31 TOTALITARIAN STATE, EXTRAVAGANT LIFESTYLE
31 登基之初
(1949–53 AGE 55–59)
1949～1953 年 55～59 岁
THE TRANSITION FROM Nationalist to Communist rule was managed without great disruption. The advancing Communist army took over all civilian institutions, and recruited educated young urban men and women to staff them, in addition to seasoned Party cadres. This machine immediately assumed control of the country.
国民党到共产党的政权交替，没有出现大的无政府状态。中共军队一路前進，一路接管所有社会机构，招收受过教育的男女青年，在共产党老干部领导下紧锣密鼓地工作起来。
Many old administrators stayed on, under their new Party bosses, and for a time the economy ran much as before. Private businessmen were told that their property would not be touched for a long while and that they must keep their factories functioning and shops open. Industry and commerce were not nationalized for some years, and the collectivization of agriculture was not carried out until the mid-1950s.
大部分旧职员原封不动地留下，经济照常运作。工厂开工，商店开门。工商业国有化、农业集体化，要在几年后才实行。
In these few years, with much of the economy still in private hands, the country quickly recovered from well over a decade of war. Agriculture saw considerable growth, as the new government issued loans and invested in water works. In the cities, subsidies were doled out to alleviate starvation. Death rates dropped.
在最初几年，由于实行宽松的经济政策，中国从十多年战火中迅速恢复，百业俱兴。死亡率下降。
Some sectors were subjected to instant drastic change. One was the law, where courts were replaced by Party committees. Another was the media, on which tight censorship was imposed at once; public opinion was stamped out. Mao would digest the rest of society gradually.
但新闻媒体马上被严格管制，公众舆论顷刻不复存在。残余的武装反抗被毫不手软地镇压下去。
Mao had an able team, headed by his No. 2 Liu Shao-chi, with Chou En-lai, the No. 3, as prime minister. In June 1949 Mao sent Liu to Russia to learn about the Soviet model in detail. Liu stayed there for nearly two months, and saw Stalin an unprecedented six times. He held meetings with a stream of top Soviet ministers and managers and visited a wide range of institutions. Hundreds of Soviet advisers were assigned to China, some returning with Liu on his train. A Stalinist state was being constructed even before Mao had formally assumed power.
毛有一个能干的班子，由刘少奇和国务院总理周恩来执掌。一九四九年六月，毛派刘少奇到苏联，把整套苏联模式搬来中国。两个月之中，刘跟斯大林见面六次。斯大林还从来没跟哪位外国领导这么频繁地会见过。刘参观了工厂和集体农庄，与苏联各部门领导开了无数次会。数百名苏联专家很快被派来中国，有的在刘返程时同车而至。毛还没有正式宣告政权易手，一个斯大林式的极权框架已经摆好，只等套上去。
The new regime ran into armed resistance in the countryside and dealt with it without mercy. Once the state was secure, Mao began systematic terrorization of the population, to induce long-term conformity and obedience. His methods were uniquely Maoist.
胜利了，毛没有大赦天下。他搞的第一个运动是杀人：镇压反革命。毛维持政权靠“运动”而不靠法律。他从心底讨厌任何法律，曾对斯诺说自己是“和尚打伞，无法无天”。*
Mao was viscerally hostile to law, and his subjects were utterly shorn of legal protection. He described himself to Edgar Snow in 1970 as “a man without law or limit” (which was mistranslated as him saying he was “a lone monk”). Instead of laws, the regime issued edicts, resolutions and press editorials. It accompanied these with “campaigns” conducted by the Party system. There was a paper facade of law, which formally allowed the “right of appeal,” but exercising it was treated as an offense, a “demand for further punishment,” as one ex-prisoner put it, which could result in one's sentence being doubled, for daring to doubt the wisdom of “the people.”
* 毛政权也有一些法律的门面，被判刑者可以“上诉”。但上诉通常被算作“态度恶劣”、“抗拒改造”，要加重判刑。
In October 1950 Mao launched a nationwide “campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries,” and devoted much energy to this, his first major onslaught since taking power, ordering his police chief to “send reports directly to me.” The targets were what remained of the old Nationalist regime. They came under the general heading of “class enemies,” broken down into categories like “Bandits,” which referred to anyone involved in armed resistance: these alone ran into many millions. Another group was “Spies,” which meant not people actually spying, but anyone who had worked in Nationalist intelligence. Grassroots Nationalist chiefs also fell victim en bloc—although senior Nationalists were protected, as bait to entice others back from abroad. “We don't kill a single one of those big Chiang Kai-sheks,” Mao said. “What we kill are small Chiang Kai-sheks.”
镇反于一九五0年十月发动，毛亲自掌舵，叫公安部长把报告“直接送给我”。运动对象一类是“土匪”，包括卷入武装反抗毛政权的人；一类叫“特务”，囊括所有为国民党情报机关工作过的人。国民党政权的基层干部全体当上了靶子，上层国民党官员则受保护优待，以引诱海外国民党人来归。毛说：“我们杀的是些“小蒋介石”。至于“大蒋介石”……我们一个不杀。”
Mao issued order after order berating provincial cadres for being too soft, and urged more “massive arrests, massive killings.” On 23 January 1951, for instance, he criticized one province for “being much too lenient, and not killing [enough]”; when it raised its execution rate, he said this “improvement” made him feel “very delighted.”
说稍加不满的话也受到镇压。有一句奇怪的话曾在华北数省不径而走：“毛主席派人下乡割蛋，送给苏联去造原子弹。”“割蛋”就是阉割男人生殖器的意思。在村子里，夜间要是谁大吼一声：“割蛋的来了！”全村便会四下逃散。当时中共在华北农村征粮出口苏联，使这“谣言”应运而生。后来，毛接到报告说：杀了一批人以后，“谣言平息，社会秩序安定。”
This nationwide campaign went hand in hand with the land reform in the newly occupied areas, where some two-thirds of China's population lived. Some 3 million perished either by execution, mob violence, or suicide.* Mao wanted the killings performed with maximum impact, and that meant having them carried out in public. On 30 March 1951 he instructed: “Many places … don't dare to kill counter-revolutionaries on a grand scale with big publicity. This situation must be changed.” In Peking alone, some 30,000 sentencing and execution rallies were held, attended by nearly 3.4 million people. A young half-Chinese woman from Britain witnessed one rally in the center of Peking, when some 200 people were paraded and then shot in the head so that their brains splattered out onto bystanders. Even those who managed to evade the rallies could not always avoid seeing horrific things, like trucks carrying corpses through the streets, dripping blood.
镇反中，毛一个指示接着一个指示，嫌他的各省领导太手软，太“右倾”，要他们“大捕大杀”。与此同时進行的是占人口三分之二的“新解放区”的土改。在这两场运动中，被枪毙、被打死、被逼自杀的人大约三百万左右。* 毛希望每一次杀人都达到杀鸡儆猴的效果，要公开進行。一九五一年三月三十日，他指示：“很多地方，畏首畏尾，不敢大张旗鼓杀反革命。这种情况必须立即改变。”在毛的督促下，北京一地就开了三万次公审枪决大会，到会的达三百四十万人次。一个有一半中国血统的英国姑娘目睹了在北京市中心开的一次大会，公审两百人，然后当众枪毙，脑浆溅在旁边的人身上。躲过了这些大会的人常常躲不过游街示众的场面，或看着大卡车拉着滴血的尸体穿街而行。
* 毛在最高国务会议上讲镇反中杀了七十万人。这个数字不包括土改中被打死的。从各类资料中可以得出结论，土改中被村民打死的人数，至少相当于被政府枪毙的人数。自杀的人数大致相当被杀的人数。
Mao intended most of the population—children and adults alike—to witness violence and killing. His aim was to scare and brutalize the entire population, in a way that went much further than either Stalin or Hitler, who largely kept their foulest crimes out of sight.
毛要的是全体人民参加镇反，要他们都受到恐吓。在这一点上，毛比斯大林和希特勒走得更远。
More might well have been killed if it had not been for their value as slave labor. Mao said as much in one order: some people had “committed crimes that deserve to be punished by death,” but they must not be killed, partly because “we would lose a large labour force.” So millions were spared to be shipped to labor camps. With advice from Russian gulag experts on deportation and camp management, Mao sowed a vast archipelago of camps, the official term for which was lao-gai: “reform through labour.” To be sent to lao-gai meant being condemned to back-breaking labor in the most hostile wastelands and down the most contaminating mines, while being hectored and harassed incessantly. Hidden away in these camps, the physically weaker, and the spiritually stronger, were worked to death. Many inmates were executed, while others committed suicide by any means, like diving into a wheat-chopper.
要不是考虑到有些人能当劳动力使用，毛杀的人还会更多。他说：有些人“犯有死罪”， 但杀了他们会“损失了大批的劳动力”。于是数百万人被“宽大处理”送進在苏联专家指导下建立起来的劳改营。劳改意味着在最荒芜的地带，污染最严重的矿井，干最累最苦的重活，听最不堪忍受的训斥。身体虚弱的、性格倔强的，往往就死在这些黑暗的集中营里。除了累死病死的，枪毙的，自杀的更不计其数。
In all, during Mao's rule, the numbers who were executed, and met other premature deaths in prisons and labor camps, could well amount to 27 million.*
在整个毛统治期间，死在监狱、劳改营里的人，和被枪毙的人，总数大约有两千七百万。*
* 据估计，毛统治下的囚犯人数每年约一千万。因各种原因造成的死亡人数，平均每年应不下百分之十。
In addition to execution and incarceration in prisons and camps, there was a third, and typically Maoist, form of punishment that was imposed on many tens of millions of people during Mao's reign. It was called being placed “under surveillance” while the victim remained in society. What it meant was “doing time on the outside,” kept on a kind of permanent knife-edge parole, one of the usual suspects to be rounded up and tormented afresh with any new bout of suppression. It meant one's whole family living like outcasts. The high-visibility stigma served as a warning to the general public never to cross the regime.†
一种典型的毛式惩罚方式叫“管制”，决定了二十七年中数千万人的命运。这些人生活在监狱外的监视中，一有运动就揪出来批斗一番，平时终日战战兢兢，不知道哪一天大祸临门。他们的家人也备受歧视欺负。这批社会罪人的命运天天都在提醒着周围的人：不要得罪共产党。
The terror worked. A report to Mao on 9 February 1951, only a few months into the campaign, said that after this first bout of killings, “rumor-mongering died down and social order stabilised.” What the state called “rumors” were often the only way people had to express their real sentiments. In one case, a seemingly bizarre alert spread not just from village to village, but from province to province: “Chairman Mao sends people to the villages to cut off [men's] balls to give to the Soviet Union to make atom bombs.” (In Chinese, “balls” and “bombs” share the same pronunciation: dan.) In some places, when what looked like a tax collector appeared, the shout went up: “The ball-cutters are here!,” and the whole village would run for cover. This story reflects the fact that Mao was already imposing extortionate food levies on the peasants, some of whom had clearly surmised that the food was being sent to Russia.
This campaign clamped the lid down hard on any such expression of dissent, but there were still a few cracks in the system in those early years. Victims could sometimes still hide. A small landowner from Anhui province managed to stay on the run with her son for 636 days, without ever being informed on, even by people sent to catch them. When the fugitives eventually returned to their village, “the overwhelming majority of people, particularly women … shed tears of pity,” the son recalled. As the campaign was over by then, they survived.
But control became increasingly pervasive, and with it the loss of freedom on every front: of speech, movement, work, information. A nationwide system of concierges called Order-Keeping Committees was established in every factory, village and street, composed of members of the public, often the nosiest and most hyper-active busybodies, now made complicit with the regime's repression. These committees kept an eye on everyone, not just political suspects and petty criminals. Above all, the regime nailed every person in China to a fixed, and usually immutable, job and place of residence through a registration system (hu-kou) begun in July 1951, which soon became iron-clad.
镇反时，全国每个工厂、村庄、街道，都成立了“治安保卫委员会”，成员是一般平民，往往是最爱管闲事的积极分子。他们的职责不仅是监视政府眼里的罪犯，而且是所有老百姓。毛政权还确立了一项最根本的控制方式：从一九五一年七月起，全国实行“户口制”，人人都必须有固定的居住、工作之地，没有人可以随意迁居、换工作。
The government also used the “suppression of counter-revolutionaries” campaign to move against all sorts of non-political offenses, such as ordinary banditry, gangsterism, murder, robbery, gambling, drug-dealing and prostitution (“liberated” prostitutes were organized to do manual labor). Thanks to phenomenal organization and ruthlessness, these actions were extremely successful. By the end of 1952, drug-dealing was virtually wiped out, as were brothels.
利用镇反，政府也收拾了刑事犯。土匪、黑帮、抢劫、杀人、聚赌、贩毒、嫖妓，都在打击之列。由于共产党组织严密，铁面无情，下得了手，社会治安很快变得空前的好。到一九五二年底，贩毒基本上绝迹，妓院也一扫而空，妓女被组织起来参加劳动。
Mao repeatedly said that his killings “were extremely necessary.” “Only when this thing is properly done can our power be secure,” he pronounced.
毛泽东再三说他的杀、关、管“是非常必要的，没有这一手不行”。“这件事做好了，政权才能巩固。”
WHILE NUMEROUS CHINESE were executed, only two foreigners are known to have suffered this fate—one Italian, Antonio Riva, and a Japanese called Ryuichi Yamaguchi. The charge was no minor one: planning to kill Mao with a mortar bomb as he stood on Tiananmen on 1 October 1950, National Day. The two men were arrested days before, together with several other foreigners. Ten months later, on 17 August 1951, these two were driven through central Peking standing up in jeeps, and then shot in public near the Bridge of Heaven. The news was splashed across next day's People's Daily under the headline “The Case of US Spies Plotting Armed Rebellion,” alleging that the assassination had been ordered by the former US assistant military attaché, Colonel David Barrett.
在大杀中国人的同时，有两个外国人被处死：意大利人李安东 (Antonio Riva) 和日本人山口隆一。他们的罪名是企图在一九五0年“十一国庆节”时用迫击炮炮打天安门城楼，刺杀毛泽东。这两个人在国庆前一天跟几个外国人一道被捕，十个月后被押着站在吉普车上游街示众，然后在北京天桥附近当众枪毙。第二天的《人民日报》大字标题，说他们是“美国政府间谍特务企图举行暴动”，幕后指挥是其实早巳离开了北京的美国原驻华武官包瑞德(David Barrett)。
For anyone, let alone a foreigner, to contemplate assassinating Mao on a maximum-security occasion like National Day, amid a throng of hundreds of thousands of organized and hyper-vigilant Chinese, not to mention some 10,000 police and another 10,000 troops, was a very tall order. Actually, Barrett, the alleged ringleader, had left China many months before. Two decades later, Chou En-lai apologized, in a vague way, about implicating him, and invited him back to China. This was an indirect acknowledgment that the accusation was faked.
警卫森严的天安门广场和周边地带，一万警察，一万武装部队，满广场高度警觉的中国人。孤零零几个外国人，动了在这里谋杀毛的念头，这好像是个讲给小孩子听的故事。二十年后，周恩来在邀请包瑞德访华时，含含糊糊地向他道歉，等于承认这事是子虚乌有。
Linking the plot to Barrett helped whip up anti-American feeling, which was not as fervid as the regime wished. The trumped-up charge was also used to tarnish another major target of Mao's—the Roman Catholic Church, whose leading foreign representative, an Italian Monsignor, was one of those arrested. China had about 3.3 million Catholics at the time. Mao was very interested in the Vatican, especially its ability to command allegiance beyond national boundaries, and his Italian visitors often found themselves being peppered with questions about the Pope's authority. The tenacity and effectiveness of the Catholics perturbed the regime, which used the phony assassination case to accelerate the takeover of Catholic institutions, including schools, hospitals and orphanages. A high-decibel smear campaign accused Catholic priests and nuns of heinous actions ranging from plain murder to cannibalism and medical experiments on babies. Hundreds of Chinese Catholics were executed, and many foreign priests suffered physical abuse.
假造这个案子的目的是激起反美情绪，那时正值朝鲜战争(韩战)。另一个目的是打击在中国拥有三百三十万信徒的天主教会，被捕的人中就有梵蒂冈在北京的主要代表、意大利人马迪懦(Tarcisio Martina)。毛对梵蒂冈跨国度的巨大权威很感兴趣，津津有味地询问来访的意大利人。正因为它的号召力和能量，天主教会对毛是个威胁。中共接管了天主教办的学校、医院、孤儿院，诬蔑教士、修女吃孤儿院里孤儿的心肝，用孤儿做医药试验。
In general, religious and quasi-religious organizations were either branded reactionary and suppressed, or brought under tight control. Almost all foreign clergy were expelled, along with most foreign businessmen, virtually clearing China of non-Communist foreigners by about 1953. Non-Communist foreign press and radio were, it goes without saying, banned.
宗教、准宗教团体，或作为“反动组织”镇压，或置于严格管制之下。几乎所有的外国教士都被驱逐。跟他们一道被赶走的还有外国生意人和记者。到一九五三年，中国基本上没什么非共产党国家的外国人了。
THE “CAMPAIGN to suppress counter-revolutionaries” lasted over a year though routine suppression continued unabated after that. Mao then focused his attention on securing watertight control of the state coffers, to make sure that the funds the state extracted from the people did not revert to private hands. In late 1951 he started a campaign known as “the Three-Antis,” targeting embezzlement, waste and “bureaucratism” (which meant slacking, not bureaucracy per se). The primary aim was to scare anyone with access to government money from pocketing it. Alleged embezzlers were called “tigers.” “Big Tigers,” involving cases over 10,000 yuan, qualified for death.
一九五一年底，毛把注意力转移到锁紧国家的钱柜上，反贪污，反浪费，反官僚主义的“三反”运动开始。反贪污是主要目的。贪污犯叫“老虎”贪污旧币一亿元(合一九五五年币制改革后新币的一万元)的叫“大老虎”要判死刑。
As corruption had been epidemic under the Nationalists, the campaign had genuine appeal. Many thought that the Communists were trying to root out corruption. What people did not realize was that while it was true that after this campaign few who had access to state money dared dip their hand in the till, the funds thus amassed in the state coffers were not going to be used for the interests of the people.
从古到今，中国人都希望有个清廉的政府，官员们不中饱私囊。人们对三反热烈拥护，心想这是共产党在铲除腐败。人们不曾意识到，国家钱柜里的钱，是从全国老百姓那里拿来的，但钱柜只有一把钥匙，攥在毛一个人手里，他想怎么用就怎么用，与老百姓的利益无关。
Mao was hands-on about what had now, in effect, become his money. He bombarded government ministers, and provincial and army leaders, with cables urging them to catch “Big Tigers,” and setting quotas: “We must probably execute 10,000 to several tens of thousands of embezzlers nationwide before we can solve our problem.” He whipped up a competition among the provinces, goading them on to higher targets, threatening: “Whoever disobeys is either a bureaucratist or an embezzler himself.”
为了把钱柜锁得牢牢的，毛不断给各部部长、各省和军队领导倾盆大雨般的发电报，要他们捉“大老虎”还定下指标：“全国可能需要枪毙一万至几万贪污犯才能解决问题。”他激励各省竞赛“捉虎”，威胁说“违者不是官僚主义分子，就是贪污分子”。找老虎的方式是坦白和检举。三百八十三万政府工作人员，还不算军队的，靠这些办法审查。刑讯时有发生。最后抓出的“大老虎”比毛预定的要少得多。
The method for uncovering those deemed to be offenders was, as Mao enjoined, “confession and informing.” Using these techniques, some 3.83 million civilian officials were grilled and screened (and more in the army). Though torture was not encouraged as a public spectacle this time, it was nevertheless used in some places, and Mao was kept informed. Russians working on the railway in Manchuria reported hearing screams (“like from Japanese dungeons”) from nearby offices. These turned out to be coming from Chinese colleagues who were being “checked” by having their testicles crushed in bamboo pliers.
In the end, relatively few officials were found to have embezzled sums large enough to qualify them as “Big Tigers.” But Mao had achieved his goal, to instill fear. From now on, few dared to pilfer state funds.
As for its second target, waste, the campaign caused more loss than it prevented. By tying up skilled managers and technicians in sterile meetings for months on end, it deprived the economy of badly needed human assets. On 14 February 1952, Tianjin reported that wholesale trade was down by half, banks had stopped loans, and private businesses dared not buy goods. Industrial production was declining, tax income collapsing, and the economy was heading into recession. In Manchuria, production plummeted by half. In fact, the system of repression itself was a prime source of waste. One Belgian priest worked out that he was interrogated—to no effect—for more than 3,000 hours over three years, which involved at least three or four people full time (at least 10,000 man-hours), as well as vast amounts of scarce paper.
三反的另一个靶子是“浪费”。实际上，运动本身造成的浪费更多。建设国家急需的管理人员、技术人员被关在屋子里开会搞运动，一关几个月，业务陷于停顿。在东北，生产降低一半。一九五二年二月十四日，天津汇报说：“自三反以来，内外交流、城乡交流停滞，对天津经济已发生重大影响。批发商业成交较前减少一半；银行不贷款，银根很紧；私人不买货，也无心卖货；工业生产开始下降；税收显着减少。一部分直接受到影响的劳动人民已在叫苦。”
In January 1952, shortly after the Three-Antis began, Mao ordered another campaign to run in tandem with it, this one called “the Five-Antis.” The offenses were: bribery, tax evasion, pilfering state property, cheating, and stealing economic information. It was aimed at private businessmen, whose property had not been confiscated, to force them to disgorge money, as well as to frighten them out of acts like bribery and tax evasion. One person involved at a high level put the number of suicides in these two campaigns as at least 200,000–300,000. In Shanghai so many people jumped from skyscrapers that they acquired the nickname “parachutes.” One eyewitness wondered why people jumped into the street rather than into the river. The reason, he discovered, was that they wanted to safeguard their families: “If you jumped into the Huangpu River and were swept away so the Communists didn't have a corpse, they would accuse you of having escaped to Hong Kong, and your family would suffer. So the best way was to leap down to the street.”
三反开始不久，毛又搞了个“五反”：反对行贿、偷税漏税、盗骗国家财产、偷工减料和盗窃经济情报。运动对象是“资产阶级”。按毛上台初期的政策，这些人的财产没有被没收，企业商业还在继续经营。五反的目的，是使他们从此诚惶诚恐地照共产党的要求干，而且通过罚款没收，从他们那里挤出钱来。
BY MAY 1953, when Mao brought the campaigns to an end, he had accomplished what he had set out to do, namely to scare people away from touching state money. Communist officialdom did become relatively uncorrupt in the conventional sense, such as not taking bribes, but it was granted a privileged standard of living, which was minutely graded hierarchically.
在上海，因五反跳楼而死的多到居然有了个诨名：“降落伞部队”。一位目击者说：“在上海目睹此惨状，心里一直有个问号，既然自杀为什么不跳黄浦江，死也少受罪，若干年后遇到上海一个南来的资本家谈及此事才明白。原来跳黄浦江被水冲走了，中共不见死尸指逃亡去香港，家属便不得了，所以只有跳楼而死。”据当时民盟中央参与三反、五反的周鲸文先生估计，两场运动中，自杀者有二、三十万人。
虽然毛泽东的中国没有传统意义上的贪官污吏，这并不等于中共干部生活得跟老百姓一样。在吃、住、行、医疗、孩子教育等民生问题上，毛政权给他们按职位高低规定了普通人望尘莫及的特权。
Mao himself did not embezzle in the conventional way, like lesser dictators who kept Swiss bank accounts. But this was simply because he did not need to hedge against losing power. He just made absolutely sure such a day would never come. Rather than embezzling, he treated the funds of the state as his own, and used them however he wanted, disregarding the needs of the population and persecuting any who advocated different spending priorities from the ones he laid down. When it came to personal lifestyle, Mao's was one of royal self-indulgence, practiced at tremendous cost to the country. This corrupt behavior emerged as soon as he conquered China.
毛自然是不“贪污”的，整个中国国库就是他的荷包。中国的钱怎么花，没有第二个人有最后决定权。他也不像一般专制者那样有什么瑞士存款。那些人存款是预防某一天被推翻。对毛来说，这一天永远不会到来。他决不允许这一天到来。
Mao lived behind an impenetrable wall of secrecy, so that very few knew anything about his life and his world, including where he lived, or where he was (he made few public appearances). Even up close, he did not give an obvious impression of high living. He had no taste for opulence, and positively shunned the sort of objects usually associated with luxury, such as gold taps, antiques, paintings, vast wardrobes, elegant furniture. But these absences involved no restraint of his desires. In fact, Mao indulged every whim in his daily life.
毛的生活是什么样的呢？是不是像他和他的后继者宣传的那样“艰苦朴素”呢？出现在人前时，不管是公开还是私下，毛都不给人一种骄奢淫逸的印象。他不喜欢豪华，一般人眼中的奢侈品，不论是金子铸的水龙头还是价值连城的古董名画，都与他无缘。然而，他并非为了人民的利益在牺牲自己，只是他所要的东西不同。凡是他想要的，他都随心所欲地拿取，对国家钱财毫不顾惜。
Mao liked villas. During his twenty-seven-year rule, well over fifty estates were created for him, no fewer than five in Peking. Many he never set foot in. These estates were set in enormous grounds, mostly in gorgeous locations. So, in many places of great beauty, the whole mountain (like Jade Spring Hills outside Peking), or long stretches of lakes (such as along the famed Western Lake in Hangzhou), were cordoned off for his exclusive use. There were often old villas on these spots, many of architectural splendor. These were torn down to make room for new buildings designed and constructed under the supervision of his security forces, with safety and comfort à la Mao as the priorities. These purpose-built edifices were bullet- and bomb-proof; some had deep nuclear shelters. Most were in the same style: a warehouse clone with identical wings, one for Mao and the other for his wife, with a huge sitting room in the middle. All were one-story, as Mao feared being trapped upstairs.
毛喜欢别墅。起码有五十多所别墅在全国各地为他建起，北京一地就有五所。大部分他从未涉足。这些别墅往往地处优美的风景区。一旦中选，整座山或整片湖岸、海岸便被封闭起来，专供毛享用。这些地方通常有过去留下的精美住宅，毛一声令下，它们就被拆掉，给他另盖房子。毛总是要新房子，从安全舒服的角度设计，由他的警卫部门监工建造。房子都得防弹防炮，有的还防原子弹。绝大部分是同一式样，進门一间特大的大厅，左右两翼各一排房间，外观像一座钢筋水泥的大仓库。
The one floor was very high, sometimes as high as a normal two- or three-story building, to cater for Mao's sense of the grandiose. One villa built in the mid-1960s outside Nanchang was about 50 feet high, a single floor, like a monstrous gray hangar. When many of them were turned into guest houses after Mao died, their corridors were so enormous that, even after creating a row of sizable rooms inside them, there was space enough for a normal-width corridor.
毛的别墅都是平房，他不喜欢住楼房，据身边人说是怕困在楼上下不来。天花板特别高，有的高过两三层楼。毛喜欢气派宏大。六十年代中期在南昌市外盖的一所，叫“八二八”，大约十三公尺高，好似一个灰蒙蒙的大飞机库。大部分别墅的走廊之宽，非一般人所能想像。毛死后有些别墅改成招待所时，在上面造起一排房间，余下的地方还可以容一条正常的走廊。
Construction on his first new villas had started in 1949, the moment he entered Peking. These were followed by others, during the Three-Antis campaign. One, completed in 1954, was at Beidaihe on the east coast. This had been a seaside resort from the turn of the century, and had over 600 villas, many of them large and elegant, but none met Mao's security specifications, so an enormous Mao-style identikit building was plonked down in an enclave with a spectacular view overlooking the beach, protected by lushly forested hills with bunkers and tunnels hollowed out inside them. The whole expanse of sea was placed out of bounds to all but an authorized few.
毛最早的别墅大概是北京城西的“新六所”， 一進京就开工修建。陆续又建别的，三反、五反照建不误。有一所在海滨胜地北戴河，一九五四年完工。北戴河从二十世纪初就是避暑胜地，有六百多座有钱人的别墅，但没一所合毛的意。按照他的标准，都不安全。毛的新别墅建在一个山凹里，面向大海，背后是郁郁葱葱的山，里面整个被工兵掏空，为毛修建成万无一失的防空洞和隧道。只有极少数中共领导和他们的家属、随从才可以靠近。
In 1952 Mao's security chief sent word to Hunan indicating that a villa should be built in the provincial capital, Changsha, for Mao's possible homecoming. The Hunan leaders were unsure whether this was really Mao's wish. As this was at the height of the Three-Antis, it seemed too blatant to be true. So they vacated their own houses, and had them refurbished for Mao. But Mao did not come. Then it dawned on them that a new estate was indeed what he desired, and construction work began. It was not until it was completed that Mao deigned to come back for a visit. Later, a second villa was built only a stone's throw away. More villas were built in his home village of Shaoshan. Other provinces, which naturally all wanted visits from Mao, would be told “But you have no place for the Chairman to stay,” and would then build the necessary mansions.
一九五二年，毛的警卫负责人罗瑞卿捎口信给湖南，要他们在省会长沙给毛造一幢房子，说“主席可能回家乡看一看”。湖南领导不知道建房是否真是毛的意思，因为时逢三反、五反，大兴土木好像说不过去。到北京去问，没有答覆。他们把自己的寓所腾出来，翻新装修，加设洗手间，安装蹲式马桶。但毛没有回来。他们恍然大悟，原来造别墅是毛的意思。直到别墅“蓉园”落成后，毛才回长沙。后来，蓉园旁边又给毛修了一幢大同小异的别墅，名曰“九所”。毛的故乡韶山一个村子就造了两幢别墅。其他省当然都盼着毛的光临，听到上边传话：“主席来了也没个地方住。” 于是都纷纷破土动工。
The houses were constantly upgraded for security and comfort. In his old age, an enclosed outer corridor was added so that Mao could take walks without risking catching cold. To minimize the risk of assassination, the outside windows in these corridors were staggered with those in Mao's rooms, so that from either direction only a wall was visible. Another security refinement in the later villas was steel gates at both ends of the portico, which became incorporated into the house, so Mao's car effectively drove right into the sitting room.
为了防备不时之需，毛的别墅都有通向附近军用机场的直达线，有的是火车专线，有的是地下车道。毛有时住在停于军用机场内的专列上。一国之主的毛好像生活在随时有生命危险的战场。
Sometimes, even Mao's train drove into his villa—or strictly speaking, into the front garden, along a spur laid specially for him. In many places, an exclusive underground tunnel ran all the way from the villa to the local military airport. Mao frequently slept in his train parked at military airports, ready to make a quick getaway by train or plane, in case of emergency. Throughout his reign, he lived in his own country as if in a war zone.
Mao mostly traveled with three sets of transport—train, plane, and ship (when applicable). Even if he was using only one kind of transport, the other two would follow wherever possible, just in case. When he flew, every other plane in China was grounded. And when his special train moved, always setting off at a moment's notice, the country's railway system was thrown into chaos, as other trains were not allowed to be anywhere near his. These disruptions were not infrequent, as Mao was constantly on the move by train. The crew were on permanent standby, not allowed home sometimes for weeks, even months on end.
毛外出时有三套旅行工具待命：火车、飞机、轮船。他一旦上天，全中国所有的飞机都得落地。专列说开就开，其他火车全部让道，铁路运输也跟着被打乱。
One particular extravagance was swimming pools, as Mao loved swimming. Pools were rare in those years, in what was a very poor country. (In Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, when a pool was built for Mao, the attendants did not know how much chlorine to put in the water. As a result, the few who had the privilege of swimming in the pool had red eyes. Mao suspected poison.) The first pool built for him was in Jade Spring Hills, right in the middle of the Three-Antis campaign. By Mao's own account, the pool cost 50,000 yuan, which was five times the amount that would condemn an embezzler to the execution ground as a “Big Tiger.” In Zhongnanhai, his official residence in Peking, well hidden behind a large sign saying “Serve the People,” an indoor pool was built for him shortly after the campaign, even though there was already an exclusive outdoor pool, which until Mao came to power had been open to the public.
毛喜欢游泳。在那个游泳池极为罕见的贫穷年代里，他为自己造了不少游泳池。第一个在玉泉山，建于三反中，根据毛自己的数字，“建造费五亿”(旧币)。三反中私用公款一亿就算“大老虎”，要判死刑。毛后来没去游过，嫌池子太小。在中南海里面，为他建了个室内游泳池。中南海本来已经有个室外游泳池，毛進京以前对公众开放。毛進中南海后，内部的人，头些年还可以在毛不游的时候去游泳，到后来，两个游泳池都归他独占。
Keeping these pools warm for months on end, in case Mao should fancy a dip, cost a fortune. The water was heated by hot steam running through a pipe, and burned up large amounts of scarce fuel.
游泳池的水是靠锅炉房把水蒸气用管子输入来烫热的。让它们保持温暖，以待毛的驾临，耗资浩大。
MAO DID NOT stint on any side of life that he enjoyed. He was a gourmet, and had his favorite foods shipped in from all over the country. (Mao and the top leaders rarely went out to restaurants, whose numbers dwindled under the Communists.) A special fish from Wuhan that he liked had to be couriered alive 1,000 km in a plastic bag filled with water and kept oxygenated. With his rice, Mao demanded that the membrane between the husk and the kernel be kept for its taste, which meant the husking had to be done manually and with great care. Once, he complained he could not taste the membrane, and told his housekeeper he had developed beriberi as a result. The housekeeper raced to the special farm at Jade Spring Hills and had some rice carefully husked the way Mao wanted.
毛是个美食家，爱好的食物来自全国。他爱吃武昌鱼，于是武昌鱼便用飞机运来，放在装满水的塑胶袋里，充上氧气。为了味道鲜美，毛吃米要求米与谷壳之间的薄膜不能碾去。有一次毛尝出他吃的米薄膜没有了，对管家说他因此缺乏维生素，得了脚气病。管家连忙叫玉泉山农场准备一碗饭的米(毛每顿吃一小碗饭)，用砖头轻轻磨掉谷壳，留下里面的薄膜，管家亲自跑到玉泉山把米拿回来，总算使毛的下一顿饭吃得满意。
This farm was specially set up to grow rice for Mao, as the water there was supposed to be the very best. In the olden days the spring had supplied drinking water for the imperial courts. Now it fed Mao's rice paddies. The vegetables Mao liked, as well as poultry and milk, were produced in another special farm called Jushan. The tea Mao chose was the one renowned as the best in China, Dragon Well, and the very best leaves were picked for him, at the ideal time. All Mao's food was put through a meticulous medical check, and the cooking was supervised by his housekeeper, who doubled as taster. Stir-fried dishes had to be served immediately, but as the kitchen was located at a distance, so that no smells would waft Mao's way, servants would race all the way to his table with each dish.
玉泉山农场专为毛生产大米，据说那里的水特别好。“玉泉”从前供给宫廷饮水，现在浇灌毛的水稻。毛喜欢的蔬菜，以及肉类牛奶，由另一个叫“巨山”的特殊农场供给。毛钟爱的茶是中国最好的龙井，产在一座特别的小山顶上，在每年最适宜的季节，采下来送進北京。毛的食物都经过化验检查。做饭时管家站在厨师旁边看着，也负责尝菜，“尝味道，尝安全”。毛的厨房离他吃饭的地方相当远，怕油烟味钻進毛的鼻子里。炒菜得现炒现吃，工作人员便提着一道道菜飞快地来回跑。
Mao did not like getting into baths, or showers, and did not have a bath for a quarter of a century. Instead, his servants rubbed him every day with a hot towel. He enjoyed daily massages. He never went to a hospital. The hospital facilities, along with the top specialists, came to him. If he was not in the mood to see them, they would be kept hanging around, sometimes for weeks.
毛不喜欢洗澡，一九四九年以后就没洗过。他喜欢的是让人用热毛巾天天给他全身擦澡。他不洗头，喜欢享受理发师给他篦头的快感。毛也喜欢舒舒服服地每日一按摩。他不爱進医院，医院的设备加最好的大夫上门服务。要是毛不高兴见他们，他们就留在那里等候召见，有时一等几星期。
Mao never fancied smart clothes. What he loved was comfort. He wore the same shoes for years, because, as he said, old shoes were more comfortable; and he got bodyguards to wear in new shoes for him. His bathrobe, face towel and quilts were heavily patched—but no ordinary patching: they were taken specially to Shanghai and mended by the best craftsmen, costing immeasurably more than new ones. Far from being indications of asceticism, these were the quirks of the hedonistic super-powerful.
毛不讲究衣着，他爱的是舒服。他的鞋多年不换，因为旧鞋才舒适。必穿新鞋了，他让警卫战士替他穿松了再穿。他的浴衣，毛巾、毛巾被都补了又补，一床毛巾被有五十四个补丁。但它们可不是平常的补丁，是拿到上海去请手艺最好的师傅精致地织补的，费用比买新的不知高过多少倍。这不是什么“艰苦朴素”。世界上许多随心所欲的巨富和极权者，常有这类享乐怪癖。
It was perhaps not unreasonable for a leader to enjoy villas and other luxuries, but Mao was gratifying himself while he was executing others for taking a fraction of what he was burning up. And doing so while preaching and imposing abstinence and having himself portrayed as “Serving the People.” Mao's double standards had a comprehensive cynicism that put him in a league of his own.
当然，一国领袖享受些奢华、别墅，没有什么了不起。毛的不同是，他一边尽情挥霍，一边把自己打扮成节约的楷模，要全中国人民都在极端艰苦中过日子，对挪用国家财产远不如他的人无情惩罚，乃至枪毙。
In no area of life did these double standards cause more misery than in the sphere of sexuality. Mao required his people to endure ultra-puritanical constraints. Married couples posted to different parts of China were given only twelve days a year to be together, so tens of millions were condemned to almost year-round sexual abstinence. Efforts to relieve sexual frustration privately could lead to public humiliation. One patriotic Chinese who had returned to “the Motherland” was made to put a sign up over his dormitory bed criticizing himself for masturbating.
在性生活方面，毛统治下的人民忍受比清教徒还清教徒的约束。分居两地的夫妇一年只有十二天探亲假，千百万中国人成年累月没有机会做爱。私下的性发泄可能带来公开的羞辱。有个华侨回到祖国，有次忍不住手淫，第二天被迫在宿舍床头贴出供众人嗤笑的“自我批评”。
And all the while, Mao was indulging in every sexual caprice in well-guarded secrecy. On 9 July 1953 the army was ordered to select young women from their entertainment groups to form a special troupe in the Praetorian Guard. Everyone involved knew that its major function was to provide bed mates for Mao. Army chief Peng De-huai termed this “selecting imperial concubines”—a complaint that would cost him dear in time to come. But his objection had no effect on Mao, and more army entertainment groups were turned into procurement agencies. Apart from singers and dancers, nurses and maids were handpicked for Mao's villas to provide a pool of women from which he could choose whoever he wanted to have sex with.
毛本人的性生活却是完全的放纵。一九五三年七月九日，解放军总政治部批发了为中央警卫团选拔文工团员的决定。彭德怀一语道破，说这是“选妃”。后来这成了整彭德怀的一条罪状。彭的反对不起作用，部队文工团成了毛的应召站。毛在各地的别墅，也都挑选了对毛胃口的护士、服务员，随叫随到陪毛睡觉。
A few of these women received subsidies from Mao, as did some of his staff and relatives. The sums involved were petty cash, but he made a point of authorizing each transaction personally. Mao was very aware of the value of money, and for years checked his household accounts with a peasant's beady eye.
毛偶尔给女友们一点补贴，有时也给身边人或亲戚一点钱。数目最多不过几百块，但毛总是每一笔都仔细亲自交代。多年来他的管家每隔一段时间要向他报一次帐，毛不时还察看帐目。
Mao's handouts came from a secret personal account, the Special Account. This was where he stashed the royalties from his writings, for on top of all his other privileges he cornered the book market by forcing the entire population to buy his own works, while preventing the vast majority of writers from being published. At its peak, this account held well over 2 million yuan, an astronomical sum. As a yardstick of what this was worth, Mao's staff earned on average about 400 yuan a year. A peasant's cash income, in a better year, could be a few yuan. Even privileged Chinese rarely had savings of more than a few hundred yuan.
毛补助身边人的钱是从中央特别会计室拿出来的，“特会”存着他的稿费。那年头中国绝大多数作者都不许出版，而人人都得“读一辈子毛主席的书”，毛著作的销量可想而知。据毛身边人说，一九六0年代，毛的稿费达两百万元以上。这在当时简直是天文数字。与此相比，毛身边一般工作人员一年工资大约四百多元，有的农民一年辛苦到头才得现金不过数元。
Mao was the only millionaire created in Mao's China.
毛的中国产生了一个独一无二的百万富翁：毛泽东。
*Mao claimed that the total number executed was 700,000, but this did not include those beaten or tortured to death in the post-1949 land reform, which would at the very least be as many again. Then there were suicides, which, based on several local inquiries, were very probably about equal to the number of those killed.
*The number of people in detention in any one year under Mao has been calculated at roughly 10 million. It is reasonable to estimate that on average 10 percent of these were executed or died of other causes.
†A Soviet diplomat who served ten years in both Nationalist and Red China, and witnessed Mao's campaigns close up, later observed in a classified source that however cruel the Nationalists could be, it was never anything like as bad as under the Communists. He estimated that Mao killed more Chinese in these early campaigns alone than died in the civil war.