to simply wise-cracking could lead to being labeled a spy.
斯诺夫人海伦对我们说，一九三七年她在延安时，人们还爱说笑话，看见毛泽东走过后有人还挤挤眼说：“上帝走了。”七年后，没人再敢这么说了。冷嘲热讽，幽默，说俏皮话，发牢骚，都可能被打成“特务”。
Mao had decided that he did not want active, willing cooperation (willingness, after all, could be withdrawn). He did not want volunteers. He needed a machine, so that when he pressed the button, all its cogs would operate in unison. And he got it.
毛要的不是志愿者，不是自愿投入的志愿者。既有自愿，就可能不自愿。毛要的是机器人，一按电钮，就按他的意志开动。他的目标实现了。
BY EARLY 1944 Russia was on the offensive against Germany, and Mao could look to it entering the war against Japan. After Japan was defeated, Mao would need cadres to fight Chiang Kai-shek, so he now began to tone down the terror.
一九四四年初，苏联在对德战场上進行大反攻，有望参与对日战争。打败了日本，苏联就会帮毛打蒋介石夺江山了。到那时，毛将需要大批干部。延安整风开始降温。
The victims remained locked up, still living in uncertainty and torment, while the security forces began to examine their cases, to see whether there were any genuine spy suspects at all from among the mountains of coerced confessions—a process that was predictably long and slow. But one thing the apparatus was sure of from the start: that true spy suspects were far less than 1 percent of the young volunteers.
中共情报机关此时着手甄别，看山一样高的口供材料中，会有多少事实，到底有没有真正的特务。这个过程很缓慢，饱受磨难的人们仍然不得自由，活在惴惴不安的痛苦里。有一点情报机关从一开头就能肯定：真正的特务嫌疑者不到志愿者的百分之一。
At this time, Mao ordered other Red bases to start their spy-hunting, replicating the Yenan model. He specifically warned them not to get into examining individual cases just because Yenan was doing so. All must go through the full cycle of terrorization. To spur them to whip up the same kind of frenzy as in Yenan, Mao inflated his KGB's estimate of the proportion of spy suspects from 1 percent to 10 percent, claiming, falsely, that Yenan had uncovered a plethora of spies through his method.
其他根据地此时开始“抓特务”。毛要这些地区负责人从头做起，把刑讯、坦白大会等一一过一遍。毛把情报机关关于特务嫌疑者不到百分之一的估计放大十倍，变成百分之十，声称延安“清出大批特务”。
It was not until another year elapsed, in spring 1945, that Mao ordered a wholesale rehabilitation of the victims. By then, he knew that Russia would be entering the war against Japan; soon he would be fighting for control of all of China, and he needed cadres fast.
又一年过去了。一九四五年春，毛确切得知苏联将参与对日战争，立刻宣布大批解放受害者。
The young volunteers, who numbered many tens of thousands in Yenan alone, had been through a hell of mental confusion and anguish. There had been many breakdowns—some lifelong. People who lived through Yenan remembered seeing caves in valleys crammed with people “many of whom had gone mad. Some were laughing wildly, some crying,” producing “screams and howls like wolves every night.”
这些人中，不少已精神失常。中共元老薄一波回忆道：“那时我母亲也同我一起到了延安，我把她安置在深沟的一个窑洞居住。有一天我去看她时，她说：“这里不好住，每天晚上鬼哭狼嚎，不知道怎么回事。”我于是向深沟里走去，一查看，至少有六七个窑洞，关着约上百人，有许多人神经失常。问他们为什么？有的大笑，有的哭泣……最后，看管人才无可奈何地告我：“他们都是“抢救”的知识分子，是来延安学习而遭到“抢救”的！””(当时把逼人承认是特务叫作“抢救”他们。)
The number who perished could be in the thousands. For many, suicide was the only way to end their ordeal. Some jumped off cliffs, others into wells. Those with children and spouses often killed them first. Repeat attempts were common: one physics teacher failed when he swallowed match heads (which were poisonous), then hanged himself, successfully. Survivors of suicide attempts were hounded mercilessly. One who had swallowed broken glass was brought back to life and immediately told to “write self-criticisms.”
死去的有上千人。自杀往往是唯一的解脱。有的跳城墙，有的跳井，有的把妻子孩子杀死然后自杀。自杀几次才终于死去的为数不少，一个物理教师先吞火柴头未死，再悬梁自尽。自杀未遂的人受到的无情待遇，从三五九旅政工干部王恩茂的日记中可见一斑：“要一个同志来谈话，因他坦白后大翻供，吃了一把碎玻璃，实行自杀，督促他写检讨材料。”
Suicide was sometimes also used as a way to stage a protest—in one case becoming a double protest. When one detainee killed himself by jumping off a cliff, his classmates buried him opposite the residence of his interrogators, one of whom registered the import of the gesture: the ghost will come back to haunt you!
自杀也是抗议的最激烈形式。一个受害者跳崖死去以后，他的同志们把尸体埋在审判官的窑洞对面，含义很清楚：让死者的魂灵天天纠缠你们！
As one official put it in a letter to the leadership in March 1945, the young volunteers had been dealt “a heavy blow to their revolutionary enthusiasm … the wounds carved in their minds and hearts are very deep indeed.” All the same, Mao was confident he could rely on these people to serve him. However unhappy they might be, they were trapped in the Communist organization, and it was extraordinarily hard for them to leave, psychologically as well as physically. In the absence of options, many fell back on their faith, which made it easier for them to rationalize sacrifice.
据中共负责青年工作的蒋南翔在一九四五年三月给中央的信，“此次抢救运动，是在知识分子党员心理上投下了一道浓厚的阴影，是相当沉重地打击了党内相当广大的新知识分子党员的革命热情……很多人都明显或不明显地流露出一种灰暗的心情，革命的锐气、青年的進取心，大大降落了。甚至有少数同志消沉失望，到了丧失信心的程度。”
Mao adroitly exploited their idealism, convincing them to accept their maltreatment as part of “Serving the People” (a snappy expression he coined now, and which later acquired fame), and as a noble experience, soul-cleansing for the mission of saving China.
但是毛泽东毫不发愁，这些人会继续为他服务，不管他们多么痛苦。他们已经陷在中共组织的这张网里出不去了。在别无选择的情况下，人们只好依靠信念过下去，为了过下去，信念反而更加强烈。毛很精明地利用他们的理想主义，说他们经历的一切冤屈都是为了救国大业所必受的考验，是崇高的、洗涤灵魂的牺牲。“为人民服务”就要有牺牲，毛说。以后人人皆知的这句话就是在此时被大加张扬的。
To defuse the bitterness that clung on in many hearts, Mao performed a few public “apologies” in spring 1945 before he sent his victims to the front to battle Chiang Kai-shek. What he typically did was to take off his cap and bow or salute his audience. But he would carefully present his apology as generously taking responsibility for others (“On behalf of the Centre, I apologise …”), and spread the blame—even to the victims themselves. “The whole of Yenan committed mistakes,” he averred. “The intention was to give you a nice bath, but too much potassium permanganate [used to kill lice] was put in, and your delicate skin was hurt.” This last remark implied that the victims had been too pampered and were easily hurt. Sophistry flowed liberally from Mao's lips: “We were fighting the enemy in the dark, and so wounded our own people.” Or even: “It was like a father beating his sons. So please don't bear grudges.” “Please just get up, dust the mud off your clothes and fight on.”
毛要把受害者们送上前线打蒋介石了。为了缓解他们的怨气、怒气，他在一九四五年春天作了几次公开道歉。在大会上，他或是摘下帽子鞠躬，或是举手敬礼。但他的道歉总是措辞巧妙，好像是在替人受过：“我代表中央道歉”，“整个延安犯了许多错误”。一场整得人死去活来的灾难被轻描淡写一笔带过：“这次延安审干，本来是让你们洗个澡，结果灰锰氧放多了，把你们娇嫩的皮肤烫伤了。”“黑夜里的白刀战，误伤了自己的同志。”“好多人摔了一跤，希望爬起来，把身上灰拍拍干净，继续工作。”毛还以老子自居，说：“老子打了儿子，就不要记仇了。”
At such moments, the audiences were usually in tears, tears which were a mixture of resignation and of relief. Most went on fighting for a system that had cruelly wronged them. After they had helped Mao come to power, they would function as part of the machine that ground down the entire population of China. Mao built this machine not through inspiration or magnetism, but fundamentally through terror.
毛说这些话时，听众常常流着眼泪，无可奈何的眼泪，一口气终于松下来了的眼泪。他们中的大多数继续为共产党战斗，为这个残酷地冤屈他们的制度战斗。他们帮着把毛送進紫禁城后，又整体地成为毛用来控制压制中国人民的机器。毛创造这架机器不是靠感召，不是靠磁力，归根结底靠的是恐怖。所谓“延安整风”，更恰当的名称应当是“延安恐怖”。
During what can be called the Yenan Terror, the whole Party was worked over, even those members who did not become outright victims themselves. These were invariably coerced into denouncing others—colleagues, friends, even spouses—which caused lasting trauma to themselves as well as to the victims. Everyone who attended a rally witnessed haunting sights, involving people they knew, and lived with the fear that the next victim might be oneself. The relentless invasion of privacy, being forced to write endless “thought examinations,” brought further stress. Mao was to say over a decade later that he did not just stamp on 80 percent of the Party—“it was in fact 100 percent, and by force, too.”
所有党员都在不同程度上被整了一遍，包括那些没有直接受害的人。他们得被迫揭发他人：同事、朋友、丈夫、妻子，心灵上跟受害者一样受到永久性伤害。人人都得参加坦白大会，目睹可怕的场面。人人都生活在恐惧中，害怕下一个轮到自己。无穷无尽的“思想检查”对每个人的隐私都横加践踏。多年后毛声称：在整风中他并不只是整了百分之八十的人，“其实是百分之一百”，而且“是强迫”。毛泽东就是这样建立起了他的权力基础。
MAO NOW HAD in his hands a formidable tool for use against Chiang Kai-shek. One supreme accomplishment of the terror campaign was to squeeze out every drop of information about any link whatever with the Nationalists. Mao introduced a special “Social Relationship” form: “Tell everyone to write down every single social relationship of any kind [our italics].” At the end of the campaign, the regime compiled a dossier on every Party member. The result was that Mao knew every channel the Nationalists might use to infiltrate in the forthcoming showdown. Indeed, during the civil war, while the Nationalists were penetrated like sieves, they had virtually zero success infiltrating the Communists. Mao had forged a machine that was virtually watertight.
在整风中，毛命令每个党员填“社会关系表”，把“本人历史上各种社会关系通通填上去”。于是人人都有了一大摞档案，毛从此掌握了国民党可能渗透中共的几乎每一管道，并且着手堵死这些管道。在即将爆发的全面内战里，国民党像一面筛子任共产党渗透，而共产党却是钻不進的铁板一块。
Mao also prepared a “no-questions-asked” anti-Chiang force by fomenting hatred of Chiang. When most of the young volunteers joined up, the CCP was not at war with the Nationalists, and many did not hate Chiang the way Mao wanted them to. As Mao said, “Some people think the Nationalist Party is very good, very pretty.” One senior official noted at the time that “new cadres cherish extremely big illusions about Chiang, while old cadres have weakened their class hatred” for the Generalissimo. Chiang was the undisputed leader of China's war against Japan. It was Chiang who got America and Britain to retrocede their territorial concessions (except Hong Kong) in 1943—an historic event for which even Mao felt obliged to order grand celebrations. And it was under Chiang that China was accepted as one of “the Big Four,” along with America, Russia and Britain. China's permanent seat and veto on the UN Security Council, which Mao eventually inherited, were acquired thanks to Chiang.
整风的过程，就是准备全面内战的过程。当初年轻志愿者们参加中共，为的是抗日，不少人并不恨蒋。如毛所说：很多人“觉得国民党很好，很漂亮”。王恩茂的日记记载：“老干部抗战后减弱了阶级仇恨，新干部对于蒋介石都有极大幻想”。
At the time, Chiang was generally regarded as the nation-builder of modern China, who had done away with the warlords and unified the country—and led the war against Japan. Mao had to smash this image. In the terror campaign, he ordered the Party to be “re-educated” on the question: “Who is the nation-builder of China: the Nationalists or the CCP?” The corollary of the drive to break Chiang's image was to create the myth that Mao was the founder of modern China.
蒋介石当时是全国公认的抗战领袖。他与美、英在一九四三年签订了废除不平等条约的协定，使美、英放弃了在华特权(除香港外)。这是一个历史性的重大事件，就连毛也不得不在延安举行庆祝大会。蒋介石还使中国成为四强之一，跟美、英、苏并列，做了联合国安理会具有否决权的常任理事。
Mao manufactured the fault-lines and hate-lines against Chiang through his “spy hunt” campaign, in which it was spying for the Nationalists, not for the Japanese, that was made the key issue, sometimes identifying the Nationalists with the Japanese by vague assimilation. It was via the terror campaign that Mao turned Chiang into the enemy of the average Communist.
毛利用整风抹黑蒋介石，成功地制造了对蒋介石的仇恨。抓特务是抓蒋介石派来的特务，所谓“日本特务”也说是为蒋介石服务的。毛就这样为打蒋奠定了心理基础。
TO STIR UP anti-Chiang fervor in the CCP, Mao cogitated another “massacre” by the Nationalists like the one involving the New 4th Army HQ two years before. This time the sacrificial victims included his only surviving brother, Tse-min.
Tse-min had been working in Xinjiang, in the far northwest, which had been a Russian satellite for years. In 1942 the warlord there turned against the Reds. Sensing that their lives were in danger, Tse-min and the other regional CCP leaders cabled Mao repeatedly asking to be evacuated. But they were told to stay put. In early 1943, Tse-min and more than 140 other Communists and their families, including his wife and son, and a girl Mao had called his “daughter,” Si-qi (Mao's future daughter-in-law), were imprisoned.
在这期间，新疆发生了一件事。一九四二年，新疆统治者盛世才怀疑苏联和中共阴谋暗杀他，跟苏联翻了脸。苏军撤走，中共在新疆的人员，包括毛唯一活着的弟弟泽民，都面临生命危险。他们再三请求延安让他们离开，毛令他们继续留下。一九四三年初，盛世才把毛泽民跟一百四十多名中共党员、家属关了起来，其中有泽民的妻子和儿子毛远新，还有毛的干女儿(也是未来的媳妇)刘思齐。
As the warlord had gone over to Chongqing, the obvious thing to do was for the CCP's liaison, Chou En-lai, to ask for their release from the Nationalist government, which is what the Russians urged Chou to do. The CCP leadership collectively (in the name of the Secretariat) also asked Chou to do this on 10 February. Two days later, on the 12th, Mao sent Chou a separate cable, signed only by him, with the agenda for talks with the Nationalists; the release of the Xinjiang group was not on it. Chou, by now taking orders from Mao alone, did not raise the matter of the Xinjiang group in his many meetings with the Nationalists.
因为盛世才现在听命于蒋介石，莫斯科一再要中共驻重庆代表周恩来向蒋介石交涉释放他们。中共中央书记处在二月十日集体给周恩来打电报要他同蒋交涉。可是，毛紧接着在二月十二日单独给周发了一封电报，列出同国民党交涉的具体内容，只字不提释放新疆被捕者。于是，周恩来在同国民党代表的一系列会见、谈判中，也就没有提出这一要求。
Lin Biao was in Chongqing at the time, and on 16 June he got to a meeting with Russian ambassador Panyushkin ahead of Chou, and told Panyushkin that Chou had not done anything, and that “orders” had come from “Yenan.” When Chou turned up, he started claiming he had written to Chiang some three months before, but had had no reply. At this point, Panyushkin reported to Moscow, Lin Biao “sat hanging his head.” Chou was obviously lying. In fact, Chou and Lin had seen Chiang only days before, on the 7th, when Chiang had been friendly and Chou had said nothing about his imprisoned comrades in Xinjiang.
林彪那时跟周恩来一道在重庆。六月十六日，他比周恩来先一步到苏联大使馆去跟潘友新大使开会。他告诉潘友新，周恩来根据毛的指示，没有向国民党提出释放新疆被捕人员的事。周恩来到后，潘友新问他，周说他在三个月前就给蒋介石写了信，但一直没有回音。潘友新向莫斯科报告说：周说这番话时，林彪“坐在那儿，头深深地垂着”， 周显然在撒谎。事实上，周和林几天前(六月七日)刚跟蒋介石会了面，蒋介石十分友好，但周恩来只字未提释放新疆被捕人员的要求。
为什么毛指示周恩来不提释放新疆被捕人员的要求？会不会是他有意促成一次 类似皖南事变那样的大屠杀，以激起共产党人对蒋介石的仇恨？
The upshot was that Mao's brother Tse-min and two other senior CCP figures were executed on 27 September on charges of plotting a coup. But with so few deaths—only three—Mao was unable to cry “Massacre.” He did not make any announcement condemning the executions, either, as this might raise questions about whether the Communists were indeed guilty as charged.* For years, Tse-min's death remained a public non-event.
毛泽民和两个中共高干在九月二十七日以阴谋武装暴动颠覆政府的罪名被处决。新疆的其他被捕者后来经蒋介石批准释放，返回延安。二十年后的文化大革命中，他们被打成“新疆一百三十一人叛徒集团”。
*Mao knew the German invasion was coming, and when, to within a matter of hours, and had alerted the Kremlin. Comintern chief Dimitrov records in his diary the tip-off from the CCP saying: “Germany will attack the USSR … the date—21 June 1941!” (bold in Dimitrov original). This is the only such warning singled out. This information had been acquired by CCP moles. When the Germans did invade on the 22nd, the Kremlin belatedly acknowledged the CCP's help, although it seems it discounted the warning.
*This project is known as zheng-feng, usually translated as “Rectification Campaign.”
*Executions sometimes served other functions. Shi Zhe recounted visiting a hospital where he was shown a big basin: “inside was a male corpse, aged about thirty, soaked in formaldehyde.” Hospital staff told him they had needed corpses for dissection, and “Kang Sheng authorised us” to kill three “counter-revolutionaries” for medical purposes.
*Using exhausting meetings to bend—and break—people was to solidify into an integral part of Mao's rule.
*The other detainees, including Tse-min's wife and their son Yuan-xin, were released later, with the Generalissimo's authorization.