43 MAOISM GOES GLOBAL
43 “ 毛主义”登上世界舞台
(1959–64 AGE 65–70)
1959～1964 年 65～70 岁
IN FEBRUARY 1959, Russia signed an agreement to provide China with the means to make nuclear submarines. This marked the high point of the Kremlin's cooperation on technology transfers. But even while the deal was being signed, Khrushchev was having second thoughts about endowing Mao with such enormous military power.
克里姆林宫一九五九年二月签约帮助毛建造核潜艇等先進武器，是苏联军事技术转让的高峰。但就在协议的酝酿过程中，赫鲁晓夫心里已经打退堂鼓了。
One incident in particular had prompted Khrushchev to rethink. In September 1958 a US air-to-air Sidewinder missile had come down over China unexploded from a Taiwanese plane. Urgent requests from Khrushchev to let the Russians examine this state-of-the-art windfall went unanswered. The Chinese then claimed they could not find it. Khrushchev's son Sergei, a leading rocket scientist, recalled:
促使赫鲁晓夫改变主意的有这样一件事。一九五八年九月，一枚美国最新式的“响尾蛇(Sidewinder)”空对空导弹从一架台湾飞机上完整未爆地落在中国国土上。赫鲁晓夫紧急要求中方让苏联专家研究这枚导弹，但中方声称他们找不到导弹。赫鲁晓夫的儿子、本人也是导弹专家的谢尔盖(Sergei Khrushchev)回忆道：
For the first time, Father sensed the deep fissures that had appeared in our “fraternal friendship.” For the first time he wondered whether it made sense to transfer the newest military technology and teach the Chinese how to build missiles and nuclear warheads.
“第一次，父亲感到“兄弟般的友谊”上有着很深的裂痕。第一次，他思索到底该不该向中国提供最新军事技术，教他们怎么造导弹和核弹头。”
… in February [1959], he decided to exert pressure for the first time … he held up transfer of instructions for the R-12 [missile]. It did the trick. The [Sidewinder] missile was immediately found.
一九五九年二月，赫鲁晓夫决定施加压力，“他按下R-12导弹的技术说明不发。这下问题解决了，“响尾蛇”马上就找到了。”
The Chinese had dismantled the missile and the critical guidance system was missing. “This was offensive and insulting to us,” Khrushchev senior wrote in his memoirs. “Anybody in our place would have felt pain. We held no secrets back from China. We gave them everything … Yet when they got a trophy they refused to share it.” Khrushchev reached the conclusion that Mao was just using Russia for his own goals, and did not care about the interests of the Communist camp as a whole. Mao, he felt, “was bursting with an impatient desire to rule the world.” Khrushchev gave orders to go slow on transferring nuclear know-how, and on 20 June 1959 he suspended assistance on the Bomb.
“响尾蛇”已被中方拆开，关键的导向系统不见了。赫鲁晓夫在回忆录里写道：“我们认为这是无理的，是侮辱我们。任何人处在我们的地位都会感到痛苦。我们对他们没有秘密，什么都给了他们。而他们得了件宝贝，却不让我们分享。”赫鲁晓夫得出结论，毛只是利用苏联为他的私利服务，心里想的不是共产主义阵营的利益，毛“急不可耐地要统治世界”。他下令拖延核技术转让。六月二十日，他停止供应中国原子弹样品和技术资料。
This was not a fatal blow, as by now China had the basic know-how, and the key equipment, for a Bomb. But Mao could see that from here on it was going to be hard to tap Khrushchev for more.
这对中国不是致命打击，因为中国此时已经掌握了制造原子弹的基本技术。但毛明白，以后赫鲁晓夫就靠不住了。
In September, Khrushchev went to America on the first-ever visit by a Soviet leader. He believed there was a real possibility of peaceful coexistence with the West. Afterwards he went on to Peking for the tenth anniversary of Mao's regime. Khrushchev urged Mao to be conciliatory towards the West, “to avoid anything that could be exploited … to drive the world back into the cold war ‘rut,' ” as Russia's chief ideologist put it.
九月，赫鲁晓夫访问美国。以前还没有苏联领袖这么干过。赫鲁晓夫相信有可能同西方“和平共处”。离开美国后，他来到中国参加中共国庆十周年庆典，敦促毛与西方搞缓和。
Mao saw Khrushchev's rapprochement with the West as a historic opportunity to put himself forward as the champion of all those around the world who saw peaceful coexistence as favoring—and possibly freezing—the status quo. The timing seemed particularly good, with decolonization in full swing. There were numerous anti-colonial movements in Africa that were keen on guerrilla war, of which Mao was perceived to be the advocate and expert in a way that Khrushchev was not. Communist parties, too, seemed soft targets, as they had little hope of getting into power except through violence. Mao envisaged a situation where “Communist parties all over the world will not believe in [Russia] but believe in us.” He saw a chance to establish his own “centre for world revolution.”
赫鲁晓夫对资本主义世界的态度给了毛一个历史性的机遇。如果毛竖起反旗，那些一心要靠暴力推翻资本主义政权的人们，就会弃赫鲁晓夫而拥戴毛。当时的世界大背景看起来对毛也十分有利。非洲正在反殖民主义，无数人想打游击战争，毛本来就被他们认为是游击战的专家，而赫鲁晓夫不是。没有掌权的共产党，想要上台不靠暴力前景渺茫。毛展望着未来：“马克思主义、列宁主义大发展在中国，这是毫无疑义的。”“东欧各国和世界各共产党不相信他们[苏联]而相信我们。”
To have his own camp, and not have to play second fiddle to Khrushchev, had long been Mao's dream. As Khrushchev had begun to dry up as a source of military hardware, Mao felt less concerned about annoying him. But nor did he want a split from him either, as Russia was still handing over a wealth of military technology, with no fewer than 1,010 blueprints transferred in 1960 alone—more even than in 1958. So Mao formulated a policy of “not to denounce” the Russians “for the time being,” and sought to milk them of everything he could as fast as he could. “China will become powerful in eight years,” he told his top echelon, and Khrushchev “will be completely bankrupt.”
但毛眼下还不能和赫鲁晓夫彻底分手。苏联的军事技术转让，虽然有了限制，但没有停止，一九六0年转让的设计图纸达一千零十份，比一九五八年还多。毛想抓紧时间先把苏联技术拿到手，“中国将在八年内相当强大起来。”毛浮想联翩。八年之后，赫鲁晓夫“将完全破产”。
The goal for now, he told his inner circle at the beginning of 1960, was “to propagate Mao Tse-tung Thought” around the world. At first, the drive should not be too aggressive, in order, as he put it, not to be seen to be trying to “export our fragrant intestines” (to which Mao compared his “Thought”). The resulting propaganda campaign brought the world “Maoism.”
毛的策略是“分而不裂”竖旗要有分寸。一九六0年初，中共开始在全世界宣传毛泽东思想。
THE IDEA OF promoting China's experience as a model when the Chinese were dying of starvation in their millions might seem a tall order, but Mao was not perturbed: he had watertight filters on what foreigners could see and hear. As of February 1959, the CIA's “preliminary judgement” about Chinese food output was that there were “remarkable increases in production.” Mao could easily pull the wool over most visitors' eyes. When the French writer Simone de Beauvoir visited in 1955, even the French-speaking Chinese woman assigned to accompany her had to get special permission to speak to her directly without going through the interpreter. After her short visit, de Beauvoir pontificated that “the power he [Mao] exercises is no more dictatorial than, for example, Roosevelt's was. New China's Constitution renders impossible the concentration of authority in one man's hands.” She wrote a lengthy book about the trip, titled The Long March. Its index has one entry for the word “violence,” which reads: “[Mao] on violence, avoidance of.”
一九六0年正是大饥荒最严重的时候，怎么可能有人相信毛主义呢？毛毫不担心，他自有一套滴水不漏的控制系统，让外国人按他的需要去看，去听。要蒙外国人容易得很。美国中央情报局一九五九年二月对中国食品生产量的判断是“大幅度增长”。法国名作家西蒙·波娃(Simone de Beauvoir)访华时，陪同她的中国女伴虽然会说法文，但没有上面许可不能跟她直接用法文交谈。波娃访华归去大谈什么“毛并不比罗斯福等人更专制，新中国的宪法保证了权力不可能集中在一个人手里”。她还写了厚厚一本书，名叫《长征》(The Long March），索引有个条目是“暴力”，后面一排字：“毛论述如何避免暴力。”
Mao made sure that no Chinese except a very carefully vetted elite could get out of the country. Among the few who could were diplomats, who became notorious for their leaden performances. They worked under straitjacket rules about exactly what they could say, the strictest orders to report every conversation, and permanent surveillance by each other. Communist China's first ambassadors were mostly army generals. Before sending them off, Mao told them, only half-jokingly: “You don't know any foreign language, and you are not [professional] diplomats; but I want you to be my diplomats—because in my view you won't be able to flee.” And over half of these men were going to other Communist countries.
绝大部分中国人被密封在国门之内。驻外的外交官被无穷尽的“涉外纪律，困得死死的，什么必须“二人同行”，什么诸事“事前请示，事后汇报”，动辄有里通外国的嫌疑，无怪乎中国外交宫在海外的名声是举止呆板。中共首批派出国的大使大都是将军们。毛接见他们时半开玩笑地说：“你们不会外文，但是还要你们去干外交，因为首先你们跑不了。”而这些大使们大半去的还是共产主义国家。
The only people who got out and would talk were a small number of daring ordinary citizens who risked their lives and swam to Hong Kong. They broke the wall of silence around Mao's famine and the dark realities of Red China in general. But their voices won little credence in the West.
出了国而敢于说真话的，是一小批冒着生命危险泅水到香港的叛逃者。他们把大饥荒的真相告诉世界。可惜，很少西方人相信他们。
Instead, when Mao told barefaced lies to France's Socialist leader (and future president) François Mitterrand during the famine in 1961 (“I repeat it, in order to be heard: there is no famine in China”), he was widely believed. The future Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau came in 1960 and co-wrote a starry-eyed book, Two Innocents in Red China, which rejected reports of famine. Even the former chief of the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization, Lord Boyd-Orr, was duped. In May 1959, after a trip to China, he opined that food production had risen 50–100 percent over 1955–58 and that China “seems capable of feeding [its population] well.” Britain's Field Marshal Montgomery, a much more gullible figure, asserted after visits in 1960 and 1961 that there had been “no large-scale famine, only shortages in certain areas,” and he certainly did not regard the “shortages” as Mao's fault, as he urged Mao to hang on to power: “China … needs the chairman. You mustn't abandon this ship.”
毛的谎言在西方却大有市场。当法国社会党领袖(后来的总统)密特朗(Francois Mitterrand)在一九六一年访华时，毛对他说：“我再重复说一遍，中国没有饥荒。” 大家都把这话当真。一九六0年，未来的加拿大总理特鲁多(Pierre Trudeau)来了一趟，回去后同别人合作写了本天真的书：《两个单纯的人在红色中国》(Two Innocents in Red China)，书中特别批驳外部世界对大饥荒的报导，说中国没有饥荒。甚至像前联合国粮农组织负责人波尔德沃(John Boyd-orr)爵土这样的专家也轻易受骗，一九五九年访华后大发议论说，中国的粮食产量从五五年到五八年翻了整整一番，中国人“看来都丰衣足食”。英国那位容易上当的陆军元帅蒙哥马利(Bernard Montgomery)在一九六0、一九六一两次访华后宣称：“中国没有大规模的饥荒，只在有的地方粮食不足。”他显然不觉得“粮食不足”是毛的过错，见到毛时一个劲儿鼓励毛抓住权力不放，说：“中国需要主席，您可不能离开这艘船不管。”
Mao had no problem covering up the famine, and was confident he could promote himself as a credible international leader. For this job he brought in three dependable writer-journalists: Edgar Snow, the half-Chinese Han Suyin, and Felix Greene, who did an interview with Chou on BBC TV during which Chou simply read out his answers from sheets of paper.
有这样的西方人，毛要掩盖饥荒易如反掌。他还特地邀来三个文人帮他搞宣传：斯诺、韩素音、英国的格林(Felix Greene)。格林为BBC电视台对周恩来作了一次采访，从头到尾只见周恩来在念稿子。
MAO'S SELF-PROMOTION abroad was fueled by vastly increased handouts of his usual trio: arms, money and food. On 21 January 1960 a new body called the Foreign Economic Liaison Bureau was formed, ranking on a par with the Foreign Trade Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, to handle the rise in foreign aid. Aid figures soared immediately. This spree of gifts by Mao coincided with the worst years of the greatest famine in world history. Over 22 million people died of starvation in 1960 alone.
要在世界舞台上推销毛主义，大把花钱是少不了的。一九六0年一月二十一日，与外交部、外贸部平行的中国对外经济联络总局成立，专门负责向外国赠送现款、食品等。就在大饥荒最严重的年份，外援激增。
China was not only the poorest country in the world to provide aid, but its aid was the highest ever given as a percentage of the donor country's per capita income—and, moreover, often went to countries with a standard of living much higher than itself, like Hungary. And the cost of these handouts was not just the standard of living, but Chinese lives. Moreover, they were literally handouts, as Peking constantly said that loans should be treated as gifts, or that repayment should be deferred indefinitely. As for arms, the regime liked to say “We are not arms merchants”; but this did not mean it did not export arms, only that the arms did not have to be paid for.
在提供外援的国家里，中国是最穷的，却是最慷慨的，借出去的债是不要还的。说到提供武器，毛的口头禅是：“我们不是军火商。”意思是中国的军火不要钱白送。
Mao saw that his best chance was where there was a war, so the main donee on his list was Indochina, on which he lavished more than US$20 billion during his reign. In Africa he tried to latch on to the decolonization movement: there he showered cash, goods and arms on the Algerians, who were fighting the biggest anti-colonial war on the continent, against the French.*
送钱最多的地方是印度支那，毛执政期间至少送了两百多亿美金。在非洲，毛送给正在打法国人的阿尔及利亚的无偿援助难以数计。
In Latin America, Peking made a beeline for Cuba after Fidel Castro took power in January 1959. When Castro's colleague Che Guevara came to China in November 1960, Mao doled out US$60m as a “loan,” which Chou told Guevara “does not have to be repaid.”
在拉丁美洲，古巴的切·格瓦拉(Che Guevara)一九六0年十一月访华，毛一口气就给了六千万美金的“贷款”， 周恩来特别告诉格瓦拉，这钱“可以经过谈判不还”。
In the Communist bloc itself, Mao worked on trying to acquire influence in every country, but only managed to detach one client from Russia's sphere of influence: tiny poverty-stricken Albania. As early as 1958, its dictator, Enver Hoxha, had scrounged 50m rubles out of a willing Mao—a considerable sum for a country of fewer than 3 million people. Then, in January 1961, as the Peking–Moscow rift sharpened and Hoxha showed he could be relied on to spout venom against Khrushchev, Peking decupled this amount, lending Tirana 500 million rubles, and sent 2.2 million bushels of wheat, which China had bought from Canada for hard currency. Thanks to food donated by China, the Albanians did not even know what rationing was, while the Chinese were dying in their tens of millions. Albania's chief negotiator with Peking, Pupo Shyti, told us that in China “you could see the famine.” But “the Chinese gave us everything.” “When we needed anything, we just asked the Chinese … I felt ashamed …” When Mao's colleagues flinched he told them off.
在共产主义阵营内，毛只争取到一个又小又穷的阿尔巴尼亚。为了拉住霍查，一九五八年，毛给了这个只有三百万人的国家五千万卢布。一九六一年一月，毛跟苏联的分裂加剧，指望霍查帮忙骂赫鲁晓夫，又给了他五亿卢布！还用外汇从加拿大买小麦送给阿尔巴尼亚。靠着中国的食品，阿尔巴尼亚人不知“定量”为何物。这一切都发生在中国数千万人饿死的时候。阿尔巴尼亚跟北京谈判的主要代表希地(Pupo Shyti)对我们说：“在中国，我们当然看得到饥馑。可是，我们要什么中国就给什么，我们只需要开开口。我感到很惭愧。”有时中国官员不愿给，只要跟毛一说，毛马上就出面责备他们。
Mao spent money trying to split Communist parties and to set up Maoist parties all over the world—a task he entrusted to his old intelligence chief, Kang Sheng. Spotting Peking's crude criteria for allegiance, freeloaders jumped aboard the gravy train. Albanian archives reveal a tetchy Kang in Tirana griping about Venezuelan leftists walking off with US$300,000 of China's money funneled through Albania. Dutch intelligence set up a bogus Maoist party, which was funded and feted by the Chinese. The CIA's top China hand, James Lilley, told us they were delighted to discover how easy it was to infiltrate China: simply get a few people to chant hosannas to Mao and set up a Maoist party, which Peking would then rush to fund—and invite to China. (These spies, however, were useless, as all foreigners were rigidly segregated from the Chinese.)*
毛把大量的钱花在分裂各国共产党，建立“毛主义党”上面，由康生负责。各国应声而起了一批“吃毛饭”的人。只要拉起一个组织，唱唱毛的颂歌，跟着就领钱享福。在阿尔巴尼亚档案馆里，有一份资料写道，康生发牢骚说，委内瑞拉的几个“左派”取走了中国经阿尔巴尼亚资助他们的三十万美金后就不见了。荷兰情报部门干脆设立了一个伪装的毛主义党来收集情报，钱呢，自然由中国出。美国中央情报局中国问题专家(后任驻华大使)李洁明(James Lilley)告诉我们，看到可以如此容易地派人進中国，他们简直乐坏了，找了些人高呼毛万岁，建立毛主义党，中共出钱养这些人，邀请他们去中国。不过，美国情报当局很快发现这些间谍去了中国也没用，他们与社会完全隔绝。*
* 为了对外宣传的需要，一张便条就可从银行取走大笔现金。有个胆大的中国人看到有机可乘，也尝试捞些钱進腰包。这个人叫王倬，是外贸部的一名科员。一九六0年三月，他伪造了一张假冒周恩来批示的便条，从中国人民银行总行取走了二十万元现金。便条写道：“总理：主席办公室来电话告称：今晚九时西藏活佛举行讲经会，有中外记者参加拍纪录影片。主席嘱拨一些款子做修缮寺庙用。这样可以表明我们对少数民族和宗教自由的政策，“周恩来”用毛笔批示：“请人民银行立即拨出现款二十万元。”另有小字批道：“为避免资本主义国家记者造谣，一、要市场流通旧票；二、十元票，每捆要包装好看一点。七时务必送到民族饭店赵全一收。”
就这么一张纸，中国人民银行总行就把两大麻袋二十万元现金交到民族饭店大堂一个自称赵全一的人手里。大家都没当一回事，只是在银行打电话问周恩来办公室这笔钱如何下帐时，才发现这是假冒的。
这是毛上台以来最大的“诈骗案”。破案在天罗地网一般的北京不消说是轻而易举。公安人员去逮捕王倬时，只见他有四个惊恐哭泣的小孩子，最大的才十一岁。王倬弄钱是为了让他们吃饱饭。他家对面是一幢华侨住的小楼，华侨有国外汇来的钱可以在国家特殊商店买高价食品。王倬在日记里写道：“钱！钱！钱！做梦都想弄钱……”。
TO LAUNCH “Maoism” on the world, Mao chose the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth, in April 1960, in the form of a manifesto entitled Long Live Leninism!, which said that advocating a peaceful road to socialism was unacceptable—“revisionism,” Peking called it—and that if Communists were to take power they would have to resort to violence. It did not attack Khrushchev by name, using Yugoslavia's Tito as its whipping-boy instead. Mao's calculation was that this way Khrushchev would have less excuse to punish him by withholding military know-how.
毛泽东选择了列宁九十周年诞辰纪念，发表了《列宁主义万岁》等文章，作为“毛主义”宣言。赫鲁晓夫没有受到指名攻击，南斯拉夫的铁托做了替身。
Simultaneously, Mao tried to move himself center-stage by inviting more than 700 sympathizers from the Third World for May Day. This was intended to be the founding moment of the Maoist camp. He received several groups of them himself, and the foreigners were reported “expressing adulation” for him and singing the Maoist anthem, “The East Is Red.” He ordered maximum publicity for these audiences, tinkering over the press reports himself phrase by phrase.
文章在一九六0年四月发表后，趁着“五一”劳动节，中共从亚、非、拉请来七百 多名同情者，把他们作为毛主义阵营的核心。毛接见了好几组人，报纸上大加宣扬，说这些外国人如何表达对毛的“敬爱”，如何唱《东方红》。毛亲自逐字逐句推敲了这些报导。
These encounters were timed to take place just before a major world event from which Mao was excluded—a summit of the Big Four (US, UK, France, Russia), which was due to open in Paris on 16 May, at which Khrushchev hoped to enshrine peaceful coexistence. Mao intended his to be a rival show, and for the world to see him as the champion of the disadvantaged. But his venture went virtually unnoticed, partly because his foreign followers were marginal figures. Mao did not inspire passionate faith, either, and acquired few fervent disciples. He was perceived as patronizing. A group of Africans heard him say that, to Westerners, “our race seems no better than you Africans.”
Mao's hopes that Khrushchev would be seen as an appeaser, and himself as the antithesis, also received a blow from an unexpected quarter. Two weeks before the Paris summit, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia. When President Eisenhower refused to apologise, Khrushchev walked out and the summit collapsed. Peking had to praise Khrushchev for taking a tough stance.
Khrushchev's bellicosity towards America risked taking the wind out of Mao's sails, but he blasted ahead nonetheless, and a convenient occasion was to hand: a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions which opened in Peking on 5 June 1960. This was the most important international meeting to be held in China since Mao had taken power, with participants from some sixty countries combining delegates from ruling Communist parties and militant trade unionists from all five continents, some not subservient to Moscow. Mao mobilized all his top colleagues to lobby hard against Moscow, arguing that peaceful coexistence was a deception, and that “as long as capitalism exists, war cannot be avoided.” The French and the Italians, who were close to Khrushchev's position, were singled out and called servants of imperialism. An Italian delegate, Vittorio Foa, told us that the hostility from the Chinese was so nerve-racking that the Italians feared for their physical safety and tried not to leave each other unaccompanied. The aggressiveness of the Chinese shocked even Albania's delegate Gogo Nushi, who described them, in private, as “bandits.”*
六月五日，世界工联理事会在北京召开，有来自五大洲六十多个国家的代表，其中好些是火药味很重的工会领袖，不愿听命于莫斯科。这是毛掌权以来在中国开的最重要的国际大会。毛让政治局全体出马，大力游说代表们，说和平共处是骗局。因为不能直接谴责苏联，法国、意大利共产党被挑出来当靶子，说它们是帝国主义的臣仆。与会的意大利代表佛阿(Vittorio Foa)告诉我们，中国的态度充满敌意，把他们吓坏了，担心会挨打，决定谁也不要单独行动。甚至阿尔巴尼亚的代表努许(Gogo Nushi)也大为震惊，私下里管中共领导叫“土匪”。
The Chinese were “spitting in our face,” remarked Khrushchev. Moscow perceived this event as the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. So did the CIA. Its Acting Director, Charles Cabell, told the National Security Council two weeks later that Chinese behavior at the meeting had been “a challenge to USSR leadership of such a magnitude that Khrushchev has been compelled to meet it head-on.” Up to now, differences between Moscow and Peking had been tightly concealed by Communist secrecy, and many had doubted that there really was a Sino-Soviet rift.
“中国人在朝我们脸上吐痰，”赫鲁晓夫说。莫斯科认为世界工联理事会事件是中苏分裂的开端。美国中央情报局也这么认为。代理局长卡贝尔(Charles CabeU)事后对美国国家安全会议说，中国的行为“对苏联领导是一场极大的挑战，赫鲁晓夫不能不迎头痛击”。中苏间的裂痕第一次被外界看到了。
On 21 June Khrushchev addressed Communist leaders from fifty-one countries gathered in Bucharest. He refuted Mao's contention that war was needed to bring about socialism: “No world war is needed for the triumph of socialist ideas throughout the world,” he declared. “Only madmen and maniacs can now call for another world war,” in which, he said, using apocalyptic language, “millions of people might burn in the conflagration.” In contrast, “people of sound mind” were “in the majority even among the most deadly enemies of communism.” This was tantamount to saying that Mao was crazy, and suggesting that coexistence with the West was a better bet than continuing an alliance with Mao. “You want to dominate everyone, you want to dominate the world,” Khrushchev told Mao's delegate, Peng Zhen, in private. Khrushchev also said to the Chinese: “Since you love Stalin so much, why don't you take his corpse to Peking?” He told his colleagues: “When I look at Mao I see Stalin, a perfect copy.”
同月二十一日，赫鲁晓夫对聚集在罗马尼亚首都布加勒斯特的五十一个国家的共产党代表讲话，强烈抨击毛泽东关于世界要靠战争進入社会主义的断言。“社会主义在全世界的胜利不必依靠世界大战，”他说。“只有疯子和狂人现在才想再打一次世界大战。”那只会使“数百万人民在战争的巨焰中死去”，“就是在共产主义的死敌中，有理性的人还是占大多数。”这些话不啻说毛是个疯子，跟他结盟还不如同西方共处。赫鲁晓夫在会外用更尖锐的语言对中共代表彭真说：“你们想支配一切人，你们想支配世界。”“你们既然那么爱斯大林，你们把斯大林的棺材搬到北京去好了。” 他对其他苏联领导人说：“我一看到毛就像看到斯大林一样。一个模子里浇出来的。”
When Peng Zhen persisted with Mao's line, he found himself alone. “We were isolated in Bucharest,” Mao noted. “There was not a single party that supported China. Not even … Albania.” This isolation, and the sharpness of Khrushchev's attack, took Mao by surprise. A split under these circumstances was counterproductive, as he still needed Russian military technology. When Khrushchev refused to accept one word of Mao's views for the communiqué, Mao backed down and told Peng Zhen to sign.
彭真发现在布加勒斯特完全没人听他讲毛的路线。毛承认：“我们在布加勒斯特是孤立的。一个党也不支持中国。就连阿尔巴尼亚也不支持。”这样彻底的孤立大大出乎毛的意料，他原先还以为他的观点会得到“积极反应”。毛也没料到赫鲁晓夫会这样毫不留情地攻击他，以往都是他欺负赫鲁晓夫。在这种形势下分裂，对毛有百弊而无一利，特别是毛还需要苏联的军事技术。当赫鲁晓夫拒绝把毛的任何提法写進会议公报时，彭真问：“一个字都不能修改？” 赫鲁晓夫答：“一个字都不能修改。” 毛只好叫彭真在公报上签字。
By now the scales had completely fallen from Khrushchev's eyes. On his return from Bucharest, he immediately ordered the withdrawal of all the 1,000-plus Soviet advisers in China and halted assistance on the 155 industrial projects that were furthest from completion.
赫鲁晓夫此时完全看透了毛，回苏联后就宣布把苏联在华的一千多名专家全部撤走，同时停止帮助中国建设尚未完工的一百五十五个项目。
Mao had miscalculated. Russian retaliation came at a highly disadvantageous time. Although his scientists had secured the technology to make a Bomb, the Russians had not finished imparting their expertise in building the delivery system: the missiles. The Chinese scrambled, telling their scientists to seize every minute to dig things out of the Russians before they left, by hook or by crook. Song-and-dance girls were brought in to get Soviet minders drunk and detain them on the dance floor, while Russian scientists' notebooks were photographed. Even so, the missile program, and indeed the entire Superpower Program, was thrown into disarray. Mao's impatience to promote himself as a world leader, and rival to Khrushchev, had led him to shoot himself in the foot.
毛低估了赫鲁晓夫。苏联的报复对毛的打击不小，中国科学家虽说已经掌握了制造原子弹的技术，导弹技术还没有完全学到。他们只得用一切手段争分夺秒地抢着在苏联专家离开前学习，友好的苏联专家也尽量帮助他们，把自己的笔记本拿给他们拍照。拍照甚至在“欢送苏联专家”的舞会过程中進行，由女文工团员们把专家的监护人拖在舞场上。然而，杯水车薪，毛的导弹工程，乃至整个军事工业化進程，都陷入混乱。
Mao had to backtrack. When eighty-one Communist parties met in Moscow in November, the Chinese appeared conciliatory. Mao himself showed up at the Soviet embassy in Peking for the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and sent Khrushchev fulsome personal greetings for New Year's 1961. There was a reconciliation of sorts. In the end, the Russians continued to provide assistance to keep construction work going on 66 of the 155 unfinished industrial projects. But Mao did not get what he coveted most—renewed collaboration on high-end military technology transfers.
毛只得设法挽回。十一月在莫斯科开八十一国共产党会议时，中共采取了和好的态度。毛亲自到苏联大使馆出席“十月革命”纪念日，一九六一年元旦给赫鲁晓夫发了封极力称颂他的贺电，好像什么别扭也没发生。两国有了某种程度的和解。最后，苏联同意在一百五十五个未完成项目中，继续帮助建设六十六项，但毛没有得到他最渴望的先進军事技术。
Scores of large-scale projects were canceled. Mao later blamed the famine that he himself had created on their cancellation, which he alleged had damaged China's economy, and his claim is believed in China to this day. In fact, the cancellations should have eased the famine: China could now export less food.
毛泽东后来把大饥荒说成是苏联“撕合同、撤专家”的结果。直到今天很多中国人还相信他。事实上，赫鲁晓夫取消军工项目只会有助于缓解饥荒，因为用来买这些军工项目的食品就不必出口了。
But instead of allowing the Chinese population to benefit from a respite, Mao found a new way to spend the food. He insisted on continuing to export it to repay Russian loans ahead of schedule—in the space of five years, instead of the sixteen that the agreements allowed.
但是，食品出口丝毫未减。毛坚持要用它们来提前还清欠苏联的债。本来欠苏联的债按中苏协定应该十六年还清，但毛决定五年还清，要老百姓“勒紧腰带”。就在这一年，中国人饿死两千两百万。
He did this because he knew Russia needed food, and Chinese food made up two-thirds of Russia's food imports. By continuing to supply the same large amounts as before, he was encouraging Russia's dependence on Chinese food, in the hope that Khrushchev would sell him more of what he wanted.
毛把提前还债说成是他“要争这口气”。实际上，毛的政策从来不建筑在“争气” 的基础上。毛要的是苏联继续依赖中国食品(苏联从中国進口的食品占总進口的三分之二)，这样毛就可能诱使赫鲁晓夫继续卖给他军工项目。
Mao later fabricated the myth that Khrushchev had pressured China to pay back its debts during the famine, and that this was one major reason why the Chinese starved. In fact, as a briefing for China's post-Mao leaders stated categorically, Russia “did not ask for the debt to be repaid” then, let alone try to “force” China to do so. It was Mao who insisted on repaying far ahead of schedule.
毛还谎称赫鲁晓夫在大饥荒时“逼债”。但正如中国外交部给毛死后的领导人提交的情况简介指出，苏联在饥荒时从来没有向中国讨过债，更不用说“逼债”了。是毛自己要还，不仅要还，还硬要从十六年提前到五年还清。
Russia's ambassador to Peking at the time, Chervonenko, told us that Moscow instructed him to try to refuse Chinese food exports, and that Russia had sometimes declined to accept shipments of grain. The Russians knew only too well about the famine. “You didn't have to do any investigation,” Chervonenko said. “It was enough just to drive in from the airport. You could see there were no leaves on the trees.” On one occasion, when the Chinese said they were going to increase meat shipments, the Russians asked how. The answer was: “None of your business!”
苏联当时驻华大使契尔沃年科告诉我们，苏联人很清楚中国尸横遍野的饥荒：“你根本不用搞任何调查，只需要驾车从北京飞机场進城就知道了。树上都没有叶子。”莫斯科授命他拒绝中国的出口食品，有时候载粮食的船只被苏联人谢绝接受。中国方面非给不可。有一次，中方对苏联主动提出增加肉类出口，苏联人问怎么可能增加？答覆是：“不关你的事！”
Far from demanding accelerated repayment, Khrushchev was extraordinarily obliging, even revaluing the yuan:ruble exchange rate in China's favor. According to a Russian source, this reduced China's indebtedness to Russia by 77.5 percent.
赫鲁晓夫不但没有逼债，而且还减轻了中国的债务。他重新调整了卢布对人民币的兑换率，使中方得益。据苏联计算，这一调整把中国欠的债降低了百分之七十七点五。
In February 1961, Khrushchev offered Mao one million tons of grain and half a million tons of Cuban sugar. Mao bought the sugar but rejected the grain. This was not out of pride. He had just grabbed at an offer from Khrushchev of technology and experts to manufacture MiG-21 fighters.
一九六一年二月，赫鲁晓夫主动向毛提出借给中国一百万吨粮食和五十万吨古巴蔗糖。毛接受了蔗糖，但婉拒了粮食。这并非出于“争气”。就在此时，赫鲁晓夫表示愿意向中国转让米格-2l战斗机的制造权，毛二话不说马上就要。
For the next two years Mao's tactic was to keep one foot in the Kremlin door, in the hope of maintaining access to military technology, while taking a swipe at Khrushchev on every possible occasion—even over the Berlin Wall, the ultimate symbol of the Cold War. An East German diplomat then in Peking told us that when the Wall went up in summer 1961, Chou En-lai made it clear to the East Germans that Mao saw this as a sign of Khrushchev “capitulating to the US imperialists.”
这一段时间，毛对赫鲁晓夫既搞缓和，也挑刺儿。东德当时驻北京的一名外交宫对我们说，冷战的象征柏林围墙一九六一年夏天修起来之后，周恩来对东德人说，毛认为这是赫鲁晓夫向美帝国主义投降的表现。
WITH MAO SHOWING himself to be such a tricky customer, Khrushchev had to cover his back when he made any important move. In October 1962, Khrushchev was secretly deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba, the most adventurous act he undertook in his decade in power, and the peak of his “anti-imperialism.” Given the danger of a confrontation with the USA, he wanted to ensure that Mao would not stab him in the back. He decided to throw him a bone, a big one: the Kremlin's blessing for China to attack India, even though this meant Russia betraying the interests of India, a major friendly state that Khrushchev had long been wooing.
赫鲁晓夫得时时防备毛，特别是在下一着大棋时。一九六二年十月，他秘密把核导弹运進古巴。这是他执政十年中最冒险的行动，事涉同美国的核武对抗。为了不让毛在这个时候跟他捣蛋，赫鲁晓夫给了毛一个大甜头：支持毛打印度 -- 尽管这是对跟苏联友好的印度的背叛。
Mao had been planning war with India on the border issue for some time. China had refused to recognize the boundary that had been delineated by the British in colonial times, and insisted it be renegotiated, or at least formalized by the two now sovereign states. India regarded the border as settled, and not negotiable, and the two sides were deadlocked. As border clashes worsened, Peking quietly prepared for war during May–June 1962. Chou later told the Americans that “Nehru was getting very cocky … and we tried to keep down his cockiness.”
中国跟印度的矛盾主要是边界问题。中国不承认英国殖民主义时代给两国划下的边界，要求重新谈判，说边界应该由两个主权国家自己来确定。印度认为边界已定，没有必要再谈判。双方僵持不下。随着边界冲突一天比一天糟，中国方面在一九六二年五、六月间开始暗中准备作战。周恩来后来对美国人说：“尼赫鲁越来越趾高气扬”，“我们想叫他不要太得意了。”
But Mao was chary of starting a war, as he was worried about the security of the nuclear test site at Lop Nor in northwest China, which was beyond the range of American U-2 spy planes flying from Taiwan, but lay within range from India. Part of the fallout from the war was that India allowed U-2s to fly from a base at Charbatia, from where they were able to photograph China's first A-bomb test in 1964.
打这一仗的决心毛是不容易下的。毛不想与印度为敌。中国原子弹基地在西北部罗布泊，美国要侦查这个基地，U-2高空侦察机从台湾起飞飞不到，可是从印度能很容易飞到。事情的发展也证实了他的顾虑：中、印边界战争之后，印度允许美国U-2飞机从印度茶巴提亚(Charbatia)基地出发，给中国第一颗原子弹爆炸拍了照。
Mao was also concerned that he might have to fight on two fronts. Chiang Kai-shek was making his most active preparations since 1949 to invade the Mainland, fired by the hope that the population would rise up and welcome him because of the famine. Mao took the prospect of a Nationalist invasion seriously, moving large forces to the southeast coast opposite Taiwan, while he himself hunkered down in his secret shelter in the Western Hills outside Peking.
毛还担心他打印度会造成两面受敌的局势。当时，蒋介石正积极准备反攻大陆，他相信饥荒会使人民欢迎他打回来。毛对蒋介石的威胁很当真，在面对台湾的东南沿海集结重兵，自己也钻進了北京西山的防空洞。
The Chinese had been holding regular ambassador-level talks with America in Warsaw since 1955. Mao now used this channel to sound out whether Washington would support an invasion by Chiang. And he got a very reassuring and direct answer. The Americans said they would not back Chiang to go to war against the Mainland, and that Chiang had promised not to attack without Washington's consent.
毛想弄清楚蒋介石到底会不会打，再决定是否与印度开战。他派人向美国人了解。中国自一九五五年以来，一直在华沙同美国進行大使级谈判。中国代表从美国大使那里得到了爽快的答覆：美国决不会支持蒋介石進攻大陆，蒋也承诺，未经美国同意，不发动進攻。
But Mao still hesitated. The paramount factor was Russia, on which China was heavily dependent for oil. In China's previous border clashes with India, Khrushchev had ostentatiously declined to back Peking. He had then agreed to sell India planes that could fly at high altitudes, and in summer 1962 signed an agreement not only to sell India MiGs, but for India to manufacture MiG-21s.
最让毛不放心的还是苏联。当时中国石油的主要来源靠苏联。赫鲁晓夫在以往的中印边界冲突中，公开不支持中国，以后又答应卖给印度可以在高原条件下飞行的先進的米格飞机，而且转让技术使印度能够制造米格-2l。
By early October, the Himalayan winter was approaching, and the window of opportunity narrowing. Mao sent out a feeler to the Russian ambassador about how Moscow would react if China attacked India. Khrushchev seized this chance to make a startling démarche. On the 14th he laid on a four-hour farewell banquet for the outgoing Chinese ambassador, at which the Soviet leader pledged that Moscow would stand by Peking if China got into a border war with India, and would delay the sale of MiG-21s to India. He revealed that he had been secretly installing nuclear missiles in Cuba and said he hoped the Chinese would give him their support.
十月到了，喜马拉雅山的酷冬就要降临，可以進攻的时间不多了。毛授命向苏联驻华大使契尔沃年科试探莫斯科对中国打印度的态度。赫鲁晓夫抓住这个机会采取了一个令人吃惊的步骤。十四日，他率领苏共全体政治局委员为即将离任的中国大使刘晓举行了热情的欢送宴会。会上赫鲁晓夫敲敲杯子后讲话，说如果中、印发生边界战争，苏联将站在中国一边，苏联将暂缓向印度出售米格-21。过后，他让中方知道他在古巴秘密部署核导弹，希望中方给他支持。
This was a hefty horse-trade, one well concealed from the world.* On the morning of 20 October, just as the Cuba crisis was about to break, Mao gave the go-ahead for crack troops to storm Indian positions along two widely separated sectors of the border. Five days later, with the Cuba crisis at fever pitch, Khrushchev came through with his support for Mao in the form of a statement in Pravda that mortified Nehru.
赫鲁晓夫是在跟毛作交易，毛心里有了底。十月二十日，古巴导弹危机爆发的前夕，中国军队在两段边界上向印方发起進攻。五天后，古巴导弹危机正值高峰，《真理报》发表社论支持中国。赫鲁晓夫此举对尼赫鲁如晴天霹雳。
Chinese forces rapidly advanced more than 150 km into northeast India. Then, having demonstrated military superiority, Mao withdrew his forces, leaving each country holding some disputed territory, a situation that prevails to this day. Mao had achieved his objective: long-term stability on this border, leaving him free to focus on his broader ambitions. The war also dealt a lethal blow to Nehru, Mao's rival for leadership in the developing world, who died eighteen months later from a stroke.
在中印边境，中国军队迅速摧毁印军阵地，推進了一百五十多公里。打了胜仗，毛泽东主动停火撤兵，由双方各自掌握一些有争议的土地。中印边境到现在也还是那时留下的样子。毛达到了他打这一仗的目的：保证边境长期安定，使他没有后顾之忧地办全球大事。尼赫鲁心力交瘁，十八个月后因脑溢血去世。毛想当亚非拉国家的领袖，从此少了一个对手。
MEANWHILE, THE Cuban missile crisis was basically settled on 28 October, after Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for a promise by US president John F. Kennedy not to invade Cuba (and an unpublished promise to pull US missiles out of Turkey). Mao immediately jettisoned his deal not to make trouble for Khrushchev during the crisis, and tried to horn in on Havana's resentment towards Khrushchev for failing to consult it about his settlement with the US. Gigantic “pro-Cuba” demonstrations were staged in China, accompanied by bellicose statements containing barely veiled accusations against Moscow for “selling out.” Mao bombarded the Cubans with messages, telling them that Moscow was an “untrustworthy ally,” and urging them to hold out against Khrushchev's agreement to remove Russian missiles and planes. Mao tried to capitalize on the differences between Castro and Guevara, who was against the settlement. “Only one man got it right,” Mao said: “Che Guevara.”
中印边境战争还在進行时，古巴导弹危机基本上解决。赫鲁晓夫答应从古巴撤出导弹，换取美国不侵犯古巴的承诺。毛马上抛开不给赫鲁晓夫制造麻烦的交易，利用古巴对赫鲁晓夫不征求它同意就和美国成交的不满情绪，想把古巴拉出苏联营垒。中国到处举行浩大的声援古巴的游行，影射苏联出卖古巴利益。毛不断给古巴领导人发电报，说苏联不可信赖，怂恿古巴人阻止赫鲁晓夫撤出导弹和飞机。当时格瓦拉特别反对苏联同美国的协议，毛希望利用他和卡斯特罗(Fidel Castro)间的分歧，把格瓦拉拉到自己一边来。
Mao meddled and needled, but failed to get Havana to sign up to his anti-Soviet stance. However, he did benefit from Cuba's bitter feelings towards the Russians. When an advanced US rocket, a Thor-Able-Star, landed accidentally in Cuba, instead of letting the Russians have it, as he would normally have done, Castro played them off against the Chinese by auctioning it. The result was that Peking got some crucial components, which played a big part in enabling it to upgrade its missiles.
毛的努力没有奏效。不过他也得到些好处。当一枚美国先進火箭发生故障落到古巴时，古巴人没有把它交给苏联，却在苏联同中国之间“拍卖”，中国买到些关键性部件，对改進中国的导弹起了不小作用。同美国达成协议后的赫鲁晓夫，也变了脸，中印边境战争还在打时，《真理报》十一月五日的社论就明显地不支持中国。但两人都还想留有余地。赫鲁晓夫想保持共产党世界表面上的完整，毛想从苏联再挖出些核武器机密。这样的状况维持到一九六三年七月，苏联同美、英签订了部分禁止核武试验的条约，中心是禁止签约任何一方搞核武扩散。这意味着苏联对毛完全没用了。*
Khrushchev, for his part, backtracked from his previous support for China even while fighting was still going on inside India. A Pravda editorial on 5 November conspicuously contained not one word endorsing Peking's position. For him, as for Mao, the collaboration had been completely opportunistic, though he still wanted to keep the Communist camp together.
* 美国总统肯尼迪（John. F. Kennedy)搞这个条约就是想扩大苏联同中国的裂痕。
So did Mao, hoping that he could still finagle a few more nuclear secrets out of Khrushchev. These hopes were dashed definitively in July 1963, when Khrushchev signed a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with America and Britain, which embargoed the signatories helping others acquire a Bomb.* This meant that Khrushchev was now virtually useless to Mao.
It was at this point, more than three years after he had started pushing Maoism onto the world stage, that Mao gave the order to denounce Khrushchev by name as a “revisionist.” A public slanging match quickly escalated. For Mao, the polemic acted as a sort of international advertising campaign for Maoism, whose essence was summed up in one of the main accusations against Khrushchev: “In the eyes of the modern revisionists, to survive is everything. The philosophy of survival has replaced Marxism-Leninism.” It is hard now to cast oneself back to a time when anyone could think this approach might appeal. But to deny people's desire—and right—to live was central to Maoism.
这下毛才完全撕破脸皮，公开指名道姓地“批赫鲁晓夫”。毛说：“豺狼当道，焉问狐狸”，“擒贼先擒王，矛头对准赫鲁晓夫”。毛掀起一场“反对修正主义”的“公开论战”， 组织人马写了九篇当时中国人人皆知的文章，总称“九评”。这实际上是在世界上给“毛主义”大作广告。毛给修正主义下的定义是：“在现代修正主义者的眼里，生存就是一切，生存哲学代替了马克思、列宁主义。” 今天的人们大概很难想像曾有过这样一个时代，反对“生存”还可能有号召力。但毛主义正是这样一个主义：它根本否定人民对生存的要求与权利。
*Algeria showed how dependent Mao was on there being an armed conflict. Once Algeria gained its independence, in 1962, his influence evaporated.
*At least one Chinese noticed how easily huge sums of money flooded into projects to do with promotion abroad and tried to take advantage. In March 1960 a clerk at the Foreign Trade Ministry walked off with the astronomical sum of 200,000 yuan, in the biggest known cash swindle to date, which he accomplished by forging just one letter, and faking one signature: Chou En-lai's. The one-page letter claimed a telephone call had come from Mao's staff to Chou's office asking for cash to be allotted to repair a temple in Tibet so that some foreign journalists could take photographs of it. The clerk had four hungry children, and wanted to buy them some extra food, which special state shops sold outside the rationing network at exorbitant prices for those with the money, mainly people with relatives abroad. Needless to say, this enterprising bureaucrat was easily discovered.
*An Albanian Politburo member, Liri Belishova, was in China at this time, and let the Russians know what was happening, for which she suffered thirty years in Hoxha's gulag—not “strangled” or “eliminated,” as Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs. She emerged with remarkable bounce, as we saw in 1996.
*When one participant (Thomas Kuchel) in Oval Office discussions on 22 October asked whether there was any indication that Russia's move in Cuba was “associated with the Chinese operation against India,” CIA chief John McCone answered: “No, we have no information whatsoever with respect to that at all.”
*Kennedy had in fact been trying to use the treaty to widen the rift between Moscow and Peking.