29 MOLES, BETRAYALS AND POOR LEADERSHIP DOOM CHIANG
29 蒋介石失去大陆
(1945–49 AGE 51–55)
1945～1949 年 51～55 岁
BY EARLY 1947, when the Nationalists had failed to crack Mao's vast base on the borders with Russia, Chiang knew he was in trouble. Many in the country knew, too. He badly needed a victory to boost morale. He came up with the idea of taking Yenan, Mao's capital. Its capture would have “the greatest significance,” he wrote in his diary on 1 March. On that day, he gave this vital task to a man who enjoyed his unconditional trust. General Hu Tsung-nan was the guardian of his younger (and adopted) son, Weigo, and had stood proxy for Chiang at Weigo's wedding.
一九四七年初，当蒋介石攻不动北满根据地时，他知道事情糟了。蒋需要战场上的胜利，来鼓舞士气，给人们以希望。他想出了攻占中共大本营延安这个主意，在三月一日的日记里写道，占领它“对于政略与外交，皆有最大意义”。蒋把这个重任交给他最信任的人：胡宗南将军。蒋介石曾把二儿子纬国托付给胡，纬国结婚时蒋不在场，“父亲”一角由胡担任。
Our investigations have convinced us that General Hu was a Red “sleeper.” He started his career at the Nationalists' Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, which Moscow founded, bankrolled and staffed, at a time when Sun Yat-sen was trying to use Russian sponsorship to conquer China. Chiang Kai-shek was the head of the Academy, and Chou En-lai the director of its pivotal Political Department. Many secret Communist agents were planted there, and went on to become officers in the Nationalist military.
At Whampoa, Hu Tsung-nan was strongly suspected of being a secret Communist,* but he had well-placed friends who vouched for him. He then struck up a friendship with Chiang's intelligence chief, Tai Li, who match-made his marriage. The two became so close that Tai ordered his subordinates in Hu's units to send copies of all their intelligence reports to Hu as well as to himself, the result of which was that none of them dared report any suspicions about Hu.
In 1947, Chiang assigned him to take Yenan. On the day he received the assignment, the message appeared on Mao's desk. Mao ordered the city to be evacuated, and the local population was herded out into the hills by armed militia. The bulk of the Red administration went to the Red base east of the Yellow River.
胡宗南二月二十八日接到蒋介石电召。同一天，毛就得到了情报。
On 18–19 March, Hu took Yenan, which the Nationalists trumpeted as a great victory. But all they acquired was a ghost town. On Mao's orders, the evacuees and the locals had buried not only their food, but all their household goods, down to cooking utensils.
三月十八到十九日，胡占领了延安。国民党大吹大擂称这是伟大胜利，其实毛已把延安疏散一空。
Mao himself had left only hours before, in an ostentatiously leisurely, even nonchalant manner, pausing awhile to gaze at the pagoda which was the symbol of Yenan, while his driver revved the engine of his American jeep (donated by the departing US mission) as a reminder that the Nationalists were nearby. Mao staged this performance to build confidence in people around him. A short time before, Mao's top brass had been awe-struck when he sent most of the troops in Yenan away, keeping only 20,000 men with him for the whole of the region—less than one-tenth of the force Hu had at his disposal, which totaled some 250,000.
在此后的一系列战斗中，战事的发展和胡将军的行为令人十分费解。毛也一反常态。 毛在陕北只留下由彭德怀率领的两万多部队，不到胡宗南统帅的二十五万大军的十分之一。毛坚持不准其他战场抽调兵力入陕增援。对延安即将失陷而惴惴不安的高级将领们，看到毛如此胸有成竹，既吃惊，又敬佩。
更令他们和毛身边的人惊叹的是，向来极端注意安全的毛，在胡宗南進城前几小时才离开。胡军的枪声一阵紧似一阵，警卫员们催了又催，他就是不走。最后说走，车门为他打开了，司机启动了引擎，再次提醒他，他却背着手站着不动，眼睛凝视着延安的标志宝塔山。
Mao set off north, riding with Chou En-lai, now his chief of staff, and Mme Mao. On the way, he and Chou chatted and laughed, as if, in the words of a bodyguard, “this was an outing.”
国民党的枪声已在近处响成一片时，毛才不慌不忙地向北动身，乘坐原美军观察组留下的吉普车。跟他同车的有周恩来和毛夫人江青。一贯为毛的安全殚精竭虑的周恩来，这次也像无事一般，一路上和毛说说笑笑，用警卫员的话说：“好像这不是一次撤离后的行军，而是平常的旅行。”
About 30 km northeast of Yenan, at a place called Qinghuabian, Mao asked the driver to slow down in a deep valley where the loess slopes had been scoured by rain and floods into deep canyons. His bodyguards were puzzled to see him pointing and nodding thoughtfully with Chou. It was only a week later that the explanation dawned on them, when Hu's 31st Brigade HQ and 2,900 troops walked into an ambush at this exact spot on 25 March.
到了延安东北三十公里的青化砭，毛叫司机把车速放慢，凝神四下看着。行车的公路沿着一条狭长的河谷，两边是黄土大山，被山洪暴雨冲刷成无数崖沢沟壑，是打埋伏战的好地方。警卫员看见毛一边细看，一边“情不自禁地点着头”，觉得“很迷惑，不知道他的眼神和动作是什么意思”。一个星期后他们才明白。三月二十五日，胡宗南的第三十一旅旅部和二千九百名官兵在这里走進了中共设下的伏击圈。
The brigade had been given the order to follow this road by Hu only the day before. But Mao's men had started taking up positions days earlier—and Mao had committed his entire force of 20,000 to this one operation. Before the first shots were fired, the brigade spotted the ambushers, and radioed the information to Hu. General Hu told his force to press on, threatening court martial if they did not, and the 2,900 men were wiped out. Meanwhile, Hu had dispatched the bulk of his army in another direction, due west, making it impossible for it to come to the rescue of the trapped brigade.
四天前，毛在陕北的全部军队两万余人就已在青化砭设伏。而胡宗南的三十一旅是在中计的前一天，才从胡宗南那里接到命令去青化砭。少将副旅长周贵昌写到：快到时，“探知青化砭附近有不少解放军[中共军队]，当即电报胡宗南。胡不但不相信所报情报，反来电斥责说：“贪生怕死，畏缩不前，非军人气概，绝对要按规定北進，迅速占领青化砭，否则以畏缩不前论罪。””这几千人只好硬着头皮往前進，结果全数被歼。
Three weeks later, on 14 April, Mao scored another victory in exactly the same fashion at a place called Yangmahe, when one of Hu's units marched straight into an ambush. Five thousand men were killed, wounded or captured. Just as before, Hu had moved his main force away, so the doomed brigade was cut off from it by impassable ravines.
这时，胡的大部队被派往另外的方向，不可能来青化砭救援。
On 4 May came a third pushover, when the Communists took Hu's main forward depot, Panlong. Once again, Hu had sent his main force away on a wild goose chase, leaving the depot lightly defended. Both the defenders and the main force had reported Red units “lying in hiding” near the depot, but Hu said they were crying wolf. When the main force reached its target, it found an empty city.
三个星期后的四月十四日，胡军一三五旅在延安正北羊马河又同样中了埋伏，死伤加俘虏五千人。就像在青化砭一样，可能驰援的胡军远在高山深峡的另一端。
The depot at Panlong handed the Reds vast stores of food, clothing, ammunition and medical supplies, while the Nationalists were left starving. Some were reduced to taking shoes from rotting Communist corpses. “No matter how we washed them,” one recalled, “we still couldn't get rid of the horrible stench.” Many fell ill, but they had been cleaned out of medicine.
中共的第三个轻而易举的胜仗，是打下延安北边五十公里处的蟠龙。那里储存着面粉四万多袋，军服五万多套，武器弹药不计其数，是胡宗南部队的补给基地。胡宗南只派一个团加旅部直属队守卫，把驻扎在那里的两个兵团七个半旅派往远在北方的绥德，说是中共主力在那里。四月二十六日这两个兵团从蟠龙出发，两天后发现中共大部队正朝跟他们相反的蟠龙方向运动。他们认为“部队不宜前進”。但胡宗南仍坚持命令他们“急進绥德”。五月二日到达绥德，等待他们的是空城一座。就在这一天，已把蟠龙团团围住的中共军队开始進攻。
战前一两天，蟠龙守军发现四周有大量伏兵。守军一六七旅少将副旅长涂健回忆道：“我们判断解放军主力确已在蟠龙地区集中，并有积极围攻蟠龙的企图，于是我们即刻向胡宗南报告。不料胡宗南接到这一报告后非但不相信，反认为我们是有意夸大敌情。”
蟠龙两天后失守，胡宗南在陕北的前進补给站的武器、物资便全部落在中共手里。天气热了，部队还脱不下充满血腥味和汗臭的冬衣。士兵没有鞋穿，只好从中共军队腐尸中脱取恶臭扑鼻的布鞋。疾病蔓延，但是药品也随蟠龙而失去。
After these three victories within two months of the Nationalists taking Yenan, the Communists broadcast the news that Mao had remained in the Yenan region. The import was clear: even though he was not actually in the capital, the CCP supremo was able to survive and operate in the area, and was very much in control of events.
中共在胡宗南占领延安不到两个月内就打了三场大胜仗，新华社向全国广播，毛泽东依然留在陕北。这一消息的重要性不言而喻：尽管毛不在延安市内，他没有像国民党宣传的那样被赶走，陕北还是他的天地。
Mao remained within some 150 km of Hu's HQ in Yenan city for a whole year, traveling with an entourage of 800 people, which eventually grew to 1,400, including a cavalry company. A sizable radio corps operated twenty-four hours a day, keeping contact with Red armies and bases all over China and with Russia.
在胡宗南占领延安的一年中，胡军被调来调去，找不到中共主力，反而一再中埋伏，一场大似一场。中共牢牢掌握着陕北大部分地区，毫无顾忌地热火朝天搞土改。毛离延安不出一百五十公里。他的随从从八百人增加到一千四百，包括一个骑兵连，还有一组规模庞大的电台，一天二十四小时工作，跟苏联以及全国各地的部队、根据地保持联系。每天，毛都用电报向全国各战场发出指示。
Mao moved about from place to place for the first time since he had come to rule this region a decade before. A litter was kept at the ready, but Mao preferred walking and riding, unlike his custom on the Long March, and became very fit. His chef carried his favorite foods like chili and sausages. Mao almost never ate with the locals or in restaurants, for fear of poor hygiene, or poison. He slept so well that he even dispensed with sleeping pills, and was in marked high spirits. He did quite a bit of sightseeing, and posed for a newsreel crew who came from Manchuria to film him. Mme Mao acquired a stills camera, and took a lot of photographs, embarking on a hobby at which she later became quite accomplished. The Russian doctors came over frequently from the Red base east of the Yellow River to give Mao check-ups and report on his condition to Stalin.
自占领陕北以来，毛第一次在他的领地旅行。跟长征不一样，这次他谢绝坐担架，自己走路、骑马，身体练得十分强壮。旅途中厨师为他预备好了他爱吃的香肠、辣椒。毛通常不在老百姓家或餐馆里用餐，怕不卫生或被人下毒。他睡得香，甚至不用吃安眠药。他兴致勃勃地游山玩水，还让专门从东北前来为他拍电影的摄影队拍了好些镜头。江青弄了一部照相机，整天摆弄来、摆弄去，她未来的摄影爱好就此开端。毛的苏联医生不时从黄河以东的根据地过河来给他检查身体，然后向斯大林汇报。
During this year, most of the Yenan region remained under Communist control, and Hu's vast army was sent into one large ambush after another, always following the same pattern: isolated units surrounded and overwhelmed by concentrated Communist forces while Hu's main forces chased their own tails elsewhere. Hu's superbly trained artillery battalion fell wholesale to the Reds, and came to form a significant part of Mao's artillery. Yet another spectacular ambush buried one of Hu's crack units when he ordered it back to Yenan, claiming that the city was under threat. It was trapped in a narrow mountain valley and shelled to smithereens. While Hu's army was thus destroyed on a massive scale, Mao came across as a military genius who could pull spectacular victories out of a hat.
MAO HAD ONE CLOSE SHAVE. It came in June 1947, when he had lingered nearly two months in a village called Wangjiawan, staying with a peasant's family, the first time he lived in intimate proximity to the locals. Here he took walks and went riding for pleasure. When the weather got hotter, he decided he wanted a shady place to read outdoors, so his bodyguards felled some trees to make pillars, weaving the twigs and leaves into a bower, where Mao read every day, studying English for relaxation.
只有一次，毛差点儿遇险。那是一九四七年六月，他在一个叫王家湾的村子里逗留了将近两个月，住在农民家里，头一回跟老百姓同在一个屋檐下。他住得很惬意，每天散步、跑马。天热了，警卫员砍了几棵树给他在室外搭了个凉棚，用树枝树叶编织成田园风味的棚顶。毛很满意，黄昏时爱坐在凉棚里看书，念英文以作消遣。
On 8 June, one of Hu's commanders, Liou Kan, suddenly appeared nearby with a large force. He had been tipped off about Mao's presence by a local who had managed to escape from the Red area. Mao erupted with unprecedented rage, bellowing at Chou En-lai, and a heated discussion ensued about which way to run. The nearest safe haven was a Red base east of the Yellow River, where boats and cars were on constant standby at the crossing. But it was too far away, so Mao decided to go west, towards the Gobi Desert—after taking the precaution of rounding up a large group of villagers, who were forcibly evacuated in the opposite direction as decoys.
六月八日，胡宗南手下的军长刘戡带着部队突然出现在附近。原来，毛住地的一名小学教员逃出去向刘戡报信，说村里有很多电台。刘估计毛就在这里。刘戡出其不意的到来，使毛泽东朝周恩来大发脾气。他们争吵着怎么办，往哪里逃去。要彻底安全只能往东走，过黄河進入根据地，黄河边停着船和汽车，日夜待命。但问题是路太远了，他们跑不过刘戡的人马。毛只能往西去，朝戈壁滩走。决定作出后，村里老百姓被集中起来往相反方向“转移”，想引开刘戡的军队。
Mao made off through thunderstorms, carried on the backs of bodyguards along mountain paths too slippery for horses. Radio silence was imposed to minimize the chances of detection—except for one radio, which worked non-stop, almost certainly to contact Hu to call his troops off.*
那天下着大雨，山路太滑无法骑马时，特别挑选的膀大腰圆的警卫把毛背在背上。电台不出声了，以防被发现。只有一架电台在紧张地工作着，显然是在设法要把刘戡调开。毛在陕北时，跟胡军中的电台联系从未中断过，管收发电报的机要人员说：“他们的行动完全掌握在我们手里”还说：“我们的人的身分有的直到现在也没公开。”
Which is exactly what happened. On 11 June, Liou Kan was so close on Mao's heels that the Reds could hear his troops and see their torches. Mao's guards said they felt their hair seemed to “stand on end.” As they were getting ready to defend him to the death, Mao emerged from a cave all smiles, predicting that the enemy would pass them by. At that instant, right in front of the guards' astonished eyes, the Nationalist troops rushed by, and left them totally unmolested. Hu had ordered Liou Kan to drop everything and race on to his original destination, Baoan, Mao's old capital.
刘戡真的被调走了。六月十一日晚，他就在毛的屁股后面，近到毛的警卫能听见他的队伍说话，能看见他们的火光。毛的警卫紧张得“头发都快立起来了”。正当他们准备誓死保卫毛时，毛满面笑容地从暂住的窑洞里出来，说敌人要转兵去保安。果不其然，警卫们瞠目结舌地看到，刘戡的队伍沿着山沟跑过，没碰他们一根毫毛。胡宗南给刘戡下了死命令：“向保安南之双儿河集结，限十四日拂晓前补充完毕。” 胡声称“匪主力”在保安，刘戡非得按期到达参加“围剿”不可。结果保安又是空城一座。毛的随从们为毛的“神机妙算”惊叹不已。
This incident may well have triggered an urgent request to Stalin to get Mao out to Russia. A cable from Stalin on 15 June was clearly in reply to such a request. Stalin offered to send a plane to pick up Mao.
在这场虚惊中，斯大林接到紧急要求，派飞机接毛去苏联。
By then, Mao was safe. The day before Stalin's telegram, Mao had wired a cheerful message to his colleagues in the Red base east of the Yellow River: “On 9–11 this month, Liou Kan's 4 brigades held a parade where we were … Apart from a little loss to the population, no losses. Now the Liou [Kan] army is running to and fro between Yenan and Baoan.” Mao did not take up Stalin's offer to evacuate him this time. All the same, he ordered an airstrip built at once just east of the Yellow River, in case.
斯大林六月十五日回电时，毛已经安全了。毛给他在黄河河东的中共领导发了封口气轻松的电报：“本月九日至十一日，刘戡四个旅到我们驻地及附近王家湾、卧牛城、青阳岔等处游行一次，除民众略受损失外，无损失。现刘军已向延安、保安之间回窜。”毛不去苏联了，但他叫人“即日动工修理”黄河边上的一个飞机场，以备万一。
Liou Kan soon met his death. In February 1948 he was ordered to reinforce the town of Yichuan, between Yenan and the Yellow River. There were three possible routes, and the one picked for him, by General Hu, ran through a narrow wooded valley. Scouts found a heavy concentration of Communist troops, clearly indicating an ambush. Liou Kan radioed Hu for permission to attack the ambushers and then change course. Hu flatly refused.
刘戡不久便死在毛的手里。一九四八年二月，胡宗南令他带两个师，增援延安与黄河之间被中共军队包围的宜川。此行有三条路可走，胡指定刘戡走经瓦子街的洛宜公路。刘戡是二月二十六日得到命令出发的。三天前的二十三日，彭德怀的军队就已经在瓦子街设伏击圈。彭在视察地形时，看到这里的公路两侧，山高坡陡，沟深谷狭，遍布梢林，满意地说：“这真是歼敌的天然好地形啊！”
One of Liou Kan's division commanders, Wang Ying-tsun, later wrote: “After this order, which completely ignored the real situation and our interests, officers and soldiers lost heart … everyone marched in silence, with their heads bowed …” They walked straight into the encirclement and were virtually annihilated. Half a dozen generals were killed, and Liou Kan committed suicide. The division commander managed to escape, and later saw General Hu. According to him, the general “hypocritically expressed his regret, and said why did you press on when you did not have enough troops? I thought: it was your order, and my men were pounded and killed …” The division commander testified: “After Liou Kan's 29th Army was wiped out, it went without saying that Hu Tsung-nan's troops had no morale to speak of. Moreover, the state of mind of the whole Chiang area was tremendously shaken …” This defeat sealed the Nationalists' fate in the Yenan theater, and negated Chiang's whole aim in capturing Yenan, which had been to boost morale and confidence in the country at large.
刘戡的先遣队发现中共大军埋伏在途中观亭一带，向胡宗南要求先打伏兵，“解除翼侧威胁”，“如不先去掉这一翼侧威胁，仍沿洛宜公路前進，不但不能完成解围任务，而且解围部队本身必遭危险”。胡宗南回电说：“宜川情况紧急，在时间上不允许先打观亭，该军仍须按照原定计划，沿洛宜公路迅速前進”。刘戡手下的二十七师中将师长王应尊回忆道：胡宗南的命令“使全军官兵大失所望，忧心忡仲，但亦无可奈何。”“在行军中大家低头不语。”他们就这样明知走進“口袋”里而不得不走進去，“全军士气颓丧已达极点”，“刘戡十分冲动地对我说：“算了，打完了事！””。两天激战，数名将领被击毙后，刘戡在重围中自戕身死。
Chiang knew that Hu wrecked everything he touched. In his diary of 2 March 1948, the Generalissimo wrote: “This catastrophe cost over one third of the main force [under Hu],” and that Hu was “following the same fatal road again and again.” And yet, when Hu disingenuously offered his resignation, Chiang turned it down, with only a lamentation: “The loss of our troops at Yichuan is not only the biggest setback in the Nationalist Army's campaign against the bandits, but also an entirely senseless sacrifice. Good generals killed, a whole army wiped out. Grief and anguish are consuming me …” A half-hearted investigation blamed the debacle on the dead Liou Kan. The Nationalist system followed its tradition of closing ranks, especially once others saw that Hu was so secure in Chiang's favor.
王应尊师长有幸乘夜色脱逃，到西安见到胡宗南。“他虚伪地表示惋惜，并说什么只有这点部队你为什么要去呢？我心想我的部队都被你绥署[胡的司令部]指挥得七零八落，难道要增援宜川时你还不知道我二十七师有多少部队吗？”王师长写道：“刘戡整编第二十九军被歼后，胡宗南集团军心涣散，固不待言，连蒋管区的人心亦十分动荡，特别是关中一带，人心惶惶，一片混乱”。蒋介石想利用“收复延安”鼓舞人心的初衷，就这样断送掉。
The fact that the Generalissimo allowed Hu to get away with a whole year of incredible defeats, all clearly following the same pattern, says a lot about his leadership and judgment. He trusted people he liked, and would back them come what may, often sentimentally. He was also stubborn, and would stick by his own mistakes. Chiang even allowed Hu to siphon off troops from other vital theaters. The chief US military adviser, Major General David Barr, observed that Hu “prevailed on” Chiang “to reinforce his Xian garrison to an extent which was later to prove disastrous to the Nationalists in east central China”; key losses there were “a direct result of this shift of troops to the west,” where, Barr noted, they were either useless or destroyed.
蒋介石在一九四八年三月二日的日记里写道：“此一损失，全陕主力几乎损失三分之一以上”。他很清楚这都是胡宗南的责任：“宗南疏忽粗率”，“重蹈覆辙”。然而，当胡宗南提出辞职时，蒋介石用伤感的满篇空话拒绝了他：“宜川丧师，不仅为国军剿匪最大挫折，而且为无意义之牺牲，良将阵亡，全军覆没，悼恸悲哀，情何以堪。该主任不知负责自效，力挽颓势，而惟以撤职查办，并来京请罪是请，当此一方重任，正在危急之际，而竟有此种不知职守与负责任之表示，殊非中正之所期于该主任者也。”一场敷衍了事的调查报告把责任推到死去的刘戡等人身上。国民党遵循的是官官相护的传统，更何况人人都知道胡宗南深受蒋介石宠信。
蒋介石容忍胡宗南再三“重蹈覆辙”，再清楚不过地说明了他用人的风格和判断力。他刚愎自用，无条件地信任他喜欢的人，天塌下来也给他们撑腰。他的固执使他犯了错误不肯回头。胡宗南毁掉了陕北的军队，蒋介石居然把别处的部队也给他调去。美国军事顾问巴尔少将(David Barr)说：“蒋委员长的老朋友胡宗南将军说服蒋不断向胡的战场增兵，后来证明，这对国民党的华东华中战场是灾难性的。开封洛阳一带的重大损失就是兵力西移的直接后果。”
When Mao finally left the Yenan region and headed east over the Yellow River to the Red base on 23 March 1948, he did so publicly, with organized crowds of peasants seeing him off at the river crossing. And he shook hands with local cadres before he boarded the boat. This unusual openness was to demonstrate that he was not running away furtively. And the general point that the Reds were riding high was reinforced a month later when Hu abandoned Yenan altogether. Over the past year he had lost 100,000 troops. Recovering Yenan was potentially a propaganda windfall for the Reds, but Mao adopted an extremely low-key position. His assistant, Shi Zhe, expected him to make the most of the occasion: “so I waited by his side … But nothing happened.” Mao did not want to attract more attention to Hu in case he was sacked.
在胡的鼻子下转了一年后，一九四八年三月二十三日，毛泽东离开陕北东渡黄河。渡口的河滩山坡上站满了组织起来送行的老百姓，毛上船前还跟区镇干部一一握手话别。这样闻所未闻的透明度，意在显示他不是偷偷摸摸地溜走的，而是以胜利者的姿态告别的。一个月后，胡宗南在损兵折将十多万后，干脆放弃了延安。一反常规，毛对中共的胜利没有大事张扬。师哲说：“我以为毛主席会发贺电，便等在一旁，准备执行任务，可是没有。”张扬起来，蒋介石可能会撤胡宗南的职。
从毛泽东的各种表现，到胡宗南的一系列行为，经过多年研究，我们得出结论：胡宗南有可能是红色代理人。*
* 人们常常提到胡宗南身边的中共情报人员熊向晖。但熊不过是胡的机要秘书，不可能在瞬息万变的战场上，下一系列具体命令，指挥军队调动。更何况熊本人在胡军進入延安两个月后的一九四七年五月二十一日就离开了胡宗南。那一系列战场上的具体命令，也不是远在南京的其他红色代理人能够下达的。
胡宗南是国民党黄埔军校第一期毕业生。那时莫斯科出钱出师资组建军校，当仁不让地埋下了若干红色代理人，经手人主要是军校政治部主任周恩来(毛留在陕北一年，一直跟在毛身边的就是周)。据胡宗南的部属在台湾编写出版的《胡宗南先生与国民革命》所述，军校里，大家都认为胡是共产党员，原因之一是他与军校卫兵司令胡公冕过从甚密，而胡公冕是公认的共产党员。由于贺衷寒等有影响的人物为胡宗南说话，胡接着又发起组织了反共的孙文主义学会，他便没有再被当作共产党人。两胡一直是好友，抗战时蒋介石派胡宗南守在延安的南边，胡宗南有时派人去延安，派的就是胡公冕。今天的中共资料明确指出，胡公冕为红色代理人。
胡宗南交了个亲密朋友，军统头子戴笠。胡结婚是戴笠做的媒。戴笠的手下张严佛写道，戴笠要胡军中的情报人员把上报的重要情报都抄送胡。这么一来，就是有人对胡有怀疑也不敢报告。
Hu went on to cause even more spectacular catastrophes for Chiang, ultimately losing many hundreds of thousands of troops. When Chiang got to Taiwan, Hu went too. There he was immediately impeached, on the charge that he had “brought about the greatest damage to our army and country” of all the Nationalists. But the impeachment failed, thanks to Chiang's protection. Chiang even put Hu in charge of operations to infiltrate the Mainland: they all came to grief. Hu died in Taiwan in 1962. Chiang may have come to doubt his judgment in his later years. His chief of guards (and subsequently prime minister of Taiwan), Hau Po-tsun, told us that Chiang showed an aversion to the mention of the Whampoa Academy, which is generally assumed to have been his base. Many moles had hailed from there.
胡宗南继续给蒋带来一次次全军覆没，最后一共有几十万大军丧失在他手上。蒋介石逃往台湾时，派飞机来接胡宗南。胡想留在大陆，却被部下一拥而前，急拥上了飞机。到台湾后他受到监察院的弹劾，说他“受任最重，统军最多，莅事最久，措置乖方，贻误军国最巨”。但胡是蒋介石的爱将，弹劾自然难成。蒋还让胡主持派人潜入大陆打游击、搞情报的活动，都一一惨败。胡死于一九六二年。蒋介石后来也许意识到他用人的灾难性错误。黄埔是他的基地。但是他的侍卫，台湾后来的行政院长郝柏村告诉我们，蒋在晚年“对黄埔军校的人都不愿谈起”。
MOLES CONTINUED to play a key role in the defeats Chiang suffered in the three military campaigns in 1948–49 that clinched the civil war. The first was in Manchuria, where Chiang picked as his supreme commander a general called Wei Li-huang. In this case, Chiang had not only been told that Wei was a Communist agent, but actually suspected this to be true. Even so, he put Wei in charge of all the 550,000 best troops in this critical theater in January 1948.
蒋的用人不当，也使他在决定国共胜负的三大战役中败北。首先是东北的辽沈战役。一九四八年一月，蒋介石任命卫立煌将军任东北五十五万大军的统帅。
Wei had asked to join the CCP in 1938. Mao passed the news to Moscow in 1940, telling the Russians that the CCP had instructed Wei to stay undercover with the Nationalists. It seems that Wei decided on his betrayal out of a mighty grudge against Chiang for not promoting him as high as he felt he deserved. Wei had told cronies then: “I am going for the Communists … Yenan is nice to me … Let's work with the Communists to bring him [Chiang] down.”
卫立煌曾在一九三八年秘密提出要求参加中共。毛泽东于一九四0年报告莫斯科说，中共请卫暂时留在国民党里，待机而行。卫立煌选择背叛蒋介石似乎是出于怨恨蒋介石没有重用他。他对亲信说：“我的心已经变了，不是从前的卫立煌了。我们当共产党去。”他针对蒋介石说：“我们同共产党一道来整垮他。”
Chiang had been told about Wei's secret liaisons by a Communist defector at the time, and so he passed Wei over again for a top army post after 1945, even though Wei had fought well in Burma against the Japanese, and earned the title “Hundred Victories Wei.” Wei became even more disgruntled, and went into self-imposed exile abroad.
有个叛逃的中共高级干部告诉蒋介石，卫是中共的人。蒋半信半疑。抗战后，尽管卫在缅甸当远征军司令官时立了大功，人称“百胜将军”，蒋没有任用他做陆军总司令。这下卫更不满了，一赌气跑出国去。
The reason Wei was brought back in 1948 and given such a crucial job was that Chiang was frantically trying to woo the Americans, who thought highly of Wei's performance in Burma and regarded him as an important “liberal.” The then US vice-consul in Shenyang, William Stokes, told us that Chiang appointed Wei “in a futile attempt to gain more American equipment and funding, because Wei was recognised by the Americans as a proven military leader.”
蒋介石任命卫立煌做东北军事长官是美国人的推荐。美国人喜欢卫，把他看作政治上的“自由派”， 欣赏卫在缅甸的作战，认为卫有做军事统帅的资格。蒋之所以接受，据美国当时驻沈阳的副领事威廉·斯多克；斯(William Stokes)说，是因为“蒋正焦头烂额地努力想从美国那里得到更多的武器装备和金钱”。
The moment Wei received the call from Chiang, he let the Russian embassy in Paris know, and thenceforth coordinated his every move with the CCP. First of all, he pulled his troops back into a few big cities, thus allowing the Communists to take control of 90 percent of Manchuria without a fight and then to surround these cities.
卫立煌接到蒋的召唤时，人在巴黎。他马上跟驻法国的苏联大使馆联系，通过他们跟中共亘通消息。从此他跟毛互相配合，做的第一件事是按毛的意思，把国民党军队集中在几个大城市里，使百分之九十的东北一枪不发地成了共产党的地盘，这些大城市变成红海中的几个孤岛。
Mao wanted Wei to make sure that all the Nationalist troops under him stayed in Manchuria so that they could be wiped out there. Wei therefore ignored repeated orders from Chiang to move his troops to Jinzhou, the southernmost railway junction in Manchuria, preparatory to withdrawing from Manchuria completely (a move the chief US adviser, Major General Barr, had also recommended). Instead of sacking Wei, Chiang went on arguing with him for months—until the Communists took Jinzhou, on 15 October, trapping most of the hundreds of thousands of Nationalist troops in Manchuria. Mao's troops then swiftly isolated Wei's forces in the remaining Nationalist-held cities, and attacked them one by one. With the fall of Shenyang on 2 November, the whole of Manchuria was in Mao's hands.
蒋介石要卫立煌把部队撤到南大门锦州，做好撤進关内的准备。美国军事顾问巴尔也是这个意见。可是毛要卫把部队部留在东北，以便中共“关起门来打狗”。卫立煌于是无视蒋介石的再三命令，拒绝调动部队。蒋介石呢，非但不撤卫的职，反而一连几个月跟他无休止地争来争去，一直争到十月十五日，中共夺取锦州，关上了东北的大门，把国民党几十万大军关在里面。中共跟着一个个围攻国民党军队孤守的大城市，十一月二日攻克沈阳后，全东北都属于毛了。
For his performance in Manchuria, Chiang put Wei under house arrest, and there were calls for him to be court-martialed. But the Generalissimo, who rarely executed, or even imprisoned, any of his top commanders or opponents, let Wei go, and he sailed off unmolested to Hong Kong. A year later, two days after the proclamation of Communist China, Wei cabled Mao, wagging his tail: “wise guidance … magnificent triumph … great leader … rejoice and cheer and whole-hearted support … Am leaping up ten thousand feet like a bird …” But he cynically declined to go and live under Mao, and tried to contact the CIA in 1951 to back him to lead a third force. He finally moved to the Mainland in 1955.
鉴于卫立煌在东北的表现，蒋介石撤了他的职，把他软禁起来。许多人呼吁要对他军法从事。但蒋介石对他的高级将领或政敌都绝少枪毙，就连监禁也很罕见，卫立煌潇洒地去了香港。一年后，中共政权宣告成立，卫马上给毛发了一封热情的贺电，充满了“英明领导”、“辉煌胜利”、“伟大领袖”、“欢腾鼓舞，竭诚拥护”、“雀跃万丈”等字眼。只是他本人不肯到大陆去生活，在一九五一年跟美国中央情报局联系，请求支持他做所谓“第三种势力”的领袖。直到一九五五年他才回大陆，一九六0年在北京去世。
Mao spoke to his nephew about Wei in withering terms: “Wei Li-huang didn't return until he went bankrupt doing business in Hong Kong. A man like Wei Li-huang is contemptible …” And Mao made sure his contempt was demonstrated. Wei's old Communist contacts were told to turn down his invitations to dinner, and the snubbing lasted until Wei's death in Peking in 1960. His critical help for Mao is still hushed up, as Mao's military genius would look a lot less brilliant if it were known that the enemy's top commander had offered up much of his force—and many of Chiang's best troops—on a platter.
毛对他后来的这番表现嗤之以鼻，对侄儿毛远新说：“卫立煌就是在香港做生意赔了本才回来的，卫立煌这样的人，人家都看不起，难道敌人看得起他？” 卫在毛的胜利上所起的关键作用，中共从来不提。
DURING THE WHOLE of the Manchuria campaign, Mao never went there. He was at his new HQ at Xibaipo, 240 km southwest of Peking. After Manchuria fell in early November 1948, he ordered the army there under Lin Biao to come south. This army now stood at upwards of 1.3 million strong, and its new mission was to tackle the 600,000-man Nationalist army in northern China led by Fu Tso-yi, a celebrated general who had fought China's first winning battle against Japanese puppets in 1936. The encounter between Lin and Fu, known as the Peking–Tianjin Campaign, was the second of the three key campaigns that decided the civil war.
辽沈战役期间，毛泽东住在北平西南二百四十公里的西柏坡。战役一九四八年十一月初结束后，毛命令林彪指挥下的一百三十多万人马入关，准备打后来知名的“平津战役”。
Unlike Wei, General Fu was not a secret Communist. But he was surrounded by people who were, not least his own daughter, who was assigned by the Party to stay with her father in this period and report his every move. Chiang had some idea about this situation, but took no action to remedy it.
华北有六十万国民党军队，总指挥是抗日名将傅作义，直接指挥绥远抗战的就是他。虽然他不是秘密中共党员，但他身边也有共产党人，包括他的女儿。毛特地指定傅的女儿搬来跟傅同住，随时报告他的一举一动。傅作义与中共的关系，蒋介石不是完全不知情，但没有采取任何行动。
By November, even before Lin was on his way south from Manchuria, Fu had made up his mind to surrender, without telling Chiang. He had lost faith in Chiang's regime, and decided to try to save the area under him from pointless devastation—not least Peking itself, the nation's cultural capital, where his HQ was located. He did not do this out of any illusions about Communist rule, which, he said publicly at the time, would bring “cruelty … terror and tyranny,” and the decision to surrender caused him great anguish. He began to fall to pieces, and was seen slapping his own face, and contemplating suicide.
十一月，面对就要来临的林彪大军，傅作义思前想后，下决心瞒着蒋介石向中共求和。他对蒋政权已失去信心，觉得打不赢中共，打也没用，只会徒然使城乡被毁，生灵涂炭。他特别害怕百万大军的无情战火，会把他深爱的古城北平夷为废墟。他想及早结束战争。傅作义对共产党统治并无幻想，他曾公开地说共产党将带来“残酷”，“恐怖与暴政”。把华北和六十万军队交给中共，这个责任使傅作义心情非常矛盾。他经常自己打自己的耳光，以头撞墙，咬火柴头想自杀。
Chiang knew what was happening to Fu. On 12 December he wrote in his diary that Fu was “deeply depressed … and seems to be going insane.” But he still refused to sack him, and when Fu offered to resign, Chiang turned him down with a maudlin “10,000 Nos.”
蒋介石很清楚傅作义的精神状况，十二月十二日他在日记里写道：“宜生[傅作义字]大受刺激，其精神亦受到严重威胁，似有精神失常之象”。但是他不解除傅的军权，甚至在傅坚决地请求辞职时，还给他来了个“万难照准”。
Mao kept close tabs on Fu's mental condition through Fu's daughter, and he decided he could extract more from the situation than just a surrender. He could establish himself in the public eye as a military genius who had beaten Fu, the renowned war hero. So, when Fu sued for surrender, Mao strung Fu's envoys along for two months, not accepting the surrender but not saying “No” either, while all the time keeping up attacks on Fu's army. By now Fu was quite unfit to command. One officer recalled how during one key battle, when asked for instructions, “Fu dithered and faltered and then said listlessly: ‘Play it by ear.' At that moment, I thought, we are finished …”
通过傅作义女儿的报告，毛对傅的情况了解得清清楚楚。他发觉从这样一个必败的对手身上，可以获得更多的好处：毛要让全中国看到是他打败了傅作义这员名将。从十一月起，傅作义不断派人联系要求“起义”，毛泽东给他来了个拖延战术，不说同意也不说不同意，拉着他又保持距离，给他希望又教他濒于绝望。与此同时，毛调兵遣将，把傅的军队一支支吃掉。这时的傅已完全失去了做统帅的心理条件。在中共围攻新保安的关键战斗中，战地的一位军长电话问傅：“是否还向北平集中，还是就在这里会战？”“究竟怎么办？”傅停了一下，没精打采地说：“你看着办吧！” 当时军长就想：“事情要坏了”。
Predictably, Mao's army took city after city, including Tianjin, the third largest in China, which fell on 15 January 1949. Only when he had created an image of himself as a military giant-killer did Mao accept Fu's standing offer to surrender Peking. Mao was thus able to say that Fu had opted for peace only after being thoroughly defeated on the battlefield—by Mao himself. The truth is that the whole campaign, which cost tens of thousands of lives, did not have to be fought at all. A broken Fu collaborated with Mao until his death on the Mainland in 1974.
直到中国第三大城市天津于一九四九年一月十五日落入毛手，显示出他的战无不胜之后，毛才对傅作义几个月前就一再请求的交出北平、交出华北的和平意向点头。然后毛立即颠倒事实，宣布傅作义只是在天津失陷、兵临城下的最后关头，“战败了，一切希望都没有了”， 才接受关心、爱护北平的毛的“和平解放”。这就是毛夸耀的平津战役。实际上，华北完全可以无战事。平津战役根本不需要打。毛为了树立自己的军事天才形象，无端浪费了数万人的生命。傅作义一九七四年在大陆去世。
AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME as the sham Peking–Tianjin Campaign, a third huge, and more genuine, campaign was being fought in the heartland of China to the north of Chiang's capital, Nanjing. Known as the Huai–Hai Campaign, this involved well over one million men, and lasted from November 1948 to January 1949.
跟“平津战役”几乎同时，一场真正的大战--“淮海战役”(“徐蚌会战”)在华中地区進行，从一九四八年十一月打到一九四九年一月，双方参战人数上百万。战役以国民党失败告终，蒋介石政权的垮台成了定局。
The chief commander on the Nationalist side here was not a Communist agent, or a mental wreck. But just below him there were strategically placed Red sleepers, including two generals who had been secret Party members for ten and twenty years respectively, who opened up the gateway to this battleground within forty-eight hours of the campaign starting.
这场大战中，国民党方面不乏地位重要的红色代理人。战役开始四十八小时，分别潜伏了二十年和十年的中共秘密党员张克侠、何基澧便率部“起义”，敞开了战区的大门。
The major saboteurs were two other men in Chiang's own HQ called Liu Fei and Kuo Ju-kui, who were intimately involved in drawing up the battle plans for the campaign. They placed the Nationalists on the defensive in every move by deliberately making wrong deployments and recommendations, while passing the plans to the Communists.
最主要的破坏者是在蒋介石总部身居要职的刘斐和郭汝瑰。他们的职责包括制定军事计划，他们也理所当然地制定错误计划，提出使国民党军步步挨打的致命建议。把情报不断传递给中共那就更不在话下。
Chiang was particularly dependent on Kuo, to whom he spoke on the phone almost every day, and whose ruinous advice he heeded. Kuo actually fell under suspicion at this time from field commanders, and was even denounced as a spy by no less a person than Chiang's adopted son, Weigo. But the Generalissimo did nothing until it was too late, and even then he merely transferred Kuo to Sichuan—on the recommendation of the other key mole, Liu Fei. In Sichuan, Kuo would later surrender an entire army.
蒋介石格外垂青的是郭汝瑰，有段时间差不多每天都给他打电话，对他言听计从。那时，战区指挥官已经对郭起疑，蒋的二儿子纬国也向蒋揭发过他。蒋虽然渐渐对他失去信任，并没有采取什么措施，最后不过把他调到四川当军长，这还是刘斐的建议。在四川，郭汝瑰在中共到来时带领整支部队投降。
By mid-January 1949, Mao had wrapped up all three major campaigns triumphantly. The country north of the Yangtze, where 80 percent of Chiang's troops had been stationed, was Mao's. He now wanted moles to be posted to unconquered areas south of the river, to wait for his army to arrive and then surrender at the opportune moment. Nationalist bigwigs jumped ship in droves. On 7 January Mao informed Stalin that “many prominent” Chiang men, including former defense minister Pai, were seeking deals: “Pai Chung-hsi asked our people—whatever orders come from the CCP, I would fulfill them immediately …” (Pai in fact did not go with Mao.)
到一九四九年一月，百分之八十的蒋军被打垮，辽阔的长江以北成了毛的天下。国民党大员纷纷倒戈。一月七日，毛电告斯大林说：蒋手下的“许多要员”都找上门来做交易，前国防部长“白崇禧对我们的人说：中共有什么命令我都会立刻去完成”。（没有迹象表明白崇禧为中共做了任何事。）
Mao told supplicants to stay with Chiang, and in some cases even to put up resistance and wait for the right moment.
*毛说他要这些来找中共的人留在国民党内，等待最佳时刻，必要时甚至可以假装抵抗。
Though the Yangtze was a formidable barrier, and Chiang had a sizable navy, these old and new betrayals made sure that the road was open to the capital, Nanjing, and the financial center, Shanghai—and to the rest of China. On 9–10 January, Mao confidently informed Stalin that his government “can be created in summer,” or “earlier.”
尽管长江是一道阻止中共军队南下的天然屏障，蒋介石的海军也不可小觑，但一个个旧谍新叛使得这道天险成了一条浅清待涉的小溪。南京、上海门户洞开。毛在一月九日至十日间发给斯大林的电报充满信心地说，他的政府“能在夏天成立”， 或“更早一点”。
Mao's victory in the civil war was enormously helped by Chiang's very poor judgment about people—although it was also not easy to detect and root out the Communist moles. Mao's own policy was not to take the slightest chance. The terror campaigns in Yenan and the other Red areas had exposed and severed virtually every connection individual Communists had with the Nationalists, and the Communists' total destruction of privacy meant there was no way those under their rule could contact the Nationalists even if they wanted to.
And Mao never let up. Each time he acquired more territory and personnel, he took relentless steps to enforce control, requiring each new Party enlistee to write down all his or her family and social relations—and this was just for starters. He never stopped seeking, never stopped plugging, every conceivable loophole. Very few agents, Nationalist or foreign, survived his attention, certainly none who reached any position of importance.
CHIANG'S STRONG FEELINGS for his wife contributed heavily to him losing China. His first prime minister after the Sino-Japanese War was T.V. Soong, who was Mme Chiang's brother. The Soongs and the family Mme Chiang's elder sister had married into, the Kungs, grew fat on T.V.'s policies. After the Japanese surrender, T.V. set the exchange rate for the currency of the puppet government outside Manchuria at the absurd level of 1 to 200. This saw the family wealth swell, but impoverished the entire population in the former Japanese-occupied areas in China proper, which included the main cities like Shanghai and Nanjing, with the bulk of the nation's middle class. Under T.V., takeover officials engaged in widespread extortion, shaking down the rich by designating them “collaborators.” Chiang himself acknowledged that his officials were “indulging in extreme extravagance, whoring wildly and gambling with no restraint … They brag, swagger and extort and stop at nothing …” “The Calamity of Victory” was how the influential Ta Kung Pao newspaper described the takeover.
蒋介石的失败，还在于他“家庭观念重”。他战后的行政院长是蒋夫人的哥哥宋子文。宋的政策使宋家跟蒋夫人的姊夫孔祥熙家族都发了财。日本投降后，宋子文把重庆跟南京汪精卫政权的货币兑换率定成极不合理的一比两百。只此一举，使孔、宋家族的财富大大地膨胀，而汪政权下人民的财产大大地缩水。在宋子文治理下，接收大员们随意指人为汉奸，敲诈勒索。蒋介石写道：“京、沪、平、津各地军政党员，穷奢极侈，狂嫖滥赌，并借党团军政机关名义，占住人民高楼大厦，设立办事处，招摇勒索，无所不为。”影响广泛的《大公报》称国民党政府的接收为“胜利的灾难”。
At the time of the Japanese surrender, Chiang seemed to be a glorious victor, yet within a very short time he was plunging into decline. Hyper-inflation, food crises, hoarding and panic buying became endemic in the cities. Under T.V., the government managed to squander not only its own reserves, but also the sizable holdings of gold and foreign currency that it inherited from the puppet government.
日本投降时，蒋介石和他的政府正处在风光之巅，转瞬间他们就跌跌撞撞地走 下坡路。物价飞涨、囤积居奇、抢购成风成了城市的流行病。国民党政府消耗干净了自己原有的，以及从汪政权那里继承来的大量黄金和外汇储备。在宋“开放外汇市场”的政策下，孔、宋两家控制的公司利用特权，捞取了巨额外汇，進口美国商品牟取暴利。由于美国物资的倾销，一九四六年中国对外贸易赤字创历史最高纪录，一大批工商业破产倒闭。
The Soongs and the Kungs had access to China's foreign currency reserves at preferential rates, which enabled them to sell US goods in China at a huge profit, causing the largest trade deficit in China's history in 1946. This dumping bankrupted swaths of industry and commerce, and T.V. was forced to resign as prime minister on 1 March 1947, after being fiercely attacked in the National Assembly and the press. Chiang ordered an investigation, which concluded that Soong and Kung companies had illegally converted more than US$380 million.
民众的愤怒，报界的谴责，监察院的弹劾，参政会议员面对面的尖锐质询，迫使宋子文在一九四七年三月一日辞职。蒋介石下令调查对他的指控，结论是宋、孔两家的公司在短短八个月中，攫取了三亿八千多万美金的外汇，高达国家同期售出外汇的百分之八十八。
But all the Generalissimo did was demote T.V., which outraged and alienated many devoted, and uncorrupt, followers. Demoralization accelerated throughout the population, while many denounced the regime as “a bunch of robbers” and “bloodsuckers.” Chiang's failure to clean up, and especially to come to grips with the malfeasance of his wife's family, also lost him support in America.
但蒋介石对他妻舅的惩处，不过是降职，派他做广东省省主席。这使忠实于蒋的那些并不腐败的追随者们气愤不平，老百姓对政府更是伤透了心，把他们叫作“一帮强盗”、“吸血鬼”。蒋介石无法制止腐败，特别是他妻子家族的腐败，也使他進一步失掉了美国的人心。
The report of the investigation into Chiang's relatives was kept secret. Then the Nationalists' own newspaper, the Central Daily, got hold of a copy and published it on 29 July, causing a sensation. Two days later, after irate phone calls from Mme Chiang to her husband, the paper had to carry a notice claiming it had got the decimal point wrong, and lowered the sum taken by the families from over US$300 million to US$3 million.
对蒋的亲戚的调查报告，当局秘而不宣。国民党机关报《中央日报》搞到一份，七月二十九日在报上发表，全国哗然。在蒋夫人生气地给她丈夫打了个电话后，《中央日报》奉命发表声明，说前日刊登的调查报告“漏列小数点”，把孔、宋套汇的数字从三亿一下子降到三百万。蒋介石不断让他的个人感情，决定他的政治、军事政策。他就这样失去了中国大陆 -- 失给一个完全没有这些弱点的人。
Chiang consistently let personal feelings dictate his political and military actions. He lost China to a man who had none of his weak spots.
*This was partly on account of his close friendship with a man called Hu Kung-mien, who at the time was commonly assumed to be a secret Communist, and who has now been acknowledged by Peking as an agent. During the war against Japan, when Hu Tsung-nan was stationed south of Yenan, he made this man his representative to Mao.
*Mao's radios had been maintaining regular communication with Communist agents in Hu's army, “so their action was entirely under our control,” one of Mao's radio men told us, adding that “some of the identities of the underground are not disclosed even today” (1999).