33 TWO TYRANTS WRESTLE
33 和大老板作交易
(1949–50 AGE 55–56)
1949～1950 年 55～56 岁
MAO'S PARAMOUNT requirement from Stalin was help to build a world-class war machine and turn China into a global power.
毛泽东最有求于斯大林的，是帮助他建立一流的军事工业体系，使中国成为全球军事大国，为他扩张势力范围作后盾。
The key to this was not how many weapons Stalin would provide, but the technology and infrastructure to manufacture armaments in China. At the time, China's ordnance factories could only produce small arms. If Mao was to move at the tempo he desired—faster than Japan had done when building up an advanced arms industry from scratch in the nineteenth century—he needed foreign assistance. And Stalin was not just Mao's best bet; he was his only bet. The Cold War had recently begun. There was no way the West could possibly help him achieve his goals without him changing the nature of his regime, which was out of the question.
为了达到这个目的，他必须要让斯大林相信：最后的大老板还是你。毛对米高扬一再表示对斯大林的忠诚，在联络员科瓦廖夫面前，也作了好些表演。科瓦廖夫向斯大林报告说，毛有一次“跳起来，高举双手，连呼三声：“斯大林万岁！””除了这些口头上的花样，毛还采取了一个所有东欧共产党国家都未采取，连斯大林本人也没有指望的极端行动：同西方不建立外交关系。西方那时已经与共产主义阵营形成两军对垒。毛告诉科瓦廖夫：“我们巴不得所有资本主义国家的大使馆都从中国一去不复返。”毛要让斯大林放心，他在以斯大林为首的共产主义阵营待定了。
But Mao had a problem: he needed to persuade Stalin that his ambitions were manageable from Stalin's own perspective. So he made ostentatious demonstrations of loyalty, lavishing praise on Stalin to the Master's top envoy Mikoyan, and putting on an act for his liaison man Kovalev. The latter reported to Stalin that Mao once “sprang up, raised his arms and cried out three times: ‘May Stalin live ten thousand years.' ” Along with the froth, Mao offered something very substantial—to cut China's ties with the West. “We would be glad if all the embassies of capitalist countries got out of China for good,” Mao told Kovalev.
跟西方切断关系也有国内的考虑。毛担心西方人在中国会给自由派人士和反对他的人增加勇气，使他们存有一线希望。他对米高扬说：“西方承认只会有利于美、英的颠覆活动。”毛为中国制定了这样一个外交政策：“打扫干净房子再请客”。这一句听起来礼貌客气的话，实际上杀机四伏。
This attitude was also motivated by domestic concerns. “Recognition would facilitate subversive activities [by] the USA and Britain,” Mao told Mikoyan on 31 January 1949. He feared that any Western presence at all would embolden liberals and give his opponents an opening, however slight. So he battened down the hatches, imposing a policy he called “cleaning house before inviting guests.” “Cleaning house” was a euphemism for drastic, bloody purges and the installation of an airtight control system nationwide, which included sealing off the whole country, banning Chinese from leaving, and expelling virtually all Westerners. Shutting out foreigners was also a way to ensure there were no outside observers to the purges. Only after he had “cleaned”—or rather cleansed—house, would Mao open the door a crack to admit a few closely controlled foreigners, who were always known as “guests,” not visitors.
Given the kind of regime he had in mind, Mao had cause to feel worried. Western influence was strong in China. “Many representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia received their education in America, Britain, Germany and Japan,” Mao told Mikoyan. Virtually all modern educational institutions were either founded by Westerners (often missionaries) or heavily influenced by the West. “In addition to newspapers, magazines and news agencies,” Liu wrote to Stalin in summer 1949, America and Britain alone had 31 universities and specialized schools, 32 religious educational institutions and 29 libraries in China, as well as 2,688 schools, 3,822 religious missions and organizations, and 147 hospitals.
西方在中国的影响很强。正如毛对米高扬所说：“中国知识分子的许多代表人物都是在美国、英国、德国、日本受的教育。”几乎所有现代教育机构都是西方人，特别是传教士办的，要不就是在西方影响下建的。刘少奇在一九四九年夏天写给斯大林的报告里说：除了报章杂志、新闻通讯社以外，仅美国和英国在中国就办了三十一所大学、专科学校，三十二所教会教育机构，二十九座图书馆，二千六百八十八所中学，三千八百二十二个传教机构和一百四十七所医院。
China was short of educated people, especially skilled personnel, and Mao needed these people to get the country working, particularly the cities. Contrary to common assumption, it was the cities he cared about most. If we can't run the cities, he told top officials in March 1949, “we won't last.” His aim was to scare the educated class out of their liberal Western attitudes. This would be much easier to achieve if potential dissidents knew there were no Western representatives in the country to whom they could appeal, or any foreign media to tell their story.
毛泽东需要这些机构培养的人才帮他管理、发展城市。人们常说毛代表农村，其实他关心的是城市，進城前夕他告诉中共高层，城市搞不好，我们就会站不住脚”。改造知识分子，把他们亲西方的倾向，从西方教育里学来的思想方式清除掉，是毛“打扫干净房子”的目标之一。
Mao was also concerned about the appeal the West had inside his own Party. His army loved American weapons: his own bodyguards compared Soviet sub-machine-guns contemptuously with US-made carbines. “The [US] carbines are so light and accurate. Why can't we have more carbines?” they pleaded with Mao. American cars positively inspired awe. One CCP official in the Russian-occupied port of Dalian had a shiny black 1946 Ford: “It was great to show off with,” he recalled, “and roused the interest of the highest command of the Soviet army,” who asked to borrow it for a day, which put him one up on the Russians. Mao's aim was to nip in the bud any chance of the West exerting any influence on his Party, in any field, from ideas to consumer goods. In this Mao was more thorough even than Stalin.
Control was one key reason Mao decided to shun Western recognition. But his primary purpose was to show Stalin that the new China was committed 100 percent to the Communist bloc. This was the main reason Peking did not establish diplomatic relations with America and most Western countries when the regime was founded. It is widely thought that it was the US that refused to recognize Mao's China. In fact, Mao went out of his way to make recognition impossible by engaging in overtly hostile acts. When the Communists captured Shenyang in November 1948, there were three Western consulates there (US, British and French), and the local CCP was friendly towards them at first. But orders soon came from Mao to “force [them] out.” Chou was explicit to Mikoyan: “We created intolerable conditions for them in order to get them to leave.”* On 18 November, US consul general Ward and his staff were put under house arrest. Ward was later accused of spying and expelled. In the same aggressive spirit, Red troops broke into the residence of US ambassador J. Leighton Stuart in Nanjing in April 1949 when they took the Nationalist capital.
人们一般认为中共建国之初没跟美国和西方建交，是因为美国不承认中共政权。事实上，毛故意采取了一系列敌对动作，使西方不可能承认中共。中共攻占沈阳后，中共干部最初对美、英、法领事馆是友善的。但毛很快就制定了“挤走”这些领事馆的方针，周恩来告诉米高扬：“我们叫他们的日子过不下去，不得不走。”“我们的目标是把东北挡在铁幕后面，除了苏联和人民民主国家[东欧]一概不跟外国政府打交道。”美国驻沈阳总领事瓦尔德(Angus Ward)和领事馆成员被软禁起来，瓦尔德后来被指控搞间谍活动而驱逐出境。以同样敌对的姿态，中共军队進入南京后，闯入美国大使司徒雷登(John Leighton Stuart)的住宅。
Mao was equally hostile to the British. When the Communists were crossing the Yangtze in late April, moving south, there were two British ships on that stretch of the river, HMS Amethyst and HMS Consort. Mao ordered that “all warships which get in the way of our crossing may be bombarded. Treat them as Nationalist ships.” Forty-two British sailors were killed, more than all other Western military deaths in the entire civil war. Consort got away, but Amethyst became grounded. Back in Britain, enraged sailors beat up CP chief Harry Pollitt, who landed up in the hospital. Winston Churchill, then leader of the Opposition, asked in Parliament why Britain did not have “in Chinese waters one aircraft carrier, if not two, capable of … effective power of retaliation.”
对英国，毛也表现得火药味十足。中共横渡长江时，“紫石英(Amethyst)”号等英国军舰停在江面。毛的命令是：凡是“妨碍我渡江作战的兵舰，均可袭击，并应一律当作国民党兵舰去对付”。四十二名英国水手在炮击下毙命，“紫石英”号受创滞留江上。在英国，愤怒的海员痛打英国共产党领袖波立特(Harry Pollitt)， 打得他伤重住院。反对党领袖邱吉尔在国会发言，责问为什么“在中国海上没有一两艘航空母舰”，使英国能够“有效地進行报复”。
The incident greatly alarmed Stalin, who placed Soviet forces throughout the Far East on full alert—the only time this occurred in connection with the Chinese civil war. Stalin was worried that the West might intervene militarily and involve Russia, and he cabled Mao urgently to play down their relationship: “We do not think now is the right moment to publicise the friendship between the USSR and Democratic China.” Mao had to tone down his aggressiveness and issued new orders to “avoid clashes with foreign ships. No firing at [them] without the order of the Center. Extremely, extremely important.” He told his commanders to “protect … especially diplomats from America and Britain,” “or else big disaster could happen.” On 27 April he suspended the advance on Shanghai, which was the most important economic and financial center in the country, and the focus of Western interests—and therefore the most likely place where the West, which had sizable military forces there, might make a stand.
斯大林害怕西方武装干涉，把苏联卷了進去。他令驻远东的苏联部队進入全面战备，一面给毛打电报，叫毛不要张扬跟苏联的关系：“我们认为宣传苏联与民主中国之间的友谊现在不是时候。”毛调低调门，要部队：“避免和外国军舰发生冲突”， 保护外交人员，“首先是美、英外交人员”。他一度下令停攻上海，考虑到这里西方利益最集中，是最可能引起西方干涉的地方。
To lessen the risk of Western intervention, on 10 May Mao took diversionary steps by authorizing talks with US ambassador Stuart, who had stayed on in Nanjing after the Nationalist government had left. Stuart was an “old China hand” who wishfully thought he could bring Washington and Mao together. Decades later, Mao's then negotiator and future foreign minister, Huang Hua, spelled out Mao's intent: “Mao and Chou … were not looking for friendly relations. They had but one concern: to forestall a major American intervention which might rescue the Nationalists at the eleventh hour …”
但很快毛就恢复了進攻，一九四九年五月底拿下上海。毛深信，西方不会莽撞地武装干涉中国。为了万无一失，毛同时采取“兵不厌诈”的计策。五月三十日，周恩来找一个中间人带信给杜鲁门总统，说中共领导人分两派，一派是以刘少奇为代表的亲苏的“激進派”，一派是以他本人为代表的亲西方的“自由派”，如果美国支持他，他也许可能影响未来的中国对外政策。这番话让一些美国人焦急等待，等待中共哪天投入西方的怀抱。
毛还派人同美国大使司徒雷登谈判。司徒雷登是个“中国通”，一厢情愿地以为他能给美国和毛做月老。其实正如毛的谈判使者、后来的中国外交部长黄华所说：“毛和周并非寻求[与美国的]友好关系，他们的目的只有一个，即防止美国大规模武装干涉，在最后关头救了国民党。”
As further insurance against a backlash from foreign powers, Mao spun a web of disinformation. On 30 May, Chou En-lai gave a verbal message to an intermediary to be passed to Truman. The message was carefully tailored to American hopes at the time. It said there was a split in the CCP between the pro-Western “liberals” headed by Chou himself, and pro-Soviet “radicals” headed by Liu Shao-chi, and that if America would back Chou he might be able to influence CCP foreign policy. This was a hoax, but it contributed to the delusion that the CCP might throw itself into the West's embrace.*
This flurry of pseudo-diplomacy, like the temporary lull on the battlefield, in no way implied any diminution in Mao's resolve to shun the West. By mid-May, he had given the go-ahead for a general offensive against Shanghai, which fell by the end of the month. When foreign warships withdrew from Shanghai as the Reds approached, and US forces quickly left their last base on the Mainland, at Qingdao, Mao was more convinced than ever that Western powers would not invade China, where they would only get bogged down, as the Japanese experience had shown.
Mao now demonstrated all-out hostility towards the West. In a signed article in People's Daily on 30 June, he stated that his foreign policy would be to “side exclusively with one camp”: yi-bian-dao. This did not just mean staying firmly in the Communist camp. It meant freezing relations with the West. A few days later the US vice-consul in Shanghai, William Olive, was arrested in the street, thrown in jail, and so badly beaten up that he soon died. The US recalled ambassador Stuart at once. At the end of July, when Amethyst tried to leave, Mao gave orders to “strike it hard.” Amethyst got away, but a Chinese passenger ship it had been hiding behind was sunk.
到大局已定时，毛公布了他的关门政策。六月三十日，《人民日报》上发表毛的署名文章，宣布外交上“一边倒”。这不只是重申中国属于共产主义阵营，而且意味着在最近的将来不与西方国家建交。为了加强效果，几天后，美国驻上海的副总领事奥立佛(William Olive)在街上被抓去痛打一顿，不久死去。美国立刻召回大使。七月底，当“紫石英”号逃离时，毛下令狠打，“紫石英”号多处中弹，紧靠一艘中国客轮以作掩护，结果客轮被炮弹击沉。
That same month, July, Mao spelled out to Stalin that his preferred policy was to “wait and not hurry to gain recognition from these [Western] states.” Stalin was delighted. “Yes! Better not to hurry,” he wrote in the margin, underlining Mao's words.
毛向斯大林郑重申明，他要“等一等，不急于要西方国家承认”。斯大林很高兴，在这句话下画了道着重线，批道：“很好！不急最好。”
SEVERING TIES with the West was Mao's gift to Stalin before they met up. Mao was keen to visit him as soon as his regime was proclaimed in October 1949. Stalin was the boss of the Communist camp, and Mao had to have an audience with him. Mao also knew that the kind of deals he wanted to do had to be transacted face-to-face.
与西方割断关系是毛泽东给斯大林准备的见面礼。一上台，毛就急于去见大老板。这不仅是非有不可的礼仪和面子，他同斯大林还有交易要做。
A visit had been pending for two years, but Stalin had been stringing Mao along, manipulating his patent desire for a meeting to punish him for ambitions beyond his borders. Even after Mao was inaugurated as supreme leader of China, there was still no invitation. By the end of October, Chou had to go to the Russian ambassador and tell him that Mao wanted to go to Moscow to pay his respects to Stalin on his seventieth birthday, on 21 December 1949. Stalin agreed, but he did not offer Mao the sort of state visit in his own right that someone who had just brought a quarter of the world's population into the Communist camp might feel entitled to expect. Mao was coming merely as one of a flock of Party leaders from around the globe converging to pay court on Stalin's birthday.
一九四九年十月底，周恩来上门告诉苏联大使，毛希望在斯大林十二月二十一日七十大寿时，到莫斯科去给斯大林祝寿。斯大林点了头。毛刚把世界四分之一的人口纳入共产主义阵营，斯大林却没有给他应有的待遇，把他作为英雄来欢迎。毛去苏联只是全球一大堆给斯大林祝寿的共产党领导人中的一个。
Mao set off by train on 6 December, on what was his first trip out of China. He did not bring a single senior colleague. The highest-ranking person in the delegation was a secretary. Stalin's liaison, Kovalev, rightly surmised that this was so that when Stalin humiliated Mao, which was inevitable, it would be “without Chinese witnesses.” When Mao met Stalin the first time, he even excluded his ambassador from the session. Face was power. A snub from the Master could weaken his hold over his colleagues.
毛十二月六日离开北京赴莫斯科，一生中第一次出国旅行。代表团里没有一个其他中共领导人，最大的官是秘书陈伯达。科瓦廖夫一语道出了毛的心思：毛知道斯大林一定不会善待他，他丢脸时“不想有中国人在场”。“脸”就是权。斯大林的羞辱会损害他在同事中的权威。同斯大林首次见面时，毛甚至连中国驻苏大使王稼祥也不让参加。
Mao got to see Stalin the day he arrived, and he reiterated that China was bound exclusively to Russia. “Several countries,” he told Stalin, “especially Britain, are actively campaigning to recognise the People's Republic of China. However, we believe that we should not rush to be recognised.” He laid out his core requests: help in building a comprehensive military–industrial system, with emphasis on an aircraft industry, and a modern military, especially a navy.
首次见面是毛到莫斯科的当天。毛向斯大林再次重申他“一边倒”的政策，说：“好几个国家，特别是英国，都在积极地争取想要承认中华人民共和国。但是我们不急于建交。”
In exchange, Mao was ready to make significant concessions. He had come to Moscow wanting to secure a new Sino-Soviet treaty to replace the Soviet Union's old treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, but after learning that Stalin had “decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now,” on the grounds that discarding the old treaty would have complications involving the Yalta Agreement, Mao conceded at once. “We must act in a way that is best for the common cause … the treaty should not be modified at the present time.” The treaty with Chiang had given Russia territorial concessions. Mao enthusiastically offered to leave them in Russian hands. The status quo, he said, “corresponds well with Chinese interests …”
毛做出重大让步。他来莫斯科时曾希望签订新的中苏友好条约，取代苏联与蒋介石签订的旧条约。可是，当他听见斯大林说，废弃旧条约会牵涉雅尔达协议，苏联决定“暂时不改动这项条约的任何条款”时，毛立即表示赞同：“对我们的共同事业怎么有利，我们就怎么办”，“目前不必修改条约。”毛主动请求苏联继续保持旧条约给苏联的领土特权，说它们“与中国的利益一致”。
Mao's readiness to make major concessions in the interests of achieving his goal—help towards furthering his global aspirations—was transparent.
作为回报，毛摆出了他的要求：帮我建立一支强大的军队，一个全面的军事工业系统。
What Stalin had to gauge was how far those aspirations would affect his own position. A militarily powerful China would be very much a two-edged sword: a tremendous asset for the Communist camp—and for him; but also a potential threat. Stalin needed time to mull things over. Should he offer Mao anything at all, and if so, what, and how much?
对毛的要求斯大林需要权衡。军事强大的中国对他有利有弊：利在能增强他领导的共产主义阵营的力量，弊在有全球野心的毛会如虎添翼，威胁斯大林本人的地位。
Mao was packed off to his bugged residence, Stalin's No. 2 dacha, 27 km outside Moscow. For days there was no follow-up meeting. Mao was left gazing out of the picture window at the snow-covered garden, and took out his anger on his staff. Stalin sent various underlings to see Mao, but they were not empowered to talk business. Rather, their job was, as Stalin put it to Molotov, “to find out what sort of type” Mao was, and to monitor him. When liaison man Kovalev reported to Stalin that Mao was “upset and anxious,” Stalin answered: “We have many foreign visitors here now. Comrade Mao should not be singled out” for exceptional treatment.
毛被送到远离莫斯科的斯大林的二号别墅，一幢安着窃听器的大屋子。一连数日毛被晾在那里，从落地大玻璃窗看窗外的雪景，朝身边工作人员发脾气。何时同斯大林正式会谈遥遥无期。斯大林派一个个底下人来看毛，但他们没事可谈；就像斯大林对莫洛托夫所说：“去看看他到底是个什么样的人物”。科瓦廖夫报告斯大林说，毛“很生气，很焦虑”。斯大林回答道：“我们这里有很多外国客人，没必要专门给毛泽东同志特殊待遇。”
But, in fact, Mao was singled out for special treatment—ill-treatment—precisely in relation to these “visitors.” Mao was eager to meet Communist leaders from other countries, and they were equally keen to meet him—the man who had just brought off a triumph that could be called the second October Revolution. But Stalin blocked Mao from getting together with any of them, except for meaningless exchanges with the lackluster Hungarian, Mátyás Rákosi. Mao asked to meet the Italian Communist chief Palmiro Togliatti, “but,” Mao told an Italian Communist delegation (after Stalin died), “Stalin managed, with a thousand stratagems, to deny me that.”*
莫斯科那时聚集着全世界的共产党领导人，毛想见他们，他们自然也想见毛，毛毕竟刚取得自“十月革命”以来共产党世界中最大的胜利。但斯大林拒绝让毛见任何一个外国党领袖，只让匈牙利平庸无奇的拉科西(Matyas Rakosi)跟毛说了几句不关痛痒的话。斯大林死后，毛一次对意大利共产党代表团说，他曾提出想见意大利共产党领袖陶里亚蒂(Palmiro Togliatti)，但“斯大林千方百计不让我见”。
For the actual birthday celebration itself, on 21 December, Mao donned the obligatory mask, and newsreels record him applauding Stalin expansively. Stalin, for his part, appeared solicitous to Mao, whom he seated on his right on the platform, and Pravda reported that Mao was the only foreign speaker for whom the audience stood at the end of his speech. At the show that followed, Mao was greeted with an ovation “the like of which the Bolshoi had undoubtedly never seen,” Rákosi observed, with the audience chanting “Stalin, Mao Tse-tung!” Mao shouted back: “Long live Stalin! Glory belongs to Stalin!”
尽管一肚子不满，斯大林七十大寿那天毛还是做得很像样，引人注目地为斯大林鼓掌。斯大林看上去也对毛格外亲切，让毛坐在他右手边主宾的位子。《真理报》报导说，毛是唯一讲话后全场起立致意的外国领袖。文艺演出结束时，全体观众起立朝毛坐的包厢欢呼：“斯大林！毛泽东！”拉科西说这样的场面莫斯科大剧院还从来没有过。毛也朝观众呼口号：“斯大林万岁！”“光荣属于斯大林！”
As soon as that was over, the next day, Mao demanded a meeting with Stalin. “I'm not here just for the birthday,” he exploded to Kovalev. “I'm here to do business!” Colorful language was used: “Am I here just to eat, shit and sleep?”
第二天，毛要求跟斯大林会谈，说：“我仅仅是来祝寿的吗？我是来办事的。” 他的用语还色彩十足：“难道我来这里就是为天天吃饭、拉屎、睡觉吗？”
Of this trio of bodily functions, none was problem-free. On the food front, Mao vented his discontent on the fact that his hosts were delivering frozen fish, which he hated. “I will only eat live fish,” he told his staff. “Throw these back at them!” Shitting was a major problem, as Mao not only suffered from constipation, but could not adapt to the pedestal toilet, preferring to squat. And he did not like the soft Russian mattress, or the pillows: “How can you sleep on this?” he said, poking at the down-filled pillows. “Your head will disappear!” He had them swapped for his own, filled with buckwheat husks, and had the mattress replaced by wooden planks.
就连这三样生理活动毛也不顺心。吃的方面，苏联主人送来的只有冰冻鱼，毛生气地对卫士说：“告诉我们的厨师，只能给我做活鱼吃，如果他们送来死鱼就给他们扔回去！”拉屎呢，他一向有便秘的毛病，又只习惯蹲式马桶，别墅里的坐式马桶使他没法子方便。睡觉他又不喜欢钢丝软床，受不了鸭绒枕头，按按枕头说：“这能睡觉？头都看不见了。”他让人换上自己的荞麦枕，把床垫掀掉，铺上中国大使馆送来的木板。
Mao saw Stalin two days later, on the 24th, but the Master declined to discuss his requests about building up China's military power, and would only talk about the issue they had not touched on at their first meeting: Mao's role vis-à-vis other Communist parties such as those in Vietnam, Japan and India. After probing Mao's appetite for turf, Stalin went silent again for days, during which time Mao's own birthday, his fifty-sixth, came along on 26 December, but went unmarked. Mao spent all his time cooped up in the dacha, dealing with domestic matters by cable. He said later that he made “an attempt to phone him [Stalin] in his apartment, but they told me Stalin is not at home, and recommended that I meet with Mikoyan. All this offended me …” Stalin rang Mao a few times, but the calls were brief and neither here nor there. Mao declined invitations to go sightseeing, saying he was not interested, and that he was in Moscow to work. If there was no work to do, then he would rather stay in the dacha and sleep. Mao was frustrated and furious; at times, to his close assistants, he appeared “desolate.”
发脾气之后两天，毛见到了斯大林。但斯大林闭口不谈毛上次提出的建设军事大国的要求，只谈上次没谈到的问题，即毛与越南、日本、印度等亚洲共产党的关系。斯大林在观察毛的野心到底有多大。观察完毕，又是许多天没有消息。在此期间，毛本人五十七岁的生日无声无息地过去。毛整天待在别墅里用电报处理中国国内问题。他后来说，“我往斯大林家里打电话，那边竟回答说斯大林不在家，让我有事找米高扬。”“科瓦廖夫来，问我去不去参观，我说没兴趣，我说这次不是专来替斯大林祝寿的，还想做点工作。”“我拍了桌子，骂了他王八蛋，我的目的就是请他去告诉斯大林。”斯大林给他打了几次电话，但都是寥寥数语，又言不及义。毛无可奈何，随员看得出他心情“非常寂寞”，“非常郁闷”。
It seems that Mao now decided to play “the West card” to prod Stalin into action. He let it be known, not least by speaking out loud in his bugged residence, that he was “prepared to do business with … Britain, Japan and America.” And contrary to what he had told Stalin upon his arrival in Moscow (that he was not going to “rush to be recognised” by Britain), talks went ahead with Britain which led to London recognizing Mao's regime on 6 January 1950. The British press, meanwhile, reported that Mao had been put under house arrest by Stalin, and this “leak” could well have been planted by Mao's men. It was “possible,” Mao later said, that this shift in policy towards the West helped “in Stalin's change of position,” noting that real negotiations “began right after this.”
毛想了个高招来调动斯大林：“打西方牌”。在他那安着窃听器的屋子里，他谈论着中国准备和“英、日、美等国做生意”。他刚到莫斯科时曾告诉斯大林，他不急于同英国建交，但此时他指示同英国加速谈判，英国很快在一九五0年一月六日承认毛的中国。英国通讯社说，毛被斯大林软禁起来了。这个风声，很可能是毛的人放出的。
BY NEW YEAR'S DAY 1950, Stalin had made up his mind. On 2 January, Pravda ran an “interview” with Mao, which, Mao said sarcastically years later, Stalin had “drafted for me, acting as my secretary.” The text prepared by Stalin made it clear that Stalin was willing to sign a new treaty; to Mao this meant that Stalin was ready to deal with the key issue of turning China into a major military power. Mao now summoned Chou En-lai from Peking, along with his main industry and trade managers, to do the detailed negotiations, specifying that Chou must travel by train, not by plane, for safety reasons. Chou would have had to come in a Russian plane, and Mao was hinting that he was taking precautions.
元旦那天，毛告诉斯大林的使者，英国将要承认中国。毛后来说，就在这一天，“我收到了一份由斯大林签署的毛泽东对报界的谈话稿”。斯大林同志改变观点了。他起草了一个我的谈话稿，他给我当秘书。”毛说是英国帮了中国的忙，承认了中华人民共和国，促使斯大林态度的改变。
从斯大林起草的答记者问中可以看出，斯大林愿意和他做交易。毛马上把周恩来以及管工业、贸易的部长们召来莫斯科進行具体谈判，特别指示：“坐火车(不是坐飞机)来”。坐飞机就得坐苏联飞机，毛在暗示他不信任苏联人。
Mao, however, was not about to swallow his treatment without taking a kick at Stalin. An opportunity quickly presented itself when US Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a speech at the National Press Club in Washington on 12 January, timed to coincide with Mao's protracted stay in Moscow, accusing Russia of “detaching the northern provinces of China … and … attaching them to the Soviet Union,” with the process “complete” in Outer Mongolia, “nearly complete” in Manchuria, and under way in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Stalin sent his right-hand man, Molotov, to tell Mao he must rebut the speech in the name of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and that Mongolia and Russia would do the same. Mao agreed to do so, but instead of a rebuttal by the Foreign Ministry, he wrote a text in the name of his press chief, a relatively low-level figure. The piece referred to the Soviet satellite of Outer Mongolia, which was formally independent, in the same breath as Chinese regions, which seemed to be saying that China did not accept Russia's de facto annexation of the territory.
毛继续“打西方牌”，对斯大林以示报复。一月十二日，因为西方传言说斯大林把毛扣起来了，美国国务卿艾奇逊(Dean Acheson)在美国华盛顿的全国出版俱乐部发表演讲，指责苏联“正在吞并中国北部的省份……把它们并入苏联”，外蒙古已经“完全”被吞并，东北是“半吞并”，内蒙和新疆也快了。斯大林当即派莫洛托夫来告诉毛，他必须以中国外交部的名义发表声明，驳斥艾奇逊，苏联、蒙古也将采取同样行动。毛答应了，但却用地位相对低级的新闻总署署长胡乔木的个人名义发表谈话，谈话中还把已经独立的外蒙占与中国的省分相提并论，好像外蒙古还是中国的一部分。
The evening this article appeared in Mao's main newspaper, People's Daily, on 21 January, Stalin hauled Mao into the Kremlin for a mighty dressing-down, which included the accusation that China's “own Tito” was emerging. This was delivered mainly by his faithful lackey Molotov, in the presence of Beria. Stalin made a point of staging the tongue-lashing in front of Chou En-lai, who had just arrived the day before. Even though Chou for Mao was a kind of eunuch, and the one among all Mao's senior colleagues that he least minded seeing him take a caning, Mao was livid.
一月二十一日，这篇谈话一登上《人民日报》， 斯大林即刻把毛“擒拿”到克里姆林宫，由莫洛托夫当炮筒训斥毛是“中国的铁托”。斯大林还有意叫头天刚到的周恩来也来听毛挨骂。尽管周恩来对毛说来是个像“太监”一般的角色，毛不在乎在他面前受辱，但毛还是怨气冲天。
Having chastised Mao, Stalin invited him and Chou to his dacha for dinner. Stalin knew that Mao was in no position to stake a claim to Outer Mongolia, as Peking had recognized it diplomatically in October 1949. Mao's insubordinate behavior about rebutting Acheson was an expression of resentment rather than a statement of policy (though Stalin still demanded an official exchange of notes regarding the status of Mongolia). For the drive to dinner, Stalin and Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter, sat on the jump seats, while Mao and Chou were given the main seats. In the car, Shi Zhe recalled, everyone was silent, and the air was like lead:
斯大林明白刚与外蒙建立了外交关系的毛并不是真的要争外蒙古主权，* 毛是在出气。教训毛一顿后，斯大林希望重归于好，请毛和周去他别墅晚宴。路上，斯大林请毛和周坐在后排主座上，他和翻译师哲坐在对面加座上。师哲回忆道：
* 为了保险起见，斯大林后来还是要求双方就外蒙地位问题正式交换备忘录。
To lighten the tension, I chatted a little with Stalin, and then asked him: “Didn't you promise to visit our delegation?”
在车上，大家都沉默不语，气氛像铅块一样沉闷。为了打开局面，我先同斯大林闲聊了几句，然后问他：“你不是答应过要到我们代表团的住处去做客吗？”
He answered at once: “I did, and I have not abandoned this wish.”
他立即回答：“我是说过，现在也没有放弃这个愿望。”
Before he finished, Chairman Mao asked me: “What are you talking to him about? Don't invite him to visit us.”
他的话还未讲完，毛主席问我：“你和他谈的什么？不要请他到我们那里去做客。”
I immediately admitted I had indeed just been talking about this with him.
我立刻承认我同他谈的正是这个问题。
Chairman Mao said: “Take it back. No more invitation.”
毛主席说： “把话收回来，不请他了。”
… Silence again. The air was heavy, as if new lead had been poured into it. We sat like this for thirty minutes.
斯大林好似也懂得我们在谈什么，于是问我： “他说什么？”
… The atmosphere at the dinner was also cold and bored … The Chairman remained silent, not speaking a word …
我回答： “是我们之间的话。”
To break the ice, Stalin got up to turn on the gramophone … Although three or four men took turns trying to pull Chairman Mao onto the floor to dance, they never succeeded … The whole thing ended in bad odour …”
大家都一言不发，气氛沉重得又象灌上了铅。大家就这样沉默地坐了三十分钟。
接下来，“晚宴的气氛仍旧冷清、无聊，丝毫没有欢快和喜庆。主席仍然沉默着，一言不发。”斯大林邀请大家跳舞，“尽管有三四个人轮番拉毛主席上场，也始终没有成功。宴会和舞会更增添了不快之感和格格不入的气氛，最终还是不欢而散。”
The two sides finally signed a new treaty on 14 February 1950. The published text was a formality. The essence of the treaty was in secret annexes. The US$300 million loan China had requested was confirmed, although it was spread over five years, and of the first year's tranche China actually got only one-third (US$20 million), on the grounds that the rest was owed for past “purchases.” The entire loan was allocated to military purchases from Russia (in Mao's inner circle it was referred to as “a military loan”). Half of the total loan, US$150 million, was earmarked for the navy. Stalin gave the go-ahead for fifty large-scale industrial projects—far fewer than Mao had wanted.
一九五0年二月十四日，中苏双方签订了新条约。苏联给中国三亿美元贷款，分五年交付，第一年的交付数只有应付款的三分之一(二千万美金)，其余的扣下偿还从前从苏联买的武器装备。全部贷款都用于军事，被称为“军事贷款”。贷款的一半(一亿五千万美金)专门用来装备海军。斯大林同意帮助毛建设五十个大型工业项目，但这只是“恢复和改造”原有的钢铁、煤矿、铁路、电力等基础设施，距离毛想要的一流军工系统相差何止万里。
In return, Mao agreed that Manchuria and Xinjiang were to be designated Soviet spheres of influence, with Russia given exclusive access to their “industrial, financial, and commercial … activities.” As these two huge regions were the main areas with known rich and exploitable mineral resources, Mao was effectively signing away most of China's tradable assets. To his inner circle he himself referred to the two provinces as “colonies.” To the Americans, decades later, he said that the Russians “grabbed half of Xinjiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchukuo [sic] was also called their sphere of influence.” He gave Russia a monopoly on all China's “surplus” tungsten, tin and antimony for fourteen years, thus depriving China of the chance to sell about 90 percent of its marketable raw materials on the world market into the mid-1960s.
斯大林给的很少，但拿走的很多，这些都隐藏在秘密附加协定和合同里。东北和新疆的“工业的、财政的、商业的”活动都只许苏联参与。当时中国可开采的矿产集中在这两个地区，毛实际上是把中国主要矿产的开采权都给了苏联。毛自己把这两个地区叫做“殖民地”。二十多年后他对美国人说，苏联当时“拿去了半个新疆，叫做势力范围，满洲国[原文如此]是苏联的另一个势力范围。”又一份秘密协定还规定，中国极宝贵的战略原料钨、锡、锑在十四年内只准卖给苏联。这意味着中国百分之九十以上可供出口的原料，都不能在世界市场上以最佳价格出售。
In 1989, the post-Mao leader Deng Xiao-ping told Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev: “Of all the foreign powers that invaded, bullied and enslaved China since the Opium War (in 1842), Japan inflicted the greatest damage; but in the end, the country that got most benefit out of China was Tsarist Russia, including [sic] the Soviet Union during a certain period …” Deng was certainly referring to this treaty.
一九八九年，邓小平对戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)说：“从鸦片战争起，列强侵略、欺负、奴役中国，对中国造成损害最大的是日本，最后实际上从中国得利最多的是沙俄，包括苏联一定时期、一定问题在内。”这最后一点毫无疑问指的是毛泽东同斯大林签的损害中国利益的秘密协定。斯大林死后，赫鲁晓夫(Nikita Khrushchev)承认这些协定对中国不公正，主动废除了它们。
Mao went to great lengths to conceal how much the treaty gave away. When he went over the draft of the announcement he carefully erased any phrases like “supplementary agreements,” and “appendix,” which might make people suspect the existence of these secret documents, marking his deletions: “Extremely crucial, extremely crucial!”*
这些秘密条约按中共的尺度堪称“卖国”。毛审阅有关签约的社论时，把所有可能使人猜测的字句，像“补充协定”，“及其附件”等全部删去，从莫斯科发标明“限即刻到”的火急电报给看家的刘少奇和负责新闻的胡乔木，令他们立即照办，“至要至要”，一九五0年三月，报纸上不小心报导了中、苏两个合股公司的消息，刘少奇写道：“消息发表后，已经在北京学生中引起了极大的波动，怀疑这两个协议是否要损害中国主权，许多青年团员提出质问，要求解释，甚至有骂苏联侵略、人民政府卖国者，并有要求退团及向人民政府请愿者。”要是年轻的中国人知道了秘密协定的详情，非上街不可。
At Stalin's insistence, China not only paid huge salaries to Soviet technicians in China, plus extensive benefits for them and their families, but had to pay compensation to Russian enterprises for the loss of the services of the technicians who came to China. But the concession Mao was most anxious to hide was that he had exempted Russians from Chinese jurisdiction. This had been the issue the CCP had always harped on as the embodiment of “imperialist humiliation.” Now Mao himself had secretly introduced it.
在斯大林的坚持下，中国不仅对在华工作的苏联专家付以极优厚的报酬，给他们和他们的家庭极优裕的生活条件，还付钱给这些人在苏联的工作单位，作为对它们“损失”的赔偿。这些人还享有“治外法权”，如果犯了罪一律由苏方处理。长期以来，中共指责“帝国主义欺负中国”的最重要一点，就是“治外法权”。毛如今偷偷把它请了回来。
Mao wanted to end his trip on a high note, so he pleaded with Stalin, who did not go to parties outside the Kremlin, to attend a celebration he was throwing at the Metropol Hotel on the evening of the signing: “we do hope you can come for a minute. You can leave early any time …” Stalin decided to grant Mao this moment of glory. When Stalin showed up at 9:00 PM, bringing his own bottle, the flabbergasted guests went into a frenzy.
签约后，毛恳求从来不出克里姆林宫参加宴会的斯大林，到莫斯科“大都会饭店” 来出席中方举行的答谢宴会。毛反覆说：“希望你，斯大林能莅临。我们希望你能出席一下，如果健康状况不允许，你可以随时提前退席，我们不会认为这有什么不合适。”
But Stalin did not come just to show good will. He had a message to send. In his toast he brought up Yugoslavia's leader, Tito, whom he had recently cast out of the Communist camp. Any Communist country that went its own way, Stalin observed pointedly, would end up badly, and would only return to the fold under a different leader. The warning was clear—and would have been even more threatening if Stalin's plans to assassinate Tito had been known.
斯大林决定给毛面子，说他“决定破例接受你们的邀请”。晚上九点，斯大林来了，带着一瓶自己喝的酒。几百客人谁也不知道斯大林会来，一瞬间全惊呆了，接着爆发出暴风雨般的掌声和“斯大林万岁”的欢呼声，争睹斯大林的人群差点把玻璃门挤碎。
斯大林不仅是来给毛面子的，也是来向毛下警告书的。在祝酒中他提到铁托，说铁托脱离共产主义阵营大家庭，想走自己的道路，可这条路行不通，南斯拉夫人民迟早要回到大家庭里来。斯大林曾一再把毛比作铁托，他的意思很清楚，当铁托没有好下场。斯大林此时正着手進行暗杀铁托的计划。
None of this dampened Mao's ambitions. Earlier that day, at the treaty-signing ceremony, when photographs were being taken, the diminutive Stalin had taken one step forward. To his staff afterwards, Mao remarked, with a smile: “So he will look as tall as I am!” (Mao was 1.8 meters tall.)
但对这个大老板，毛并无多少惧怕感。签约仪式上，记者给身材高大的他和相对矮小的斯大林照相时，斯大林向前移了一步。事后秘书提及此事，毛微笑着说：“这样就一般高了嘛”。
Mao was bent on pursuing his dream of making China, his base, a superpower. Stalin was equally determined to thwart this ambition—as Mao could tell from the fact that, in return for the huge concessions he had made, he got relatively little from Stalin. What Stalin let him have fell far short of even the skeleton basis for a world-class military machine. Mao was going to have to find other ways to squeeze more out of Stalin.
这次访苏，远远没有满足毛的胃口，他要从斯大林的虎口里扯出肉来，还得打别的主意。
*Chou used the expression “iron curtain” to describe what the CCP wanted: “to drive at having Manchuria covered by the iron curtain against foreign powers,” “except the USSR and people's democracies.”
*It was also a source of the lasting misconception that Liu Shao-chi was more hard-line than Chou.
*British Communist leader John Gollan's notes of what Mao said to him in 1957 (about 1949) read: “Not even freedom of meeting leaders. 70th birthday—Didn't dare although there.”
*When a news item in March 1950 mentioned joint companies, Liu Shao-chi noted that the news “has aroused tremendous waves among Peking students, who suspect these … might be damaging China's sovereignty. Many Youth League members demanded an … explanation; some even charged out loud … that the people's government had sold out the country.” And this was without knowing the half of it.