27 THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING!
27 苏联红军终于来了
(1945–46 AGE 51–52)
1945～1946 年 51～52 岁
IN FEBRUARY 1945, at Yalta in the Crimea, Stalin confirmed to Roosevelt and Churchill that Russia would enter the Pacific War two or three months after Germany's defeat. This meant the Soviet army would enter China, and thus give Mao his long-awaited chance to take the country. Mao had made a shrewd assessment as far back as 1923: communism, he had said then, “had to be brought into China from the north by the Russian army.” Now, twenty-two years later, this was about to become reality.
一九四五年二月，在苏联克里米亚半岛上的雅尔塔(Yalta)，斯大林向罗斯福和丘吉尔承诺，苏联将在打败德国之后两到三个月内参加太平洋战争。这意味着苏联红军将大举進入中国，这是毛梦寐以求的。早在一九二三年，他就清醒地指出：中共要上台“得由俄国军队从北边带進来。”二十二年后，这个预言即将变为现实。
Stalin did not have to persuade Roosevelt and Churchill to let him tail-end on the war against Japan. They wanted him involved. At the time, the US atomic bomb had not been tested, and the feeling was that Soviet entry would hasten the defeat of Japan and save Allied lives. The two Western leaders accepted Stalin's demands for “compensation,” neither seeming to realize that Stalin needed no inducement at all to come in. They agreed not only to accept “the status quo” in Outer Mongolia (in effect, allowing Stalin to keep it), but to turn the clock back decades and restore the Tsarist privileges in China, including extraterritorial control over the Chinese Eastern Railway and two major ports in Manchuria.*
罗斯福和丘吉尔唯恐斯大林不参战，接受了斯大林的要求，承认苏联占有外蒙古的“现状”，恢复沙俄在中国的特权，让苏联控制中东路、旅顺、大连。* 这两位西方领袖没有意识到，同斯大林根本无须做交易，斯大林早就想挤進来。斯大林将以对日作战为藉口侵占中国大片领土，为毛泽东夺权创造条件。雅尔塔会议之后不久的二月十八日，斯大林的这一意向由苏联《消息报》反映出来：莫斯科“在解决远东问题的时候会把中共利益考虑在内”。
* 雅尔达协定说这些“赔偿”是日本欠苏联的，事实上肉是从中国身上剜的。邱吉尔说：“俄国人从中国拿赔偿只会对我们保持香港有利。”尽管这些条款事关中国领土，但中国政府却被蒙在鼓里。美国说由它来告诉蒋介石，可是答应斯大林，斯大林什么时候让它说它才说。这样一来，蒋介石一直到四个月后的六月十五日才从美国那儿得到协定的全文。
Stalin used the excuse of fighting Japan, at the very last minute, to invade China and create the conditions for Mao to seize power. A hint came right after Yalta, on 18 February, when Russia's governmental mouthpiece, Izvestia, wrote of Moscow's “desire to solve the Far Eastern problem taking due account of the interests of the Chinese Communists.”
Mao was ecstatic, and his goodwill towards the Russians extended to their sex lives. Within days, he was trying to fix them up. “Haven't you liked a single pretty woman here?” Mao asked Russian liaison Vladimirov on 26 February. “Don't be shy …” He returned to the theme a week later: “Well, there are attractive girls, aren't there? And extremely healthy. Don't you think so? Maybe Orlov would like to look around for one? And maybe you, too, have an eye for someone?”
毛兴奋已极。怎么感谢苏联人呢？他想起他们驻延安代表的性生活。二月二十六日，他对孙平说：“这里的漂亮姑娘你一个都不喜欢吗？不要不好意思嘛。”三月五日他又再次提起：“怎么，这儿动人的女孩子还是有的嘛？”“身体也健康。对不对？也许阿洛夫大夫想找一个？你呢？看上了谁了？”
Vladimirov wrote:
当天孙平在日记里写道：
towards evening a girl appeared … She shyly greeted me, saying she had come to tidy up the house …
傍晚时分，一个女孩子出现了……她害羞地跟我打招呼，说她是来收拾房间的……
I took out a stool, and placed it under our only tree, near the wall. She sat down, tense, but smiling. Then she amiably answered my questions, and was all the while waiting cautiously, her legs crossed, small slender legs in woven slippers …
我搬了把板凳，放在屋外墙边唯一的一棵树下。她坐下来，紧张，也微微笑着。她和婉地回答我的问题，一边小心地等待着，两条腿交叉着，穿着布鞋的娇小玲珑的腿……
She was a smashing girl, indeed!
她真可爱极了！
… she told me she was a university student, just enrolled. How young she was …
她告诉我她是个大学生，刚参加共产党。她真年轻啊。
On 5 April, Moscow told Tokyo it was breaking their Neutrality Pact. One month later Germany surrendered. This came right in the middle of the CCP congress that ratified Mao's supremacy. Mao fired up the delegates with the sense that victory was imminent for the CCP as well. The Soviet army would definitely come to help them, he said, and then, with a big smile, he put the side of his hand to his neck like an ax head, and announced: “If not, you can chop my head off!” Mao delivered the most effusive comments he ever made about Stalin in his entire life. “Is Stalin the leader of the world revolution? Of course he is.” “Who is our leader? It is Stalin. Is there a second person? No.” “Every member of our Chinese Communist Party is Stalin's pupil,” Mao intoned. “Stalin is the teacher to us all.”
四月五日，苏联通知日本废除苏日中立条约。一个月后德国投降。消息传来正开“七大”， 毛用中共胜利在望的前景激励与会代表，对他们说苏联军队一定会来的。他语意深长地笑着，手掌砍在脖子上说：“国际援助一定要来，如果不来，杀我的脑袋！”毛反覆提到斯大林，其感激之情溢于言表，赞颂讴歌的浓度在他一生中空前绝后。他自问自答：“斯大林是不是领导着世界革命？当然领导”。“领袖是谁？是斯大林。有没有第二个人？没有了”。毛宣布：“我们中国共产党的每一个人，都是斯大林的学生……他是我们的先生”。
AT TEN PAST MIDNIGHT on 9 August 1945, three days after America dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, over 1.5 million Soviet and Mongolian troops swept into China along a huge front stretching more than 4,600 km, from the shores of the Pacific to the province of Chahar—far wider than the European front from the Baltic to the Adriatic. In April, Mao had ordered those of his troops who were near the Russian points of entry to be ready to “fight in coordination with the Soviet Union.” As soon as the Russo-Mongolian army entered China, Mao went to work around the clock dispatching troops to link up with them and seize the territory they rolled over. He moved his office to an auditorium at Date Garden, where he received a stream of military commanders, drafting telegrams on a Ping-Pong table he used as a desk, pausing only to wolf down food.
一九四五年八月九日午夜之后十分钟，美国在广岛投下第一颗原子弹的三天后，一百五十万苏蒙联军在四千六百公里的边境线上开進中国，从东北到察哈尔，比整个从波罗的海到亚得里亚海的欧洲战线还长。毛泽东在四月就下令中共靠近外蒙的军队准备“配合苏军作战”。苏军一入境，他便昼夜工作，调兵遗将，把苏军席卷而过的土地接管过来。毛把办公室搬到枣园小礼堂，接见川流不息的各地应召前来的将领。一张乒乓球台成了他的办公桌，上面摆着笔墨纸砚，在那里他起草电报，一挥而就地写委任状。得空时抓起桌上的瓜果馅饼等当饭吃，吃得如风卷残云。
Under the Yalta agreements, before entering China, Russia was supposed to sign a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, but it stormed in anyway without one. A week after the Russians invaded, with their army driving hundreds of kilometers into China, Chiang's foreign minister reluctantly put his signature on a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which formally severed Outer Mongolia from China. Chiang compromised in return for the Russians recognizing him as the sole legitimate government of China and promising to hand back all the territory they occupied to him and only to him.
根据雅尔塔协定，苏联军队進入中国以前要跟蒋介石签个条约，取得蒋的认可。蒋介石不愿意签条约，因为条约承认外蒙古独立，在旅顺、大连等问题上损害中国主权。但苏军在没有条约的情况下就進来了。一个星期以后，苏军已经入侵中国境内几百公里，蒋介石的外交部长王世杰只好勉强在《中苏友好同盟条约》上签字。蒋不得不同意签，因为他怕没有条约约束，斯大林会毫无顾忌地把苏军占领的地盘交给中共，而条约规定苏联承认他为中国唯一的合法政府，许诺把全部占领土地都交给他。
In spite of his promise, Stalin found myriad ways to assist Mao. His first ploy was to refuse to commit to a timetable for withdrawal. He made a verbal promise to withdraw his troops within three months, but refused to incorporate this in the agreement; and it was attached only as a non-binding “minute.” In fact, Stalin was to stay much longer than three months, and was to use the period of occupation to thwart Chiang and secretly transfer territory and assets to Mao.*
当然斯大林无意遵守诺言。为了帮助毛接管，他尽量拖长占领时间，说是三个月撤军，但拒绝把这一条写進条约里。苏军占领时期远远超过三个月，这期间斯大林用各种办法阻挠蒋介石接管。斯大林甚至想过把内蒙古从中国割走，苏联占领军成立了内蒙古临时政府，准备跟外蒙占合并。这个计划最终放弃了。
Japan surrendered on 15 August. The occasion was greeted in China with firecrackers and street parties, tears and toasts, drums and gongs. Most of China had been at war for eight years, and some regions for fourteen years. During that time at least one-third of the population had been occupied by the Japanese. Tens of millions of Chinese had died, untold millions had been crippled, and more than 95 million people—the largest number in history—had been made refugees. People yearned for peace.
日本是八月十五日投降的。这一天中国人用鞭炮、狂欢、眼泪、祝酒和敲锣打鼓来庆贺。战火在中国烧了八年，有的地方达十四年，使千百万中国人死亡、伤残，制造的难民多达九千五百万，为世界之最。中国人渴望和平。
What they got instead was an all-engulfing nationwide civil war, which broke out in earnest at once. In this, Stalin was right behind Mao; in fact, the Russians did not stop their drive south when Japan surrendered, but pressed on for several weeks afterwards. The area Russian troops moved into in northern China was larger than the entire territory they occupied in Eastern Europe. Russian paratroopers landed as far west as Baotou, the railhead due north of Mao's base, some 750 km west of the Manchurian border. By the end of August, with Russian help, the CCP had occupied much of Chahar and Jehol provinces, including their capitals, Zhangjiakou and Chengde, both only some 150 km from Peking, to the northwest and northeast respectively. For a while Mao planned to move his capital to Kalgan, and camel trains carrying documents and luggage set off thither from Yenan.
等待他们的，却是立即爆发的全面内战。日本投降后，苏军仍不停地向南推進，一连好几个星期，占领的中国北部领土超过苏联在东欧所占全部土地的总和。苏联伞兵空降到东北西面七百五十公里的包头，靠近陕甘宁边区。到八月底，在苏联人帮助下，中共占领了察哈尔、热河的大部分地区，包括它们的首府张家口和承德。毛考虑把他的大本营移到张家口，一队队驮着文件行李的骆驼起程远行。
The key prize was Manchuria, which contained China's best deposits of coal, iron and gold, giant forests—and 70 percent of its heavy industry. Manchuria was bordered on three sides by Soviet-controlled territory—Siberia, Mongolia and North Korea. The border with Siberia alone was over two thousand kilometers long. “If we have Manchuria,” Mao had told his Party, “our victory will be guaranteed.”
对毛最重要的还是东北。那里蕴藏着中国最丰富的煤、铁、金矿，辽阔的森林资源，还有全国百分之七十的重工业。不仅如此，东北三面跟苏联控制的地区接壤：西伯利亚、蒙古、北朝鲜(北韩)。毛在“七大”上说：有了东北，“我们在全国的胜利，就有了巩固的基础了。”“也就是说确定了我们的胜利。”
Neither the Communists nor the Nationalists had armies in the region, which had been occupied by the Japanese, efficiently and ruthlessly, for fourteen years. But Red guerrillas were far closer than Chiang's troops. The Russians immediately opened up Japanese arms depots to these Reds, including the biggest arsenal, in Shenyang, which alone contained about “100,000 guns, thousands of artillery pieces, and large quantities of ammunition, textiles and food,” according to a secret CCP circular. Only a few months earlier, the Communist 8th Route Army had had only 154 pieces of heavy artillery.
不管是共产党还是国民党在东北都没有军队，那里被日本人无情有效地占领了十四年。但是中共的游击队就在山海关附近，他们立马出关，跟苏军联系上后，苏军把日本军火库对他们开放。沈阳有日本最大的军火库，据当时的报告，中共接受了“枪支十万支，大炮数千门及弹药、布匹粮食无数”。就在几个月前，整个八路军总共才有一百五十四门炮。
The bonanza was not just in weapons, but also in soldiers. The troops of the Japanese puppet Manchukuo regime, almost 200,000 strong, had surrendered en masse to the Soviet army, and were now made available by the Russians to be “re-enlisted” by the CCP. So were hundreds of thousands of men newly unemployed as a result of Russian depredations and outright destruction. The Soviet occupation forces carted off whole factories and machinery as “war booty,” and even demolished industrial installations. The equipment removed by the Russians was estimated to be worth US$858 million (US$2 billion at current replacement cost). Many local people were deprived of their livelihood. The CCP, which had originally dispatched 60,000 troops into Manchuria, saw its force snowball to well over 300,000.
日本傀儡满洲国的二十万军队整个投降了苏联红军，苏军把他们交给中共整编。参军的还有成千上万新近失业的男子，失业的原因是苏军把东北的工厂设备机器以“战利品”的名义大批拆运回苏联，拆运过程中甚至毁掉整个工厂。据专家估计，苏军运走的设备差不多价值八亿五千八百万美金，要重新安装得花二十亿美金。大拆运的结果是许多老百姓失去了生活来源，有的只好当兵。中共最初派進东北的部队有六万人，转瞬就增加到三十万。
THIS EMPOWERMENT of the CCP was carried out by the Russians in maximum secrecy, as it was in stark violation of the treaty Moscow had just signed with Chiang. The Generalissimo's best, combat-hardened troops, who were American-trained and equipped, were stuck in South China and Burma, far away from the areas Russia held. To get them to Manchuria fast, he desperately needed American ships. America wanted him to talk with Mao about peace; so under American pressure, the Generalissimo invited Mao to come to Chongqing for talks. America's China policy had been defined by the late President Roosevelt (who had died on 12 April 1945 and was succeeded by his vice-president, Harry Truman) as to “knock heads together,” and the US ambassador in China had earlier suggested the idea of bringing the Generalissimo and Mao to the White House together if the two Chinese leaders reached a deal.
蒋介石急于把东北抢到手。但他的精锐部队远在华南和缅甸，要把他们运到东北去得仰仗美国的军舰。美国人要他跟毛泽东和谈。美国的对华政策是刚去世的罗斯福总统制定的：“无论如何把他们拉在一起。”美国驻华大使曾建议，要是蒋介石、毛泽东达成协议，就把他们一块儿请到白宫去。在美国压力下，蒋在八月十四到二十三日向毛发出三道邀请，请毛来重庆谈判。
Mao did not want to go to Chongqing, and twice turned down Chiang's invitation, mainly because he did not trust Chiang not to harm him. This would be Mao's first venture out of his lair since he had started running his own military force in 1927. He told Chiang he was sending Chou En-lai instead. But Chiang insisted the summit must take place with Mao, and in the end Mao had to accept. Stalin had cabled him no fewer than three times to go. While secretly helping Mao to seize territory, Stalin wanted him to play the negotiations game. If Mao refused to show up, he would look as though he were rejecting peace, and America would be more likely to give its full commitment to Chiang.
毛泽东不想去重庆，头两道邀请他都拒绝了。毛怕蒋介石谋害他。他对蒋说派周恩来去，但蒋坚持要毛亲自去。最后毛只好答应--不答应不行，斯大林给他发了三封电报叫他去。斯大林一面秘密帮毛抢占土地，一面要毛玩和谈游戏。如果坚持不去重庆，给人的印象就会是他不要和平，美国在内战中就会全力支持蒋介石。
Mao resented this pressure from Stalin. It was to be his biggest grievance against Stalin, and one he would keep bringing up for the rest of his life.
斯大林强迫他去重庆，成了毛此后一生对斯大林最大的怨气，他在各种场合提了又提，把斯大林责备来责备去。
Stalin told Mao that his safety would be assured by both Russia and the US. The Founder of Chiang's FBI, Chen Li-fu, told us that the Nationalists had no designs on Mao's life “because the Americans guaranteed his safety.” Mao knew he would also have secret protection from his strategically placed moles, especially the Chongqing garrison chief, Chang Chen. Even so, he insisted on US ambassador Patrick Hurley coming to Yenan and escorting him to Chongqing as insurance against being bumped off in mid-air.
斯大林告诉毛他的性命不成问题，由美、苏两家担保。国民党元老、中统创始人陈立夫告诉我们：“毛泽东到重庆来，是美国人保证他的，他是安全的。”毛也有身任要职的秘密中共党员保护他，例如重庆宪兵司令张镇。毛还是不放心，坚持要美国大使赫尔利(Patrick Hurley)专程飞来延安跟他同机去重庆，怕蒋介石把他在半空里干掉。
With all these precautions in place, Mao at last flew off to Chongqing in an American plane on 28 August, leaving Liu Shao-chi in charge in Yenan. When the plane landed, Mao stuck close to Hurley, and got into Hurley's car, shunning the one Chiang had sent for him.
在这层层卫护下，毛终于在八月二十三日乘美国飞机飞往重庆，把刘少奇留在延安看家。飞机着陆后，毛紧紧地贴着赫尔利，一头钻進赫尔利的汽车，而不坐蒋介石派来接他的那一辆。
Mao also took out insurance of the kind he knew best, by ordering an offensive against Nationalist forces while he was in Chongqing, which demonstrated that the Reds would escalate the civil war if anything happened to him. He told his top generals, who were about to be flown (by the Americans) to 8th Route Army HQ: Fight without any restraint. The better you fight, the safer I am. When his troops won the battle at a place called Shangdang, Mao beamed: “Very good! The bigger the battle, the bigger the victory, the more hope I will be able to return.”
赴渝前夕，毛指示即将(乘美国飞机）离开延安飞返根据地的八路军将领“放手打”，“你们打得越好，我越安全”。在毛安排下，他在重庆时，八路军在山西省上党县打击国民党军队，大获全胜。毛高兴地说：“打得好！打得越大越胜利，我回去的希望就越大。”
Mao flew into one moment of panic in Chongqing, when Hurley left on 22 September, followed by Chiang on the 26th, and he feared he was being set up for a hit. Chou was dispatched to the Soviet embassy to ask if the Russians would let Mao stay there, but Ambassador Apollon Petrov was non-committal, and got no reply when he wired Moscow for instructions. Mao was furious.
在重庆，毛吃了一场虚惊。九月二十二日，赫尔利离开重庆，几天后蒋介石本人也走了。毛一看这不就是暗杀他的前奏吗？马上派周恩来到苏联大使馆，要求让毛住進去。苏联大使彼得罗夫(Apollon Petrov)不置可否，打电报去莫斯科请示，莫斯科没有回话，毛非常生气。
Mao gained a lot by going to Chongqing. He talked to Chiang as an equal, “as though the convicts were negotiating with the warders,” one observer remarked. Foreign embassies invited him not as a rebel, but as a statesman, and he played the part, behaving diplomatically, and laughing off a pointed challenge from Churchill's no-nonsense envoy General Carton de Wiart, who told Mao that he did “not consider that [the Reds] contributed much towards defeating the Japs,” and that Mao's troops only “had a nuisance value, but no more.” Even when put on the spot in a tough face-to-face encounter with the US commander in China, General Albert Wedemeyer, about the murder and mutilation by the Reds of an American officer called John Birch, Mao showed aplomb. And he kept his cool when Wedemeyer told him, with more than a hint of a threat, that the US was planning to bring atomic bombs into China, as well as up to half a million troops. By appearing conciliatory, Mao scored a propaganda victory.
毛来重庆这一趟其实收获甚丰。他跟蒋介石平等对话，外国使馆邀请他做客，视他为政治家。他也显出政治家的风度，说话颇多外交辞令。丘吉尔在重庆的特使是直来直往的独眼将军卡顿·维尔特(Carton de Wiart)，一次席间他开门见山地对毛说，他“根本就不认为中共对打败日本起了多大作用”， 中共军队“只能找找日本人的麻烦”。出乎他意料，毛不但没发怒，还开怀大笑。
一次，八路军杀死一个叫约翰·伯奇(John Birch)的美国军官，把脸部戳得稀烂。美国在华军队总指挥魏德迈(Albert Wedemeyer)当面严厉谴责毛，毛客客气气地对答。魏德迈诈唬说美国计划运原子弹来中国，外加五十万军队，毛仍然不改冷静。毛的和解姿态赢得了宣传战的胜利。
The peace talks lasted forty-five days, but the whole episode was theater. Mao went around exclaiming “Long live Generalissimo Chiang!” and saying he supported Chiang as the leader of China. But this meant nothing. Mao wanted China for himself, and he knew he could only get it through civil war.
重庆和谈持续了四十五天，但整桩事从头到尾是做戏。毛到处喊：“蒋委员长万岁！”宣称他支持蒋做中国领袖，不过是说说而已，他要中国属于自己，非打倒蒋介石不可。
Chiang also knew that war was inevitable, but he needed a peace agreement to satisfy the Americans. Although he had no intention of observing it, he endorsed an agreement that was signed on 10 October. And this behavior brought benefits, at least in the short term. While Mao was in Chongqing, US forces occupied the two main cities in northern China, Tianjin and Peking, and held them for Chiang, and started to ferry his troops to Manchuria.
蒋介石也很清楚全面内战不可避免。只是他需要一个和平协议以满足美国人的要求。尽管他毫无履行任何协议的意思，十月十日，他仍批准国民党同中共签订了《双十协定》。蒋做的样子骗住了美国人。毛还在重庆时，他们开始帮蒋运兵到东北，还占领了华北的北平、天津，等待蒋介石的军队前来接收。
After the treaty was signed, Chiang invited Mao to stay with him for the night; and the next day they had breakfast together before Mao departed for Yenan. The moment Mao's back was turned, the Generalissimo gave vent to his true feelings in his diary: “The Communist Party is perfidious, base, and worse than beasts.”
《双十协定》签订后，蒋介石邀请毛当晚下榻他的寓所林园，第二天一早他们共進早餐，然后毛泽东飞返延安。一切都礼貌周全。毛刚一转背，蒋就把他的真实感情倾泻在日记里：“共党不仅无信义，且无人格，诚禽兽之不若也。”
WHEN MAO RETURNED to Yenan on 11 October he immediately started military operations to keep Chiang's army out of Manchuria. Lin Biao was appointed commander of the Red forces there. Tens of thousands of cadres had already been dispatched, coming under a new Manchuria Bureau whose leaders the Russians flew secretly from Yenan to Shenyang in mid-September.
十月十一日，毛回到延安，第一件事就是部署军事行动，不让蒋介石的军队進入东北。林彪受命担任中共在东北军队的总司令。数万名奉命出关的干部这时已在路上。为了领导中共在东北事务，并与占领东北的苏军随时联系，新成立的东北局的成员，已在九月中旬由苏联飞机秘密运送到沈阳。
Mao ordered troops deployed around Shanhaiguan, at the eastern end of the Great Wall. His forces had occupied this strategic pass from China proper into Manchuria in cooperation with the Soviet army on 29 August. He asked the Russians to take care of the seaports and the airports. With Russian encouragement, CCP units posing as bandits fired on US ships trying to land Chiang's troops, in one case shooting up the launch of the US commander, Admiral Daniel Barbey, and forcing him back out to sea.
毛下令把部队部署在东北的大门山海关，以挡住国民党军。他要求苏军把守港口和飞机场，阻止国民党军登陆。在苏军鼓励下，中共武装装扮成上匪，向运送国民党军的美国军舰开火，有一次打中了巴贝上将(Daniel Barbey)的登陆艇，迫使他调头驶回外海。
The US 7th Fleet finally had to dock at Qinhuangdao, a port just south of Manchuria, and one of Chiang's best armies disembarked. On the night of 15–16 November it stormed the Shanhaiguan pass. Mao had called for a “decisive battle” and told his troops to hold out at the pass, but Chiang's divisions simply swept through them. Mao's forces disintegrated so overwhelmingly that one Nationalist commander lamented proudly that “we don't even have enough people to accept all the arms being surrendered.”
美国第七舰队最后在东北以南的秦皇岛靠岸，一支蒋介石的精锐部队在那里登陆，十一月十五到十六日夺取了山海关。毛命令他的部队“坚持山海关”，“举行决战”。但国民党军队挥戈直入，把他们一路赶出山海关和北上的铁路枢纽。中共部队溃不成军，一个国民党军官不无骄傲地说：“共军大队退下来，缴枪也来不及。”
The Communist forces had no experience of trench warfare, or of any kind of modern warfare. As guerrillas, their first principle, as laid down by Mao himself, was “retreat when the enemy advances.” And that is what they did now. Chiang's armies, on the other hand, had fought large-scale engagements with the Japanese: in Burma, they had put more Japanese out of action in one campaign than the entire Communist army had in eight years in the whole of China. The Nationalist supremo in Manchuria, General Tu Yu-ming, had been in command of major battles against the Japanese, whereas Mao's commander, Lin Biao, had taken part in one single ambush in September 1937, eight years before, since when he had hardly smelled gunpowder. By studiously avoiding combat with the Japanese, Mao had ended up with an army that could not fight a modern war.
中共军队没有打正规战争的经验，而国民党军队跟日本人打过大规模的阵地战。在缅甸，他们的一个战役比中共整个八年抗战打死打伤的日军还多。国民党军队在东北的最高指挥官杜聿明跟日本人在不少大仗中交过手，而中共的林彪只在一九三七年九月指挥过一次平型关伏击战以后，他几乎没闻过硝烟味。毛一心保存实力躲避日本人，躲出了一支不能打现代战争的军队。
The Reds had been in some frontal engagements during the Japan war, but mostly against weak Nationalist units. They had not faced the cream of Chiang's forces, who, as one top Red commander wrote to Mao, were fresh, well-trained, “US-style troops,” and battle-ready.
抗战中中共打败过国民党军队，但这次它面对的是蒋介石最精锐的人。据中共指挥官黄克诚向毛报告，这些人“经过美国训练，参加印缅作战”，“带着远征军、常胜军的骄傲态度”，“战斗确实也顽强。”
The CCP troops were not only badly trained, but also poorly motivated. After the Japanese war, many just wanted peace. The Reds had been using a propaganda song called “Defeat Japan so we can go home.” After Japan's surrender, the song was quietly banned, but the sentiment—let's go home—could not be quenched as easily as the song.
When Red troops were marched to Manchuria, mainly from Shandong, pep talks focused not on high ideals but on material enticements. Commissar Chen Yi told officers: “When I left Yenan, Chairman Mao asked me to tell you that you are going to a good place, a place of great fun. There are electric lights and high-rises, and gold and silver in plenty …” Others told their subordinates: “In Manchuria we'll be eating rice and white flour [desirable foods] all the time,” and “everyone will be given a promotion.”
中共军队作家张正隆生动地描述了士兵们想回家，不想出关打仗的情景。为了把部队带出关，新四军军长陈毅接见三师连以上干部时说：“我离开延安时，毛主席让我告诉你们，你们要到一个好地方去。那个地方是个花花世界，有电灯，有楼房，出金子，出银。那是个什么地方呢？毛主席没告诉我们，我也没法告诉你们(哈哈大笑)”。
Even so some officers found it impossible to motivate the soldiers, and kept the destination secret until the troops were safely on board ship en route to Manchuria.
有的干部觉得动员不顶用，干脆不告诉下面部队到哪里去，直到他们登上了去东北的海船，没法下来了。
Communist officers who trekked to Manchuria remembered abysmal morale. One officer recalled:
“闯关东”的老人回忆里充满了那一路的人心浮动：
The thing that gave us the worst headache was desertions … Generally speaking, all of us Party members, squad commanders, combat team leaders had our own “wobblies” to watch. We would do everything—sentry duty, chores, and errands—together … When the wobblies wanted to take a leak, we would say “I want to have a piss, too” … Signs of depression, homesickness, complaints—all had to be dealt with instantly … After fighting, particularly defeats, we kept our eyes peeled.
“那时当干部，特别是当连长、指导员的，平时最操心，最头痛，压力最大的，就是怕出逃兵……党员，正副班长，战斗小组长，一般都有个“巩固对象”。站岗，值勤，出公差，都在一起，睡觉也挨着，醒了摸一把。“巩固对象”要上厕所，“我也要尿了”， 马上跟去”。“谁不高兴了，谁发牢骚了，谁想家了，都是“思想苗头”，要随时掌握。发现异常，立即报告。一仗下来，特别是打了败仗，更要瞪大眼睛。”
Most of those who ran away did so after camp was pitched, so … as well as normal sentries, we placed secret sentries … Some of us tied ourselves surreptitiously to our wobblies at night … Some of us were so desperate we adopted the method the Japanese used with their labourers—collected the men's trousers and stowed them in the company HQ at night.
逃兵大都是宿营后跑掉的。“每到一地，除正常岗哨外，还在村外放几处暗哨。有的怕自己睡得死醒不来，用根绳悄悄把自己和“巩固对象”拴在一起，一动就拉醒了。逼急眼了，有的甚至用鬼子对付劳工的办法，晚上睡觉把裤子都收到连部去。据说，有的还把手榴弹弦拉得老长，像绊马索一样横拉在路口上。一响就报警了。”
Yet even some of these trusted cadres deserted.
The commander of one division that had transferred from Shandong to Manchuria reported to Mao on 15 November that between “deserters, stragglers and the sick” he had lost 3,000 men out of the 32,500 he had set off with. Earlier, the commander of another unit reported: “Last night alone … over 80 escaped.” One unit suffered a desertion rate of over 50 percent, ending up with fewer than 2,000 out of its original 4,000-plus men.
带新四军三师去山东的黄克诚十一月十五日给毛的电报说，“三师由苏北出发共三万二千五百人”，“沿途逃亡掉队病号约三千人”。指挥官万毅报告：“逃亡仍严重，仅昨夜即逃副排长以下八十余。”有两个团四千多人，到古北口不足两千了。
Local Manchurian recruits also defected in droves when they realized they would be fighting the national government. During a ten-day period in late December 1945 to early January 1946, over 40,000 went over to the Nationalists, according to the Reds' own statistics. Although CCP troops in Manchuria far outnumbered the Nationalists, and were well armed with Japanese weapons, they were still unable to hold their own.
东北本地的新兵也逃 -- 一旦他们听说作战对象是中央政府。据中共《东北三年解放战争军事资料》， 从一九四五年十二月底到一九四六年初，十天左右，“先后叛变共约四万余人”。
MAO'S NO. 2, Liu Shao-chi, had foreseen that the Reds would not be able to shut Chiang out of Manchuria. He had a different strategy from Mao. While Mao was in Chongqing, Liu had instructed the CCP in Manchuria to focus on building a solid base on the borders with Russia and its satellites, where the troops could receive proper training in modern warfare. On 2 October 1945, he had sent an order: “Do not deploy the main forces at the gate to Manchuria to try to keep Chiang out, but at the borders with the USSR, Mongolia and Korea, and dig our heels in.”
刘少奇早就看出，有这一切弱点的中共军队，不可能挡住国民党军队進东北。毛还在重庆时，刘指示中共集中精力在与苏联、外蒙古、北朝鲜接壤的地方建立巩固的根据地，训练部队。一九四五年十月二日，刘指示：“不是首先将主力部署在满洲门口，抵住蒋介石，而是首先将主力部署在背靠苏、蒙、朝鲜边境，以便站稳脚跟之后，再争取大城要道。”
In addition, Liu had told the Reds to be ready to abandon big cities and go and build bases in the countryside surrounding the cities.
刘要已经進城的中共武装准备撤离城市，分散到农村各地建立根据地：“沈阳及其他城市的武器资材，应向乡村及热河运出。”
But when Mao returned to Yenan from Chongqing, he overruled Liu. Concentrate the main forces at the pass into Manchuria and at big railway junctions, he ordered on 19 October. Mao could not wait to “possess the whole of Manchuria,” as another order put it. But his army was not up to the job.
但是毛回到延安后，否决了刘少奇的部署。十月十九日，毛下令：“我党方针是集中主力于锦州、营口、沈阳之线”，“坚决拒止蒋军登陆”，“改变过去分散的方针。” 毛要的是：“霸占全东北”。可惜，他心有余而力不足。* *
Mao's relationship with his army was in many ways a remote one. He never tried to inspire his troops in person, never visited the front, nor went to meet the troops in the rear. He did not care about them. Many of the soldiers sent to Manchuria had malaria. In order to drag these feverish men the many hundreds of kilometers, each sick man was sandwiched between two able-bodied soldiers and pulled along by a rope around the waist. Mao's preferred method for dealing with wounded soldiers was to leave them with local peasants, who were usually living on a knife-edge between subsistence and starvation, and had no access to medicine.*
毛跟他的部队很少接触。他从来不在阵前发表激动人心的讲话，从来不视察前方，从来不巡视部队，对伤病员他毫不关心。一次，毛要求他的军队破釜沉舟，不依靠后方而打到国民党地区去。他的指挥官们问，没有后方，伤病员怎么办？毛答道：“好办，你们可以把伤病员交给群众，群众是会给你们管好的。”老百姓自己生活都成问题，哪有钱粮养活伤病员，给他们治伤治病呢？
His army's performance showed that Mao had no prospect of victory anytime soon, and Stalin adjusted rapidly. On 17 November 1945, after Chiang's army stormed into southern Manchuria, Chiang noted a “sudden change of attitude” in the Russians. They told the CCP it would have to vacate the cities, putting an end to Mao's hopes of becoming immediate master of all Manchuria, and of a quick victory nationwide.
毛的军队的作战表现，使斯大林看到他们没有立即打败蒋介石的希望，斯大林也就迅速调整他的策略。一九四五年十一月十七日，在国民党军攻入南满时，蒋介石注意到苏联人对他的态度“忽然转变，表示彼必履行《中苏友好同盟条约》， 助我便利接收东北”。苏联人要把铁路枢纽及城市全部交蒋，要中共让出来。这对毛渴求的立刻“霸占全东北”，是当头一棒。
Stalin knew this decision would be devastating for Mao, so he made a gesture to reassure him. On the 18th, a cable was dispatched from Russia: “MAO AN YIN[G] asks for your permission to go to ‘41' [code name for Yenan].” Stalin was finally returning Mao's son. This was good news for Mao, but no help in seizing Manchuria. Desperate entreaties to the Russians followed, and futile orders for his troops to hold out. When both failed, Mao collapsed with a nervous breakdown. On the 22nd he moved out of Date Garden into a special elite clinic (after all the patients had first been turfed out). For days on end, he was unable to rise from his bed, or to sleep a wink. He lay trembling all over, his hands and feet convulsing, pouring cold sweat.
斯大林想出个法子来安慰毛。十八日，一封电报从莫斯科发到延安：“毛岸英请求您的允许回到四十一号来。”“四十一号”是延安的代号，斯大林这是告诉毛要放他儿子回家。这对毛当然是好消息，但东北对他更重要。他苦苦请求莫斯科重新考虑。他再三要求他的指挥官们打胜仗，保住铁路枢纽，不厌其烦地向他们宣讲国民党军兵如何少，如何“无斗志”， 问题如何多：“孤军深入，军民不和，弹药不济”，“是能够大部或全部加以消灭的”。
毛的军队取胜无望，斯大林又不听从他的要求，绝望之余，毛病倒了，需要住院治疗。十一月二十二日，他搬進了为他腾空的干部疗养所。好些天，他一刻不眠，躺在床上浑身出冷汗，发抖，手脚痉挛。
At his wits' end, Mao's assistant Shi Zhe suggested asking Stalin for help. Mao agreed, and Shi cabled Stalin, who replied at once, offering to send doctors. Mao accepted the offer, but two hours later he seems to have had second thoughts about laying himself so bare to Stalin's eyes and asked Shi to hold the telegram. But it had already gone off.
助手师哲实在没有办法，建议向斯大林求援。毛点头之后，师哲给斯大林发了封电报，斯大林跟着回电，提出派医生来延安。毛同意了。但过后又觉得不安，怕斯大林对自己的弱点一览无余。过了两个小时，他叫师哲暂时不要发那封电报，但电报已经发出。
Only days before, Stalin had recalled Mao's GRU doctor Orlov, together with the whole GRU mission in Yenan. Orlov had been in Yenan for three and a half years without a break, but the minute he arrived in Moscow, Stalin ordered him back to Mao. The hapless Orlov arrived back on 7 January 1946, accompanied by a second doctor called Melnikov from the KGB. They found nothing seriously wrong with Mao, except for mental exhaustion and nervous stress. Mao was advised to delegate work more, relax, take walks and get plenty of fresh air. Orlov, however, was soon pleading nervous tension himself and begging Moscow to recall him. In vain.
这时阿洛夫大夫和整个驻延安的苏军情报组刚被召回苏联。阿洛夫在延安住了三年半，一次家也没回，这才下了飞机，斯大林又要他重返延安去照顾毛。阿洛夫满心不情愿地重登飞机，在一九四六年一月七日回到延安。随他而来是克格勃成员米尔尼柯夫(Melnikov)大夫，大家简称为米大夫。两人给毛進行了全面检查，结论是毛没什么大病，症状是神经过于紧张所致。他们要毛在一段时间内不要管事，尽量放松，多走动，多到野外去呼吸新鲜空气，让神经松弛下来。不久阿洛夫大夫倒感到他本人的精神快崩溃了，请求莫斯科调他回去。莫斯科不准。
On the plane with the doctors came Mao's son, An-ying, to whom Stalin had personally presented an inscribed pistol before he left. It was over eighteen years since Mao had seen his son, then four years old, in 1927, when Mao had left his wife Kai-hui and three sons and begun his outlaw career. Now An-ying was a good-looking young man of twenty-three. At the airfield Mao hugged him, exclaiming: “How tall you have grown!” That evening, Mao wrote a thank-you letter to Stalin.
跟医生们一块儿回延安的还有岸英，离开莫斯科前斯大林亲手送给他一把刻有他题签的手枪。毛泽东十八年没见到儿子了。十八年前他离别妻子杨开慧和三个儿子去井冈山当山大王时，岸英四岁，如今已是一表人才的青年了。在飞机场毛抱了抱他说：“你长这么高了！”当晚毛给斯大林写信致谢。
Mao had moved out of the clinic by now and settled in the HQ of the military, a beautiful place known as Peony Pavilion. It was surrounded by a large garden of peonies, including some of China's most gorgeous varieties. To this rich splendor the plant-loving nominal C-in-C, Zhu De, and his staff had added a delicate peach orchard, a fish pond and a basketball court. Mao spent a lot of time with An-ying, often sitting at a square stone table chatting outside his adobe house, which stood right next to his deep—and private—air-raid shelter. A frequent mah-jong and card partner of the Maos at the time noticed that Mao acted very affectionately towards his son. Mao's health gradually improved. By spring, he had made a good recovery.
毛从疗养所搬進军委所在地王家坪。这里又名牡丹亭，得名于一大院子艳丽的牡丹，好些是中国罕有的品种。热爱花卉的朱德总司令跟他的下属种植了一片桃林，修了个鱼池，开辟了篮球场。毛天天有儿子做伴，坐在窑洞外的一方石桌旁聊天，紧挨着专给他挖的防空洞。据毛当年的牌友、马海德医生的夫人苏菲说，看得出来毛很喜欢他的儿子。毛心情喜悦，健康也好转了，春天到来时，他逐渐恢复了正常。
The most comforting thing for Mao was that most of Manchuria was still in Communist hands. Stalin maintained overall control of the area, having hung on way beyond the three months he had promised, and had refused to allow anything but a skeleton Nationalist staff into the cities. Though the CCP had to move its organizations out of most cities, they entrenched in the vast countryside.
给毛最大安慰的还不是儿子，而是东北的局势。虽然中共让出了多数大城市，但苏军仍然是那里的主人，只准国民党派人数可怜的行政人员進城。中共在附近乡下重整旗鼓，还不时進城去跟苏军联络，称之为上“旅馆”。
THE RUSSIAN ARMY did not finally leave Manchuria until 3 May 1946, nearly ten months after it had entered. To maximize the CCP's chances, they kept the Nationalists in the dark until the very last minute about the pull-out schedule, while coordinating their departure with the CCP so that it could take over the area's assets, including major cities, which the Reds now re-entered. Mao ordered his army again to hold out in key cities on the railway line, which he insisted were to be defended “regardless of the sacrifice,” “like Madrid,” evoking the heroic image of defending the capital to the death in the Spanish civil war.
一九四六年五月，苏军终于在進占东北十个月后，开始撤离。撤军是跟中共协调的，苏军事先不告诉国民党他们什么时候走，而让中共做好安排。中共又進了大城市。毛再次命令他们坚守，“不惜任何牺牲”，“死守长春”，“死守四平，寸土必争”。西班牙内战时共产党一边曾拚死保卫马德里，于是毛要：“把长春变成马德里。”“化四平街为马德里。”
Mao's second in command, Liu Shao-chi, again cautioned that the Reds were not up to stopping Chiang's army, and that most cities would have to be abandoned. The Manchuria commander, Lin Biao, also warned Mao that “there is no great likelihood of holding on to [the cities],” and suggested their strategy should be “to eliminate enemy forces, not defend cities.” He agreed with Liu Shao-chi that the priority was to build up rural bases. Mao insisted that the cities must be defended “to the death.”*
刘少奇认为，中共军队此时仍旧抵挡不了国民党军队，大部分城市最终还得让出来。林彪也向毛進言说，固守城市的可能性不大，“因此我军方针似应以消灭敌人为主，而不以保卫城市”为主，“对于难夺取与巩固之城市，则不必过分勉强去争取”。“我们要把眼光转一转，从大城市转到中小城市和广大农村去，把大力气用到建设根据地去。”但在毛看来，有大城市才算有江山，他要林彪“死守”。后来，林彪的战略思想和刘少奇的主意都成了毛的“英明决策”。其实毛最热衷于夺取大城市。
But the next round of battles showed that his army was still no match for Chiang's. Within weeks of the Russian withdrawal the Nationalists had seized every major city in Manchuria except Harbin, the nearest to Russia, and the Communist forces had been reduced to a state of collapse. They retreated north in chaos, under aerial bombardment, harried by Nationalist tanks and motorized troops. Lin Biao's political commissar later admitted that “the whole army had disintegrated” and fallen into what he called “utter anarchy.” One officer recalled being chased northward non-stop for forty-two days: “It really looked as though we'd had it …”
毛的“马德里”保卫一个丢一个，苏联撤军几个星期，国民党就夺回了东北几乎所有大城市，只剩下最靠近苏联的哈尔滨。中共军队向北败退，头上是国民党飞机的扫射轰炸，屁股后面紧追着坦克汽车。林彪的政委罗荣桓回顾说：这一场大撤退中溃不成军，“全军无所措手足。”一位过来人说他们一连走了四十二天才站住脚，那阵势“可真是不大行了”。
Not only were the Reds collapsing militarily, but they were at a huge disadvantage with the civilian population, which longed for national unity after fourteen years of brutal Japanese rule, and saw the Nationalists as representing the government. Lin Biao reported to Mao: “People are saying that the 8th Route Army shouldn't be fighting the government army … They regard the Nationalists as the Central Government.”
中共部队不仅军事上大败，民心上他们也不如国民党。东北人受够了日本侵占多年的苦，渴望和平，把国民党军队看作“正牌”。如林彪向毛报告：“老百姓说：八路军和中央军都是为老百姓的，彼此不打好了，并认为国民党是中央”。
The CCP had a further disadvantage, that of being linked in people's minds with the much-hated Russians. Russian troops plundered not only industrial equipment, but people's homes; and rape by Russian soldiers was frequent. When the belated publication of the Yalta Agreement in February 1946 revealed the huge extraterritorial privileges Stalin had grabbed in Manchuria, anti-Soviet demonstrations erupted in many cities there, as well as in other parts of China. There was a widespread feeling that the CCP had got into Manchuria on the back of the Russians and was not working for the interests of China. When demonstrators shouted slogans like “The CCP should love our country,” onlookers applauded. Rumors circulated that the Party was offering the Russians women in exchange for weapons.
中共有个不利之处：人们把他们和“老毛子”苏联人连在一起。苏军不仅掠夺东北的工业设施，还闯進百姓家里拿东西，强奸妇女。一九四六年二月，雅尔塔协定发表，暴露了斯大林在东北攫取特权的事实，在全国引起轩然大波。一些大城市爆发了反苏游行，高呼：“中共应该爱国！”村民们还有这样问战士的：“大侄子，听说你们那枪呀炮的，都是用大姑娘和老毛子换的，这是真的吗？”
The locals treated the Chinese Reds quite differently from the Nationalists. One Red officer recalled: “We were hungry and thirsty when we got to Jilin … There was not a soul in the street … But when the enemy entered the city; somehow the folks all appeared, waving little flags and cheering … Imagine our anger!”
东北中共军队司令部的《阵中日记》一九四六年十一月十二日记载：“顽区群众条件极坏，我军通过时，沿村抗击”。一位老战士回忆：“又饥又渴赶到吉林市，满指望能吃点喝点，大街空荡荡的没一个人影，像座空城。”离城过了桥，炸了桥，隔江看着国民党脚跟脚進了城，“老百姓像从地下冒出来似的涌到大街上，挥动各色小旗，呼喊口号”。
The Red troops were disheartened, and vented their fury even on their top brass. Lin Biao was once caught in his jeep in a crowd of retreating troops. When his guard asked the men to make way for “the chief,” he was greeted with yells like: “Ask that chief, are we retreating to the land of the Big Hairy Ones?” The sobriquet was the locals' derogatory term for the Russians.
战士们把气发在司令头上。一天，林彪的吉普车堵塞在北退的队伍中，警卫员请战士让道：“后面是首长的车，首长有急事。”四下里七嘴八舌起了叱骂声：“什么手掌脚掌的，这时候了还摆臭架子要威风！” ，问问你们那个首长，是不是要撤到老毛子那边去？”
At this point it looked as though the Chinese Reds might be driven across the border into Russia, or be scattered into small guerrilla units in the mountains, which Lin Biao anticipated. On 1 June, he asked Mao for permission to abandon Harbin, the last big city the Reds held, about 500 km from the Russian border. The CCP's Manchuria Bureau gave Mao the same fatalistic message the next day: “We have told Brother Chen [code name for the Russians] that we are ready to leave [Harbin] …” Mao twice implored Stalin to intervene directly, in the form of either a “military umbrella” or “joint operations.” Stalin declined, as intervention would have international implications, although he allowed CCP units to cross into Russia. On 3 June, Mao had to endorse plans to abandon Harbin and go over to guerrilla warfare “on a long-term basis.”
中共军队看起来真有可能要么撤進苏联，要么化整为零重开游击战。林彪做好了思想准备，一旦哈尔滨失守，就到辽南的山区打游击。六月一日，他给毛的电报说“准备游击放弃哈尔滨。”第二天，东北局也给毛同样无可奈何的电报：“我们准备放弃哈尔滨”，“我已告辰兄准备退出”。(“辰兄”即苏军。)身心交瘁的毛这时两次恳求斯大林出兵干涉，来个“联合行动”，或者把中国置于苏联的军事“保护伞”之下。斯大林婉言拒绝，怕出兵引起国际反应。但他允许中共军队退入苏联境内。六月三日，毛万不得已，电告东北局和林彪：“同意你们作放弃哈尔滨之准备，采取运动战与游击战方针”，而且是“作长期打算”。
Mao was on the ropes. Then he was rescued—by the Americans.
毛看似到了绝境。然而，就在此时，他的救星到了-- 美国人。
*In the Yalta Declaration, these are presented as reparations due Russia by Japan, but the reality was that they were gouged out of China. Churchill welcomed this, on the grounds that “any claim by Russia for indemnity at the expense of China would be favorable to our resolve about Hong Kong.” Though the deals involved Chinese territory, the Chinese government was not even informed, much less consulted. Moreover, the US put itself at Stalin's mercy by committing to wait for his permission before it told Chiang Kai-shek—and placed itself in the uniquely constrained position of then being responsible for obtaining Chiang's compliance. As a result, the Generalissimo was not given a full account by the US until 15 June, over four months later. This was shabby treatment of an ally, and it stored up trouble.
*Stalin also had his own aggressive agenda: a tentative scheme to detach part of the Mongolian region of China adjacent to Outer Mongolia and merge it with the Soviet satellite. Russo–Mongolian occupation forces actually formed an Inner Mongolia provisional government, ready for the merger, but the scheme was then dropped.
*When two years later he urged sending large forces deep into Nationalist areas, the commanders asked what would happen to the wounded without a base area to fall back on. Mao's airy response was: “It's easy … leave the wounded and the sick to the masses.”
*Since then, a cultivated myth has credited Mao with the strategies of “surrounding the cities from the countryside” and of “aiming mainly to eliminate enemy forces, not to defend or capture cities.” In fact, the former idea came from Liu Shao-chi, and was vigorously opposed by Mao before practicality forced him to adopt it; and the latter was Lin Biao's.