38 UNDERMINING KHRUSHCHEV
38 打掉赫鲁晓夫的权威
(1956–59 AGE 62–65)
1956～1959 年 62～65 岁
WITHIN MONTHS of denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev had run into trouble. In June 1956, protests erupted in Poland at a factory suitably named “the Stalin Works” in the city of Poznan, and more than fifty workers were killed. Wladyslaw Gomulka, a former Party leader who had been imprisoned under Stalin, returned to power, espousing a more independent relationship with Moscow. On 19 October the Russians told Mao that anti-Soviet feelings were running high in Poland, and that they were thinking of using force to keep control.
赫鲁晓夫批评斯大林几个月不到就遇到了麻烦。一九五六年六月，波兰波兹南市（Poznan）的“斯大林工厂”爆发力罢工游行，导致五十多个工人死亡。在全国此起彼伏的反抗局势下，斯大林时期被监禁的前波兰共产党总书记哥穆尔卡(Wladyslaw Gomulka)重返政坛。哥穆尔卡追求独立于莫斯科的民族主义政策。十月十九日，莫斯科通知毛说，波兰反苏情绪高涨，他们考虑采取武力。
Mao saw this as an ideal opening to undermine Khrushchev by presenting himself as the champion of the Poles and the opponent of “Soviet military intervention.” As this might involve a clash with Khrushchev, Mao weighed the pros and cons long and carefully, lying in bed. He convened the Politburo on the afternoon of the 20th. None counseled caution. Then, clad in a toweling robe, he summoned Russian ambassador Yudin and told him: If the Soviet army uses force in Poland, we will condemn you publicly. He asked Yudin to phone Khrushchev straight away. By now, Mao had concluded that Khrushchev was something of a “blunderer,” who was “disaster-prone.” The awe he had felt for Khrushchev at the time when the Soviet leader denounced Stalin was rapidly fading, replaced by a confidence that he could turn Khrushchev's vulnerability to his own advantage.
斯大林死后，毛一直想坐共产党阵营的第一把交椅。开头他对赫鲁晓夫还摸不透。如今他看出：“赫鲁晓夫这个人也能捅漏子”，“多灾多难”，“可能日子也不太好过”。毛越来越自信，觉得他可以挑战赫鲁晓夫。正好，波兰事起，毛决计做波兰的保护人。 毛又担心弄不好会适得其反。他在床上待着想了一天，第二天召开政治局会议，听众人发议论。大家都附和毛。毛便穿着一身睡衣把苏联大使尤金召進卧室，叫尤金马上打电话告诉赫鲁晓夫：如果苏联出兵，我们将公开谴责你们。毛一再重复，讲得很严厉。
Before Yudin's message reached the Kremlin, Khrushchev had already made the decision not to use troops. On the 21st he invited the CCP and four other ruling parties to Moscow to discuss the crisis. Mao sent Liu Shao-chi, with instructions to criticize Russia for its “great-power chauvinism” and for envisaging “military intervention.” In Moscow, Liu proposed that the Soviet leadership make “self-criticisms.” Mao was aiming to cut Khrushchev down to size as leader of the Communist bloc, and make his own bid for the leadership, which had been his dream since Stalin's death. Now an opportunity had come.
毛的警告到达莫斯科之前，赫鲁晓夫已经决定不出兵波兰。但毛不想放过这个机会，他派刘少奇去苏联，指责苏共是大国沙文主义，要莫斯科公开作“自我批评”。毛的目标是让赫鲁晓夫丢脸。
At this juncture, another satellite, Hungary, exploded. The Hungarian Uprising was to be the biggest crisis to date for the Communist world—an attempt not just to gain more independence from Moscow (which was the aim in Poland), but to overthrow the Communist regime and break away completely from the bloc. On 29 October the Russians decided to withdraw their troops from Hungary, and informed Peking. Up till this point, Mao had been urging a pull-back of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, but he now realized that the regime in Hungary would collapse if the Russians left. So the next day he strongly recommended that the Soviet army stay on in Hungary and crush the uprising. Keeping Eastern Europe under communism took priority over weakening Khrushchev. Mao's bid to become the head of the Communist camp would be worthless if the camp ceased to exist.
就在这时，匈牙利事件爆发。匈牙利人民追求的不仅是民族主义，而且要推翻共产党统治。十月二十九日，苏联决定从匈牙利撤出苏联红军。红军一走，匈牙利的共产党政权肯定垮台。若是共产党阵营不复存在，毛泽东又怎么谈得上坐第一把交椅呢？刚刚还在谴责苏联“武装干涉”的毛，转身向莫斯科强烈要求：苏军不能走。
On 1 November, Moscow reversed itself. Its army remained in Hungary, and put down the Uprising with much bloodshed. The realisation that Russian troops were essential to keep the European satellites under Communist rule was a blow to Mao's designs to ease these countries out of Moscow's clutches. But he did not give up. On 4 November, as Russian tanks were rolling into Budapest, he told his Politburo: The Hungarians have to find a new way to control their country—and we must help. What he meant was that Eastern European regimes should adopt his method of rule and do their own brutal repression: that way, they would not have to rely on Russian tanks. Back in 1954, Mao had dispensed his ideas on statecraft to the man who was to be Hungary's prime minister when the Uprising started, András Hegedüs. Hegedüs told us that Mao had urged him to keep a total grip on the army, and all but told him that the Hungarian regime should make its power unchallengeable through killing. When Mao heard about the Yugoslav dictator Tito arresting his liberal opponent Milovan Djilas, he showed “such delight,” army chief Peng noticed, “that his face lit up.” Mao was to continue advocating his Stalinist ways to Eastern European countries, hoping they would emulate his model of repression and embrace his leadership.
十一月一日，莫斯科改变主意，苏军留下了，血腥地镇压了起义。事实证明，东欧卫星国离不开苏军。毛看出，这种状况的根源是东欧国家镇压反对派手软。他早就在劝说东欧，向他学习，大杀“反革命”，不要依赖苏联坦克。在匈牙利事件初期任总理的赫格居斯(Andras Hegedus） 告诉我们，毛一九五四年就这样告诫他，说巩固权力非靠铁腕暴力不可。当毛听说南斯拉夫的铁托逮捕了自由派对手吉拉斯(Milovan Diilas)时，彭德怀注意到：“主席很高兴，脸都红了。” 波匈事件后，毛采取迂回战术继续跟赫鲁晓夫争权。
IN JANUARY 1957, Mao sent Chou En-lai to Poland to try to pull Gomulka into his fold. “The key to all questions,” Chou told Gomulka, was “to attack right-wing forces and hidden counter-revolutionaries … targeting one particular group at a time.” This advice held no appeal for Gomulka, who had spent years in Stalin's prisons. Chou's résumé to Mao afterwards revealed both Peking's patronizing designs and its failure: “Polish leadership is correct … but still has not grasped the key question.” Later that year, in Moscow, Mao tried again by repeatedly offering Gomulka advice on how to hang on to power, referring to Gomulka's government as “your court” (our italics). Mao did not get very far. Gomulka did not aspire to be a tyrant.
一九五七年一月，他派周恩来去反苏情绪高涨的波兰，说共产主义阵营应该有个带头的，要哥穆尔卡同意宣布“以苏联为首”。毛料到波兰人决不会同意，他的目的是引出哥穆尔卡的话：还是以你们为首吧。
Mao hoped to prod the Poles into proposing him as head of the Communist camp. His convoluted way of doing this was to keep telling Gomulka that the Communist camp had to be “headed by the Soviet Union.” By saying that the camp must have a head, Mao was trying to broach the issue of who that head should be, hoping the Poles would look his way. Gomulka simply frowned each time Chou used the formula.
使毛失望的是，哥穆尔卡对这个提法听也不要听，周恩来一说他就皱眉头。*
* 东欧当时流传着一个政治笑话：一个人去买茶叶。店主说：“我们有俄国茶，有中国茶，你要哪一种？”他答道：“那我还是喝咖啡吧！”
What the Poles wanted was more freedom, not more Stalinism, or more poverty. A vivid illustration of the yawning gap between Mao's vision and Polish reality came when a group of Polish visitors told Mao that their fellow countrymen were unhappy with their low living standards, and that their Party felt it had to do something to meet its people's wishes. Mao replied: “I do not believe the standard of living in Poland is too low. On the contrary, I feel that it is relatively very high: the Poles are eating more than two or three thousand calories every day, while [about 1,500] could be sufficient. If the people feel that there are too few consumer goods available, the [regime] should increase their propaganda efforts.” After Mao's “monologue,” a Polish diplomat wrote, the Poles “realized that Chinese assistance could not be substantial or long-lasting because their program was even more ‘anti-people' than the Soviet one.”*
游说波兰未遂，毛当即转向同样反苏的南斯拉夫，南斯拉夫在斯大林死后与共产主义阵营的关系已经“解冻”。毛指示正在那里访问的彭真，单独会见铁托总统，以苏共声誉不好，没人听它的为理由，请铁托同中国一道发起世界各国共产党最高级会议。在毛看来，谁发起会议就等于谁为首。这时的毛正在内部骂铁托、骂哥穆尔卡，说他们是右派的祖师爷。毛主动找上门去不过是想利用他们。可惜铁托听彭真说完以后，表示没有兴趣，连参加也不能保证。
When Chou En-lai saw that it was unlikely he could line up the Poles to propose Mao as the head of the Communist camp, Mao turned at once to the other most anti-Moscow Communist country, Yugoslavia. An envoy already there in January 1957 was instantly instructed to request an ultra-private meeting with Tito, at which he asked the Yugoslav president to co-sponsor a world Communist summit with Peking, using the argument that the Soviet Party was in such disrepute that no one would listen to it. At that very moment, Mao was trashing Tito to his inner circle as an enemy—just as he trashed Gomulka. Mao's cultivation of these two Communist countries was completely opportunistic, based solely on the fact that they were the most anti-Soviet. After listening to Mao's pitch, Tito not only declined to co-sponsor such a conference, but would not even commit to attend it.
毛再度努力要苏联领导人当众出丑的计划也没有成功。周恩来在莫斯科教训苏联领导人，要他们公开承认犯了大国沙文主义的错误，并按毛的调子重新评价斯大林。愤怒的苏联人一口回绝。未能如愿以偿的毛，在各省书记会议上说：“我在电话里跟恩来同志说，这些人利令智昏，对他们的办法，最好是臭骂一顿。什么叫利呢？无非是五千万吨钢，四亿吨煤，八千万吨石油。这算什么？这叫不算数。你无非是在地球上挖了那么一点东西，变成钢材，做成汽车飞机之类，这有什么了不起！” 毛把自己的不得志归咎于中国缺乏经济实力。
At the same time, Mao was trying again to weaken the Kremlin by getting the Russians to humiliate themselves. In Moscow in January 1957 Chou demanded that the Soviet leaders make groveling “open self-criticisms” and re-evaluate Stalin along Mao's lines. The Russians bristled, and rebuffed him on both scores. Mao's reaction was a rant to Chou, as he told his provincial chiefs: “I told Comrade En-lai on the phone that these people have been turned into cretins by their material gains, and the best way to deal with them is to give them a good round of stinking curses. What do they actually have? No more than 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of oil … Big deal!” Mao was blaming his failure to supplant Khrushchev on China's lack of economic muscle.
MAO HAD OTHER sources of frustration. One was the Middle East, where a major crisis erupted at the same time as Hungary, over the Suez Canal, which Egypt had nationalized in July 1956. On 29 October Israel attacked Egypt, as the spearhead of a secretly coordinated Israeli-Anglo-French invasion.
Mao was itching to act as Egypt's protector and teacher. He staged mammoth demonstrations against the British and the French, involving nearly 100 million people. To a visitor from Franco's Spain attending one in Peking, it was: “Worse than fascist meeting. There are leaders in all stands who start to cheer and everybody shout when they shout. These are not true demonstrators … very boring.” Mao dispensed advice to Egypt's ambassador, General Hassan Ragab, on everything from how to handle the exiled King Farouk to how Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser could avoid assassination, urging the ambassador to “study the experience of China,” which was “very much worth studying.” Voicing barely veiled rivalry with Russia, Mao pressed aid on Ragab: “The Soviet Union will be doing all it can to help Egypt. China also would like to do our best to help Egypt, and our help does not have any strings attached. Whatever you need, just name it … Our aid to you does not have to be paid back … if you insist on paying back … then pay back in a hundred years.” China gave Nasser 20 million Swiss francs in cash, and rigged the bilateral trade balance heavily in Egypt's favor.
Mao was so keen to play a role that on 3 November he sent Nasser a war plan. True to form, he offered cannon-fodder: 250,000 Chinese volunteers. An offer Nasser did not take up—fortunately for the “volunteers,” but also for Mao, as China had no way of transporting this number of people to the Middle East.
Nasser paid scant attention. Nasser's top adviser Mohamed Heikal told us that the president left Mao's war plan at the bottom of his pile of correspondence. What Nasser really wanted was arms. He had decided to recognize Peking that spring so that China, which was outside the UN, could serve as a conduit for Russian arms in case there was a UN arms embargo.
When Cairo asked for arms in December, China at once offered to donate whatever it produced, cost-free. But it could only make small arms such as rifles, and the offer was not taken up. Mao found himself left on the sidelines. All this made him more impatient to speed up his Superpower Program, and to possess the Bomb; otherwise, as he put it, “people just won't listen to you.”
FOR THIS HE NEEDED Khrushchev. Luckily for Mao, Khrushchev needed him too. Hardly had the tumult in Poland and Hungary subsided than Khrushchev was faced with a domestic crisis. In June 1957, Molotov, Malenkov and a group of old Stalinists tried to overthrow him. Khrushchev thwarted the attempt, but felt he needed to get explicit support from foreign Communist parties. Other Communist leaders sent their endorsements promptly, but not Mao. So Khrushchev dispatched Mikoyan to see Mao, who was in the southern lake city of Hangzhou. “I think they wanted someone senior to come to them,” Mikoyan's interpreter told us. Mao let Mikoyan talk for much of the night before gesturing languidly over his shoulder to his former ambassador to Moscow: “Old Wang [Jia-xiang], where's our cable?” The telegram of support had been ready all the time. Mao would, of course, back Khrushchev, who was, after all, the power in the Kremlin. He just wanted to make Khrushchev plead, and to up his price. China immediately asked to renegotiate the technology transfer agreement.
赫鲁晓夫没有惩罚毛。他有求于毛。波匈麻烦一波未平，国内危机一波又起。一九五七年六月，莫洛托夫、马林科夫和一帮老斯大林分子联合起来企图推翻他。赫鲁晓夫挫败了这个企图，各国共产党都表态支持，就是毛泽东迟迟不出声。赫鲁晓夫只好派米高扬到杭州去见毛。米高扬的翻译告诉我们：毛听米高扬谈了大半夜，然后把手懒懒地朝坐在沙发后面的前驻苏联大使王稼祥挥挥：“老王，电报呢？”其实支持赫鲁晓夫的电报早巳就绪，“毛无非是想要我们派个高级领导来求他。”毛不可能不支持赫鲁晓夫这个赢家。
Moscow responded extremely positively, saying that it was happy to help China build atom bombs, and missiles, as well as more advanced fighter planes. It turned out that Moscow needed even more support from Mao. The Communist world's biggest-ever summit was set for 7 November, the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. For this event to go smoothly, Moscow had to have Mao on board.
赫鲁晓夫还需要毛更多的合作。共产主义世界空前的最高级会议即将于“十月革命”四十周年时在莫斯科召开，赫鲁晓夫生怕毛拆他的台。
Mao exploited this situation to the hilt. He said he would attend the summit only on condition that the Russians signed a prior agreement guaranteeing to hand over “the materials and the models for the production of an atomic weapon and the means to deliver it.” On 15 October, three weeks before the summit was to convene, Moscow signed a fateful deal agreeing to provide Mao with a sample A-bomb. Russian ministries were told “to supply the Chinese with everything they required to build their own Bomb.” So many missile experts were suddenly transferred to China that it caused “havoc” in Russia's own program, according to one Russian expert.* Russian experts also helped China choose missile and nuclear test sites deep in the interior.
毛表示可以参加这次会议，但有一个条件，苏联要保证转让制造原子武器以及运载手段的材料、模型。莫斯科反应积极。十月十五日，最高级会议开幕前三个星期，中国核武器制造史上的一个里程碑--“国防新技术协定”在莫斯科签字。苏联给中国一个原子弹模型。苏联各部接到的指示是：“提供中方一切东西使他们能够自己造原子弹。”大批导弹(飞弹)专家调往中国。据一位专家说，连苏联自己的导弹项目也受到影响，造成“混乱”。中国原子弹、导弹的试验场也是苏联专家帮助定下的。
Although the “father of the Russian Bomb,” Igor Kurchatov, strongly objected, Khrushchev sent a top nuclear scientist, Yevgenii Vorobyov, to supervise the construction of Mao's Bomb, and during Vorobyov's stay in China the number of Chinese nuclear specialists increased from 60 to 6,000. Russia “is willing to let us have all the blueprints,” Chou told a small circle. “Whatever it has made, including atom bombs and missiles, it is willing to give us. This is maximum trust, maximum help.” When Khrushchev later said: “they received a lot from us …” Mikoyan chipped in: “We built [nuclear weapons] plants for the Chinese.”
不顾苏联“原子弹之父”库尔恰托夫(Igor Kurchatov)的强烈反对，赫鲁晓夫派最好的核专家弗洛比约夫(Yevgenii Vorobyov)到中国帮助策划原子弹制造。弗洛比约夫在华期间，中国核科研人员从六十名增加到六千名。周恩来在中共高层说：苏联“把整个蓝图给我们”，凡是它一种定型的东西，包括原子弹、导弹这些东西，都愿意给我们。这是最大的信任，最大的互助。”赫鲁晓夫后来说：“我们给了他们不少东西。”米高扬插话说：“是我们帮中国建的核工厂。”
Soviet know-how enabled the Chinese to copy every shortcut the Russians had made, secure in the knowledge that these shortcuts worked, thus greatly speeding up Mao's Bomb. China was the only country in the world that had anything like this level of help to manufacture nuclear weapons. Mao was told by his delegation just before the signing of the new agreement that with this degree of Russian assistance, he could possess all the attributes of a military superpower by the end of 1962. The undertaking cost a fortune. An authoritative Western source estimated the cost to China of making the Bomb alone at US$4.1 billion (in 1957 prices). A large part of this was paid for by agricultural products.
苏联的技术转让大大加速了中国原子弹的建造。中方谈判代表报告毛，有苏联这些“极慷慨”的援助，中国的军事力量将在五年内“跃進”到一个崭新的水平。
And Mao wanted more than the Bomb and missiles. On 4 October 1957, Russia launched a satellite called Sputnik, the first man-made object in space—and the first time the Communist world had “overtaken” the West in any technical sphere. Mao wanted to get into the space race right away. “Whatever happens, we must have Sputniks,” he announced to his top echelon in May 1958. “Not the one-kilo, two-kilo kind … it has to be several tens of thousands of kilos … We won't do ones the size of chicken eggs like America's.” The first US satellite, launched in January 1958, had weighed 8.22 kg, compared with Sputnik's 83.6 kg. Mao wanted his to be bigger than either America's or Russia's, and he wanted it launched in 1960.
一九五七年十月四日，苏联发射了世界上第一颗人造卫星，在太空技术上超过了西方。毛立刻迷上了卫星，他说：“我们也要搞人造卫星。我们要抛就要抛大的。要干就要干一二万公斤的。也许要从较小的抛起，但我们也要从一两千公斤开始。”(苏联的卫星重八十三点六公斤。)毛的卫星技术从哪里来？还得向赫鲁晓夫要。
MAO FLEW OFF to Moscow on 2 November 1957 for the Communist summit, having decided to be cooperative so as to get what he wanted out of Khrushchev, while at the same time to try to place himself on the map of the Communist camp as Khrushchev's equal, even superior. The summit, the biggest of its kind ever, was attended by leaders of 64 Communist and friendly parties, among which 12 of the Communist parties were in power. Just before leaving Peking, Mao floated to the Russians the idea of the final declaration being signed only by himself and them.
一九五七年十一月二日，毛飞去莫斯科开共产党阵营最高级会议。有六十四个共产党代表参加，其中十二个是执政党。为了表现自己在阵营内与赫鲁晓夫平起平坐的地位，临行前，毛向苏联建议大会宣言仅由他和苏联两家签署。
Mao did not quite bring this off, but China was the sole co-drafter, with the Russians, of the final declaration, and Mao himself was accorded special treatment in Moscow, being the only foreign leader put up in the Kremlin, where everything was arranged to his taste, with a large wooden bed, and the toilet turned into a squat one, by making a platform on the seat. At the ceremony on the eve of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mao and Khrushchev appeared hand in hand. At parades on Gorky Street and Red Square people waved Chinese flags, and shouted “Long live Mao and China!”
这一招没能奏效。但大会宣言只由中、苏两方起草。毛也受到特殊待遇，是唯一下榻克里姆林宫的外国领袖。寝室里特地为他安上木板床，抽水马桶上搭了个平台改成蹲式。在“十月革命”前夕的庆祝仪式上，赫鲁晓夫和他手拉手出现，高尔基大街和红场上的游行队伍挥舞着中国国旗，高呼：“毛和中国万岁！”
Mao's great asset in his drive for equal status with Russia was China's manpower. A Muscovite said to a top Finnish Communist at the time: “We don't need to be afraid of America any more. The Chinese army and our friendship with China have altered the whole world situation, and America can't do a thing about it.” And it was the asset Mao himself promoted while he was in Moscow. There, he totted up to Khrushchev how many army divisions each country could raise, based on its population. China outnumbered Russia and all its other allies combined by two to one. Immediately after returning from Moscow, Mao definitively rejected birth control for China, a policy on which the regime had earlier kept a fairly open mind.
毛能够争得这样的地位，靠的是中国人多，有的是人为共产党世界打仗。毛跟赫鲁晓夫一块计算过，打起仗来每个共产党国家根据自己的人口能出多少军队，结果中国比苏联连同所有卫星国加在一起还多一倍。有位苏联官员当时对芬兰共产党领导人说：“我们再不用害怕美国了，中国军队和我们同中国的友谊，改变了整个世界形势，美国根本拿我们没办法。”毛深知人口众多是他的无价之宝，回国后他否决了计划生育。在此之前，中共曾想实行计划生育，毛本人也还没拿定主意。莫斯科之行使他打定主意，中国人多多益善。
As a way of showing that he was equal to his Russian host and above the rest of the participants, Mao brushed away the conference standing order that every speaker must provide an advance text, saying: “I have no text. I want to be able to speak freely.” He did indeed eschew a written text, but he had prepared his seemingly off-the-cuff speeches with intense care. Before entering the conference hall, Mao was in a state of super-concentration, so intensely focused that when his Chinese interpreter moved to button up his collar as they were waiting for the lift, Mao seemed totally oblivious of what his aide was doing.
为了表现他高于与会者的地位，毛拒绝了大会要每个讲话人事先递交讲稿的规定：“我没有讲稿，我要想到哪儿说到哪儿。”毛确实没用讲稿，但他的即兴演说，经过了仔细的准备。進入大厅前，他处于思想高度集中状态，中山装领扣没扣好，翻译帮他扣时，他混然不觉。
Mao was also the only person to speak sitting down, from his seat. He said he had been “sick in the head.” This, as the Yugoslav ambassador wryly put it, “came as a surprise to the majority of those present.”
毛也是唯一一个坐在座位上，而不是站着讲话的人。毛谈到核战争：
Mao talked about war and death with a gross, even flippant, indifference to human suffering:
Let's contemplate this, how many people would die if war breaks out. There are 2.7 billion people in the world. One-third could be lost; or, a little more, it could be half … I say that, taking the extreme situation, half dies, half lives, but imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.
“要设想一下，如果爆发战争要死多少人。全世界二十七亿人口，可能损失三分之一；再多一点，可能损失一半。……我说，极而言之，死掉一半人，还有一半人，帝国主义打平了，全世界社会主义化了，再过多少年，又会有二十七亿，一定还要多。”
An Italian participant, Pietro Ingrao, told us the audience was “shocked” and “upset.” Mao gave the impression that not only did he not mind a nuclear war, he might actually welcome it. Yugoslavia's chief delegate Kardelj came away with no doubt: “It was perfectly clear that Mao Tse-tung wanted a war …” Even the Stalinist French were appalled.
在场的意大利代表英格劳(Pietro lngrao)对我们说：大厅里听众感到震惊、生气，感到“人” 对毛无非是数字，死人他满不在乎，核战争他毫不介意，还挺欢迎。南斯拉夫首席代表卡德尔听毛讲完后想：“再清楚不过了，毛泽东想要战争。”就连信仰斯大林主义的法国共产党也很反感。
Mao dismissed concerns about improving living standards:
毛反驳了希望改善人民生活的倾向，说：
People say that poverty is bad, but in fact poverty is good. The poorer people are, the more revolutionary they are. It is dreadful to imagine a time when everyone will be rich … From a surplus of calories people will have two heads and four legs.
“有人说穷是坏事，我看穷是好事。越穷越要革命。人人都富裕的时代是不堪设想的……热卡太多了，人就要长两个脑袋四条腿了。”他的观点跟斯大林死后共产党世界不希望战争，更在乎生活水准的风气背道而驰。
Mao's views ran dead against the mood of the post-Stalin Communist regimes, which wanted to avoid war and raise living standards. He was not a success. Although he met plenty of Communist leaders this time, unlike on his previous visit, when Stalin had banned any such meetings, and although he missed no opportunity to dispense advice, few took his words seriously. Notes by Britain's John Gollan of Mao's advice to the tiny and irrelevant British Party read: “… wait for opportune moment—one day England will be yours.—when win victory don't kill them, give them a house.” To the third-rate Bulgarian Todor Zhivkov, one of the youngest present, Mao remarked: “you are young and clever … When socialism is victorious in the whole world, we will propose you for president of the world community.” No one but Zhivkov himself thought Mao meant it. Mao fascinated some, but he did not command the kind of respect that translated into allegiance, or confidence.
毛见了各国共产党领导人，但这些人感到他说话不着边际，无法当真。英国共产党本是个微不足道的小党，可是毛对英共领袖戈兰(John Gollan)说：“等待最好的时机行动，英国会是你们的。胜利以后不要把他们[资产阶级]都杀了，把他们养起来。”毛对能力有限的保加利亚共产党领导人日夫科夫(Todor Zhivkov)说：“你又年轻又聪明，社会主义在全世界胜利以后，我们推举你做全世界人的领袖。”听者中相信的只有日夫科夫自己。
毛本想此行能振臂一呼，应者云集，但尽管对他感兴趣的人不少，响应他的人寥寥无几。
Mao attributed this failure to China's lack of economic and military muscle. “We are a short tree and the Soviet Union is a tall tree,” he told Poland's Gomulka, citing steel output as the yardstick. He was determined to remedy this. In his final speech he announced: “Comrade Khrushchev told me that in fifteen years the Soviet Union can overtake America. I can also say that in fifteen years we may catch up or overtake Britain.” The subtext was that he was in the race, as much a player as Khrushchev.
毛略带失落感地对哥穆尔卡说：“我们树矮，苏联树高。中国从人口上说是个大国，从经济上说却是个小国。我们产的钢只有五百万吨……而苏联是五千万吨。” 他要和赫鲁晓夫在经济实力上比高低的情绪在大会最后发言中表现得十分强烈：“赫鲁晓夫同志告诉我们，十五年后，苏联可以超过美国。我也可以讲，十五年后我们可能赶上或者超过英国。”
To put Khrushchev down, Mao adopted a grand style, talking to the Soviet leader like a teacher: “You have a quick temper, which tends to make enemies … let people voice their different views, and talk to them slowly …” In the presence of a large audience, Mao sounded even more superior:
虽然树矮，毛也要压赫鲁晓夫一头，他同赫鲁晓夫谈话，就像老师对学生：“你的个人脾气不好，很容易伤人……有什么不同意见，让人家讲出来以后，慢慢谈。”
Everyone needs support. An able fellow needs the help of three other people, a fence needs three stakes to support it. These are Chinese proverbs. Still another Chinese proverb says that with all its beauty the lotus needs the green of its leaves to set it off. You, comrade Khrushchev, even though you are a beautiful lotus, you too need the leaves to set you off …
“任何一个人都要人支持。一个好汉也要三个帮，一个篱笆也要三个桩。这是中国的成语。中国还有一句成语，荷花虽好，也要绿叶扶持。你赫鲁晓夫同志这朵荷花虽好，也要绿叶扶持。”听到拿他比作荷花，在场人看到苏联领袖“把头垂下，脸胀得通红”。*
At this point, according to one participant, Khrushchev “hung his head and went very red.”*
* 毛想让人觉得他充满哲理，说话用了很多中国成语。这些成语很难翻译。一个意大利代表说：“大家都不知道毛在说些什么，我记得我们的翻译双手托头，一副无可奈何的样子。”
Worse, in front of delegates from all 64 countries, Mao brought up the attempt to oust Khrushchev a few months earlier, and described Molotov, the chief plotter, as “an old comrade with a long history of struggle,” saying that Khrushchev's line was only “relatively correct”; at this point a deathly silence fell over the hall. Mao repeatedly said things to top Russians in private like “We loved Molotov very much.” (In 1955 the highly unlovable Molotov had called China the “co-leader” of the Communist camp.)
更令赫鲁晓夫屈辱的是，毛当着六十四国代表的面，提起几个月前那场企图搞掉赫鲁晓夫的政变，称搞阴谋的带头人莫洛托夫为“老同志，有很长的斗争历史”， 说赫鲁晓夫的路线仅仅是“比较正确”。毛讲到这里时，整个大厅陷入死一般的沉寂。会外毛也常常说：“我们热爱莫洛托夫。”毛三番五次赞美莫洛托夫的原因是，莫洛托夫一九五五年曾说毛可以与苏共“共同领导”共产主义阵营。
In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote about Mao's “megalomania”: “Mao thought of himself as a man sent by God to do God's bidding. In fact, Mao probably thought God did Mao's own bidding.” But Mao was not just being megalomaniac, he was also deliberately aiming to diminish Khrushchev's stature, and elevate his own. Khrushchev put up with all this in the interests of preserving the unity of the Communist camp. This concern tied Khrushchev's hands vis-à-vis Mao, and Mao exploited this weak spot to the full.
对这些轻蔑、侮辱，赫鲁晓夫有切肤之痛，在回忆录中说：毛是个“自大狂”，“毛认为他是上帝的特使。他很可能认为上帝是他的特使。”但是，赫鲁晓夫都忍了--为了共产主义阵营的团结。毛很清楚赫鲁晓夫的这个弱点，无论他怎样欺负赫鲁晓夫，赫鲁晓夫也不会跟他决裂。他将不断利用这一点来为自己服务。
AFTER RETURNING from Moscow, Mao added to his shopping list another item dear to his heart: nuclear submarines, which Peking regarded as “the ace in the modern arsenal.” In June 1958 Chou wrote to ask Khrushchev for the technology and equipment to manufacture these, as well as aircraft-carriers and other large warships.
从莫斯科回来以后，毛对苏联的购货单又添加了一项：当代武库中的王牌核潜艇。一九五八年六月，周恩来写信给赫鲁晓夫要求提供生产核潜艇的技术、设备，此外还要航空母舰和其他军舰。
But this time Khrushchev did not just hand over what Mao asked for. Instead, he tried to secure a quid pro quo: use of China's long coastline, which had easy access to the high seas, unlike Russia's. Khrushchev suggested that China (and Vietnam) could co-crew ships with the Russians in return for these ships using Chinese (and Vietnamese) ports. Ambassador Yudin put this to Mao on 21 July.
这一次赫鲁晓夫没有照单发货。他建议中、苏建立一支共同舰队，越南也参加。这样中国既有了核潜艇，苏联也可以借用中国直通太平洋的海岸线。苏联大使尤金七月二十一日向毛提出合作的建议。
Mao wanted a fleet of his own, and to build his own ships. In order to give himself an excuse to turn down the Russian proposal for cooperation, he staged a tantrum. Next day, on 22 July, he summoned Yudin back and told him: “You upset me so much that I didn't sleep all night.” He then distorted Moscow's proposal into an issue of sovereignty, accusing the Russians of “wanting to control us” through a “joint fleet.” “It boils down to you don't trust the Chinese …” In among the bluster, Mao inserted his real demand: “You must help us to build a navy!… We want to have two or three hundred [nuclear] submarines” (our italics).
毛当然不会同意，他要的是建造和拥有自己的核潜艇。但他抓住苏方建议借题发挥。第二天他把尤金叫来，当着其他中共领导人的面大发雷霆，说：“你们昨天把我气得一宿没有睡觉。”他把合作建议上升到民族感情、主权问题：“你们只搞了一点原子能，就要控制，就要租借权。”“你们就是不相信中国人，只相信俄国人。俄国人是上等人，中国人是下等人，毛手毛脚的。”发火之余，毛露出他的真实目的：“你们帮助我们建设海军嘛！”“我们打算搞二三百艘这种潜艇。”最后毛要求：“请赫鲁晓夫同志来北京。”
Khrushchev was alarmed by Mao's outburst, as Mao had hoped he would be, and rushed to Peking in secret on 31 July. Mao gave him an ostentatiously frosty welcome. As the leaders drove into their first talk, Khrushchev declared straightaway that: “There was no thought of a joint fleet.” After much bombast, Mao backed down and conceded that his interpretation of Khrushchev's proposal was unfounded, that he had “lost sleep” for nothing, though he continued to act as if his national pride had been mortally wounded. But Mao's theatrics had got Khrushchev to come more than halfway, and the Soviet leader offered to build China “a big plant … to manufacture a large number of nuclear submarines.” To keep the pressure on, Mao strongly hinted that otherwise the Russians might be drawn into a war: “Now that we don't have a nuclear submarine fleet, we might as well hand our entire coast over to you, for you to fight for us.” Then, to hammer this point home, as soon as Khrushchev departed, Mao manufactured a war situation, once again using Taiwan.
赫鲁晓夫按毛的要求于七月三十一日飞来北京。毛板着脸到机场去接他，没有红地毯，没有仪仗队。落座后，赫鲁晓夫不断解释，说他根本没有想控制中国的想法。毛仍然表现得好像他的民族自尊心受了莫大伤害，站起来指着赫鲁晓夫的鼻子声色俱厉地说：“我问你，什么叫联合舰队！”他还装作赌气地说：要是“我们没有核潜艇舰队，将来索性把海岸都交给你们，你们去打好了。”毛的表演把赫鲁晓夫蒙住了，许诺帮助中国在黄河或其他河流边“建立一个制造潜水艇的大工厂，大量生产潜水艇”。
The second Taiwan Strait crisis was very like the first in 1954–55, which Mao had staged to twist his ally's arm for A-bomb technology. This time his target was nuclear submarines and other high-tech military know-how. On 23 August Mao opened up a huge artillery barrage against the island of Quemoy, the springboard to Taiwan, blanketing the tiny island with over 30,000 (mainly Russian-made) shells. Washington thought Mao might really be going for Taiwan. No one in the West suspected his true goal: to force the USA to threaten a nuclear war in order to scare his own ally—a ruse unique in the annals of statecraft.
赫鲁晓夫走后不久，八月二十三日，毛突然炮轰金门，一口气朝这个最靠近大陆的国民党海岛，发射了三万枚苏制炮弹，引发了第二次台海危机。美国又以为毛要打台湾。没人知道的是，毛在故伎重施，以迫使苏联人给他核潜艇和其他最新的军事技术。
The US moved a large fleet into the area, and on 4 September Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the US was committed to defending not only Taiwan, but also Quemoy, and threatened to bomb the Mainland. The Kremlin got very nervous about an armed confrontation with the US, and sent foreign minister Andrei Gromyko secretly to Peking the next day. Gromyko brought the draft of a letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, which said that an attack on China “is an attack on the Soviet Union.” Khrushchev was inviting Mao's comment, which he hoped would be a reassurance that things would not go that far. Mao obliged, telling Gromyko that “this time we are not going to strike Taiwan, nor are we going to fight the Americans, so there will not be a world war.” But he made it clear that a war over Taiwan was definitely on the cards “for the future,” and that it would most likely be a nuclear war.
美国舰队驶入台湾海峡，九月四日，国务卿杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)宣布美国不但坚决保卫台湾，而且也要保卫金门，威胁要轰炸大陆。赫鲁晓夫紧张了，怕苏联被拖進与美国的军事冲突中去，第二天派外交部长葛罗米柯(Andrei Gromyko) 来中国。毛要葛罗米柯放心，说：当前我们不会打台湾，也不会打美国，不至于引起世界大战。但毛又让苏联人感到，他将来和美国必有一战。
Khrushchev thought Mao could well trigger off such a war, but he wrote in his memoirs: “We made no move to restrain our Chinese comrades because we thought they were absolutely right in trying to unify all the territories of China.” This was the beauty of Taiwan as an issue for Mao: even if it threatened to cause a third world war, Moscow could not fault him.
Having established this scenario of a future nuclear war with America over Taiwan, Mao scraped hard at the Russians' nerves. He told Gromyko he would like to discuss with Khrushchev at some stage how to coordinate in such a war, and then raised the specter of Russia being wiped out. When the war was over, he asked, “Where shall we build the capital of the socialist world?,” implying that Moscow would be gone. He proceeded to propose that the new capital be located on a man-made island in the Pacific. This remark so startled Gromyko that he wanted to exclude it from his telegram home; there the Kremlin “paid particular attention” to Mao's sally, according to the aide who drafted the cable.
毛接着吓唬苏联人，对葛罗米柯说，他希望同赫鲁晓大交换意见，看核战争爆发了怎么个打法。他暗示苏联届时将被整个毁掉，问葛罗米柯：这样一场世界大战之后，“我们应当在哪里建立社会主义世界的首都呢？”言外之意是莫斯科那时不复存在。毛建议在太平洋上人造一座小岛，作为社会主义世界的新首都。葛罗米柯听得毛骨悚然，不想把这些话写在发回莫斯科的电报里，但想想还是写了，起草电报的助手说毛的这番话引起了莫斯科的特别注意。
Having thus shaken up Gromyko, Mao then proceeded to mollify him by saying that China would take all the heat of the coming nuclear war. “Our policy is that we will take the full consequences of this war ourselves. We will deal with America, and … we will not drag the Soviet Union into this war.” Except, Mao said, “we have to make preparations to fight the war with America,” and that included “material preparations.” Chou En-lai spelled it out to the Russian chargé: “We have made plans to produce modern weapons with the help of the Soviet Union.” Mao had made his position clear: You can opt out, if you enable me to fight the war myself.
吓唬了葛罗米柯后，毛给他吃定心丸：我们的方针是我们自己来承担这个战争的全部责任。我们同美国周旋，我们不要你们参加这个战争。我们不会拖苏联下水。当然，前提是，你们得帮我们，使我们能独自对付美国。
Khrushchev got the point. On 27 September he wrote to Mao: “Thank you for your willingness to take on yourselves a strike, without involving the Soviet Union,” and followed this up on 5 October by announcing that the Taiwan crisis was an “internal” matter and that Russia would not get involved in what he called this “civil war.” For Khrushchev to say that he would let Mao deal with a nuclear war with America on his own signaled his agreement to arm the Chinese to do so. The very next day, Mao wrote a statement in the name of his defense minister, suspending the shelling of Quemoy. This ended the second Taiwan Strait crisis.
赫鲁晓夫九月二十七日给毛写信说：“感谢您愿意独自承受打击，而不把苏联卷進去。”赫鲁晓夫同意帮助毛，使毛有能力对抗美国。毛的要求得到满足，他以国防部长彭德怀的名义写了一纸声明，宣布暂停炮击金门。第二次台海危机解除。
Mao then wrote to Khrushchev confirming that he would be only too happy for China to fight a nuclear war with America alone. “For our ultimate victory,” he offered, “for the total eradication of the imperialists, we [i.e., the Chinese people, who had not been consulted] are willing to endure the first [US nuclear] strike. All it is is a big pile of people dying [our italics].”*
十月十四日，毛给赫鲁晓夫写信说，他十分乐意让中国独自承受美国的核武打击：“为了最后胜利，灭掉帝国主义，我们愿意承担第一个打击，无非是死一大堆人”。当然，毛泽东自称的“我们”，准备“死一大堆”的中国人民，是没有被征求意见的。*
To keep the Taiwan issue alight, Mao ordered the shelling of Quemoy to resume, eventually cutting it back to alternate days. This characteristically Maoist extravagance put tremendous strain on the economy. The army chief of staff, who was not let in on Mao's intentions, protested: “There is little point in the shelling. It costs a lot of money … Why do it?” Mao could find nothing to say except to accuse the general of being “right-wing,” and he was soon purged. Firing expensive shells onto the rocky island went on for twenty years, and stopped only after Mao's death, on New Year's Day 1979, the day Peking and Washington established diplomatic relations.
* 毛不久恢复了炮打金门，但只是象征性的，单日打，双日停。这种典型的毛式挥金如土令总参谋长黄克诚深感不解，问毛：“既然我们并不准备真打，炮轰的意义就不大，打大炮花很多钱，搞得到处都紧张，何必呢？”毛无言以对，只有指责黄是个““右”的参谋”，不久黄被打倒。昂贵的炮弹朝金门岛倾泻了二十年，直到一九七九年一月一日，中、美建立外交关系，毛泽东也已经死了。
Meanwhile, Khrushchev endorsed a number of high-end technology transfers, which led to an astonishing deal on 4 February 1959 under which Russia committed to helping China to make a whole range of advanced ships and weapons, including conventional-powered ballistic missile submarines and submarine-to-surface missiles. The first Taiwan Strait crisis had panicked the secrets of the Bomb out of Moscow; now, four years later, with the second Taiwan Strait crisis, Mao had prised out of Khrushchev an agreement to transfer no less than the whole range of equipment needed to deliver the Bomb.
这次台海危机带给毛的是：赫鲁晓夫批准转让一系列尖端技术，一九五九年二月四日签订了惊人的“新技术援助协定”，规定苏联帮助中国建造整套先進武器、军舰，包括常规动力导弹潜艇、潜对地弹道导弹等。第一次台海危机使毛从莫斯科挖出了原子弹的秘密，四年后的第二次，使他所得更丰。
Over the years from 1953 when Mao had first outlined his Superpower Program, its scale had grown prodigiously, but each expansion had only aggravated his fundamental problem: how to squeeze out enough food to pay for his purchases. In 1956, when the scope of the Program was much smaller, deaths from starvation had become so shocking that his usually docile Politburo had balked at the plan and forced him to slow down. Now a far worse death toll was in the offing. But this time Mao did not have to make concessions to his colleagues at home. In the course of 1957 he had altered one fundamental thing. Khrushchev no longer had any authority in Peking, and Mao no longer felt constrained by him.
从一九五三年毛首次推出军事工业化纲领以来，他的购货单膨胀了不知多少倍。每一次膨胀都加深一次毛的根本困难：怎么挤出农产品去偿付。一九五六年，当政治局反对时，他只能以下马项目来让步，因为赫鲁晓夫的权威使他有所顾忌。如今，他不必担心赫鲁晓夫，他已经把赫鲁晓夫的威信从中共领导中一扫而光。从此毛说了算。
*A joke went the rounds in Budapest about a man buying tea. When asked: Which tea do you want—Russian or Chinese? he replied: I'll have coffee instead!
*Khrushchev handed over two R-2 short-range, ground-to-ground missiles, which China copied, though he declined to transfer rockets with a range of more than 2,900 km. The Russians also stationed a missile regiment outside Peking, with sixty-three R-1 and R-2 missiles, on which they trained the Chinese.
*Mao decided to play the superior philosopher, and used a language full of Chinese metaphors, oblique for a non-Chinese audience, and almost impossible to translate. One of the Italian interpreters recalled: “From the Russian translation I heard, no one could understand what Mao said. I remember our translators put their heads in their hands.” In fact, even Chinese audiences had to guess what Mao was driving at when he employed this style.
*Mao had said similar things before, in less overtly callous language. In 1955 he told the Finnish ambassador that “America's atom bombs are too few to wipe out the Chinese. Even if the US atom bombs … were dropped on China, blasted a hole in the Earth or blew it to pieces, this might be a big thing for the solar system, but it would still be an insignificant matter as far as the universe as a whole is concerned.”