34 WHY MAO AND STALIN STARTED THE KOREAN WAR
34 毛泽东斯大林为什么要打朝鲜战争
(1949–50 AGE 55–56)
1949～1950 年 55～56 岁
STALIN RECOGNIZED that Mao had the drive and the resources, especially the human resources, to expand the frontiers of communism in Asia significantly. In order not to erode his own power, Stalin decided not to form an Asian Cominform, which would give the Chinese leader a formal pan-Asia set-up, but instead to dole out individual countries to Mao, in such a way that he, Stalin, remained the ultimate boss. At their second meeting, during Mao's stay in Moscow, Stalin assigned him to supervise Vietnam.
在划分势力范围方面，毛泽东的進展也不大，只是把越共交给了他。
Stalin had hitherto shown little interest in Vietnam. In 1945, when the Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh led an uprising against French colonial rule and declared a provisional independent government, Moscow had not even bothered to answer his cables. But, even though he did not entirely trust Ho, Stalin changed his attitude radically once Mao took power and Chinese troops reached the border with Vietnam in late 1949. On 30 January 1950, while Mao was in Moscow, Stalin recognized Ho's regime, some days after Mao did. The lack of a common frontier with Vietnam made it difficult for Stalin to command from afar, whereas China could supply arms, goods and training across its border with Vietnam (and Laos). By giving Mao custody of Vietnam, Stalin gave himself a way of reaching into Vietnam, and gratified Mao, while passing on to China the enormous expense of sustaining the Indochina insurgencies.
斯大林是一举三得：既让毛高兴，又能在亚洲有效地扩展共产主义阵营，援助越南的巨大费用自然也由中国负担。
Mao had already been trying to bring the Vietnamese under his tutelage. Ho had lived in China for more than a decade, including a stretch in Yenan, and spoke fluent Chinese. Mao had been training, funding and arming the Vietnamese, but when he developed a plan to send in Chinese troops once he controlled the border with Vietnam, in late 1949, Stalin called him to heel. Stalin wanted to gather all the strings together in his own hands first.
越共领袖胡志明十分亲华，在中国住过多年，去过延安，说一口地道的中文。毛一直在出资、出力支援他。尽管他与中共关系非同一般，为了体现大老板的地位，斯大林还是要由自己亲自把越共分配给毛。
Ho Chi Minh was brought to Moscow, via Peking, arriving in time to make a dramatic appearance at Stalin's farewell dinner for Mao in the Kremlin on 16 February 1950. Stalin told Ho that aid to Vietnam was China's responsibility—and cost. Ho was the only foreign Communist leader with whom Mao was allowed to have proper talks on this trip, and the two returned to China on the same train, in a convoy between one train carrying Soviet airmen going to protect Shanghai and China's coastal cities, and one loaded with MiG-15s.
在毛访苏期间，斯大林把胡志明召到莫斯科，对胡说援越由毛负责。胡志明成为共产党领袖中唯一跟毛会谈的人，还跟毛同乘火车回到中国。
Mao now began to take personal charge of action in Vietnam, vetting both grand strategy and the minutiae of military operations. The first objective was to link up the Vietnamese Communists' base with China, as the CCP had done with Russia in 1945–46. Inside China, a road-building blitz to the border was completed in August 1950. Within two months this enabled the Vietnamese to win a crucial series of battles known as the Border Campaign, as a result of which the French army lost control of the frontier with China. Thereafter, China poured in aid. On 19 August, Mao told Stalin's emissary Pavel Yudin that he planned to train 60,000–70,000 Vietnamese soldiers. It was having China as a secure rear and supply depot that made it possible for the Vietnamese to fight for twenty-five years and beat first the French and then the Americans.
自此，越南问题毛事必躬亲，大至战略计划，小到战场细节，首先是把越共的根据地与中国连成一气，就像当年中共打通苏联一样。中国国内通向越南的公路于一九五0年八月完工。接着中共帮胡志明打赢了“边界战役” ，中国援助从此源源而至。八月十九日，毛告诉斯大林的使者尤金(Pavel Yudin)， 他准备训练六、七万越共军队。正是因为背靠中国，越共才得以打了二十五年的仗，先赶走了法国人，再赶走了美国人。
In most of these years, the huge logistics burden of the fighting in Indochina fell almost entirely on China. To Mao, the cost was irrelevant. When the French Party's first emissary to Ho mentioned ways the French Communists could help the Vietnamese, he was told by Liu Shao-chi: “Don't waste your time on this. Don't get into things like medical aid. We can do that. After all there are 600 million Chinese …”
It was not long before Mao started trying to “Maoise” his client, imposing a much-hated land reform on Vietnam in the 1950s, in which Chinese advisers even presided over kangaroo tribunals that sentenced Vietnamese to death in their own country. Vietnam's “poet laureate,” To Huu, hymned Mao's role in surprisingly frank doggerel:
毛不久就开始“毛化”越南，搞毛式土改斗地主，中国顾问甚至坐在台上宣判越南本地人死刑。毛式土改为越南人所深恶痛绝，好些越共领导人强烈反对，就是胡志明也進行了抵制。
Kill, kill more …
For the farm, good rice, quick collection of taxes …
Worship Chairman Mao, Worship Stalin …
Even though some Vietnamese leaders raised strenuous objections to the Mao-style land reform, Ho Chi Minh put up only feeble and belated resistance to Mao's attempt to turn the Vietnamese revolution into a clone of China's.
IN SEPTEMBER to October 1950, Mao downgraded operations in Vietnam, in order to focus on a much larger war on another patch of turf that Stalin had decided to assign him. This was Korea.
一九五0年九、十月间，毛暂缓了在越南的军事行动，以便集中精力打朝鲜战争。
At the end of World War II, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan early in the century, was divided across the middle, along the 38th Parallel, with Russia occupying the northern half and the US the South. After formal independence in 1948, the North came under a Communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In March 1949, as Mao's armies were rolling towards victory, Kim went to Moscow to try to persuade Stalin to help him seize the South. Stalin said “No,” as this might involve confronting America. Kim then turned to Mao, and one month later sent his deputy defense minister to China. Mao gave Kim a firm commitment, saying he would be glad to help Pyongyang attack the South, but could they wait until he had taken the whole of China: “It would be much better if the North Korean government launched an all-out attack against the South in the first half of 1950 …” Mao said, adding emphatically: “If necessary, we can stealthily put in Chinese soldiers for you.” Koreans and Chinese, he said, had black hair, and the Americans would not be able to tell the difference: “They will not notice.”
二十世纪初沦为日本殖民地的朝鲜，在二次大战日本战败后，被沿着北纬三十八度线一分为二，南边驻扎美国军队，北边驻扎苏联军队。一九四九年三月，北朝鲜首相金日成看见中共军队就要夺取全中国了，着急了，到苏联去想说服斯大林帮他打南朝鲜(南韩)。斯大林拒绝了，怕跟美国打起来。金日成于是求毛帮忙，派他的国防部副部长来北京见毛。毛明确表态支持，说等他拿下全中国再开战。毛说北朝鲜“最好是在一九五0年上半年举行全面進攻”。毛着重说：“如果必要，我们可以悄悄派些中国部队给你们。”中、朝两国人肤色一样，美国人“认不出来”。
Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA—and volunteered Chinese manpower—as early as May 1949. At this stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely, posing as Koreans, and not about China having an open collision with America. During his visit to Russia, however, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly—because only such a war would enable him to gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment.
这时候，毛的意思还是秘密派兵進去，乔装成朝鲜人，而不是公开与美国对阵。访苏期间毛有了改变。他要公开同美国作战 -- 只有这样他才能从斯大林那里拿到他想要的东西。毛设想的交易是：我帮你打败你的敌人美国，你给我军事工业、势力范围。毛之所以敢打，是因为他拥有千百万可充当炮灰的中国人。他相信美国不可能跟他比赛死人，他不会被打败。打朝鲜战争还给他提供了一个处理上百万在国共内战后期投降的国民党部队的办法：把他们大量派去朝鲜。
Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao's eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South.
Stalin was given a push by Kim. On 19 January 1950, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, reported that Kim had told him, “excitedly” that “now that China is completing its liberation,” South Korea's was “next in line.” Kim “thinks that he needs to visit comrade Stalin again, in order to receive instructions and authorization to launch an offensive.” Kim added that “if it was not possible to meet comrade Stalin now, he will try to meet with Mao.” He stressed that Mao had “promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China.” Playing “the Mao card,” Kim told Shtykov that “he also has other questions for Mao Tse-tung, in particular the question of the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform” (no mention of talking to Stalin about this). Mao, he said, “would have instructions on all issues.” Kim was telling Stalin that Mao was keen to give him military support, and that if Stalin would still not endorse an invasion, he (Kim) would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao.
斯大林收到了金，毛之间联系的报告。一九五0年一月十九日，苏联驻平壤大使什特科夫(Terentii Shtykov)又电告斯大林：金日成很激动地请求允许他发动進攻，强调说，毛曾向他许下诺言，中国战争一旦结束就来帮他的忙。三十日，斯大林叫什特科夫告诉金日成，说“可以帮助他”。这是第一份斯大林同意发动朝鲜战争的文献。斯大林改变主意是因为毛要参战。两个月后，斯大林把金日成召来莫斯科，对他说：中国人现在可以专心对付朝鲜问题了，我们有了成败攸关的条件--北京的支持，我们可以采取更积极的行动来统一朝鲜了。斯大林要金“必须依靠毛，毛对亚洲事务的了解再高明不过”。*
* 西班牙共产党领袖卡里约(Santiago Carrillo)告诉我们：金日成曾对他说，朝鲜战争是金发起的，毛比斯大林更早、更坚决地支持他。
Eleven days later, on 30 January, Stalin wired Shtykov to tell Kim that he was “prepared to help him on this.” This is the first documented evidence of Stalin agreeing to start a war in Korea, and he shifted his position because of Mao, who possessed the critical asset—an inexhaustible supply of men. When Kim came to Moscow two months later, Stalin said that the international environment had “changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea.” He went on to make it explicit that this was because “the Chinese were now in a position to devote more attention to the Korean issue.” There was “one vital condition—Peking's support” for the war. Kim “must rely on Mao, who understands Asian affairs beautifully.”*
A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America's technology, as well as acquiring some of this technology, along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia's involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp.
从斯大林的角度看，中国和北朝鲜同美国打一场大仗对他有说不完的好处。第一他可以做军火商。第二他可以试验自己的新式装备，特别是米格飞机，还可能获得某些美国军事技术。第三他可以摸摸美国的底，在跟共产主义阵营对垒上，美国到底能走多远。
But for Stalin, the greatest attraction of a war in Korea was that the Chinese, with their massive numbers, which Mao was eager to use, might be able to eliminate, and in any case tie down, so many American troops that the balance of power might tilt in Stalin's favor and enable him to turn his schemes into reality. These schemes included seizing various European countries, among them Germany, Spain and Italy. One scenario Stalin discussed during the Korean War was an air attack on the US fleet on the high seas between Japan and Korea (en route to Inchon, in September 1950). In fact, Stalin told Mao on 5 October 1950 that the period provided a unique—and short-lived—window of opportunity because two of the major capitalist states, Germany and Japan, were out of action militarily. Discussing the possibility of what amounted to a Third World War, Stalin said: “Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not … If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years' time …”†
但最使斯大林动心的还是中国人能消灭并牵制大量美国军队，使世界权力平衡倒向对苏联有利的一边。斯大林的全球梦包括在德国、西班牙、意大利等若干欧洲国家夺权。他在给毛的电报里说：共产党面对一个绝无仅有、而且转瞬即逝的良机，那就是在资本主义阵营里，德国和日本这两个主要军事强国都刚刚战败，如果共产主义阵营和资本主义阵营之间打第三次世界大战的话，“我们应当害怕这一前景吗？我认为，我们不应当害怕”，“如果大战不可避免，那么让它现在就来吧，与其几年后打，不如现在就打”。
Mao repeatedly spelled out this potential to Stalin, as a way of stressing his usefulness. On 1 July 1950, within a week of the North invading the South, and long before Chinese troops had gone in, he had Chou tell the Russian ambassador: “Now we must energetically build up our aviation and fleet,” adding pointedly for Stalin's ears: “so as to deal a knockout blow … to the armed forces of the USA.” On 19 August Mao himself told Stalin's emissary, Yudin, that America could send in thirty to forty divisions but that Chinese troops could “grind” these up. He reiterated this message to Yudin a week later. Then, on 1 March 1951, he summed up his overall plan for the Korean War to Stalin in chilling language: “to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives.”
毛泽东很清楚斯大林的梦，反覆向斯大林表态：可以依靠他来实现这个梦。毛一再告诉斯大林的联络员尤金：美国可能在朝鲜投入三十到四十个师，但是中国军队会把他们“碾”得粉碎。
With Mao's expendables on offer, Stalin positively desired a war with the West in Korea. When Kim invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council quickly passed a resolution committing troops to support South Korea. Stalin's ambassador to the UN, Yakov Malik, had been boycotting proceedings since January, ostensibly over Taiwan continuing to occupy China's seat. Everyone expected Malik, who remained in New York, to return to the chamber and veto the resolution, but he stayed away. Malik had in fact requested permission to return to the Security Council, but Stalin rang him up and told him to stay out.
金日成入侵南朝鲜后，联合国安理会很快通过决议派联合国军队支援南朝鲜。苏联驻联合国的代表马利克(Yakov Malik)本来可以行使否决权，否决这一决议，但人就在纽约的马利克没有到会。马利克曾向斯大林要求去安理会，斯大林亲自给他打电话，叫他不要去。派联合国军队的决议于是得以通过。
The Soviet failure to exercise its veto has perplexed observers ever since, as it seemed to throw away a golden opportunity to block the West's involvement in Korea. But if Stalin decided not to use his veto, it can only have been for one reason: that he did not want to keep Western forces out. He wanted them in, where Mao's sheer weight of numbers could grind them up.
苏联拒绝行使否决权的举动，一直使人们大惑不解，都说苏联错过了阻止西方出兵的机会。实际上，斯大林是故意让联合国通过决议，想要以美军为首的联合国军队進朝鲜，好让毛的士兵们把他们“碾”得粉碎。
IT WAS NOW very much in Stalin's interest to make Mao the sub-chief over Kim, but this was a different case from Vietnam. Because of the enormous ramifications of taking on the USA, Stalin decided to keep an extra degree of control. He had to make absolutely sure that Kim understood that he, Stalin, was the ultimate boss before he put Kim in Mao's hands. So even though Mao was in Moscow on 30 January, when Stalin gave Kim his consent to go to war, he did not breathe a word to Mao, and ordered Kim not to inform the Chinese. Stalin brought Kim to Moscow only at the end of March, after Mao had left. Stalin went over battle plans in detail with Kim, and at their last talk, in April 1950, he laid it on the line to Kim: “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.” With this comradely envoi, Kim was waved away to Mao's care.
毛要帮金日成打仗了，斯大林自然要让他当金日成的顶头上司。但斯大林得让金明白，大老板还是他。当他首次电告金日成同意打南朝鲜时，毛正在莫斯科，斯大林对毛一字未吐，反而命令金日成不许向中国人露出一点风声。在毛回国以后，斯大林才把金日成接来莫斯科，跟他讨论作战方案。
On 13 May a Russian plane flew Kim to Peking. He went straight to Mao to announce that Stalin had given the go-ahead. At 11:30 that night, Chou was dispatched to ask the Soviet ambassador, Roshchin, to get Moscow's confirmation. Stalin's stilted message came the next morning: “North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed … personally with comrade Mao.” Next day (15 May), Mao gave Kim his full commitment, and on the most vital issue: “if the Americans were to take part … [China] would assist North Korea with its own troops.” He went out of his way to exclude the participation of Russian troops, saying that: “Since the Soviet Union is bound by a demarcation agreement on the 38th Parallel [dividing Korea] with America, it would be ‘inconvenient' [for it] to take part in military actions [but as] China is not bound by any such obligations, it can therefore fully render assistance to the northerners.” Mao offered to deploy troops at once on the Korean border.
五月十三日，苏联飞机把金日成送到北京。一下飞机金直奔毛处，向毛宣布斯大林已经同意了。当晚十一点半，毛派周恩来到苏联大使罗申那里去核实。第二天一早，斯大林的话来了：“北朝鲜可以着手行动；可是，这个问题应该与毛泽东同志本人讨论。”十五日，毛对金日成表示无保留的支持：“如果美国参战，中国将派兵入朝。”毛泽东特意排除了苏联军队的卷入：“苏联同美国有三十八度线的协议，不方便直接参与军事行动；中国没有这种约束，可以全面援助北部。”毛主动提议马上在中朝边界部署大军。
Mao endorsed the Kim–Stalin plan, and Stalin wired consent on the 16th. On 25 June the North Korean army smashed across the 38th Parallel. Mao, it seems, was not told the exact launch day. Kim wanted Chinese troops kept out until they were absolutely needed. Stalin, too, wanted them in only when America committed large numbers of troops for the Chinese to “consume.”
金日成同斯大林制定的计划得到毛的认可，斯大林十六日来电最后点头。六月二十五日，北朝鲜的军队越过三十八度线，侵入南朝鲜。
TRUMAN REACTED fast to the invasion. Within two days, on the 27th, he announced that he was sending troops into Korea, as well as upping aid to the French in Indochina. Furthermore, he now reversed the policy of “non-intervention” towards Taiwan. It was thanks to this new US commitment that neither Mao nor his successors were ever able to take Taiwan.
美国总统杜鲁门于二十七日宣布派兵入朝。同时他增加了对正同越共打仗的法国人的援助，改变了对台湾的“不干预”政策。由于这一政策改变，毛和他的后继者们都只能对台湾隔海兴叹。
By early August, the North Koreans had occupied 90 percent of the South, but the US poured in well-armed reinforcements, and on 15 September landed troops at Inchon, just below the 38th Parallel, cutting off much of the North Korean army in the South, and positioning itself for a move into the North. On the 29th Kim sent an SOS to Stalin, in which he asked for “volunteer units” from China.
八月初，北朝鲜军攻占了百分之九十的南朝鲜。美军增援迅速赶到，九月十五日在三十八度线以南的仁川登陆，把北朝鲜军截为两半，紧接着准备向北進攻。二十九日，金日成急电斯大林，请大老板叫中国派“志愿军”。
On 1 October, Stalin signaled to Mao that the moment had come for him to act, dissociating himself shamelessly from any responsibility for defeat: “I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea …” After this barefaced lie came his real point: “I think that if … you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five–six divisions towards the 38th Parallel … [These] could be called volunteers …”
十月一日，斯大林告诉毛：履行诺言的时刻到了。斯大林的电报先推卸责任说：“我现在远离莫斯科在度假，跟朝鲜的事有点隔膜。”接着他委婉而客气地下命令：“据我看，如果您认为可能派兵援朝的话，您应该起码派五、六个师向三十八度线進发”， “他们可以称为志愿军”。
Mao leapt into action. At 2:00 AM on 2 October he issued an order to the troops he had already moved up to the Korean border: “Stand by for order to go into [Korea] at any moment …”
毛马上作出反应。十月二日凌晨二时，他要已经派到中朝边界的部队，随时待命出动，按原定计划与新的敌人作战。”
Poverty-stricken, exhausted China was about to be thrown into war with the USA. It seems it was only now, at the beginning of October, that Mao convened the regime's top body, the Politburo, to discuss this momentous issue. The Politburo was not a team to make important decisions, but to serve as a sounding-board for Mao. On this occasion, he specifically invited differing views, because of the colossal implications of war with America. Nearly all his colleagues were strongly against going into Korea, including his No. 2 Liu Shao-chi and nominal military chief Zhu De. Lin Biao was the most vocal opponent. Chou En-lai took a cautious and equivocal position. Mao said later that going into Korea was “decided by one man and a half”: himself the “one” and Chou the “half.” Among the huge problems voiced were: that the US had complete air supremacy, and artillery superiority of about 40:1; that if China got involved, America might bomb China's big cities and destroy its industrial base; and that America might drop atomic bombs on China.
决心已定的毛，在临战前，才召开政治局会议，想听听同事们的意见，看有没有自己还没想到的地方。对毛来说，政治局不是做决定的机构，而是为他提参考意见的智囊团和他的决定的执行者。这次，他特别要求智囊们畅所欲言，着重摆一摆出兵的不利条件。绝大部分人反对出兵。周恩来采取了模棱两可的立场。反对声音最高的是林彪。毛泽东后来曾讲出兵“是一个半人决定的”。一个是他，半个是周恩来。反对意见包括：美国具有完全的制空权，大炮优势是四十比一，美国可能轰炸摧毁中国大城市及工业基地，甚至可能朝中国扔原子弹。
Mao himself had been losing sleep over these questions. He needed a functioning China as the base for his wider ambitions. But Mao gambled that America would not expand the war to China. Chinese cities and industrial bases could be protected from US bombing by the Russian air force. And as for atomic bombs, his gut feeling was that America would be deterred by international public opinion, particularly as Truman had already dropped two—both on an Asian country. Mao took precautions for himself, though. During the Korean War, he mostly holed up in a top-secret military estate outside Peking in the Jade Spring Hills, well equipped with air-raid shelters.
这些问题毛都知道，他也曾为此多少天睡不着觉。毁了中国对他本人有百害而无一利。毛最终把赌注押在美国不可能打到中国本土来。中国的城市和工业基地也会有苏联空军保卫。毛不相信美国会扔原子弹。不过，他还是为自己采取了以防万一的措施：待在有坚固防空设施的玉泉山。
Mao was convinced that America could not defeat him, because of his one fundamental asset—millions of expendable Chinese, including quite a few that he was pretty keen to get rid of. In fact, the war provided a perfect chance to consign former Nationalist troops to their deaths. These were men who had surrendered wholesale in the last stages of the civil war, and it was a deliberate decision on Mao's part to send them into Korea, where they formed the bulk of the Chinese forces. In case UN troops should fail to do the job, there were special execution squads in the rear to take care of anyone hanging back.
Mao knew that America just would not be able to compete in sacrificing men. He was ready to wager all because having Chinese troops fighting the USA was the only chance he had to claw out of Stalin what he needed to make China a world-class military power.
Mao hand-drafted a cable to Stalin on 2 October, committing to “sending Chinese army to Korea.” Then it seems he had second thoughts. In his eagerness to go in, he had not informed Stalin of any of his problems. Playing them up could raise his price. So he held back the cable committing Chinese forces, and sent a quite different one, saying that Chinese entry “may entail extremely serious consequences … Many comrades … judge that it is necessary to show caution … Therefore it is better to … refrain from advancing troops …” However, he left open the option of going in: “A final decision has not been taken,” he ended; “we wish to consult with you.”
十月二日，毛起草了一封给斯大林的电报，说他“决定出动中国军队到朝鲜和美国人作战”。这之后他意识到自己一向对出兵显得太积极，从未谈过困难，不利于同斯大林讨价还价。毛压下已起草的电报，发给斯大林另外一封，故意表现得犹豫不决，说：中国出兵“多半会带来极严重的后果”，“多数同志认为对此持慎重态度是必要的”。“因此，目前最好暂时不派出军队。”毛怕斯大林把他的话当真了，特地说：“我们尚未作最后决定，希望能同您商量。”
AT THE SAME TIME, Mao prepared the ground for going into Korea by pretending to give America “fair warning.” For this purpose, Chou En-lai staged an elaborate charade, waking the Indian ambassador in the small hours of 3 October to tell him “we will intervene” if American troops crossed the 38th Parallel. Choosing this roundabout channel, using an ambassador whose credit in the West was minimal, when it would have been perfectly simple to make an official statement, suggests compellingly that Mao wanted his “warning” to be ignored: thus he could go into Korea claiming he was acting out of self-defense.
与此同时，为了给出兵铺路，毛假装给美国一个“警告”，派周恩来演了场有声有色的戏。十月三日凌晨，周把印度驻华大使潘尼迦(Kavalam Madhava Panikkar)从睡梦中叫醒，要他告诉全世界，如果美国军队越过三十八度线，“我们不能坐视不顾，我们要管。”为什么中国政府不直接发表声明，而绕个弯透过一个在西方说话没人听的大使？显然毛有把握这个“警告”会被置之不理，他便能以“美国把战火烧到中国大门口”为理由出兵。
By the 5th of October, with UN forces already pushing into the North, Stalin was showing impatience. That day he replied to Mao's cable of the 2nd which had suggested that Mao might hold back. He reminded Mao that he, Mao, had made a commitment:
十月五日，联合国军队已经推進到了朝鲜北部，斯大林对毛感到有些不耐烦了。他回答毛那封“暂不出兵”的电报说：“我上次向您提出派五、六个师的中国志愿军，是因为我很了解，中国领导同志作出过一系列声明，说他们准备好了派几个军去支援朝鲜同志。”这里的“中国领导同志”显而易见是指毛。斯大林是在提醒毛，朝鲜战争是毛最先积极要打的。
I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five–six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades [i.e., you] regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades …
Stalin referred ominously to what he called “a passive wait-and-see policy,” which, he said, would cost Mao Taiwan. Mao had been using Taiwan as an argument to persuade Stalin to help him build an air force and a navy. Stalin was now telling Mao he would get neither if he stalled about his mission in Korea.
But Mao was not really trying to opt out. He was raising his price. By the time he received Stalin's reply, he had already appointed a commander-in-chief for the Chinese forces slated for Korea: Peng De-huai. Mao moved at his own pace. On 8 October, having ordered his troops to be redesignated as “Chinese People's Volunteers,” he wired Kim that “we have decided to dispatch the Volunteers into Korea to help you.” He also sent Chou En-lai and Lin Biao to see Stalin about arms supplies. En route, Lin sent Mao a long cable urging him to abandon the idea of going in. The reason Mao sent Lin Biao to see Stalin when Lin was such a strong opponent of intervention, was to impress on Stalin the military difficulties facing the Chinese and thus extract the maximum out of the Master.
毛只是想抬高身价。收到斯大林的这封电报时，他已经指定了入朝总司令：彭德怀。十月八日，他下令组成志愿军，“迅即向朝鲜境内出动”，当天电告金日成：“我们决定派遣志愿军到朝鲜境内帮助你们”。他同时派周恩来，林彪到苏联，向斯大林要武器。路上，林彪给毛发了封长长的电报，再次劝毛回心转意，放弃出兵。派强烈反对出兵的林彪去见斯大林，毛有他的用心。他想让林彪对斯大林多说，说够出兵的困难，以便从斯大林那里得到尽可能多的东西。
Chou and Lin got to Stalin's villa on the Black Sea on the 10th, and talked through the night until 5 in the morning. Stalin promised them “planes, artillery, tanks and other equipment.” Chou did not even negotiate a price. But out of the blue Stalin reneged about the key requirement: air cover for Chinese troops. Stalin had promised this (“a division of jet fighter planes—124 pieces for covering [Chinese] troops”) on 13 July. Now he claimed that the planes would not be ready for another two months. Without air cover, Chinese troops would be sitting ducks. Chou and Lin Biao argued that Russian air cover was essential. An impasse was reached. Stalin then wired Mao to tell him that China did not have to join the war.
周、林于十月十日到达斯大林在黑海畔的别墅，当晚谈了一夜，直到黎明五点钟。斯大林答应卖给中国飞机、大炮、坦克等军事装备，周恩来连价格也没问，他知道不管多少都非买不可。斯大林曾许诺派“一个空军师，一百二十四架飞机，提供空中掩护”。可现在他忽然说派不出了，苏联空军尚未准备好，要等两个月。没有空军掩护，志愿军只好在地面上等着挨美国飞机炸。周恩来、林彪坚持说苏联空军掩护决不可少，争来争去斯大林也不松口。
Stalin was calling Mao's bluff by saying, as Mao put it later, “Forget it!” Mao climbed down at once. “With or without air cover from the Soviet Union,” he told Stalin, “we go in.” Mao needed the war. He wired Chou on 13 October: “We should enter the war. We must enter the war …” When Chou received the cable he buried his head in his hands. That same day Mao told the Russian ambassador that China was going in, only expressing the “hope” that Russian air cover would arrive “as soon as possible, but not later than in two months,” which was, in fact, Stalin's own timetable.
最后，斯大林打电报给毛说：中国不必出兵。用毛后来的话，斯大林说：“算了吧！”斯大林这是在将毛的军，明知毛想出兵，非出兵不可。果然，毛马上就不争了，说：“不管苏联出不出空军，我们去。”十月十三日，他打电报给周恩来：“应当参战，必须参战，参战利益极大，不参战损害极大。”周恩来看完电报后，一言未发，双手抱着头，陷入深深的沉思。毛怕周不把他的意图传达透澈，双管齐下，通知苏联驻华大使罗申，中国一定出兵。
So it was that out of the global ambitions of the two Communist tyrants, Stalin and Mao, as well as the more local ambition of Kim, China was hurled into the inferno of the Korean War on 19 October 1950.
中国，就这样在一九五0年十月十九日被毛投進了朝鲜战争。
*Kim Il Sung later told the head of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo (who told us), that he had started the war—and that Mao had been far more strongly for launching it than Stalin.
†In late 1950 a top French government adviser in Indochina (Jean Sainteny) summed up the thinking of the French commanding general there, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, in these words: “that the Russians are looking for one billion human beings, human beings from Asia, a sort of human livestock, to get them to fight the West.” The same thought had occurred earlier to US Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Questioning the head of the US Military Advisory Group to the Chinese Nationalists, Major General Barr, in March 1949, Lodge asked: “Do you think the Russians can regiment those Chinese … and make them a military asset outside the borders of China, and use them in Europe or … somewhere else?” After an interjection by Senator Alexander Wiley (“Genghis Khan was a Chinese, was he not?”), Barr replied: “… could the Russians organize a Chinese division and take it over to Germany or in that area … I am afraid that idea would appeal to some of the Chinese Communists.”