35 MAO MILKS THE KOREAN WAR
35 难发的战争“财”
(1950–53 AGE 56–59)
1950～1953 年 56～59 岁
WHEN CHINESE troops went into Korea in October 1950, the North Koreans were on the run. Two months later, Mao's army had pushed the UN out of North Korea and restored Kim Il Sung's dictatorship. But Kim was now militarily powerless, with his depleted 75,000-man army outnumbered 6:1 by the 450,000 troops Mao had in Korea. On 7 December, the day after the Chinese recovered Kim's capital, Pyongyang, Kim ceded command to the Chinese. The Chinese commander Peng De-huai cabled Mao that Kim had “agreed … not to intervene in the future in matters of military command.” Peng was made the head of a joint Chinese–Korean HQ. Mao had taken over Kim's war.
中国志愿军入朝参战时，金日成正败得一塌糊涂。两个月后，志愿军把联合国军赶出了北朝鲜。金现在说话不算数了，毛在朝鲜有四十五万人，是他七万五千残兵败将的六倍。十二月七日，志愿军收复平壤，金把战争指挥权交给了中国人。彭德怀打电报给毛说：“金同意组成联合指挥部，今后不再直接干预指挥。”联合指挥部司令是彭德怀，毛泽东接管了金日成的战争。
Peng wanted to stop north of the 38th Parallel, the original boundary between North and South Korea, but Mao refused. Peng pleaded that his supply lines were over-extended, leaving them seriously exposed to US bombing: “our troops are unable to receive supplies of food, ammunition, shoes, oil or salt … The main problem is no air cover, and no guaranteed railway transport; the moment we repair them, they are bombed again …” Mao insisted. He was determined not to stop fighting until he had squeezed the utmost out of Stalin. “Must cross the 38th Parallel,” he ordered Peng on 13 December. Early in January 1951 the Chinese took Seoul, the Southern capital, eventually pushing about 100 km south of the Parallel.
志愿军打到三十八度线时，彭德怀向毛要求停下来，说运输线太长：“目前部队粮、弹，鞋、油，盐均不能按时接济，主要原因是无飞机掩护，随修随炸。”毛拒绝停下来，十二月十三日，他覆电彭德怀：“我军必须越过三十八度线。”
Chinese military successes greatly boosted Mao's standing with Stalin, who sent extraordinarily enthusiastic congratulations, which he had not done for Mao's triumph in taking China. Stalin particularly remarked that the victories had been won “against American troops.”
志愿军不久攻占南朝鲜首都汉城(首尔)。斯大林给毛贺电的热度远远高过对毛夺取中国的祝贺。斯大林还特意指出，毛的胜利是“针对美国人的”。
Mao had dealt an enormous psychological blow to the USA. On 15 December 1950, Truman went on radio to declare a State of National Emergency, something that did not happen in either World War II or the Vietnam War. Using almost apocalyptic language, he told the American people: “Our homes, our Nation … are in great danger.” The Chinese by then had already driven the Americans back some 200 km in a matter of weeks, in appalling conditions, with sub-zero temperatures compounded by icy winds. Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the reverse as the “worst defeat” for US forces in a century.
十二月十六日，杜鲁门在电台上宣布全国進入紧急状态，这在第二次世界大战或以后的越南战争中都未曾发生过。杜鲁门用严峻的语言对美国人民说，他们的家庭和民族“现在面临巨大的危险”。几个星期的工夫，在零下几十度的冰天雪地里，中国人把美国人往后赶了两百公里。国务卿艾奇逊说美国军队遭到一百年来“最惨的失败”。
The Chinese won their victories at horrendous cost to their own men. Peng told Mao on 19 December:
中国的胜仗代价沉重。彭德怀十二月十九日报告毛说：
The temperature has dropped to minus 30 degrees centigrade. The troops are very run down, their feet are incapacitated by frostbite, and they have to sleep in the open … Most troops have not received coats and padded shoes. Their padded jackets and blankets have been burned out by napalm. Many soldiers are still wearing thin cotton shoes, and some are even bare-foot …
“大衣和棉鞋多数未运到，棉衣、被毯，多被敌机燃烧弹烧掉，不少战士穿单鞋，甚至还有部分人打赤脚。…… 目前正值大雪，气温已降至零下三十度，战士在体力削弱，冻坏脚者无法走和沿途露营情况下，可能发生不可想像之损失。”一九五一年一月二日，中共负责志愿军后勤供应的李富春告诉苏联人，有的整支部队死于严寒。
“Unimaginable losses may happen,” Peng warned. Mao's logistics manager told the Russians on 2 January 1951 that whole units had died from cold. Many “Volunteers” developed night blindness from lack of nutrition. HQ's answer was: Gather pine needles to make soup. Eat live tadpoles to provide some vitamins and protein.
The Chinese fought with “human wave tactics” (ren-hai zhan-shu), using the only advantage they had—superiority in numbers. The British actor Michael Caine, who was drafted into the war, told us he had gone into it feeling sympathetic to communism, coming as he did from a poor family. But the experience left him permanently repelled. Chinese soldiers charged in one wave after another, to exhaust Western bullets. He could not help thinking: If they don't care about the lives of their own people, how can I expect them to care about me?
志愿军打仗靠“人海战术”，用他们的唯一优势--人多--跟西方的炮火拚。英国名演员麦可·凯恩(Michael Caine)曾在朝鲜战场作战。他告诉我们，他出身穷困家庭，刚去朝鲜时对共产主义颇带同情，但战场的经历使他从此厌恶这个制度。他亲眼目睹中国士兵像大海波浪般一潮一潮地往前冲，用身体消耗西方的子弹。他当时就想：他们连自己人的生命都不顾惜，我怎么能指望他们关心我呢？
The Chinese advance was soon halted. On 25 January 1951 the UN launched a counter-offensive, and the tide began to turn. Chinese casualties were extremely heavy. Peng went back to Peking on 21 February to tell Mao to his face about the “grave difficulties” and the “massive unnecessary casualties.” From the airport he raced to Zhongnanhai, only to find that Mao was staying out at Jade Spring Hill in his bunker. When Peng got there he was told Mao was having a siesta, but he pushed his way past the bodyguards and burst into Mao's bedroom (practically lèse-majesté). Mao let him say his piece, but brushed his concerns aside, and told him to expect the war to be a long one: “Don't try to win a quick victory.”
中国军队的胜利没能持久，一月二十五日，联合国军队发动反攻，形势逆转。中方的伤亡极其惨重。二月二十一日，忧心似焚的彭德怀赶回北京去见毛。一下飞机他驱车直奔中南海，听说毛住在玉泉山别墅，他匆匆赶去。警卫告诉彭毛正在休息，彭德怀焦急之下，做了件无人敢做的事：他推开警卫，闯進毛的寝室，把毛叫醒，向毛讲述朝鲜局势如何严重。毛听后说：“朝鲜战争能速胜则速胜，不能速胜则缓胜，不要急于求成。”
Mao outlined his “overall strategy” to Stalin in a cable on 1 March, which opened with the sentence: “The enemy will not leave Korea without being eliminated in great masses …” He then told Stalin that his plan was to use his bottomless reserves of manpower to exhaust the Americans. The Chinese army, he reported (which was true), had already taken “more than 100,000 casualties … and is expecting another 300,000 this year and next.” But, he told Stalin, he was replenishing the losses with 120,000 more troops, and would send a further 300,000 to replenish future losses. “To sum up,” Mao said, he was “ready to persist in a long-term war, to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives, so they will back down …” Mao was reminding Stalin that he could seriously weaken America,* but Stalin must help him build a first-class army and arms industry.
几天后的三月一日，毛泽东向斯大林陈述了他的作战方针：“敌人不被大部消灭，是不会退出朝鲜的，而要大部消灭这些敌人，则需要时间。因此，朝鲜战争有长期化的可能。”他告诉斯大林，他准备用中国的人力来跟美国拚消耗。“在过去四个战役中，中国志愿军战斗的和非战斗的伤亡及减员已超过十万人，正将补充老兵新兵十二万人；今明两年准备再有伤亡三十万人，再补充三十万人”。“总之，”毛说，“我军必须准备长期作战，以几年时间，消耗美国几十万人，使其知难而退”。
MAO GOT MOVING on this fundamental objective from the moment China entered the war in October 1950. That very month, China's navy chief was sent to Russia to ask for assistance to build up the navy. He was followed in December by a top-level air force mission, which had considerable success. On 19 February 1951, Moscow endorsed a draft agreement to start building factories in China to repair and service planes, as a large number were being damaged, and required advanced repair facilities in the theater. The Chinese plan was to convert these repair facilities to actually making aircraft. By the end of the war, China, a very poor country, had the third largest air force in the world, with more than 3,000 planes, including advanced MiGs. And factories were being built to churn out 3,600 fighter planes annually which, it was projected (over-optimistically, as it turned out), would come on stream in three to five years' time. Discussions had even begun about manufacturing bombers.
中国军队一入朝，毛马上行动起来，向斯大林要军事工业。他派他的海军司令去莫斯科谈海军建设问题。跟着去的是谈判建立航空工业的代表团。在航空工业方面，毛相当成功，莫斯科签订了协议，帮中国建工厂，先修理、维修飞机，再在三到五年内过渡到制造，届时年产三千六百架歼击机。轰炸机的制造也在讨论之中。中国在朝鲜战争结束时拥有世界上第三大空军，有大约三千架飞机，包括先進的米格机。
Immediately after the aircraft deal in early 1951—and after Stalin endorsed Mao's plan “to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives”—Mao upped the ante by asking for the blueprints for all the weapons the Chinese were using in Korea, and for Russian help to build factories to produce them, as well as the arms to equip no fewer than sixty divisions. He sent his chief of staff to Russia in May to negotiate these requests.
一九五一年五月，毛派总参谋长徐向前率“兵工代表团”到苏联去索要中国在朝使用的各种兵器弹药的制造蓝图，要求苏联帮助建设军事工业。代表团提出买六十个师的武器装备，对此斯大林满口答应。但建兵工厂就不一样了。徐向前说：一连数月，“兵工生产问题迟迟不见答覆，我着急得很，左催右催，没有结果”。徐发电报问毛怎么办，毛覆电说：不管怎样，耐心等待。最后，苏联只同意转让几种兵工技术资料，其他的一概不谈。
Although Stalin wanted China to do his fighting for him, and was happy to sell Mao the weapons for the sixty divisions, he had no intention of endowing Mao with a full-blown arms industry, so the Chinese delegation was stonewalled in Russia for months. Mao told his chief of staff to keep on pushing, and in October the Russians reluctantly agreed to transfer the technology for producing seven kinds of small arms including machine-guns, but declined to divulge more.
By now the war had lasted for a year, during which North Korea had been pulverized by US bombing. Kim saw that he might end up ruling over a wasteland, and possibly a shrunken one at that. He wanted an end to the war. On 3 June 1951 he went to China in secret to discuss opening negotiations with the US.
这时朝鲜战争已经打了一年，美国空军把北朝鲜炸得千疮百孔。金日成眼看着他将来统治的会是一片废墟，面积可能比当初的还小，他急于结束战争。一九五一年六月三日，他秘密到中国，建议同意联合国早已提出的停战谈判。
As Mao was nowhere near his goal, the last thing he was interested in was stopping the war. In fact, he had just ordered Chinese troops to draw UN forces deeper into North Korea: “the farther north the better,” he said, provided it was not too near the Chinese border. Mao had hijacked the war, and was using Korea regardless of Kim's interests.
毛不想停战，斯大林还远远没有满足他对军事工业的要求。但他不反对临时停火。志愿军这时正吃败仗，急需喘口气。毛派东北负责人高岗同金日成一道去见斯大林，既谈临时停火，也催帮助建设军事工业。斯大林谈完后打电报给毛，避而不提军工，只说了句让毛开心的话，把金日成视为毛的部下：“今天见到了您在东北和朝鲜的代表。”斯大林同意临时停火。朝鲜停战谈判在七月十日举行。
But, as his troops had been suffering heavy defeats, a breathing space was tactically useful for Mao, so he sent his Manchuria chief with Kim to consult with Stalin—and to press for more arms factories. Afterwards, Stalin cabled Mao, treating Kim as Mao's satrap, to propitiate Mao, as he was turning him down on the arms factories. After talking “with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea” [sic], Stalin told Mao, “a truce is now advantageous.” This did not mean Stalin wanted to stop the war. He wanted Mao's soldiers to inflict more damage on the US, but he saw that engaging in talks could be expedient, and seeming to show an interest in peace would help the Communists' image. Interim ceasefire talks opened in Korea between UN and Chinese–Korean military teams on 10 July.
几个月内，大多数问题都很快解决了，毛和斯大林扭住一个问题不放：战俘遣返问题。当时联合国军手上有两万中国战俘，大部分是原国民党官兵，不愿意回到共产党统治下的大陆去。美国坚持自愿遗返，* 毛要全部遣返，命令谈判代表：“一个也不能放！”这一句冷酷的话使朝鲜战争多打了一年半，中国多死了几十万人，朝鲜死的人更多。金日成本人是一心想接受美国的条件，劝毛说没必要去争那几个政治上不可靠的国民党。金的话没用。
* 美国的立场是基于二战结束后战俘遣返带来的悲剧，当时西方送归斯大林的许多战俘，后来被斯大林杀害或监禁，在西方引起强烈震撼。所以无论从人道或从政治考虑，美国都决不接受强迫遣返。
Most items were settled fairly swiftly, but Mao and Stalin turned one issue into a sticking point: the repatriation of POWs. America wanted voluntary, “non-forcible,” repatriation; Mao insisted it had to be wholesale. The UN held over 20,000 Chinese, mainly former Nationalist troops, most of whom did not want to go back to Communist China. With the memory of handing back prisoners to Stalin at the end of World War II, many to their deaths, America rejected non-voluntary repatriation, for both humanitarian and political reasons. But Mao's line to his negotiators was: “Not a single one is to get away!” Mao's chilling mantra prolonged the war for a year and a half, during which hundreds of thousands of Chinese, and many more Koreans, died. Kim had been only too keen to concede, and argued that “there was no point in putting up a fight” to recover “politically unstable” ex-Nationalists. But this cut no ice with Mao, as that was not his point. Mao did not care about the POWs. He needed an issue to string out the war so that he could extract more from Stalin.
BY EARLY 1952, Kim was absolutely desperate to end the war. On 14 July 1952 he cabled Mao begging him to accept a compromise. American bombing was reducing his country to rubble. “There was nothing left to bomb,” US Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed. The population was declining to almost critical survival levels, with perhaps one-third of adult males killed.
边谈边打一年以后，一九五二年七月十四日，一度信心百倍要征服南朝鲜的金日成，给毛发电报，哀求毛接受妥协，结束战争。美国轰炸下的北朝鲜，就像美国国务卿腊斯克(Dean Rusk)说的：“再没什么东西可炸了。”北朝鲜人口降到生存线之下，大约三分之一的成年男子死亡。
Mao turned Kim down by return telegram, with the cold-blooded argument that “Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will bring only one harmful consequence—further losses for the Korean people and Chinese people's volunteers. However …” Mao then proceeded to list the “advantages” in these human losses, such as the sufferers being “tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.” He signed off menacingly by saying he would report to Stalin and then get back to Kim “upon receiving an answer.”
毛当即给金日成回电拒绝。“不接受敌人[自愿遣返]的提议只有一个害处，”毛说，“就是朝鲜人民和中国人民志愿军多死些人。但是……”毛接下去在“但是”后面大做文章，说死人有好处：“锻练了人民，使他们获得了与美帝国主义作斗争的经验。” 回电结尾处，毛说他要向斯大林报告，看大老板怎么说。
Without waiting for Mao to tell him what Stalin thought, Kim replied at once to say that Mao was, of course, “correct,” and that he, Kim, was determined to fight on. Kim simultaneously cabled Stalin, pathetically trying to explain his wavering.
金日成怕大老板看出他不坚定，不等毛通知他斯大林如何作答，即刻给毛回电，说毛当然是“正确的”，他自己也决心打到底，只请求再给他些军援。金同时主动发电报给斯大林，可怜巴巴地解释他为什么动摇。
Stalin wired Mao on the 17th with his verdict: “We consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely correct. Today we received a report from Pyongyang that comrade Kim Il Sung also agrees with your position.”
斯大林在十七日给毛回了封两行字的电报：“我们认为您对停战谈判采取的立场是完全正确的。今天，我们接到平壤的报告，金日成同志也赞成您的立场。”
Kim was frantic, but he was powerless to stop the war in his own country. Moreover, his own fate was in peril. An ominous conversation between Stalin and Chou En-lai a month later shows that he had reason to feel insecure. After Chou said that China was preparing for “the possibility of another two to three years of war,” Stalin asked about the attitude of the Korean leaders. The meeting record runs as follows (our comments in brackets):
一个月后，斯大林、周恩来有一段隐含杀气的对话。据会谈纪录，周先说中国准备战争再继续两到三年，斯大林问起朝鲜领导人的态度，说“美国人没有吓倒中国，能不能说他们也没有吓倒朝鲜？”
STALIN says that the American[s] have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?
CHOU EN-LAI affirms that one could essentially say that.
周恩来说：“基本上可以这么说。”
STALIN: [obviously skeptically] If that is true, then it's not too bad.
斯大林显然有些不相信地说：“要真是这样的话，那倒还不错。”
CHOU EN-LAI [picking up on Stalin's skepticism] adds that Korea is wavering somewhat … Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.
周恩来改口说：“朝鲜是动摇了……从朝鲜某些领导人身上，甚至可以感到恐慌。”
STALIN reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim Il Sung's telegram to Mao Tse-tung.
斯大林说他“已经从金日成给毛泽东的电报里看出了恐慌。”
CHOU EN-LAI confirms this.
周恩来说：“是这样。”
Kim's panic about America paled beside his fear of Mao and Stalin. American bombing could kill a large part of his population, but Stalin and Mao could depose him (something Mao in fact later plotted doing)—or worse.
显然，对金日成而言，斯大林、毛泽东的确比美国轰炸更可怕，他们一句话就能推翻他。
So the war went on.
战争，就这样继续了下去。
BY AUGUST 1952, Mao decided to push Stalin harder and nail down his twin key demands: turf and arms industries. He sent Chou to Moscow with these requests. Chou first established that Mao had done Stalin an invaluable service. At their first meeting, on 20 August, he told Stalin that Mao “believes that the continuation of the war is advantageous to us.” “Mao Tse-tung is right,” Stalin answered. “This war is getting on America's nerves.” Echoing Mao's dismissive comments about casualties on their own side, Stalin produced the bone-chilling remark: “The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties.” “The war in Korea has shown America's weakness,” he commented to Chou, and then said “jokingly”: “America's primary weapons are stockings, cigarettes, and other merchandise. They want to subjugate the world, and yet they cannot subdue little Korea. No, Americans don't know how to fight.” “Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean War.”
一九五二年八月，毛派周恩来去莫斯科见斯大林。首先是表功。八月二十日第一次会谈时周说：“毛泽东相信战争继续下去对我们是有利的，它把美国拴在朝鲜，使美国无法打新的世界战争。”斯大林夸奖说：“毛泽东说得对，这场战争使美国人坐卧不安。”周接着斯大林的话头强调中国的作用，说：“是中国在朝鲜战争中打先锋，使美国无力打第三次世界大战了。”斯大林赞赏地说：“美国人是根本没能力打大规模的战争，特别是在这场朝鲜战争以后。”斯大林还加上几句“笑话”，说：“美国的强大强大在什么地方？美国人的主要武器不过是长筒丝袜、香烟、这个那个商品。他们想征服世界，可是拿小小的朝鲜也没办法。”
It was Mao who had made it possible for Stalin to draw this conclusion. America was losing more aircraft than it could afford militarily, and more men than the public would accept. Altogether, the US lost well over 3,000 aircraft in Korea, and could not replenish these losses fast enough to feel safe about being able to fight a two-front war simultaneously in Asia and Europe. Equally important, the US lost some 37,000 dead.
毛的参战让斯大林可以藐视美国了，该斯大林给他回报了。周恩来开口就向斯大林要求援建一百四十七个项目，“都为军事需要服务”。这中间有生产战斗机的、舰艇的，坦克的，周要求“一家工厂一年出产一千辆轻型坦克，另一家四、五年内出产中型坦克。
Although the American death toll was only a small percentage of the Chinese, democratic America could not compete with totalitarian China when it came to body bags. As America headed into a presidential campaign in 1952, support in the US for continuing the war stood at only about 33 percent, and the Republican candidate, ex-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, campaigned on the slogan “I Will Go to Korea,” which was widely taken to mean ending the war.
China's role in taking on the US gave Chou the cards to shoot for the moon, and he asked the Master for no fewer than 147 large military-related enterprises, including plants to produce warplanes and ships, 1,000 light tanks per year, with one factory for medium tanks to be ready within five years.
Stalin prevaricated, responding with platitudes (“China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces”; “China must become the flagship of Asia”). But he never signed Chou's list.
斯大林的反应是拿些漂亮话来搪塞，什么“中国一定要很好地武装起来，”“中国一定要成为亚洲的旗舰。”斯大林就这样一直敷衍下去，到死他也没有对周恩来的单子点头。
Then there was the question of turf. Stalin had been doling out parts of Asia to Mao since he had begun to think about the war in Korea. Mao had extruded tentacles into half a dozen Asian countries stretching from Japan (the Japanese Communists had come to Peking in spring 1950 to prepare for armed action in coordination with the Korean War) to the Philippines (where the US had strategic bases) and Malaya, where a sizable, and largely ethnic Chinese, insurgency was fighting British rule. In Southeast Asia, Burmese Communist insurgent forces had been moving towards the Chinese border to link up with China to receive supplies and training, just as Ho Chi Minh's army had done in Vietnam. One evil harbinger who was soon to come to China for training was the future leader of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot.
周恩来见斯大林的另一目的，是确立毛的势力范围。自从斯大林决定打朝鲜战争以来，他同意毛把手伸進日本、菲律宾、马来亚等亚洲国家。日本共产党人来北京筹备组织与朝鲜战争配合的武装行动。在东南亚，缅甸共产党游击队尤其活跃，正朝中国边境运动，以期打通中国，接受军援军训。来中国受训的还有未来的柬埔寨红色高棉领导人波尔布特(Pol Pot)。
In September 1952, Chou talked to Stalin about Southeast Asia as if its fate were to be entirely decided by Peking, and the Chinese army could just walk in if Peking so wished. The minutes of their meeting on 3 September record that Chou: “says that in their relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma … The same in Tibet. Asks whether this is a good strategy.” Chou was treating Burma in the same vein as Tibet. Stalin replied wryly: “Tibet is part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.” But Stalin immediately added, confirming that Burma was Mao's: “It would be good if there was a pro-China government in Burma.” (Stalin monitored Burma closely through his ambassador, the long-time liaison in Yenan, Vladimirov.)
周恩来谈起东南亚时，好像中国已经主宰着它的命运。九月三日，周说：“在跟东南亚国家的关系中，中国的方针是和平地施加影响，而不是派兵進去。”他说对缅甸是这样，“对西藏也是一样。”斯大林见周把西藏跟缅甸相提并论，语带讽刺地说：“西藏是中国的一部分，中国军队当然得進驻西藏。至于缅甸，你们应该小心行事。” 斯大林又添上一句：“缅甸是应当有个亲中国的政府。”
Mao was now planning to form his regional conglomerate, using a “Peace Congress” of the Asia–Pacific region scheduled to convene in Peking. This was on Chou's agenda for his talks with Stalin. Stalin was obliged to acknowledge that China should play “the principal role.” That he was not at all pleased can be seen from what followed. Chou asked “what specific actions” the Russian delegation would take, which was a subtle invitation for Stalin to confirm that the Russians would not grab leadership. Stalin replied sarcastically with one word: “Peace.”
周提起将要在北京召开的亚洲太平洋地区“和平大会”。斯大林说既然开会是中国的主张，应该让中国起主导作用。周恩来追问，苏联代表团“将起什么具体作用”。斯大林挖苦地说：“和平。”
Undeterred, Chou forged on to say that during the imminent Soviet Party Congress Liu Shao-chi would like to meet Asian Communist leaders. This was a way of trying to secure Stalin's blessing for Mao to take charge of Asian parties, but dragging endorsements out of the Master was like getting water out of a stone. First mentioned were the Indonesians. The minutes record:
周恩来明知斯大林不满，仍然继续说，希望趁十月苏共“十九大”时，中共代表刘少奇与到会的亚洲共产党领袖会谈。周问：“是否可以利用这个机会同印尼共产党代表在莫斯科谈党的问题。”
CHOU EN-LAI … asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.
STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet …
斯大林含糊地答道：“现在还很难说……”
CHOU EN-LAI reports that the Japanese should arrive, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.
周恩来進一步提要求说：“日本同志也将到会，他们很可能也想讨论党的问题。”
STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shao-chi …
斯大林回避表态，说：“在这个问题上，老大哥当然不能拒绝帮助小弟弟。等刘少奇来了再说……”
CHOU EN-LAI points out that Liu Shao-chi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.
周恩来步步紧逼：“刘少奇来的意向就是要谈，他将带来有关材料。”
STALIN notes that if the Chinese comrades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no objection, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.
斯大林不得不说：“如果中国同志想谈，当然我们不会反对。”但他又想推托，紧接着说：“如果不想谈，那么什么也不必谈。”
CHOU EN-LAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.
周恩来很坚决：“中国同志绝对肯定想谈。”
How forceful Chou En-lai was! Relentlessly pursuing the Master as he tried to evade. Two and a half years and a devastating war before, when Mao was in wintry Moscow, Stalin had blocked him from any such meetings. Now, Stalin was forced to concede: “in this case, we shall find the time.”
毛泽东两年多前在莫斯科时，斯大林曾不许他见任何人。今非昔比，斯大林只好说：“既然如此，我们会找到时间谈。”
Then, another little sarcasm when the smooth Chou, “ending the conversation, says they would like to receive instructions concerning all these issues.”
目的达到，周恩来说了句让大老板宽心的话：“希望我们所有要谈的问题，都能得到斯大林同志的指示。”
STALIN asks—instructions or suggestions?
斯大林嘲讽地问：“指示？还是建议？”
CHOU EN-LAI answers that from comrade Stalin's perspective this would be advice, but in their perception these would be instructions.
周恩来回答：“从斯大林同志的角度来说是建议，但是对我们来说就是指示。
Chou's tact masked a startling new degree of assertiveness on Mao's part. In fact, Mao had even begun conspiratorial operations in the USSR itself.
周恩来的绵里藏针代表了毛泽东新起的强硬。
CHOU'S MISSION in August–September 1952, transparently aimed at enabling Mao to become a major power and a rival to Stalin, drastically sharpened Stalin's sense of the threat from Mao, and so he set about undermining Mao by exhibiting special intimacy towards Mao's top colleagues. Stalin first cultivated army chief Peng De-huai, who came to Moscow in early September, with Kim, for the only tripartite Russo-Sino-Korean summit of the war. At the end of one meeting, most unusually, Stalin took Peng aside for a tête-à-tête, without Chou, which Chou reported to a furious Mao. Peng explained to Mao that Stalin had only talked about the way the North Koreans had been maltreating POWs (which had been causing problems for the Communists diplomatically). Mao remained suspicious, but seems to have concluded that this was just a ploy of Stalin's to unsettle him.
为了让毛过得不舒服，斯大林有意在毛和毛的同事之间制造冲突。九月初，彭德怀和金日成同来莫斯科，参加朝鲜战争打响后唯一的一次苏、中，朝三边会议。斯大林在一天会后破格把彭德怀叫到一边，单独谈了一阵，没有叫周恩来。周报告了毛，毛大为生气。彭德怀解释说，斯大林谈的只是北朝鲜人虐待战俘的问题。毛疑心未消。
Then came another attempt by Stalin to drive a wedge—this time between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, who came to Moscow for the Soviet Party Congress in October. Stalin was extraordinarily, and noticeably, attentive to Liu, demonstrating a degree of intimacy that amazed Liu's entourage. “Stalin even mentioned his personal matters and moods,” Liu's interpreter, Shi Zhe, observed. Shi had also interpreted for Mao, and saw the sharp contrast with the way that Stalin had treated Mao. Chou En-lai was to comment to a small circle that Stalin had given a far warmer welcome to Liu than to Mao.
下一个是刘少奇。十月份刘到莫斯科出席苏共“十九大”，斯大林对他的亲密程度超乎寻常。刘的翻译师哲注意到，斯大林“甚至谈及他个人的处境、心情”。周恩来后来说，斯大林对毛访苏“还不如对少奇同志访苏时热烈”。
Stalin then fired a salvo across Mao's bows with an unprecedented gesture, unique in the annals of world communism. On 9 October, Pravda published Peking's congratulations to the Congress, which Liu had delivered the previous day. In large type, Liu was billed as “General Secretary” of the CCP (the highest post in other parties). But, as Moscow well knew, the CCP did not have a general secretary. It was inconceivable that this was an accident. “Pravda in those days didn't make mistakes,” one Russian ambassador to Britain commented to us. Stalin was saying to Mao: I could make your No. 2 the No. 1!
十月九日，《真理报》刊登了刘少奇在头一天代表中共向“十九大”致的贺词，大字标题把刘称为中共“总书记”。这个头衔在除中共以外的各国共产党中都是第一号人物，莫斯科很清楚中共没有“总书记”。这样的登法不是失误，正如苏联驻英国大使对我们说的：“《真理报》在那个年代不可能失误。”这是斯大林故意捣鬼。
Liu had to clear himself, so he immediately wrote a note to Stalin's No. 2, Georgi Malenkov, saying that he was not general secretary, and that the CCP was “all under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung [who] is the Chairman.” Clearly deciding that the wise thing to do was not to panic, he sent no frantic excuses home to Mao. After the congress, he stayed on as planned to talk to other Asian Communist leaders, including Ho Chi Minh, and together the two discussed not only Vietnam, but also Japan and Indonesia with Stalin. Stalin then kept Liu in Russia for months, until January 1953, to meet the people who were at the top of Mao's list—the Indonesians.
刘少奇当即写信给斯大林的副手马林科夫(Georgi Malenkov)申明：中共中央现在没有总书记，全党“均在毛泽东同志的领导之下，以毛泽东同志为主席”。刘没有惊惶失措，“十九大”结束后，他按照原计划留在苏联跟亚洲共产党领导人会谈。毛最想染指的是印尼共产党，而印尼共又迟迟不来，毛要刘见了印尼共才走，刘只好在苏联等下去，直到第二年的一月六日。
On the night of 6–7 January 1953 Liu finally joined Stalin and Russia's top agent in Indonesia for an unusually long meeting with the Indonesian Communist leaders Aidit and Njoto, to discuss Peking “taking over” the Indonesian Party. Afterwards, Aidit celebrated by going out into the freezing night to throw snowballs, unaware that little more than a decade later, in 1965, Mao's tutelage would condemn him and Njoto and hundreds of thousands of their followers to premature and ghastly deaths.
这天夜里，在斯大林主持下，刘与印尼共产党领袖艾地(D．N． Aidit)、尼约托(Njoto)等人开会，中共正式“接管”印尼共。会开到第二天清晨才结束。艾地走到雪地里，扔雪球庆贺。他没想到，十二年后的一九六五年，毛的领导将把他跟数十万印尼共产党人送上死路。
As soon as the meeting with the Indonesians was over, Liu left Moscow for home that same day. Altogether, he had stayed in Russia for three months. Mao could do nothing about Stalin's machinations to needle him and stir up suspicion, nor was he able to take it out on Liu, which would play into Stalin's hands. But he flashed a warning signal to Liu the moment Liu returned to Peking, which amounted to: Don't get ideas!*
跟艾地等人的会一开完，刘少奇当天就离开莫斯科回国。
Meanwhile, Mao kept on bombarding Stalin with requests relating to arms industries. A blockbuster eight-page cable on 17 December 1952 bluntly demanded of Stalin: “Please could the Soviet government satisfy our arms order for war in Korea in 1953, and our orders for arms industries.” Prefaced to this was Mao's vision for the war: “in the next phase (suppose one year), it will become more intense.” As an added inducement to Stalin to cough up, Mao offered to carry Kim's bankrupt state, informing Stalin that Peking would subsidize Pyongyang for three years—to the tune of US$60 million p.a., which happened to be exactly the amount Stalin had “lent” to Mao in February 1950; but, per capita, fifty times the amount Stalin had been willing to advance—and from a much poorer country. And, unlike Stalin's loan, Mao's to Kim carried no interest. A few weeks later, in January 1953, Mao put in another large request for his navy. Stalin said he would send the armaments requested, and approved Mao's fleet taking part in naval operations on the high seas for the first time, but he firmly declined to meet Mao's demands about arms industries.
随着朝鲜战争的继续，毛泽东向斯大林索要军事工业的频率也越来越高。一九五二年十二月十七日的一封电报长达八页纸。一九五三年二月二日，新任美国总统艾森豪威尔(Dwight Eisenhower)在国事演说中暗示他可能对中国使用原子弹。毛立刻就向斯大林要原子弹技术。
AT THIS POINT, the armistice talks had long been in recess, while heavy fighting had continued. On 2 February 1953 the new US president, Eisenhower, suggested in his State of the Union address that he might use the atomic bomb on China. This threat was actually music to Mao's ears, as he now had an excuse to ask Stalin for what he wanted most: nuclear weapons.
艾森豪威尔以为他的话会吓住毛，殊不知这正是毛迫不及待想听到的。第一颗原子弹扔下以后，毛外表上作出一副轻蔑的样子，说原子弹不过是“纸老虎”。实际上，他迷上了这个大规模杀人武器。访苏时，他看了苏联原子弹试验的纪录片，回去后说：“这次到苏联，开眼界哩！看来原子弹能吓唬不少人。美国有了，苏联有了，我们也可以搞一点嘛。”管经济的薄一波说：“那个时候，毛主席在各种会议的场合几乎都要提到我们没有原子弹的问题，毛主席讲来讲去着急啊！”
Ever since the first Bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, Mao had longed to possess one. One of his economic managers, Bo Yi-bo, recalled that all through the early 1950s, “at all meetings and on all occasions, Chairman Mao would talk about the fact that we had no atom bombs. He talked and talked. Chairman Mao was really anxious!” Mao successfully concealed this hankering from the public, affecting instead an image of nonchalant contempt for atomic weapons, and pretending that he preferred to rely on “the people,” a position made famous by his remark in 1946 that the atom bomb was “a paper tiger.”
As soon as Eisenhower made his remarks about possibly using the Bomb, Mao dispatched his top nuclear scientist, Qian San-qiang, to Moscow. Mao's message boiled down to this: Give me the Bomb, so that you will not be drawn into a nuclear war with America. This confronted Stalin with a serious dilemma, as Russia had a mutual defense pact with China.
艾森豪威尔提到美国可能使用原子弹后，毛派核专家钱三强赶赴苏联去见斯大林，要这个梦寐以求的宝贝：你要是不想跟美国打核战争，你就得让我拥有原子弹。
Stalin did not want to give Mao the Bomb, but he was worried about Eisenhower. It was under this unremitting pressure—from Mao as much as from the West—that Stalin, it seems, decided to end the Korean War. According to Dmitri Volkogonov, the Russian general who had access to the highest-level secret archives, Stalin made the decision to end the war on 28 February, and told his colleagues he was planning to act the next day. That night Stalin was felled by a stroke, which killed him on 5 March.
这一招将了斯大林的军，因为苏联同中国有同盟条约，一方挨打，另一方也得卷進去保护它。斯大林不想让毛拥有原子弹，但他怕艾森豪威尔真会扔原子弹。这促使斯大林决心结束朝鲜战争。根据看到了俄罗斯最高机密档案的苏联沃克戈洛夫将军(Dmitri Volkogonov)的披露，斯大林在二月二十八日决定结束战争，告诉苏共领导人他第二天将采取行动。就在当天晚上，他突然脑溢血，几天后的三月五日死去。
Mao may well have been a factor in the stroke. At the last dinner Stalin had talked about the Korean War, connecting the failure to keep Yugoslavia's Tito in the camp with the Communists losing the chance to win in Korea. He also brought up the Comintern in the Far East, and how it had failed in Japan. After dinner, he read some documents, and the last was a report that his attempt to assassinate Tito had failed. Stalin had suspected Mao of being a Japanese spy in the past, and was viewing Mao as a potential Tito. His obsessive mind may have been revolving around Mao, reflecting that getting rid of Mao would be just as daunting a task as trying to finish off Tito.* Mao may have helped cause Stalin's stroke.
导致斯大林脑溢血，毛泽东的压力，说不定也有一份。斯大林在他最后一顿晚餐上谈到朝鲜战争，把在朝鲜老打不赢，同没能把南斯拉夫的铁托留在共产主义阵营这两件事联系起来。斯大林还谈起共产国际早年在远东的工作，提到共产国际在日本的失败。晚餐后，斯大林读的最后一份报告内容是暗杀铁托失败。从斯大林的话题，到他看的文件，都跟毛有关系。*
* 一九九四年，发动朝鲜战争的四十四年后，金日成因心脏病突发死去，死时坐在椅子上，手里攥着俄罗斯政府即将解密的关于朝鲜战争内情的文件。
Mao went to the Soviet embassy to mark Stalin's death. An embassy staffer claims that Mao had tears in his eyes and had trouble standing up straight, and that Chou wept. Actually, Stalin's death was Mao's moment of liberation.
毛泽东到苏联大使馆去吊唁斯大林。使馆工作人员称他含着眼泪，有点儿站立不稳，周恩来痛哭失声。事实上，斯大林的死是毛泽东的解放。
On 9 March a giant memorial service was held in Tiananmen Square, with an organized crowd of hundreds of thousands. Strict orders were issued to the populace, including the injunction “Don't laugh!” A huge portrait of Stalin was draped above the central archway, and the ceremony opened with Mao bowing before the portrait and laying a wreath. Many speeches were made, but none by Mao. Nor did he go to the funeral in Moscow, though Mme Mao, who was then in Russia, visited Stalin's bier. Chou attended the funeral in Red Square, and was the only foreigner to march with the top Russian mourners, walking next to security chief Beria, in bitter cold (among Chou's gifts was immunity to temperature).
三月九日，天安门广场召开追悼大会，全国举哀，规定的纪律里有一条：“不准笑！”天安门城楼上挂着斯大林的巨幅画像，仪式以毛向遗像鞠躬、献花圈开场。会上有多人讲话，但毛没讲。他也没到莫斯科去给斯大林送葬。江青那时在苏联，去向斯大林的遗体告了别。周恩来受命出席红场上举行的葬礼，同苏联领导人一道跟在斯大林的棺材后面走。那天天气特别冷，不怕冷的周恩来只穿着件薄薄的大衣。走在周后面的捷克党首脑哥特瓦尔德(Klement Gottwald)，几天后也一命呜呼，说是“感冒”，实际上是酗酒过度。在布拉格举行葬礼时，周恩来也去了，碰上英国共产党领导波立特，向周要了五千五百英磅重修伦敦的马克思墓。
Stalin's death brought instant changes. During an all-night meeting on 21 March, the new Russian leaders, headed by premier Georgi Malenkov, told Chou they had decided to end the war in Korea. Stalin's successors were keen to lessen tension with the West, and made it clear that if Mao cooperated over stopping the war he would be rewarded with a large number of arms enterprises—ninety-one—which Stalin had been delaying. Unlike Stalin, who saw Mao as his personal rival, the new Soviet leaders took the attitude that a militarily powerful China was good for the Communist camp.
三月二十一日，以马林科夫为首的苏共新领导人与周恩来开了一夜的会，对周说他们决定结束朝鲜战争，要是毛合作的话，他们愿意卖给毛九十一座大型军工企业。这些都是斯大林迄今拒绝出售的。苏共新领导人不像斯大林把毛看成是对他个人的威胁，他们认为军事上强大的中国对共产主义阵营是件好事。
But Mao insisted on keeping the Korean War going. He wanted one more thing: the Bomb. In fact, this was the main goal of Chou's trip, along with arms industries. Chou tried hard to get the nuclear physicist Qian San-qiang's group into Russian nuclear research institutes, but their repeated requests for the transfer of nuclear technology were turned down. Qian kept pushing for two months, a period that coincided exactly with Mao's foot-dragging over ending the war. Then, in May, Moscow put its foot down.
但毛不停战。他想要的一样东西还没得到：原子弹。周恩来参加斯大林葬礼时，曾再次提出这个要求。此时仍在苏联的钱三强代表团一再请求核技术转让，都被莫斯科拒绝。钱三强等人在苏联“赖”了三个月，这三个月正是毛拒绝停止朝鲜战争的三个月。五月，苏共新领导人给毛发了“最后通牒”。
The Communist camp had for some time been waging a huge campaign accusing the US of using germ warfare in Korea and China, and had vaguely claimed large numbers of deaths from germ attacks. Captured US airmen were made to confess to dropping germ bombs, sometimes on camera.
朝鲜战争期间，共产党一方指责美国在中、朝两国使用细菌战。被俘的美国空军被迫供认扔细菌弹。中共至今指控说美国“布撒细菌即达八百零四次之多”，而宣布的死亡人数只有八十一个。当时在朝鲜的两位苏联将军，北朝鲜总参谋长南日的顾问索兹诺夫(Valentin Sozinov)，和北朝鲜军的主要医药顾问斯里瓦诺夫(Igor Selivanov)，都对我们说，他们没有见到任何细菌战的痕迹。斯里瓦诺夫特别说，以他的职位，要是扔了细菌弹他不可能不知道。其他苏联将领、外交官也异口同声说没扔。
Mao used the issue to whip up hatred for the US inside China. But the accusations were concocted.* When Stalin died, the Kremlin immediately decided to drop the charges, which, Beria wrote to Malenkov on 21 April 1953, had caused Russia to “suffer[ed] real political damage in the international arena.”
The accusation of fabricating the charges was now used to put pressure on Mao to end the war. Soviet foreign minister Molotov wrote to his colleagues that the Chinese had given the North Koreans “an intentionally false statement … about the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans.” The Koreans, he said, were “presented with a fait accompli.” The Russians were laying the groundwork for throwing all the blame onto Mao.
“捏造细菌战”当初毫无疑问斯大林是点了头的，如今苏共新领导把它变成罪名，给毛施加压力，要他停止朝鲜战争。外交部长莫洛托夫说细菌战是中方“故意捏造” 的，给北朝鲜方面“造成既成事实”。北朝鲜官员对苏联人说：“细菌弹很可能是中国飞机自己投下的。”
On 2 May the Kremlin told its new ambassador in Peking, V. V. Kuznetsov, to deliver an unprecedentedly harsh message to Mao, which read:
五月二日，苏联新任驻华大使库兹涅佐夫(V．V． Kuznetsov)递交给毛一封空前严厉的信，说：
The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU [Soviet Party] were misled. The dissemination in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information. The accusations against the Americans were fictitious.
苏联政府、苏共中央委员会被给予了错误的信息。报纸上关于美国在朝鲜使用细菌武器的大肆宣传，是建筑在虚假的消息来源上。对美国的指控是虚构的。
The message “recommended” that Peking drop the accusations, and informed Mao menacingly that the Russians “responsible for participation in the fabrication … will receive severe punishment.” Indeed, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, V. N. Razuvayev, had already been recalled, as Mao certainly knew, and tortured by Beria's men.
信中“建议”北京不要再提这些指控，并说苏联方面“参与捏造这一指控的人将受到严厉惩罚”。苏联驻北朝鲜大使拉兹瓦也夫(V．N．Razuvayev)已经被召回，关進了克格勃的监狱。
Kuznetsov saw Mao and Chou at midnight on 11–12 May. Afterwards he reported to Moscow that Mao back-pedaled. According to Kuznetsov, Mao said “that the campaign was begun on the basis of reports from the [Chinese] command … It is difficult now to establish the authenticity of these reports … If falsification is discovered, then these reports from below should not be credited.” Kuznetsov was clearly under orders to give a detailed account of Mao's reactions. He reported that: “some nervousness was noticed on the part of Mao Tse-tung; he … crushed cigarettes … Towards the end of the conversation he laughed and joked, and calmed down. Chou En-lai behaved with studied seriousness and some uneasiness.”
库兹涅佐夫大使在五月十一日深夜把信交到毛手上，周恩来也在座。据库大使向莫斯科报告，毛说关于细菌战的宣传是“根据前方的汇报”，“要确定这些汇报的精确度是很难的”。“如果你们发现了造假，那么这些来自下面的汇报就是假的。”库大使显然奉命要详细描述毛的反应，他说他“注意到毛泽东表现得有点紧张，不断地掐断香烟……到会见快结束时，毛才镇定下来，开始有说有笑。周恩来的举动是刻意的严肃，也有些不安。
Mao had every reason to feel uneasy. Moscow's language was uncommonly severe. It showed how determined the Kremlin was to end the war, and signaled a readiness to apply extreme pressure, and to disavow something that Stalin must have approved. Coming fast on the heels of the Kremlin disowning Stalin's last fake conspiracy, the “Doctors' Plot” (the first time any action of Stalin's was publicly repudiated, which came as a bombshell to the Communist world), the new Kremlin was telling Mao it was determined to have its way. Mao was clearly taken aback, as he gave orders to end the war that very night.*
从对细菌战的否定，到莫斯科声色俱厉的用语，毛看出不结束朝鲜战争不行了。第二天凌晨，苏联大使离开后，毛做出决定，结束朝鲜战争。
Mao could see that getting the Bomb from Russia was out of the question for now, as the new Kremlin was bent on lowering tension with America. So he recalled his nuclear delegation from Moscow, and settled for the arms projects that the new Kremlin leaders had offered. He ordered his negotiators in Korea to accept voluntary repatriation of POWs, which had been on the table for over eighteen months.
苏共新领导人一心要缓和与美国的紧张关系，毛知道他得不到原子弹了。他召回钱三强，接受了军工项目。他通知停战谈判代表接受美国方面坚持了十八个月之久的自愿遣返战俘的方案。
Two-thirds of the 21,374 Chinese POWs refused to return to Communist China, and most went to Taiwan.† The one-third who returned to the Mainland found themselves labeled as “traitors” for having surrendered, and suffered appallingly for the rest of Mao's reign. One other dire, and little-known, contribution Mao made to the misery of the Korean nation was to help consign over 60,000 South Korean prisoners, who were illegally retained by the North at the time of the armistice, to a terrible fate. Mao told Kim to hold on to them. These unfortunate men were dispersed to the remotest corners of North Korea to conceal them from prying eyes and minimize their chances of escape, and this is where any survivors are probably held to this day.
两万一千三百七十四名中国战俘中，三分之二拒绝返回大陆，大多数去了台湾。回到大陆的从此被当作“叛徒”、“特务”，在一次次整人的运动中历尽苦难，直到毛死。毛还向金日成建议，扣下当时北朝鲜秘密关押的六万南朝鲜战俘。金日成把他们分散在北朝鲜最偏僻的角落里做苦工。他们中的幸存者也许今天还在那些地方。
AN ARMISTICE WAS finally signed on 27 July 1953. The Korean War, which had lasted three years and brought millions of deaths and numerous wounded, was over.
一九五三年七月二十七日，朝鲜停战协议签字。这场历时三年，导致数百万人死亡、不计其数的人伤残的战争，终于结束了。
More than 3 million Chinese men were put into Korea, among whom at least 400,000 died.* An official Russian document puts Chinese dead at 1 million.
中国赴朝参战的至少三百万人，起码死亡四十万人。中国官方数字是十五万二千人，但邓小平对日本共产党领导人，康生对阿尔巴尼亚的霍查(Enver Hoxha)， 都承认是四十万。志愿军副司令洪学智也说：“我们在朝鲜战场上牺牲了几十万同志”。苏联官方文件认为中国死亡人数为一百万。* 美国死亡人数三万七千人，英联邦一千二百六十三人，其他国家一千八百人。在这场战争中，据估计南朝鲜包括平民在内的死亡人数大约有一百万，而北朝鲜更高达二百五十万人。
* 这些牺牲并未让北朝鲜感激中国。当我们要求参观平壤的中国参战纪念馆时，当局一口回绝：我们问中国的牺牲人数，当局两次拒不作答，最后答覆是：“可能一万。”
这场大战打下来，金日成一寸土地也没拿到，他的国家反而变成一片焦土。毛泽东得到了什么？势力范围的扩大，航空工业的起步，和苏联签了几十个军工项目。但战争使中国每年百分之六十以上的国民经济总产值被吞噬，还背上了从苏联那里贷款购买军火的沉重包袱。更不用说数百万中国人伤残死亡。
Among those who died in Korea was Mao's eldest son, An-ying, killed in an American air raid on Peng De-huai's HQ, where he was working as Peng's Russian translator. It was 25 November 1950, just over a month after he had entered Korea. He was twenty-eight.
在那无数葬身异地的中国人中，有毛泽东的长子岸英。他在志愿军总部给彭德怀当俄文翻译，在美国空袭中被炸死。那天是一九五O年十一月二十五日，他刚到朝鲜一个月，年纪只有二十八岁。
He had married only a year before, on 15 October 1949. His wife, Si-qi, was a kind of adopted daughter to Mao, and she and An-ying had known each other for some years. When An-ying told his father in late 1948 that he wanted to marry her, Mao had flown into a ferocious rage and bellowed at him so terrifyingly that An-ying fainted, his hands going so cold they did not react even to a boiling hot water bottle, which left two big blisters. Mao's furious reaction suggests sexual jealousy (the beautiful and elegant Si-qi had been around Mao for much of her teens). Mao withheld consent for many months, and then told the couple to delay getting married until his regime was formally proclaimed, on 1 October 1949. By the time of his first wedding anniversary, An-ying was gone. As was the rule, he did not tell his wife where, and she did not ask.
一年前他才结婚，妻子刘思齐是毛泽东的干女儿，两个年轻人相识有几年了。一九四八年，岸英告诉父亲他想结婚，毛勃然大怒，冲着他大吼，岸英又吓又急又气，走出毛的屋子就晕倒在院子里。他两手冰凉，人们赶紧用暖水袋给他暖手，滚烫的暖水袋把手烫出两个大水泡，他也毫无知觉。毛的大怒也许带些“性”妒忌。思齐长得文雅出众，在毛身边待了好些年。岸英又跟毛提过几次，毛都不松口，后来终于说可以，但得等到一九四九年“十一国庆”以后。新婚刚一年，岸英就走了。按照共产党的纪律，他没告诉妻子他到哪里去。思齐也没问，但她猜到他是去了朝鲜。
When Mao was given the news of his son's death, he was silent for some time, and then murmured: “In a war, how can there be no deaths?” Mao's secretary observed: “He really didn't show any expression of great pain.” Even Mme Mao shed some tears, although she had not quite got on with her stepson.
毛泽东的秘书叶子龙按照周恩来的指示，把岸英的死讯报告给毛。叶记得很清楚，毛“听后久久没有说话”，然后“自言自语：“打仗嘛，怎么会没有伤亡呢？””“我回到自己办公室，过了一会儿，江青来到我这里流了一阵眼泪，可能是毛泽东把岸英牺牲的消息告诉她了，可她同岸英的关系一直不怎么样。”根据叶的观察，毛泽东本人“硬是没有流露出十分痛苦的表情”。
Nobody informed An-ying's young widow for over two and a half years. While the war was still going on, she accepted An-ying's silence, as she was used to Party secrecy. But in summer 1953, after the signing of the armistice, she found his continued silence puzzling, and asked Mao, who told her that An-ying was dead. During those years she had been seeing Mao constantly, spending weekends and vacations with him, and he had not shown any sadness, not even a flicker to suggest that anything was wrong. He had even cracked jokes about An-ying as though he were alive.
两年半多的时间，岸英的死讯一直没人告诉他年轻的遗孀。朝鲜战争还在打的时候，她没觉得丈夫长久的沉默不正常，在共产党里待久了，她明白搞秘密工作的人常常这样。但是一九五三年夏天，停战协议签订了，岸英还是没有消息，她感到奇怪了，去问毛，毛这才告诉她岸英早已去世。在这两年多的时间里，她几乎每星期都见到毛，寒暑假也跟毛一块儿过，毛从来没有表现出任何悲伤，一点让她觉得事情不对的样子也没有。相反地，毛还不时谈到岸英，还开玩笑，完全不像谈已死的人，就像岸英还活着一样。
*Altogether, China put at least 3 million troops into Korea. The US committed roughly 1 million military personnel.
*Mao did this by denouncing the head of the trade unions, Li Li-san, for advocating greater independence for unions. Those in the know were well aware that this was a line that Liu had strongly espoused.
*The Korean War also boomeranged in spectacular fashion on its third instigator, Kim Il Sung. In 1994, forty-four years after he started it, Kim was found dead, sitting holding copies of the dossier the post-Communist Russian government was about to release revealing the inside story of the war and his role in starting it.
*Peking is still sticking to the allegation, although its official claim now is a grand total of 81 deaths from 804 US germ attacks—45 Koreans from cholera and plague, and 36 Chinese of plague, meningitis, and “other diseases.” Two Russian generals who were in Korea, Valentin Sozinov, chief adviser to North Korean chief of staff Nam Il, and the chief medical adviser to the North Korean army, Igor Selivanov, both told us they had never seen any evidence of germ warfare, and Selivanov stressed that in his position he would have known about it if it had happened. Other leading Russian officers and diplomats involved concurred.
*Kim's regime was eager to put the boot into Mao. The Soviet chargé in Pyongyang, S. P. Suzdalev, reported to Moscow on 1 June that on hearing the Kremlin's new “recommendations,” the Korean official to whom he conveyed the message, Pak Chang-ok, jumped at the chance to disown the Chinese, even suggesting “the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown from Chinese planes.”
†Twenty-one Americans and one Scot opted to go to China, where most soon became disillusioned and left, often after great difficulties. Their defection stoked fears in the West about “brainwashing,” as did captured airmen's “confessions” about dropping germ bombs. While the top brass worried that some of those who “confessed” might spill hi-tech knowledge of great use to an enemy, FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover mounted a vast surveillance campaign on returned POWs, fearing “Manchurian Candidates,” the then US Attorney General Herbert Brownell told us.
*The official claim is 152,000 deaths, but in private Deng Xiao-ping told Japanese Communist leaders that the number of Chinese killed was 400,000. The same figure was given by Kang Sheng to Albania's Enver Hoxha. These sacrifices did not earn China much gratitude from North Korea. When we tried to gain access to the Chinese war memorial in Pyongyang, Korean officials refused permission. To the question, “How many Chinese died in the Korean War?,” the reply came, most grudgingly, after two refusals to answer: “Perhaps 10,000.”