PART FIVE CHASING A SUPERPOWER DREAM
32 RIVALRY WITH STALIN
32 与斯大林较劲
(1947–49 AGE 53–55)
1947～1949 年 53～55 岁
EVEN BEFORE he conquered China, Mao had set his sights on the wider world. He started to get active as soon as victory hove in sight in the civil war.
同国民党的内战刚胜利在望，毛便跃跃欲试，要在斯大林的全球势力范围内插一脚。
Mao hoped to repeat the huge PR success he had had with Edgar Snow and Red Star Over China, a success which was unique for the Communist world. But Snow had meanwhile been banned by Moscow, and so Mao had to fall back on a second-rate American journalist called Anna Louise Strong, who had nothing like Snow's influence globally, and was generally perceived as a lackey.
毛希望有个斯诺式的人物来助他一臂之力。但莫斯科已禁止毛再接待斯诺。他只能转而求其次，用二流美国记者安娜·路易斯·斯特朗(Anna Louise Strong)。斯特朗在西方完全不具备斯诺的名声，人们认为她不过是共产党的传声筒。
In 1947, Mao sent Strong on a world tour to promote him. She was given documents that Mao told her to pass “to the world Communist parties.” He particularly wanted her to “show them to Party leaders in the United States and Eastern Europe,” adding pointedly that he “did not think it was necessary for her to take them to Moscow.”*
一九四七年，毛派斯特朗周游列国，为他宣传。临行前，毛给了她一套文件，嘱咐她“转交给全世界的共产党，特别是给美国、东欧共产党领导人看看”，要她“不必拿到莫斯科去”。
Strong duly churned out an article called “The Thought of Mao Tse-tung,” and a book called Dawn Out of China. They contained encomia like the claim that Mao's “great work has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form … On every kind of problem … in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream”; that “all Asia will learn from [China] more than they will learn from the USSR”; and that Mao's works “highly likely influenced the later forms of government in parts of postwar Europe.” These claims trod hard on Stalin's toes. Not surprisingly, publication of her book was stonewalled in Russia, and the US CP demanded that half the book be deleted. The full version came out in India and, more significantly, in several countries in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia.
斯特朗遵命写了篇文章《毛泽东思想》(The thought of Mao Tsetung)，外加一本书，题为《中国的黎明》(Dawn out of China)，颂扬毛“用马克思、列宁做梦也没有想到的方式解决每一个具体问题”，“整个亚洲可以从中国学到比苏联更多的东西”， 还说毛的著作“完全可能影响了欧洲有些政府战后的模式”。这些话明摆着在夺斯大林的风光。斯特朗的书在苏联出不了，在美国出版时美共删去一半。但书的全文在印度和好几个东欧国家出版了，包括正跟斯大林顶着干的南斯拉夫。
To promote Mao internationally without Stalin's endorsement, to suggest that Mao had improved on Stalin, and could offer more than Stalin, were red rags to the Kremlin. But Mao clearly understood that acquiring a sphere of influence needed elbow. And he now had real clout.
There were also signs that Stalin was prepared to cede some turf. In September 1947 he set up a new organization called the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), which included only European parties. This left open the possibility of a separate Asian grouping. In November, within weeks of the Cominform being established, and while he was still wandering near Yenan, Mao had the name of his entourage changed to “Unit Asia.”
STALIN REMAINED totally committed to backing Mao, but he now took steps to contain him, and to remind him who was master.
斯大林盘算着采取什么办法教训毛，让毛知道谁是大老板。一九四七年十一月三十日，毛看着内战胜券在握，向斯大林提出访问苏联的要求。斯大林的机会来了。
On 30 November 1947, when Mao became confident that he would win the civil war soon, he proposed to Stalin that he should visit Russia. Stalin decided that the visit was the ideal vehicle to make Mao sweat. Stalin's office cabled back a welcome on 16 December. Dr. Orlov, the recipient of the cable, was clearly under orders from Stalin to report in detail on Mao's reactions. Next day he informed Stalin that Mao was “extremely pleased,” “rather animated” in fact, and “said immediately: ‘Very good, I can go there [in] 3 months …' ”
十二月十六日，斯大林办公室给毛回电说欢迎他访苏。电报由阿洛夫大夫转给毛。阿洛夫大夫同时收到指令，要他汇报毛的反应。第二天，他电告斯大林：毛“非常高兴”，“可以说是兴奋得手舞足蹈”，“马上说：“好极了，我三个月后可以动身”。”
Three months passed, with no sign of an invitation from Stalin. Mao brought it up again on 22 April 1948, the day after the CCP retook Yenan; he told Orlov he planned to depart on 4–5 May. This time Stalin said “Yes.” Mao asked to take both Russian doctors with him, on health grounds—but really to prevent any of his colleagues communicating with the Russians during his absence. Stalin agreed. Mao also wanted to visit Eastern Europe, a proposal Stalin pointedly did not endorse.
三个月过去了，斯大林没有发来邀请函。毛等了又等，中共收复延安那天，毛再向阿洛大大夫提起，说他打算五月四、五号起程。斯大林回电说“好”。毛要求把两个苏联医生都带上，说是健康缘故，其实是防备：他不在时宿敌王明直接跟莫斯科联系。斯大林回电说可以，但是有意不表示同意毛的另一个要求：访问东欧。
On 10 May, days after Mao's self-appointed departure date, Stalin suddenly postponed the visit. And as spring slid into summer, there was no sign of him reviving his invitation. Mao was anxious to get going. He was with his colleagues at Party HQ at Xibaipo at the time, and they all knew he was going to Moscow to see Stalin. The impression was that he was leaving any minute. One sign was that nothing was done to the frogs that were disturbing Mao's sleep. Ordinarily, any noisy animals like chickens and dogs were brought “under control” wherever Mao stayed. His bodyguards proposed using dynamite to silence the frogs, which were croaking away happily in a reedy pond. The plan was not carried out, because it was assumed that Mao's stay at Xibaipo was going to be short. Mao felt the need to head off any negative impact of the delay, and arranged for his bête noire, Wang Ming, to suffer another medical “accident.” On 25 June Wang Ming was given the urinal cleaner Lysol as an enema, which wrecked his intestines.
五月十日，毛自己定的起程日子已过了几天，斯大林突然来电推迟访问。春去夏来，再也不见斯大林提及邀毛访苏的事。毛着急要走，这时他已与中共其他领导人汇集在西柏坡，人人都知道毛要去莫斯科见斯大林，而且就在这几天。说走说了半天，斯大林仍不来邀请，毛大失面子。为了不让王明以为有了咸鱼翻身的希望，六月二十五日，王明又出了一次“医疗事故”。
On 4 July, Mao cabled Stalin: “I have decided to visit you in the near future.” He set his departure date for ten days ahead: “we shall leave anyway about the 15th of this month,” and told Stalin “it is necessary to send two transport (passenger) airplanes.”
七月四日，毛沉不住气了，给斯大林发了封电报，说他打算十天后出发：“我决定近期访问您。”“无论如何我们都得要在这个月十五号动身。”他要斯大林派两架飞机。
On the 14th, the eve of the date he had told Stalin he would be leaving, instead of a plane, what came from Stalin was a cable to Dr. Orlov, putting off the visit until the winter:
十四日，毛自定行期的前一天，天上不见飞机，地上阿洛夫大夫却传来斯大林的电报：
Tell Mao Tse-tung the following: In view of the start of the grain harvest, top Party officials are leaving for the provinces in August, and will remain there until November. Therefore, the Central Committee requests Comrade Mao Tse-tung to delay his visit to Moscow until the end of November in order to have the opportunity to meet with all the top Party comrades.
“告诉毛泽东：鉴于粮食收获季节在望，党的高级领导都要在八月份离开莫斯科到各省去，十一月才回来。因此，中央委员会敬请毛泽东同志把他对莫斯科的访问推迟到十一月底，以便有机会会见所有中央负责同志。”
This pretext was openly derisive. Orlov reported back that Mao “listened with a slight smile,” saying “fine, fine.” But he asked Orlov: “ ‘Can it be … that in the USSR they attach such great importance to the grain harvest that leading members of the Party … go off for it?' ” “I have known Mao Tse-tung for more than six years,” Orlov reported, “and if I understand him right, his smile and the words hao, hao (fine, fine) … in no way indicate he was pleased …” “Melnikov [the other Russian doctor] told me that on July 15 Mao Tse-tung asked him a similar question about the harvest.” “He [Mao] was confident he would be leaving just now.” “Evidently, the visit has become necessary to him …” “[His] suitcases had already been packed, plus leather shoes had been bought … and a woolen coat made …”
全苏联的领导人都要离开莫斯科四个月到外省去收庄稼？毛泽东访苏非得推迟到有名的俄罗斯隆冬？这显然是在耍毛。阿洛夫大夫向斯大林汇报毛的反应：毛挂着一丝微笑听着，嘴里说：“好，好。”但他问阿洛夫：“在苏联，他们真的这么看重粮食收获，所有的中央领导人都要下去？”阿洛夫说：“我认识毛泽东六年多了，如果我对他的了解是正确的话，他的微笑，他的“好，好”， 并不表示他真正满意”。“米大夫对我说七月十五日毛泽东问他同样的关于粮食收获的问题。”“他本来信心十足就要上路，箱子都收拾好了，皮鞋也做了，还做了件呢子大衣”，“显然，这场访问对他非常必要。”
It was clear to Mao that Stalin was annoyed with him, and was yo-yoing him over his trip. He scrambled to make amends, starting with his own personality cult. On 15 August, Mao vetoed the new North China University's program “mainly to study Mao Tse-tung-ism,” saying: “There is no benefit, only harm.” He also changed the term “Mao Tse-tung Thought” to “Marxism-Leninism” in documents. Promoting his own formulations to a “Thought” had not gone down well with Stalin: Soviet media never mentioned Mao's “Thought,” and red-penciled the expression when they published CCP documents containing it.
毛意识到他的野心惹恼了斯大林，连忙采取措施补救。八月十五日，他得知华北大学准备提出“主要的要学习毛泽东主义”后，马上否决了这一提法，说这是“无益有害的，必须坚决反对这样说”。他还下令把文件中“毛泽东思想”改为“马列主义”。
Finally, with autumn setting in, Mao sent an unusually ingratiating telegram on 28 September, in which he addressed Stalin by the sobriquet “the Master,” and begged: “it is essential to report personally to … the Master … I hope sincerely that they [the Soviet Party and Stalin] would give instructions to us.”
九月二十八日，毛发给斯大林一封讨好的电报，请求斯大林让他去苏联。毛首次用斯大林喜欢听的别号“大老板”称呼斯大林：“请让我本人面见大老板，亲口向大老板汇报情况，这至关紧要。”
Stalin had shown who was boss. Mao had groveled. Having made his point, Stalin replied on 17 October, aloof yet reassuring, confirming Mao's trip for “the end of November.” Mao was now confident enough to respond by requesting a brief postponement. The first round of Stalin's punishment of Mao for harboring ambitions beyond China was over.
斯大林见毛低了头，便放下身段，十月十七日，给毛回了封友好而不失居高临下的电报，说他欢迎毛十一月底来。毛吃了定心丸。只是国内战局的发展使他不得不自己主动推迟访苏行期。
MAO HAD BLINKED first. But he also stood firm vis-à-vis Stalin when his fundamental interests were involved. In the last stage of the civil war, before Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, Nanjing sued for a ceasefire and peace on 9 January 1949. Stalin told Mao to respond and say the CCP “supports negotiations.” Mao was furious (“spoke more sharply,” Orlov reported to Stalin). Stalin most uncharacteristically sent another telegram the next day, attempting to reposition himself, and claiming that his proposal had been purely tactical, to make it seem that it was the Nationalists who were responsible for continuing the war: “our draft of your response … is designed to undermine the peace negotiations.”
但在关键问题上，毛对斯大林是寸步不让。国共内战接近尾声时，一九四九年一月，南京政府要求和谈。斯大林要毛答覆“中共主张同国民党進行谈判”。毛大为光火。阿洛夫大夫报告斯大林说，毛“比起平常来说话更不客气”。斯大林得知后第二天补发一封电报向毛解释，说他的提议完全是做样子，为的是让全世界看到继续内战的责任在国民党。斯大林说：“我们为您拟的答覆，目的只是为了破坏南京方面所提议的和平谈判。”
Mao's attitude was that the Nationalists should not be allowed a day's peace, even for appearances' sake. He told Stalin he wanted “the unconditional surrender of the Nanjing government … we no longer need to undertake any more political detours.” For the first time ever, Mao told Stalin what to say, telling the Master: “We think you should give the following answer …” to the Nationalists, who had requested Russian mediation. Mao had gained a definite edge over Stalin, which was noticed in the Kremlin: one of Stalin's top China advisers confirmed to us that Stalin's staff felt the Master had been “told off” by Mao in no uncertain terms.
毛的想法是一天和平也不能给国民党，哪怕做做样子也不行。他对斯大林说，他要的是南京政府的无条件投降，“我们已无须采取政治上的迂回策略。”毛还史无前例地教斯大林怎样说话。当时南京政府请求苏联调解，毛对斯大林说：“我们认为您应该这样回答 --”斯大林的贴身中国顾问对我们说，斯大林身边的人都觉得斯大林“受了毛的训”。
Stalin fired back next day, 14 January, with a lengthy lecture, telling Mao that turning down talks was bad PR, and raising the specter of foreign intervention. Mao did not believe that this was likely, but he found a way to stick to his guns while also satisfying Stalin, by publishing a list of conditions for peace talks that were tantamount to demanding unconditional surrender. He then artfully quoted back to Stalin the latter's own expressed position: “With regard to the basic line (to undermine the peace talks with the Nationalists, to continue the revolutionary war up to the end), we are absolutely unanimous with you.” Stalin folded the following day: “we have reached complete agreement … Hence, the issue is now closed.”
斯大林当然不会善罢甘休，第二天就给毛来了篇长篇说教，说拒绝和谈有损公众形象，还危言耸听地说可能导致西方武装干涉。毛根本就不相信什么西方干涉，但也不想叫斯大林下不了台，他策略地找了个办法。当天中共发表声明，开出一系列和谈条件，等于是叫国民党无条件投降。然后毛电告斯大林，巧妙地引用斯大林的原话，似乎这一声明是按斯大林的指示办的：“在破坏同国民党的和平谈判，将革命战争進行到底这一基本方针上，我们同您的意见完全一致。”斯大林也顺势下了台阶，第二天回电：“我们已经达成完全一致的意见”，“这件事就此了结。”
Stalin seems to have been impressed. It was just after this that he commented to Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders that Mao was insubordinate, but successful. Mao had fought his corner fiercely—and effectively. So when on 14 January Stalin “insisted” that Mao postpone his trip to Moscowyet again, it seems that he genuinely meant it when he said “because your presence in China is essential.” Instead, Stalin offered to send an “authoritative” member of the Politburo to see Mao “immediately.”
斯大林再次感到毛这个人不简单。就是在这时他对南斯拉夫等共产党人说：毛不听话，但是个能成事的。一月十四日，斯大林要毛再次推迟访苏，说“中国此时的局势缺您不行。”斯大林提出即刻派权威的政治局委员来见毛。
Mao's first reaction to this further postponement was irritation. His secretary remembered him throwing the telegram on the table, saying: “So be it!” But on second thoughts, he saw that Stalin was actually conveying an accolade. Stalin had never sent a member of his Politburo into a war zone to visit a Communist party involved in a civil war—and, moreover, a civil war against a government with which Moscow had diplomatic relations. On 17 January Mao responded “very much welcoming” a visit by Stalin's envoy.
得知斯大林又要延期，毛的第一反应是把电报往桌上一扔，说：“随他去吧！” 等静下来一想，毛明白斯大林其实是看重他。斯大林还从来没派政治局委员到任何共产党打内战的国家去过，更不用说那个国家的政府跟苏联还有外交关系。一月十七日，毛回电说“非常欢迎”斯大林的使者。
The envoy was Stalin's old confidant, Anastas Mikoyan. He arrived at Mao's HQ at Xibaipo on 30 January, bringing two specialists in neutralizing delayed-action bombs and bugging equipment. Mao “was extremely pleased,” Mikoyan reported, “and thanked comrade Stalin for his good care.” With Mikoyan came former railways minister Ivan Kovalev, who had been fixing the railroads in Manchuria, and who was now to be Stalin's personal liaison with Mao.
米高扬在一月三十日到达西柏坡。在给斯大林的汇报里，米高扬说毛“高兴已极，感谢斯大林同志的细心关怀”。跟米高扬一道来的还有一直在东北为中共修复铁路的科瓦廖夫，做毛和斯大林之间的联络员。
Mao showed his self-confidence straightaway. The day after Mikoyan arrived, the Nationalist government moved from Nanjing to Canton. The only ambassador to accompany the Nationalists was the Soviet ambassador, Roshchin. On 1 and 2 February, Mao absented himself from meeting Mikoyan in a show of pique, and Chou En-lai was deputized to ask for an explanation. Describing it as “quite natural,” Mikoyan said it “would not at all cause detriment to our common cause, but on the contrary, would facilitate it.”* Mao was not assuaged and Stalin knew it. Soon afterwards Stalin tried to explain to Mao's No. 2, Liu Shao-chi, that the move had been made in order to gather intelligence. But Mao remained displeased, and took his displeasure out on Roshchin when Stalin sent him back to China as Russia's first ambassador to Mao's government. When Roshchin threw his first dinner for the Chinese Politburo, Mao sat through it without saying a word all evening, displaying what one Russian diplomat described as “a mocking-indifferent attitude.”
米高扬到的第二天，国民党政府由南京搬到广州，随同搬去的只有一个外国大使：苏联大使罗申。二月一、二日，毛没有出席跟米高扬的会谈，以示不快。周恩来受命请米高扬解释，米高扬说：“这是很正常的。不仅对我们的共同事业无害，恰恰相反，还有助于它的发展。”这理由当然说服不了毛。斯大林后来对刘少奇解释，说大使搬去广州是为了收集情报。毛不依不饶，拿罗申出气。罗申被斯大林派到毛的中国来做首任大使时，设宴招待中共领导人，毛坐在那里整晚一言不发，苏联外交官称毛“露出一副不屑一顾的样子”。
During Mikoyan's visit Mao curbed his annoyance. To Mikoyan's astonishment, Mao did not complain about Russia's 1945 treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, under which Russia had regained extraterritorial concessions; he even went so far as to call it “patriotic.” Mao wanted a lot from Stalin. His shopping list started with a request for a US$300 million loan—exclusively for military purposes—and moved on to a vast range of arms, including heavy tanks and anti-aircraft guns, plus advisers on reorganizing the army. Even more important was long-term help for factories to produce his own aircraft, tanks and other heavy weapons. Mao wanted Stalin's help to become a major military power.
尽管心怀不满，毛仍让米高扬喜出望外。他对苏联跟蒋介石政府一九四五年签的损害中国领土权益的协定，没有提出任何异议，反而说它是“爱国的”。米高扬向斯大林汇报说：毛再三强调说，斯大林是中国人民的导师，是全世界人民的导师，他是斯大林同志的信徒，随时准备接受指示。毛有意降低自己作为领袖、理论家的地位，说他没有对马克思主义做出新的贡献，等等。可是米高扬也告诉斯大林：“毛泽东的这些话并不真代表他这个人，也不代表他对自己的真实看法。”
Stalin had recently expelled Tito, the Yugoslav leader, from the Communist camp. Tito had shown too much independence and an inclination to carve out his own sphere of influence. In an earlier message to Stalin, Mao had referred to Tito's experience, seemingly placing it alongside Russia's as a possible model, and had been slapped down hard in return. Mao now made the right noises about Tito commending Stalin's criticism of Yugoslav nationalism. This was Mao's effort to reassure Stalin that he would not be another Tito.
那时南斯拉夫的铁托(Josip Broz Tito)由于表现出太多的独立性刚被斯大林开除出共产主义阵营。毛竭力表示他不会成为铁托式的人物，在米高扬面前批南斯拉夫，甚至还引用斯大林远在一九二五年对南斯拉夫民族主义的批评。
Mao also made a point of stressing to Mikoyan how much he regarded himself as Stalin's subordinate. Toasting Stalin's health, Mao “emphasised that … Stalin was … the teacher of the Chinese people and the peoples of the whole world,” Mikoyan reported to Stalin. Mao “emphasised several times that he was a disciple of comrade Stalin,” and “was awaiting instructions … and deliberately downgraded his own role … as a leader and as a theoretician … [saying] that he … had made no new contribution to Marxism, etc.” But the astute Mikoyan was not taken in. “This,” he told Stalin, “does not correspond to what Mao Tse-tung is in reality, nor to what he thinks about himself.”
米高扬向毛提起亚洲共产党之间的关系。毛马上提出成立“亚洲情报局”。斯大林在这之前成立了“共产党情报局”，成员只有欧洲的共产党，毛认为这是斯大林示意亚洲共产党可以有另外一个组织。毛对米高扬说，他已经计划好了亚洲情报局的成员，列举了朝鲜、印度支那、菲律宾等，一旦在中国掌权后，立刻可以干起来。
Indeed, when Mikoyan brought up the subject of “coordination” among Asian Communist parties, Mao was ready with his plan, which was to create an Asian Cominform, which he proposed starting to organize as soon as he had completed his conquest of China. He wanted the group to consist of “several” other Asian parties, listing the Koreans, the Indo-Chinese and the Filipinos, to begin with.
Mikoyan then produced Stalin's offer, which restricted Mao to China's immediate backyard, saying that Mao should “head” a bureau of East Asian parties, consisting initially of only three members: China, Japan and Korea. “Later on,” he said, others “could also be involved gradually.”
米高扬建议考虑成立以毛为首脑的“东亚”情报局，一开始只包括三个成员：中国、日本、朝鲜，以后再逐步增加。这比毛期待的范围小得多。
Stalin was conceding some ground. At the same time, he sent a signal for Mao not to push too hard. The day after the conversation about turf, Stalin sent Mikoyan a very strong cable telling him to order Mao to arrest an American working with the CCP called Sidney Rittenberg—“as a spy.” Stalin linked Rittenberg with Anna Louise Strong, the American whom Mao had sent abroad to promote himself; according to Stalin, Strong too was an American spy. (Mikoyan said Stalin had given him special orders to check for US and British “spies” in the entourage of the CCP leadership.) Rittenberg was duly arrested.
米高扬同毛讨论势力范围的第二天，斯大林通过米高扬向毛发出强烈暗示：你的野心不要太大了！具体方式是命令毛逮捕为毛到处游说的斯特朗的美国同事李敦白(Sidney Rittenberg)。斯大林说他俩是美国间谍网成员，《真理报》公布了斯特朗在莫斯科被捕的消息。
Strong herself was at that moment stranded in Moscow, denied an exit visa for China. On 13 February, the day after Mikoyan returned to Moscow and saw Stalin, she was thrown into the Lubyanka prison. Most unusually, her arrest, on a charge of “espionage,” was reported in Pravda the next day, which made the warning more emphatic for Mao, and for Communist satellite regimes. After Strong was deported shortly afterwards, she wrote to a CCP intermediary: “Please tell Chairman Mao … that, so far as I could learn, it was my too persistent search into the road to China [sic] that the Russians finally attacked as ‘spying.' ”
毛按斯大林的意思逮捕了在西柏坡工作的李敦白。在苏联，随着斯特朗進监狱的还有曾风云一时的鲍罗廷。斯特朗请他帮忙在苏联出版她颂扬毛的书，鲍罗廷为之奔走。现在他也跟着倒楣，刑讯逼问要他交代跟毛的关系。
One of Strong's contacts in Moscow was Mikhail Borodin, Stalin's main operative in China in the 1920s, who had been trying to help get her book promoting Mao published in Russia. Two weeks after Strong's arrest, Borodin too was arrested and tortured for information about Mao.
面对斯大林的“项庄舞剑，意在沛公”，毛并不紧张。他领会到了斯大林对他的警告，但更多地看到斯大林的主动让步：东亚可以给你，不要把手伸到美国、欧洲去。斯大林在和毛划分势力范围，对毛，这是何等的成就！
Though these arrests were shots across Mao's bows, he was unruffled. Stalin was saying: Don't mess with America, or Europe. But Mikoyan had already promised him East Asia. Mao was now demarcating turf with Stalin. So it was in a cheerful mood that he thought out loud on this subject to a pre-victory Central Committee plenum on 13 March 1949.
At this meeting, his old challenger Wang Ming, who by now had conceded defeat, curried favor instead, declaiming that Mao's Thought was “the … development of Marxism-Leninism in colonial and semi-colonial countries.” Not East Asia, or just Asia, but all “colonial and semi-colonial countries.”
此时的王明，自知没法子扳倒毛，转而对毛极尽恭维之能事，说毛泽东思想“是马列主义在殖民地半殖民地的具体运用和发展”。不仅是东亚，甚至不仅是亚洲，而且是全球的“殖民地半殖民地”。
Wang Ming had spelled out what Mao had in mind, and Mao was so delighted that he got rather carried away: “Comrade Wang Ming's phrase gives off a smell of dividing a ‘market.' Colonial and semi-colonial countries take up a very large part of the world. Once they come under us, doesn't that mean Stalin only takes charge of the developed industrial regions, and [the rest of the world] is under our charge …?” Persisting with the royal “we,” Mao continued: “… we say colonial and semi-colonial countries belong to us. But what if one of them doesn't buy our goods and goes straight to Moscow …?… Of course, let's not be in a hurry to think too big; let's fix China first.”
王明搔到了毛的痒处，搔得毛格外舒服。在一九四九年三月十三日七届二中全会上，毛浮想联翩：“照王明的提法，则有点划分“市场” 的味道。世界上殖民地半殖民地的范围很宽，一划分开，就似乎是说，斯大林只管那些工业发展的地方，而殖民地半殖民地归我们，可是有那么一个国家，提出不买你的货，而要直接到莫斯科去买货，这又怎么办呢？……比如，拿日本来说，按照王明的提法，它现在算归我们，将来美帝国主义撤走以后，它又该归斯大林管了，这岂不是笑话？当然，我们不要忙于想宽了，先把中国自己的事情做好。”
Mao had begun to dream about dividing the world with Stalin.
毛泽东做的梦，已经是在与斯大林瓜分世界了。
STALIN CLEARLY decided that if he allowed Mao stewardship over even a limited slice of turf his own power would be eroded. So when Liu Shao-chi visited Russia that summer and delicately broached the subject by asking Stalin whether China could join the Cominform, he got a taste of the Master at his slyest. “I think it is not really necessary,” Stalin replied. China should, instead, be “organising a union of Communist parties of East Asia.” But this seeming confirmation of his earlier offer was followed at once by: “Since the USSR is a country situated both in Europe and Asia, it will participate in [this] union.” The Master was not backing off at all.
刘少奇这年夏天访问苏联，委婉地想让斯大林把建立东亚情报局这一设想付诸实施。刘少奇是这样引出话题来的：他问斯大林中国是否应该加入那个只有欧洲国家参加的“共产党情报局”。斯大林答道：“我认为没必要，中国应当组织一个东亚共产党联盟”。这似乎是确认毛在东亚的领袖地位，但其实不然，斯大林紧接着又说：“苏联横跨欧亚大陆，也将参加这个联盟。”苏联一進来，毛还有什么领袖可当呢？显然，斯大林改变了主意，眼下还不愿放手。
As before, Stalin served up sharp warnings to Mao by arresting a whole string of operatives who had been in China. While Liu was in Moscow, many of the key Russian agents who had been with Mao followed Borodin into the torture cells: Mao's GRU doctor, Orlov, was recalled and savagely tortured by KGB chief Viktor Abakumov in person. Orlov was accused of links with “the American and Japanese spy” Mao. Orlov's arrest was signaled to Mao, as the Russians approached Shi Zhe, Liu's interpreter and Mao's assistant, and asked him to inform on Orlov. These were signals that Stalin was preparing the ground to denounce Mao as a spy or a Titoist if it became opportune to do so.*
斯大林继续用抓人来向毛发警告。刘少奇在莫斯科时，阿洛夫大夫進了监狱。克格勃头子阿巴库莫夫(Viktor Abakumov)亲自审问他跟“美国、日本间谍”毛泽东的关系。苏联人特地找到为刘少奇做翻译的师哲，叫他揭发阿洛夫。斯大林用这种方式告诉毛，他在整毛的“黑材料”，要毛收敛他的野心。*
* 在毛那里工作过的苏联人后来都死得不明不白。阿洛夫不久坐飞机出了事。米大夫在陪同毛访苏后消失得无影无踪。鲍罗廷一九五一年死于酷刑之下。驻延安的孙平一九五三年去世。据他的儿子、奥林匹克举重冠军、苏联解体后的总统候选人尤利·乌拉索夫(Yuri Vlasov)说，孙平是被克格勃的贝利亚(Lavrenti Beriai)用缓慢释放毒性的毒药毒死的。
Stalin was baring his fangs. But Mao was not scared, and flexed his muscles on an issue of great importance to him: the first international Communist gathering scheduled to be held in his new capital, Peking. This was a huge trade union conference, which would be the springboard for putting Mao on the world map, as it covered not only the whole of Asia, but also Australasia, an advanced capitalist continent. It was also highly political, more like an international conference of Communist parties than a trade union gathering. Stalin tinkered with the idea of blocking it, or moving the venue, but Mao had Liu insist that it “should be held in China at the scheduled time.” Liu promised that it “would not carry out any work of organization,” meaning that Mao would not try to exploit it to set up his own international network.
羽翼已丰的毛毫不示弱。毛建国后第一个国际性共产党会议“亚洲澳洲工会代表会议”， 订于一九四九年十一月在北京召开。这是毛通向世界舞台的跳板。斯大林对大会召开事先点了头，但过后又想不开了，或者改地方开。刘少奇写信给苏联人说：“会议仍应如期在中国召开。它的筹备工作不应停止，开会地点亦不应改变。”刘许诺说，大会只作一般的号召，不進行任何组织工作，意思是毛不会藉开会之机建立海外关系网。
When the conference opened, on 16 November 1949, Mao had just founded his regime, on 1 October. In his keynote speech, Liu proclaimed “the Mao Tse-tung road,” and did not mention Stalin, or the Russian model, once. The theme of the conference was seizing power via the “Mao Tse-tung road” throughout Asia—and beyond: “The road that the Chinese people have followed is the road that the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial areas should traverse …” Liu was categorical: “It is impossible for the revolutionary … people in such areas to avoid taking [this] road … [and] it will be wrong if they do so.” “Armed struggles,” he said, “should be the principal form of struggle.”
大会如期开幕，刘少奇在会上大谈“毛泽东的道路”，一次也没提斯大林或者苏联的榜样。刘说：“中国人民走过的路就是殖民地半殖民地人民应该走的路”，“这些地区的革命人民不可能不走这条路，谁要想回避它谁就将犯错误。”毛还违反了他不進行任何组织工作的诺言。十一月二十三日，刘少奇向大会宣布将成立一个“联络局”，总部设在北京。毛的意图是用这个机构作指挥别国的工具。
This was strong stuff, and what followed showed how much headway Mao had made. When the Russian delegate complained that Liu's speech was “ultra-left,” Stalin denounced his own man as “a turncoat.” The hapless delegate, Leonid Solovyov, was obliged to admit error at a meeting chaired by Mao. This was a first for Mao—a senior Russian apologizing to him in front of his colleagues. Mao then grandly asked Stalin to “pardon” Solovyov.
毛我行我素，斯大林又能拿他怎么样？当苏联代表索洛维约夫(Leonid Solovyov)指责刘少奇的讲话“极左”时，斯大林反过来骂索洛维约夫是“工贼”，要他向毛作检查。毛主持了这次检查会，第一次听苏联高级官员当着中共其他领导人的面向他道歉。毛然后以胜利者的姿态，请斯大林原谅索洛维约夫。
Even bolder, Mao reneged on his commitment that there would be no organizational follow-up to the conference. On 23 November, Liu Shao-chi announced that a Liaison Bureau would be set up, in Peking, through which the participating countries “can form their ties.” Mao was gearing up to give orders to foreign Reds. Stalin let it pass.
Mao knew the cMaster was not going to swallow all this lying down. Some punishment was sure to result. But he now owned China, and with it a quarter of the world's population. He had significantly increased the scope and weight of the Communist camp as a whole. Stalin could not afford to disown him. Mao fully intended to force Stalin to help him advance his own global ambitions.
毛很清楚斯大林眼前的让步预示着新的暴风雨的来临。但他也很清楚斯大林不可能像开除铁托那样对付他。毛拥有中国，拥有人类四分之一的人口，极大增强了共产主义阵营的分量。毛还要让斯大林为他服务，帮助他扩展自己的野心。
*In America, the CCP had its own people operating inside the US Communist Party, and a powerful intelligence network with access to information unavailable to the Russians. When Moscow denounced US CP head Earl Browder, an old China hand, whose secret “China Bureau” had close links to Mao, Mao had very publicly continued to call him “comrade.”
*Mao learned from Stalin's duplicity about conducting an open, even apparently friendly relationship with a government while secretly trying to overthrow that same government. When he came to power, he was to copy Stalin in his dealings with other countries.
*Many of Stalin's agents with Mao were soon to die abnormal deaths. Orlov died shortly afterwards in a plane crash. Mao's KGB doctor, Melnikov, vanished without trace after accompanying Mao on his trip in Russia in winter 1949–50. Borodin perished from torture in 1951. Vladimirov died at the age of forty-seven, in 1953—murdered by security overlord Lavrenti Beria with slow-acting poison, according to Vladimirov's son, the post-Communist presidential candidate (and Olympic weight-lifting champion) Yuri Vlasov.