36 LAUNCHING THE SECRET SUPERPOWER PROGRAM
36 军事工业化的起步
(1953–54 AGE 59–60)
1953～1954 年 59～60 岁
AFTER MAO had accepted an end to the Korean War, in May 1953, Stalin's successors in the Kremlin agreed to sell China ninety-one large industrial enterprises. With these assured, on top of the fifty projects agreed to by Stalin, Mao was able to launch his blueprint for industrialization on 15 June. This focused exclusively on building up arms industries, to make China a superpower. It was in effect Mao's Superpower Program. Its utterly military nature was concealed, and is little known in China today.
斯大林继任者卖给毛的九十一个大型项目，连同斯大林从前答应的五十个，使毛得以在一九五三年六月十五日推出称作“总路线”的中国工业化蓝图。鲜为人知的是，这些项目是以军事工业为核心，毛的工业化实质上是“军事工业化”。
Mao wanted to channel every resource the nation had into this program. The whole “industrialisation” process had to be completed “in ten to fifteen years,” or at most a bit longer. Speed, he said over and over again, was everything—“the essence.” What he did not spell out was his real goal: to become a military power in his own lifetime, and have the world listen when he spoke.
毛要在十年到十五年，或至多再长一点时间内，实现这个目标。他反覆交代的是要“快”，“提前完成”，“超额完成”，说速度是“灵魂”。为什么这么急呢？毛泽东有一个说不出口的理由：他要在他活着的时候，中国就变成军事大国，使他在全世界“说话有人听”。
Mao was approaching sixty, and he often referred to his own age and mortality when discussing this industrialization. Talking to a group of his guards on one occasion, he stressed: “We will make it in fifteen years,” then out of nowhere came the words: “Confucius died at seventy-three.” The subtext was: Surely I can live longer than Confucius, and thus be able to see results within fifteen years.
毛快六十岁了。在谈起工业化时，他经常说到岁数生死问题。一次对中央警卫团战士讲话，他一边说：“大家努力干，用十五年时间实行工业化”，一边冷不丁地说：“孔夫子是七十三岁死的。”孔夫子和工业化有什么关系？毛的紧迫感显然很强烈。
On another occasion he said that “we can overtake Britain … in fifteen years or slightly more,” and then added: “I myself also have a Five-Year Plan: to live … another fifteen years, then I will be satisfied; of course, it will be even better to over-fulfill”—i.e., live even longer.
又一次，他讲到再过三个五年计划，就超过英国时，他说他也有个五年计划：“最好再活十五年，我就心满意足了。能超额完成当然更好。”
Mao was not interested in posterity. Back in 1918 he had written: “Some say one has a responsibility for history. I don't believe it … People like me are not building achievements to leave for future generations …” (our italics). These remained his views throughout his life. In 1950, after visiting Lenin's mausoleum, Mao said to his entourage that the superb preservation of the corpse was only for the sake of others; it was irrelevant to Lenin. Once Lenin died, he felt nothing, and it did not matter to him how his corpse was kept.
早在一九一八年，毛就表示过，他对身后名利完全不感兴趣。这种彻底唯物主义思想贯穿了他的一生。一九五O年在莫斯科参观列宁墓，毛对随行人员说：列宁的遗体保存得很好只是为了他人，“从个人看，人一死就什么也不知道了，保存遗体也就没有必要了。”
When Mao died, he left neither a will nor an heir—and, in fact, unlike most Chinese parents, especially Chinese emperors, he was indifferent about having an heir, which was extremely unusual (in stark contrast to Chiang Kai-shek, who went to inordinate lengths to protect his heir). Mao's eldest son, who died in the Korean War, had no offspring, as his wife did not want to have children while she was still studying. Mao put no pressure on him to produce an heir, even though he was the only one of Mao's sons who was of sound mind, as the younger son was mentally handicapped.
毛既不追求流芳千古，也不在乎遗臭万年，对他死后天塌地陷都不关心。他去世的时候，没有留下任何遗嘱，也没有指定接班人。而且，不像绝大多数中国父母，不像中国历代皇帝，更不像蒋介石，毛泽东完全不在乎断子绝孙。在朝鲜战争中死去的岸英既是长子，又是毛唯一头脑健全的儿子，可是岸英没有孩子，原因是岸英的妻子当时在上学，不想要孩子。毛泽东没有向岸英两口子表示过希望他们生孩子。
For decades to come, Mao's determination to preside over a military superpower in his own lifetime was the single most important factor affecting the fate of the Chinese population.
MAO WAS IN a rush for his arsenal. In September 1952, when Chou En-lai gave Stalin Peking's shopping list for its First Five-Year Plan (1953–57), Stalin's reaction was: “This is a very unbalanced ratio. Even during wartime we didn't have such high military expenses.” “The question here is … whether we will be able to produce this much equipment.” According to official statistics, spending during this period on the military, plus arms-related industries, took up 61 percent of the budget—although in reality the percentage was higher, and would rise as the years progressed.
一九五三年，以军工为核心的第一个五年计划开始。周恩来曾把计划草案呈报斯大林，斯大林看到军工在预算中占的比例时，说：“这个比例太不平衡了，即使在战争时期，我们的军事开支也没有这样高。”“问题是我们能不能生产出这么多的设备。”从中国官方公开的数字看“一五”时期，军事开支和以军事工业为中心的重工业投资，占总开支的百分之六十一。真实的数字更大，以后越来越大。
In contrast, spending on education, culture and health combined was a miserable 8.2 percent, and there was no private sector to fall back on when the state failed to provide. Education and health care were never free, except in the case of epidemics, and often not available, for either the peasants or the urban underclass. In order to save money on health, the regime resorted to schemes like hygiene drives, which called for killing not only flies and rats, but in some areas also cats and dogs, although, curiously, it never extended to cleaning up China's stinking, and pestiferous, toilets, which survived uncleansed throughout Mao's reign.
而国家花在教育、文化、医疗卫生上的全部钱加在一起，也不过是可怜的百分之八点二。西方人长期以为毛时代的医疗免费，实际上，享受这类福利的只有城市里一部分人。对占中国人口大多数的农民和城市底层人民来说，除了治疗急性传染病以外，医疗从来不免费，而且普遍缺医少药。
The Chinese people were told, vaguely but deliberately, that equipment from the USSR used in China's industrialization was “Soviet aid,” implying that the “aid” was a gift. But it was not. Everything had to be paid for—and that meant mainly with food, a fact that was strictly concealed from the Chinese people, and still largely is. China in those days had little else to sell. Trade with Russia, Chou told a small circle, “boils down to us selling agricultural products to buy machines.”* Throughout the 1950s, “the main exports were rice, soybeans, vegetable oil, pigs' bristles, sausage skins, raw silk, pork, cashmere, tea and eggs,” according to today's official statistics. In this period Mao told the Indonesian President Sukarno, almost flippantly: “Frankly speaking, we haven't got a lot of things [for export] apart from some apples, peanuts, pig bristles, soybeans.”
中国从苏联進口的企业称为“苏联援建项目”，给人的印象是这些项目都是苏联送的。其实每一颗螺丝钉都是中国人花钱买的，而付款方式大多是出口食品和其他农产品。周恩来在国务院说：“我们同苏联的贸易是卖出农产品，换回机器”。根据官方的《当代中国对外贸易》， 整个五十年代，“出口商品主要仍是大米、大豆、植物油、猪鬃、肠衣、生丝、猪肉、羊绒、茶叶、蛋品等”。毛曾对印尼总统苏加诺(Achmed Sukarno)说：“说老实话，我们没有好多东西[出口]，无非是一些苹果、花生、猪鬃、大豆。”
What China was exporting to Russia, and its satellites, consisted overwhelmingly of items that were basic essentials for its own people, and included all the main products on which China's own population depended for protein: soybeans, vegetable oil, eggs and pork, which were always in extremely short supply. With only 7 percent of the world's arable land, and 22 percent of its population, land was too precious to raise livestock in most places, so most Chinese had no dairy products and very little meat. Even grain, the staple, was on Mao's export list, while China's grain production was woefully inadequate, and the country had traditionally been a large importer of grain.
中国耕地只占世界百分之七，人口却占世界百分之二十二。这是世界上少见的土地宝贵到不能大量饲养牲口的国家，人民少有肉、奶制品吃。中国人的蛋白质来源主要靠大豆、植物油、蛋品、猪肉，主食是稻麦。这些食物向来匮乏，粮食传统上更是依赖進口。管经济的陈云说，大清帝国、北洋军阀、国民党都是靠進口粮食，向美国，加拿大，澳洲买粮食。而如今，食品要大批出口，大米居首位。
Mao was ready to deprive his people of food so that he could export it. One instruction to the Foreign Trade Ministry in October 1953 read:
一九五三年十月，中共中央指示外贸部：粮食、大豆、植物油等，“必须想尽一切办法挤出来，以供出口。”次年七月，又一道命令：“有些商品如肉类，应该压缩国内市场的销售，保证出口。有些商品如水果、茶叶和各种小土产，应尽先出口，多余的再供国内市场销售。
Regarding commodities that are crucial to the survival of the nation (e.g., grain, soybeans and vegetable oil), it is true we need to supply the Chinese population, but we cannot only stress this … We must think of every way to squeeze them out for export [our italics] … As for commodities (such as meats, peanuts) that are less essential to the survival of the population, we have all the more reason to cut down on consumption inside China, to satisfy the need for export.
Another order in July 1954 read:
For commodities like meats, the internal market should be reduced and shrunk to guarantee exports. Other commodities like fruits, teas … should be exported as much as possible, and should only supply the internal market if there is anything left … [our italics]
The main impact fell on the peasants. Policy was to guarantee basic food to the urban population, with strict rationing, and leave the peasants to starve when the inevitable food shortages struck. Anyone registered as a peasant at the time Mao took power was forbidden to move into urban areas or to change their status. Peasants were not even allowed to move to another village except with special permission (e.g., if they got married). Otherwise, they were nailed to their village for life. And so were their children and grandchildren. This total immobility was something new in China. Traditionally, peasants had always been able to move geographically as well as socially. They had been able to aspire to fame and fortune—as Mao had done. If there was a famine, they had been able to flee into towns or other regions and at least try their luck. Now, even at the best of times, they could never hope to improve their lot, except when the government enrolled them into the army, or into a factory. And when disaster struck, they would starve or die in their villages.*
在“挤”、“压”政策下，受害最重的是农民。毛政权用严格定量的办法，保证城市人口有基本食品，而农民就没有保障了。为了限制城市人口，农民不准搬進城里，不准進城找工作。他们被终身钉死在自己的村子里，子孙后代难有出头之日。传统上，中国农民享有充分的迁徙自由，可以通过本事发财致富，可以通过读书出人头地。毛政权对农民的限制和压迫在中国历史上是空前的。*
* 这就是为什么在毛统治下，城里人都怕下放农村。下放意味着全家、子子孙孙从此生存没有保障。毛利用这一惩罚手段使城里人听话。
Once, as he was promising to send East Germany more soybeans, Chou En-lai told his German interlocutors: “If people starve here it will be in the countryside not in the cities, the way it is with you.” In other words: our starving won't be seen.
有一次，周恩来答应向东德出口大豆时说：“我们的人要是挨饿是在乡下，不像你们的人在城里。”意思是：中国挨饿的人外人看不见。
The peasants had to produce the food for export with virtually no help from the state, a fact confirmed to the rubber-stamp Supreme Council on 27 February 1957 by Premier Chou when he said bluntly: “Nothing to agriculture.” For raising output, Mao's agriculture chief spelled out to his staff, “we depend on the peasants” two shoulders and one bottom”—i.e., manual labor and excrement used as manure.
毛泽东一方面出口农产品，一方面却不向农业投资。一度管农业的邓子恢对部下说：“我们发展农业生产，是靠农民的两个肩膀、一个屁股。”就是说靠农民的手工劳动和粪便。
As well as having to produce food to pay for military imports from Russia and Eastern Europe, the peasants were having to part with precious produce to make up the massive donations Mao was dispensing to boost his turf aspirations. China not only provided food for poor countries like North Korea and North Vietnam, it gave liberally to very much richer European Communist regimes, especially after Stalin's death, when Peking floated the idea of Mao becoming the head of the world Communist camp. When Romania staged a youth jamboree, Mao donated 3,000 tons of vegetable oil—while the peasants in China who produced the oil were getting about one kilogram per year, which had to do for both cooking and lighting, as electricity was non-existent in most of the countryside. After the 1956 uprising in immeasurably wealthier Hungary, Peking sent the regime 30 million rubles' worth of goods and a £3.5 million “loan” in sterling; and loans, as Mao kept saying, did not have to be repaid.
在如此可怜的条件下从事生产的农民，不但要偿付毛从苏联、东欧進口的大量军工设备，还要支付毛为了扩大势力范围而有求必应的慷慨赠送。中国不但把北朝鲜、北越等穷国养起来，还对比它富得多的欧洲国家也大给特给。罗马尼亚举办青年节，毛一口气就捐赠了三千吨植物油。而中国产油地区的农民这时一年一人只许留用一公斤，除了做饭还要点灯。一九五六年匈牙利事件后，尽管匈牙利的富裕程度与中国比有天壤之别，毛大笔一挥，赠送了价值三千万卢布的食品，外带三百五十万英镑的“贷款”。毛的“贷款”，他反覆说，是不需要偿还的。
When the first big revolt in Eastern Europe erupted in East Germany in June 1953, just after Stalin died, Mao jumped in to bolster the dictatorship there, immediately offering 50 million rubles' worth of food. But the Germans wanted more, offering in exchange machines that China had no use for. Peking's foreign trade managers had actually decided to turn the exchange down, but Mao intervened and ordered them to accept, with the ludicrous argument that “They are much harder-up than we are. We must make it our business to take care of them” (Mao's emphasis). It was thanks to Chinese food that East Germany was able to lift food rationing in May 1958.
一九五三年六月，东德人民闹事。毛马上送给东德专制政权价值五千万卢布的食品。东德还想多要，要求用机器偿付。这些机器当时在中国没用，外贸部决定不要。但是毛下令接受，说什么“他们比我们苦得多，我们不能不管。”毛还在这些荒唐的话下面加圈加点，以示强调。正是中国的食品，使东德得以取消定量配给制度。
Ordinary Chinese not only had no say in Mao's largesse, they had no idea they had made such generous donations. The pleasure was all Mao's. When East Germany's brutish leader, Walter Ulbricht, came to China in 1956 and paid Mao a ritual compliment, Mao responded grandly: “You must not copy us to the dot.” Mao was talking like a mentor. He also wanted to ascertain that Ulbricht was oppressive enough. “After the 17th of June [1953 uprising in East Berlin],” Mao asked, “did you take a large number of them prisoner?” He suggested one Chinese “model” the East Germans might consider copying: the Great Wall. A wall, he said, was a great help with keeping out people like “fascists.” A few years later the Berlin Wall went up.
毛的慷慨解囊，中国人民是没有资格过问的。享受满足感的只有毛。毛送了东西便以老师自居，要东德的乌布利希(Walter Ulbricht)在“镇压反革命”上搞彻底，还建议他们学习中国建长城，把“法西斯”关在外面。几年后，柏林围墙还真的修起来了。
The highest proportion of GNP the richest countries gave as foreign aid barely ever exceeded 0.5 percent, and the US figure at the turn of the millennium was far below 0.01 percent. Under Mao, China's reached an unbelievable 6.92 percent (in 1973)—by far the highest the world has ever known.
世界上最富有国家的对外援助，也极少超过国民生产总值的千分之五，美国在二十世纪末的外援远低于万分之一。可是在毛泽东时代，中国这样一个一贫如洗的国家，外援居然曾达到财政支出的百分之六点九二(一九七三年)！
CHINESE PEASANTS were amongst the poorest in the world, as Mao knew very well. He knew equally well that peasants were starving under him. On 21 April 1953, on the eve of launching the Superpower Program, he noted on a report: “About 10 percent of agricultural households are going to suffer food scarcity in spring and summer … even out of food altogether.” This was happening “every year,” he wrote. How could the country's limited stock of food pay for Mao's vast ambitions? Elementary arithmetic alone would suggest there were going to be massive deaths from starvation if he went ahead sending food abroad at these levels.
毛很清楚农民在饿饭。一九五三年四月二十一日，他在一份报告上写道：“全国大约有百分之十的农户要遭春荒夏荒，缺乏口粮，甚至断炊”这种状况“年年如此”。
Mao did not care. He would make dismissive remarks like: “Having only tree leaves to eat? So be it.” All economic statistics and information were top-secret, and ordinary people were kept completely in the dark. They were also powerless to influence policies. But the men at the top were in the picture, and one of them, Mao's No. 2, Liu Shao-chi, balked at the colossal consequences of Mao's program. He was in favor of industrialization and superpower status, but he wanted to reach these goals at a more gradual tempo, by building a stronger economic foundation and raising living standards first.
在这样的状况下出口食品，必然导致农民大批饿死。毛的第一副手刘少奇不希望有这样的后果。他也想中国工业化，但他希望步子走得缓一些，先提高人民生活水准，建立适当的经济基础。刘在高层反覆讲了他的设想，强调“不可以先发展重工业”。所谓重工业，在毛时代就是以军工为核心的工业。刘解释说：“重工业积压资金很厉害，需要大批资金才能建立……我们没有别的办法筹钱，只有一个办法，靠人民节省……现在人民生活很苦，”刘说：“农民要穿新衣服，要买袜子，要穿鞋子，要“梅兰芳”的镜子，要肥皂，要毛巾。他们需要各种东西，他们的孩子要读书。” 刘的看法是应该先满足这些要求。而毛泽东从来没有说过这类具体的关心人民生活的话。
“We cannot develop heavy industry first,” he told a small audience on 5 July 1951, because it “consumes a tremendous amount of money with no returns … and the only way available to us to raise the money is by depriving our people … Now people's life is very miserable. We must raise people's living standards first,” a process he suggested would take ten years. This, he said, should be the Party's priority. “People are very poor,” he wrote. “They desperately need to lead a better life, a well-to-do and cultured life.” “The [Party's] most basic task must be to fulfill this wish …” “Peasants,” he said on another occasion, “want to have new clothes, to buy socks, to wear shoes, to use … mirrors, soap and handkerchiefs … their children want to go to school.” This was the kind of language Mao never used.
Five years Mao's junior, Liu also came from a village in Hunan, only a few kilometers away from Mao's. He had gone to Moscow in 1921 and joined the Party there as a 23-year-old student. Enormously attractive to women, he was a very serious young man, with no hobbies except reading, and disliked idle chatter. He first met Mao when he returned to Hunan in 1922, but the two did not strike up any special relationship until the late 1930s, when Liu became Mao's ally through sharing his cold vision of using the war with Japan to destroy Chiang Kai-shek. Mao promoted him to be his No. 2 in 1943. In 1945, when Mao had to go to Chongqing, and again in 1949–50, when he was in Moscow, he appointed Liu as his stand-in. Mao relied on him as his chief executive.
刘少奇比毛泽东小五岁，出生地离韶山只有几公里。他一九二一年去莫斯科，二十三岁时在那里加入了共产党。同学们说他深沉文静，几乎没有什么个人爱好，时间都花在学习俄文、看书、思考问题上，从来不闲聊天。不少女孩子被他吸引。刘认识毛是在一九二二年回到湖南后，两人并非一见如故，也没有特别的交情。直到三十年代后期，刘支持毛利用日本人打垮蒋介石、扩张共产党的主张，他们才成了同盟。毛在一九四三年把他提拔成自己的主要助手，一九四五年去重庆、一九四九年去苏联时，都依靠刘看家。
Liu was the most able all-round lieutenant Mao had found. He also combined total discretion with a willingness to be at Mao's beck and call day and night. Mao slept during the day and worked at night, and Liu changed his routine to try to synchronize with Mao. But Mao was erratic, and would often summon Liu when the latter was heavily drugged from the very strong pills he, like almost all of Mao's lieutenants, needed to sleep. One of Liu's secretaries recalled: “Whenever Chairman Mao's secretary rang, the message was always: ‘Come this minute.' … As the sleeping pills were working, [Liu] would look very tired, in agony. He often didn't even have time to take a sip of the strong tea his man-servant made him, and set off to Mao's place at once.” Most importantly for Mao, Liu harbored no ambitions to supplant him.
在毛网罗的人才中，刘的能力是最全面的。毛对他有知遇之恩，他也兢兢业业地报答。他的秘书写道：“为了适应毛主席的没有任何规律的生活习惯，所以他也逐步地使自己习惯了通宵达旦地工作。毛主席召集会议没有固定的时间，有时上午，有时下午，有时晚上，有时凌晨。而且要求很急，秘书一通知就是“现在就来”。有时少奇同志的汽车还没到，毛主席的秘书就又来电话催。……有时少奇同志正在睡觉，我们叫醒他后，因安眠药正在起作用，他总是显得很疲倦、很难受，这时，他连卫士泡好的浓茶也来不及喝一口，立刻驱车赶到毛主席的住处。”
But around the time the Communists took power, serious disagreements emerged between the two about whether to give priority to becoming a military superpower via a forced march, or to improving living standards. Mao constantly mocked Liu's espousal of the latter, retorting: “ ‘Oh, peasants' lives are so hard'—the end of the world! I have never thought so.”
最令毛宽心的是，刘守口如瓶，谨慎小心，没有取代他的野心。但是，中共掌权后，毛刘之间产生了严重的政策分歧，焦点是中国到底是要不顾一切地搞军事工业，还是先发展民生经济，提高人民生活水准。
While Stalin was still alive, Mao held his fire so as not to give the Master any pretext to muscle in and sabotage him. Stalin had been trying to undermine Mao by showering attention on Liu during Liu's visits to Russia; and, not least, by taking the unprecedented step of having Pravda call Liu “the General Secretary” of the CCP.
刘是毛的政策的头号执行人，毛得确保刘按照他的意旨办事。在多次对刘的观点表示不满之后，毛感到他得给刘点“颜色”看看，使刘能对他说一不二。毛的动作选择在斯大林死亡之际。在这之前，毛不想给在毛刘间制造嫌隙的大老板以可乘之机。
As soon as Mao learned that Stalin was dying, at the beginning of March 1953, he leaped into action. First he sent out signals that Liu might be removed. At the time, Liu was in the hospital, having had an appendectomy in late February. Mao made sure he stayed there, even going as far as blocking the news of Stalin's death from him. Mao went to the Soviet embassy twice in connection with Stalin's illness and death, both times accompanied by other top leaders, but not Liu, although Liu was well enough to move around. When People's Daily published a cable of good wishes for Stalin from the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the message was not signed by Liu, who was president of the Association, but by a subordinate, which was extraordinary in terms of protocol. And Liu was excluded from the memorial ceremony on Tiananmen Square.
斯大林病危时，刘正患阑尾炎住院。毛对他封锁了有关斯大林的消息。斯大林死后，中苏友好协会给苏方发唁电时，虽然刘是会长，但唁电却不署他的名字，而是刘手下人的名字。这在礼节上完全是说不过去的。在天安门广场上召开的追悼大会也没通知刘参加。
In May Mao sent Liu a sharp, indeed menacing, letter saying: “all documents and telegrams issued in the name of the Center can only be issued after I have seen them. Otherwise, they are invalid [Mao's emphasis]. Be careful.” Another told Liu (and Chou and army chief Peng) to “check all telegrams and documents issued in the name of the Center or the Military Council … to see whether there are any … that have not been seen by me … In the past, several decisions … have been issued unauthorized, without me having seen them. This is intolerably wrong, and is a sabotage of rules …” These were very strong words indeed, and they were designed to make Liu sweat all the more.
五月十九日，毛写给刘一封尖锐的信：“凡用中央名义发出的文件、电报，均须经我看过方能发出，否则无效，请注意。”毛还在“否则无效”四个字下面加上了着重号。写完以后，毛似乎觉得言犹未尽，立刻又写了一封(收信人加上周恩来、彭德怀)：“(一)请负责检查自去年八月一日(八一以前的有过检查)至今年五月五日用中央和军委名义发出的电报和文件，是否有及有多少未经我看过的……，以其结果告我；(二)过去数次中央会议决议不经我看，擅自发出，是错误的，是破坏纪律的”。这样的声色俱厉在两人的关系中迄今为止很少见。
Next came a direct and open attack on Liu to a small but crucial audience. On 15 June, when the Politburo gathered to hear Mao announce his industrialization program, Mao sharply condemned Liu, calling him “right-wing.” Even though he did not name Liu, every listener knew whom he was driving at. Mao had taken precautions for the most unlikely eventuality of Liu using the Praetorian Guard, which also guarded Liu, to fight back. He had had a hush-hush investigation conducted beforehand to gauge individual members' relationships with Liu. On the day of the meeting, some of the guards were rounded up and transferred out of Peking.
六月十五日，毛在推出军事工业化纲领的政治局会议上，当面谴责刘的观点，不点名地指责他“右倾”。开会当天，中央警卫团把警卫中央常委的一批官兵突然调出中南海，调出北京城。之前，三月初毛开始给刘颜色看的时候，中央警卫团就在逐个了解成员的情况。
Over the following months, Mao denounced Liu by proxy to ever larger audiences, criticizing key Liu protégés like finance minister Bo Yi-bo, who had devised a tax system that would not produce anything like the revenue that Mao's program demanded. Then in September Mao handpicked a lower-rank official to insinuate to a Party conference that Liu and his protégés had suspect pasts, and could be enemy agents. This was a frightening accusation. Liu was in danger of losing far more than just his job.
政治局会议后，毛在几个场合打击同刘亲近的人。其中一位是财政部长薄一波，毛在全国财经会上搞了个“批薄射刘”。接着毛又亲自授意东北局组织部长在组织工作会议上影射刘和所谓刘的人是叛徒内奸(因为他们坐过国民党的监狱)。仅以这个罪名，刘少奇面临的就决不只是一个丢官的问题。
Mao let Liu stew for months, and then on 24 December 1953 he suddenly announced to the Politburo that he was going away on holiday, and was appointing Liu to stand in for him, which meant that Liu was still No. 2. The psychological effect of being thus pulled back from the precipice was considerable, and Liu caved in to Mao's demands that he recant his old views to his top colleagues, which he did, groveling for three days and nights non-stop. Mao had what he wanted: a hyper-intimidated Liu.
毛让刘在煎熬中度过了几个月。突然，十二月二十四日，毛向政治局宣布他要外出度假，由刘少奇主持在北京的日常工作。这等于说刘还是第二号人物，好比把已在悬崖边上就要掉下去的刘一把拉回生路。刘如释重负，马上按毛的意思挨个找中共领导层的人检讨自己，最紧张时三天三夜没有睡觉。毛达到了目的：他狠狠地惩罚了刘少奇，使他的总管对军事工业化纲领不敢再有二话。
MAO HAD BEEN threatening to replace Liu with another man called Gao Gang, the head of Manchuria. Gao was a hard-liner and supported Mao's Superpower Program 100 percent. He had been the most vocal critic of Liu's views in the top circle. Mao showed that he liked Gao and disliked Liu, and hinted to Gao that he was considering giving him Liu's job. Gao talked to other top people about what Mao had said, and played the key role in attacking Liu. Many in the inner circle assumed that Gao was about to take Liu's place.
毛整刘少奇的同时，给人一种印象，他要用主管东北的高岗来取代刘。高岗全心全意拥护毛的总路线，为了刘少奇的观点同刘屡动干戈。毛示意他喜欢高岗，不喜欢刘，向高岗放风，他有意以高代刘。在毛的默许下，高把毛的话透露了出去。不少人以为高上刘下已成定局。
Then, out of the blue, Mao reinstated Liu—and purged Gao, who was charged with “plotting to split the Party in order to usurp the power of the Party and the state.” This was the first top-level purge since the regime had come to power, and it spread an atmosphere of disquiet and dread. When the Dalai Lama arrived in Peking just after Gao was condemned, his entourage immediately alerted him to the purge as an ill omen. It was the first topic the Dalai Lama himself wanted to discuss with us when we interviewed him forty-five years later.
谁知，晴天一声霹雳，毛依然用的是刘少奇，反而清洗了高岗，给高安上“分裂党以图夺取党和国家权力”的罪名。这是毛掌权以来第一次高层清洗，而清洗对象又完全出人意料。达赖喇嘛那时正到北京，随行人员对他说这是个凶兆。我们在四十五年后见到达赖喇嘛时，他想谈的第一个话题就是高岗问题。
The real reason for the purge involved Soviet Russia. As boss of Manchuria, Gao had had a lot to do with the Russians, and he had shot his mouth off to them, even telling Stalin's liaison Kovalev about disagreements in the Politburo, where he claimed that Liu headed a “pro-American faction.” Mao got to know about this when he was in Moscow in 1949, when Stalin gave him a report by Kovalev, partly based on talks with Gao. Gao told other Russians that Liu was too soft on the bourgeoisie. He complained about Chou, too, telling the Russians that he had had a “serious clash” with Chou over the Korean War in the Politburo.*
毛早就有了搞掉高的想法。他先利用高和高手下的人打刘，然后利用高打刘这一点，来清洗高。高岗的倒楣可以说是祸从口出。他是“东北王”，经常跟苏联人打交道，他同苏联人说话没什么忌讳，甚至把中共政治局内的争论也告诉斯大林的联络员科瓦廖夫，说政治局内有个以刘少奇为首的“亲美派”。毛在莫斯科时，斯大林把科瓦廖夫根据高岗谈话写的报告交给毛。高岗还对其他苏联人说刘少奇对资产阶级太软弱，抱怨周恩来，说他跟周在朝鲜战争问题上发生过“严重争执”。
That Gao was a talker had been noticed by a British couple in Yenan a decade before. Gao, they wrote, was “perhaps the most indiscreet of all the Communists whom we interviewed.” They must have been quite struck, as Gao was then a complete unknown.
高岗是个不拘小节、口没遮拦的人。早在十年前，到延安去的一对英国夫妇就留意到：“在我们访问过的共产党人中，高岗是最不谨慎的。”当时根本没人知道高岗是何方神圣，这对夫妇特别提到他，显然对高岗这一特点印象极深。
For Mao, to have underlings talking about the inner workings of his regime to any outsider was an absolute taboo. By purging Gao he wanted to send a message: you can never be too tight-lipped, even—and especially—with the Russians. As the Superpower Program depended overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union, there was going to be a lot of contact with Russians. Mao feared that fraternization might lead to a loosening of his grip, and conceivably threaten his power. On this score, Mao never took the slightest chance. His vigilance in anticipating potential threats was the main reason he died in his bed. Mao could not ban all contacts with Russians, so he moved to put an invisible barrier between his men and “the brothers.” Gao provided a perfect vehicle for warning his underlings: Don't get too fraternal with the Russians!
对毛泽东来说，跟外人谈论中共领导圈内的事是不可容忍的，特别是还传到了斯大林耳朵里。清洗高岗对人们是个警告：对苏联人，他们的口闭得越紧越好。毛搞军事工业化全仗苏联，跟苏联人将有很多来往，中国人一来二去放松了，可能像高岗一样真跟苏联人建立起“兄弟关系”。这对毛的权力是一种潜在威胁。在巩固权力这个问题上，毛总是不怕一万，只怕万一，防患末然，未雨绸缪。毛怕中国人跟苏联人亲近，但又不能阻止他们来往，只能在中国人脑子里设一道坚固的障碍，把他们跟苏联人无形地隔开。
Soon, Mao used the Gao case explicitly to order his top echelon to disclose any relationships with any Russians, what he termed “illicit contacts with foreign countries”:
不久，毛利用高岗一事要全体中共高干交代他们同苏联人的一切关系：
Do we have such people in China, who give information to foreigners behind the back of the Centre [i.e., me]? I think there are—Gao Gang for one … I hope those comrades will disgorge totally … Everything should go through the Centre [me again]. As for information, don't pass it … Those who have passed information, own up and you won't be pursued. If you don't, we'll check, and we will find out. You will be in trouble.
“这里讲一个“里通外国”的问题。我们中国有没有这种人，背着中央向外国人通情报？我看是有的，比如高岗就是一个。”“这样的事就不要干了。”“要讲就经过中央去讲，至于情报，不要去通。”
Mao did not define what counted as information, so the rule of thumb was simply not to talk to foreigners about anything.
什么叫“情报”？毛故意不说清楚，人们为了保险起见，干脆什么话也不跟苏联人说。
Mao designated Chou En-lai chief “prosecutor” against Gao, while he absented himself. At the meeting in February 1954 when Chou delivered his onslaught on Gao (who was present), tea mugs were, unusually, filled beforehand, to prevent servants eavesdropping. But as the leaders were unable to proceed without more hot water, a tea boy was allowed in. He was stunned to see the usually suave Chou transformed, contorted into a picture of ferocity, a side that the outside world never got to see. Chou, the old assassin, had taken the precaution of getting two trusted subordinates to bring along pistols, something normally absolutely unthinkable at top-level meetings.
毛派周恩来在打倒高岗的会议上做主要攻击人，自己不出场。一九五四年二月周作长篇发言时，服务员事先得到通知，会议中间不许给茶杯上水，“任何人不许進去。”因为会开得太长，与会的领导们禁不起没茶水喝，一个服务员被指定進去添水。他看到周恩来正站在前面讲话，口气非常激烈严厉。他还是第一次看到周这个样子。周知道他的角色就是凶神恶煞，怕高岗冲动起来加害自己，派他信赖的陈赓、宋任穷破例地带枪進入会场。
Gao was beside himself with shock about how Mao had set him up, and he tried to electrocute himself, unsuccessfully, on 17 February. For this he was forced to apologize, but his apology was rejected with the Party's customary pitilessness; this act of despair was branded “an out-and-out traitor's action against the Party.” He was kept under house arrest, and finally succeeded in ending his life six months later, after accumulating enough sleeping pills to do the trick.
高岗没想到毛会这样设圈套陷害他，他伤心、失望，在二月十七日触电自杀，但没死成。这一绝望的企图带给他更多的声讨。周恩来说这是“叛变党的行为”表现了高“仇恨党、仇恨同志”，高必须“沉痛认罪，彻底交代”，“必须长期加以管教。” 高被关在家里，六个月后，他偷偷存够了安眠药，结束了自己的生命。
In the Communist world a conspiracy was always preferred to a lone schemer. To make up a “conspiracy,” Mao picked on the head of the Organization Department, Rao Shu-shi, who was accused of forming an “anti-Party alliance” with Gao, although the two were not particularly close. Rao had been the head of the CCP intelligence network in America, inter alia, and this was very possibly why Mao wanted him behind bars, as Mao was gearing up for a purge in his intelligence system. Rao was arrested, and died in prison twenty years later, in March 1975.
在共产党世界里，要收拾某人最好说他有个“反党集团”，而不是一个人单干。于是毛给高岗拈来个同伙：中央组织部长饶漱石，说他们是“高饶联盟”。其实高、饶二人并没有什么关系。毛搞饶漱石的原因与饶从前在中共情报机构里任要职，一度主管对美情报有关。军事工业化的推出，使毛需要跟海外打交道。从饶开头，毛对跟海外有千丝万缕联系的中共情报网進行了一场“大扫除”，把他不信任的情报人员全都抓了起来。其中最着名的是潘汉年。饶漱石成为中共高层中罕有的“关死犯”， 一九七五年三月死在狱中。
ON 26 DECEMBER 1953, having lit the fuse for Gao's demise, Mao merrily celebrated his sixtieth birthday with his staff, drinking more wine than usual, even eating peaches, a symbol of longevity, though normally he did not like fruit. During the meal he hummed along to records of Peking opera and beat time on his thigh. Stalin had died, and Mao had successfully completed two maneuvers that were key for his Superpower Program: hammering his chief executive, Liu, into shape; and inoculating his top subordinates against any possible Russian contagion that might endanger his power.
敲响高岗丧钟的两天之后，一九五三年十二月二十六日，毛泽东红光满面地同身边工作人员一起庆祝自己的六十大寿。他比平时多喝了葡萄酒，吃了长寿面，还一反不吃水果的习惯，吃了寿桃。他边吃边听喜爱的京剧录音，在大腿上打着拍子跟着哼哼。在座人看得出，毛的情绪异常的好。怎么能不好呢？斯大林死了，军工项目到手了，刘少奇驯服了，高岗清洗了。
Next day, when he arrived in picturesque lakeside Hangzhou, near Shanghai, he was in such good spirits that he could hardly wait to settle in before he ordered a game of mah-jong. Mao had been in Hangzhou thirty-two years before, in summer 1921, after the 1st Congress of the Communist Party. Then he had been a hard-up provincial teacher travelling on a Russian allowance. Now he was the master of China. His coming had been suitably prepared. A famous turn-of-the-century estate called Water and Bamboo had been picked for him. It was adorned with ponds and bamboo groves, and vines and palm trees, and enjoyed a panoramic view over the Western Lake. Villas next to it, and the hills behind it, were all incorporated into a single enormous estate, covering 36 hectares. The hill behind was hollowed out to provide a nuclear shelter. Mao stayed in an exquisite building, combining classical Chinese and exotic foreign styles, with pillars, doors and decorations which had been lovingly shipped in piece by piece by the original owner. But shortly afterwards, Mao had it torn down and replaced with his usual nondescript identikit structure. The creaking of the old timber had rattled his nerves with thoughts about assassins. He only felt safe in a reinforced concrete bunker.
第二天，他来到风景如画的杭州，一進门就叫准备打麻将。三十二年前，开完中共“一大”，他曾来过这里。那时，他是个穷教员，旅费还是俄国人出的。如今，他以中国最高统治者的身份旧地重访。一座建于十九世纪末的面湖背山的别墅“水竹居”被选为他的下榻处。庄园周围的园林山峦，包括康有为的住宅康庄，共同为毛组成一座占地五百四十亩的大庄园。园子里小桥流水，荷塘竹亭，棕榈树为江南山水点缀着热带颜色，整个西湖尽收眼底。防空洞就在背后的山中。
庄园的主房是一幢岭南特色加海外风光的精致楼阁，里面的一根根梁、一条条柱、一扇扇门、一堵堵窗，都经过主人精心挑选，千里迢迢运来，甚至来自海外。可是毛只有住在钢筋水泥的库房般的毛式房子里，才感到安全。“西湖第一名园”上的这朵奇葩被一拆而光。
Mao fell in love with the view. Every day, even in drizzle, he climbed the nearby peaks, which were specially cordoned off for him. He lingered over plum blossoms, sniffing at the petals. He chatted and joked with his staff. His mood was captured by his photographer, in a picture of a beaming plump-cheeked Mao, bathed in sunshine.
毛爱上了西湖的景色。每天爬山，哪怕细雨蒙蒙。在盛开的梅花树下，毛闻香吟诗，跟身边工作人员聊天说笑。摄影师侯波把毛的愉快情绪留在照片上：胖胖的毛泽东在阳光下笑逐颜开。
Soon the biggest snowfall in decades descended. Mao got up at the, for him, outlandish hour of 7:00 AM, and stood transfixed by the snow-clad southern garden. He then walked along a path blanketed with snow, which he ordered left unswept, to marvel at the lake in white. He tinkered with a poem.
不久一场几十年罕见的大雪给毛遇上了，他在清晨七点钟通常酣睡的时候起床观雪景。冬去春来，一次出游，侯波采了一把野花递给毛，没人知道花叫什么名字，毛说：那就叫它侯波花吧。
Spring came, alternating between misty drizzle and dazzling sunshine, each day unfolding its masses of blossoms. During one pleasure trip, his female photographer, Hou Bo, gathered a bunch of wildflowers and presented them to Mao. Nobody seemed to know what the flower was called, so Mao said: Let's name it the Hou Bo Flower.
Mao fancied a visit to the home of his favorite tea, Dragon Well village, which was nearby. The peasants were duly removed “for a mass meeting”—in fact for his security. But occasional surprise drop-ins were deemed safe enough, and so, on another occasion, Mao called in on one peasant house. The couple could not understand a word of his Hunan dialect, nor he theirs. Curious villagers started to converge, so Mao's guards whisked him away.
On one excursion to the top of a hill, Mao saw a thatched hut on fire in the distance. The inhabitants were standing outside, helpless as the flames swallowed their home. According to Mao's photographer, Mao “turned to me with a glance, and said coolly: ‘Good fire. It's good to burn down, good to burn down!' ”
一天爬到山腰亭子里，毛看见远处一座草房着了火，房子里的人只来得及抱出几件行李，无能为力地看着火焰把家烧光。侯波回忆道：
“哎呀，着火了！”我惊叫着。
The photographer was astonished. Sensing this, Mao said:” ‘Without the fire, they will have to go on living in a thatched hut.'
毛泽东回过身来，看了一眼，不慌不忙地说：“着火好。烧了好，烧了好。”
“ ‘But now it's burnt down, where are they going to live?…'
咦，着火还好，他怎么说这样的话？
“He did not answer my question, as if he hadn't heard …”
“不烧了，他就老住茅草房。”
“那烧了，他住哪里呀？人家盖不起瓦房才住草房呀！”
Mao had no answer to this question. Throughout his reign, peasants had to fend for themselves when it came to housing. The state provided no funds. Even in urban areas, other than apartments for the elite and residential blocks in industrial complexes, virtually no new dwellings were built.
他没有回答我的问题，好像没听见似的……自言自语地说：
Watching the thatched cottage turned to ashes, Mao eventually said to himself: “Um, Really clean if the earth has fallen to complete void and nothingness!”
“唉，落了片白茫茫大地真干净！”
This was a line of poetry from the classic Dream of the Red Chamber. But Mao was doing more than just reciting poetry. This was an echo of the attraction to destruction that he had alarmingly expressed as a young man. He continued: “This is called: ‘No destruction, no construction.' ”
这是《红楼梦》里的一句话。毛不光是在念诗句，他也在抒发喜欢毁灭的一面，年轻时他就对毁灭心向往之。
Construction for Mao was exclusively related to becoming a superpower. Here in Hangzhou, he began revising the draft of the first “Constitution,”
看着草房被烧掉，毛说：“这叫不破不立”。可毛是管“破”不管“立”的。在他统治下，农民盖房全靠自己。就是在城里，除了给有特权的人盖公寓，给工厂建宿舍，几乎没有给老百姓盖什么房子。
something he had only just got around to after more than four years in power. Among the things he wanted revised was the promise that his regime “protects all citizens' safety and legal rights …” Mao underlined the words “all citizens” and wrote in the margin:
掌权四年多了，毛才着手修“宪法”。草案上说国家“保护全体公民的安全和一切合法权益”。毛在“全体公民”旁画了两条竖线，写道：
“What exactly is a citizen?”
“什么是公民？”
Flatterers had suggested that the document should be named the “Mao Tse-tung Code,” clearly with the Napoleonic Code in mind. Mao rejected the idea. He was averse to law, and wanted there to be nothing that could bind him. Indeed, hopelessly feeble as it was, the Constitution was soon to be discarded altogether.
有人提议把这部宪法叫“毛泽东法”，毛否决了。宪法对毛如同废纸一张，他不久干脆就把它扔進废纸篓里。
One day Mao toured a temple, which had, as usual, been emptied for security reasons, except for one blind monk. On the altar was a wooden holder with bamboo slips for divination, and Mao asked his photographer to pick a slip for him. She shook the holder, took out a slip, and went to a bookcase containing old poetry books to find the line referred to on the slip. It read: “No peace, either inside or outside home.” There could be no question of presenting this inauspicious line, so she quickly picked another. It had a cheery message, and brought laughter.
又一天，毛進了一座山上的寺庙，里面为他的安全“清了场”，只有一个瞎眼和尚。大殿供桌上的香炉旁边摆着竹签筒，毛叫侯波给他抽支签。侯波抱起木筒摇了摇抽出一支，然后按签上的号码在壁橱里找出签诗，上面写着：“家里家外不安宁。” 这样的签诗自然不便给毛看，侯波急忙重新找了一张吉利的签诗给毛送过去，毛看了哈哈大笑。
The divination was eerily accurate. Mme Mao had come with their daughter, Li Na, to spend Chinese New Year, the traditional time of family reunion. But the visit had ended with Mme Mao in tears, asking for a plane to take her away. Hangzhou, famed not only for its scenery but also for its women, had caught Mao's sexual fancy. He was to return forty-one times, partly for this reason. He liked young and apparently innocent women, whom underlings procured as partners for the weekly dances and for subsequent fornication.
第一支签把毛的状况一语道中。江青几天后带着女儿李讷来杭州跟毛过春节团圆，但不久就哭泣着要了架飞机离开了。杭州是出丽人的地方，毛心猿意马，应接不暇。此后毛来杭州四十一次，一半为的是“美人”。毛喜欢单纯天真的少女。
Mao no longer felt sexual interest in his wife. Even before 1949, his Russian doctor Orlov had been treating him “for sexual problems” with her (Orlov acidly referred to Mme Mao as “the Queen” in a cable to Stalin). Then Mme Mao had suffered serious gynecological problems, for which she was treated in Russia, under the pseudonym “Yusupova,” as she stayed in a palace in Yalta that had belonged to Prince Yusupov, the man who killed Rasputin. (Stalin himself had stayed in it during the Yalta conference.) Her illness almost certainly put Mao further off her. He became more and more brazen in his philandering. Mme Mao was once found weeping by the lake in Zhongnanhai. “Don't tell anyone,” she said to the man who saw her, Mao's doctor. “The Chairman is someone no one can beat in political fighting, not even Stalin; nor can anyone beat him in having women, either.” Mme Mao grew increasingly difficult and hysterical, and vented her fury and frustration on the staff, routinely accusing her nurses of “deliberately tormenting” her, striking them, and demanding they be punished.
毛对他夫人的性欲早就淡了。四十年代后期，苏联大夫阿洛夫就给他看过跟江青“性方面问题”的病。后来，江青生了严重的妇女病，毛更加失去跟她做爱的兴趣。江青曾长时间在苏联治病，化名尤素波娃(Yusupova)，得名于她在雅尔达住过的豪宅(斯大林本人在雅尔达密会期间也住过)的前房主，刺杀拉斯普丁(Rasputin)的尤素波夫王公(Prince Yusupov)。毛无所顾忌的寻花问柳使江青实在难以忍受。中南海的舞场边，后来新添了个“休息室”，放上张床。跳舞中毛把一个或几个女孩子带進去“玩儿”。休息室隔音，外面听不见里面的声色追逐。毛和女孩子在干些什么，谁也清楚。在众目睽睽下，毛毫不在乎。
Meanwhile, as the divination on the bamboo slip uncannily described, quite a few of Mao's colleagues were going through turmoil and dread. For the nation as a whole, economic policy was about to become drastically harsher as the Superpower Program got under way.
一天晚上，江青独自在中南海的湖边流泪，毛的大夫李志绥经过那里，吃了一惊。她控制住自己，对李说：“大夫，不要同别人讲。主席这个人，在政治斗争上，谁也搞不过他，连斯大林也没有办法对付他。在男女关系的个人私生活上，也是谁也搞不过他。”寂寞，抑郁使江青的心理越来越不平衡，人也越来越难伺候。她常常把一腔怒气发泄在身边工作人员身上，张口就骂，有时还动手打人。
在杭州的一九五四年那个春天，毛的家内不安宁，家外呢，刘少奇心力交瘁，高岗欲死不能。全国上下，随着军事工业化的起步，从农民口中夺粮的风暴就要来临。
*Chou told Stalin in September 1952 that China could also “collect” up to £1.6 billion sterling plus US$200m over five years, “mostly” through what he called “contraband.”
*The threat of rustication functioned as a powerful deterrent to urban-dwellers not to step out of line. Everyone knew that being cast into the peasantry would bring on themselves and their families not only back-breaking labor, but the loss of any certainty of earning a livelihood, and that this misfortune would extend to future generations as well.
*That Gao said too much was indirectly confirmed by the top Soviet adviser in China, Arkhipov. When we pushed him on the subject, he threw us a steely stare and said in a different tone of voice: “Why do you want to know so much about Gao Gang?”