46 A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY AND SETBACKS
46 不安的岁月，受挫的岁月
(1962–65 AGE 68–71)
1962～1965 年 68～71 岁
IN THE YEARS after 1962, while China was recovering economically, Mao nursed his revenge. Liu Shao-chi, his normally circumspect and seemingly obliging No. 2, had ambushed and outsmarted him at the Conference of the Seven Thousand in January 1962. Under the collective pressure of virtually the whole Chinese establishment, Mao had been forced to abandon his lethal policies. Mao was not going to let Liu or anyone who sympathized with Liu get away with thwarting him.
一朝经济好转，毛就一步步走向大复仇、大清洗。他首先停止了“包产到户”、为受害者平反等开明措施，斥之为“单干风”、“平反风”。毛加强了个人崇拜，对他的歌颂逐渐充斥了学校教科书、出版物，媒体。人们睁眼就看到三呼万岁的口号，耳边响起的音乐都是“爹亲娘亲不如毛主席亲”。全中国比以往任何时候都更彻底地化入对他的顶礼膜拜。
Mao started clearing the ground for a big purge from the moment the famine abated. He put the brakes on liberal measures such as letting peasants lease some land, and rehabilitating political victims, and he steadily fueled his personality cult. Eulogies of Mao increasingly dominated school texts, publications, the media and every sphere that affected people's minds, so that wherever anyone's eye fell there were slogans hailing him, and whenever a song was heard it was in the vein of the one called “Father is close, Mother is close, but neither is as close as Chairman Mao.” Mao was making everything more thoroughly politicized than ever, in a context where only adulation of him was permitted to exist.
He opened with novels, saying sarcastically to a Party audience in September 1962: “Aren't there a lot of novels and publications at the moment? Using novels to carry out anti-Party activities is a big invention.” Mao later laid into all books: “The more books you read, the more stupid you become.” “You can read a little,” he would say, “but reading too much ruins you, really ruins you.” This was unashamedly cynical, as he himself was well-read, and loved reading. His beds were tailor-made to be extra large, with enough space for loads of books to be piled on one side (and sloping, so that the books would not topple over onto him), and his favorite hobby was reading in bed. But he wanted the Chinese people to be ignorant. He told his inner circle that “We need the policy of ‘keep people stupid.' ”
文化方面毛拿小说开刀。一九六二年九月，他说：“现在不是小说、刊物盛行吗？利用小说来進行反党活动，这是一大发明。”针对读书，他说：“书读的越多越蠢。”“书可以读一点，但是读多了害人，的确害人。”毛本人似乎不怕被“害”， 他的特大木板床的一边总是堆满了书。为了以防书落下来打着他，睡人的一边床脚垫高了一点。毛最喜爱的消遣是待在床上看书。但是他不要中国人民看书，要让他们保持愚昧状态。毛对中共高层讲：我们需要“愚民政策”。
In spring 1963, Mao turned his attention to traditional Chinese opera. Unlike opera in the West, Chinese opera was popular entertainment. For hundreds of years, different regions had developed their own distinctive styles, performed in village markets as well as city theaters, danced in the northern mountains amidst winds and dust, and sung under moonlight and kerosene lamps on southern islets, listened to by fishermen on houseboats. Mao himself was a fan, indeed a connoisseur of regional operas. He had a collection of over 2,000 cassettes and records, and would discuss interpretations of arias knowledgeably with opera singers. The only time he let people see him wearing glasses was at operas. He was a very involved viewer as well, and once he became so engrossed that he not only sobbed and blew his nose loudly, but shot straight up from his seat, whereupon his trousers fell down, as his servant had loosened his belt to make him more comfortable. He had a particular taste for those operas his own regime deemed “pornographic.”
一九六三年春，毛的刀伸向传统戏。毛本人其实是个戏迷，收藏了两千多盘磁带唱片，还能同演员讨论演唱风格。看戏是他唯一在公开场合戴眼镜的时候，他也看得非常投入。有一次看《白蛇传》，他哭出了声，毫无顾忌地擤鼻涕，高潮时还一跃而起，裤子都掉了下来-- 原来卫士为了他看得舒服，在他坐下后帮他松了裤带。
Mao's passion for the opera did not prevent him suppressing a large number of them soon after his reign began. But when he embarked on this new purge he set out to get the old repertoires banned in toto, starting with a genre known as “Ghost Dramas,” in which dead victims' spirits took revenge on those who had driven them to their death. Mao had the genre banned in March 1963; having just been the agent of tens of millions of deaths, he regarded these on-stage avengers as uncomfortably close to reality.
毛泽东爱看戏并不妨碍他一上台就对大批戏剧宣判死刑。现在他要把传统戏全都赶下舞台。首先做了刀下鬼的是“鬼戏”，戏中屈死的冤魂向害死他们的人报仇索命。看见这些舞台上的复仇者，毛难免不会想起他的政策害死的几千万人。
At the end of 1963, he accused “all art forms—operas, theater, folk arts (including ballad-singing, traditional story-telling and stage comics), music, the fine arts, dance, cinema, poetry and literature” of being “feudal or capitalist,” and “very murky.” Even works produced under his own regime to sing the praises of the Communists were condemned as “poisonous weeds.” Mao ordered artists to be sent down to villages to be “seriously reformed.” “Throw singers, poets, playwrights, and writers out of the cities,” he said in his quintessentially blunt style in February 1964. “Drive the whole lot of them down to the villages. No food for those who don't go.”
一九六三年底，毛把炮火对准整个艺术领域：“各种艺术形式 -- 戏剧，曲艺，音乐，美术，舞蹈，电影，诗和文学等等，问题不少，人数很多，社会主义改造在许多部门中，至今收效甚微。许多部门至今还是“死人”统治着。”他说这些艺术都是“封建主义和资本主义的”，有“大问题”。就连歌颂共产党的作品，也以这样那样的理由被打成“毒草”。艺术家下放劳动，接受“改造”，一九六四年二月毛以他特有的风格说：“要把唱戏的、写诗的、戏剧家、文学家赶出城，统统轰下乡……不下去就不开饭”。
Ancient monuments, the visible signs of China's long civilization, fell victim too. Mao had started having city walls and commemorative arches knocked down indiscriminately soon after he came to power; by the end of the 1950s the vast majority were destroyed. He now added temples and old tombs to his hit list, and complained to one of his secretaries in December 1964 about the slow obedience to his order: “Only a few piles of rotten bones [i.e., tombs] have been dug out … You take the enemies [i.e., those resisting] too lightly. As for the temples, not one of them has been touched.”
中国传统建筑也成了牺牲品。中共掌权后不久，牌坊和城墙就被不分青红皂白地推倒。一九五八年，对北京八千处古迹，毛只让保留七十八处。连北京市长彭真都竭力反对，最后这一计划当时没有完全实施。但由于毛的坚持，几百年历史的城墙、城门楼还是大多被拆掉，拆城墙的土填平了市内一座美丽的湖。毛在一月二十八日讲：“南京、济南……[省略号系原文]的城墙拆了我很高兴。”他嘲弄心疼古迹的知识分子：“有的人为了拆城墙伤心，哭出眼泪，我不赞成。”“北京拆牌楼，城墙打洞，张奚若也哭鼻子，这是政治。”破坏古迹的“劳动”，知识分子还必须参加。中华民族灿烂文明的标志，就这样一片片从地球上被抹去。
毛在不少场合都表示过他对中国建筑的讨厌。在为大跃進铺路的南宁会议上他说：“北京、开封的房子，我看了就不舒服，青岛、长春的房子就好。”另一回插话时说：“青岛、长春最好。”北京、开封是古都，而青岛从前是德国殖民地，长春是日本建来作满洲国首都的。
毛不许建造中国传统式的房子。执政初期，建筑设计师们沿袭过去的民族风格盖房子，被斥为“复古主义”受到批判。一九五九年中共建国十周年时要修一些纪念性建筑，基本上是模仿苏联。这些建筑还算稍有美感，但是凤毛麟角，其余的不是工厂，就是丑陋省钱的火柴盒式的水泥住宅。
天安门广场原来有十一公顷。但毛要的是“能容纳一百万人集会的世界上最大的广场”。于是广场扩大了四倍，变成一片其大无比的水泥地。充满古城风味的建筑被一扫而光。
毛的“打倒”清单上还有寺庙和古墓。一九六四年底，他以前的秘书胡乔木写信给他，说杭州“苏小小墓等”正在被“清理”当中，“您多年以前就提出的主张，在现在的社会主义革命新高潮中总算有希望实现了。”毛在这段话旁批道：“这只是一点开始而已。”“今日仅仅挖了几堆朽骨，便以为问题解决，太轻敌了，且与事实不合……至于庙，连一个也未动。”
Mao even pushed for the elimination of horticulture: “growing flowers is a hangover from the old society,” he said, “a pastime for the feudal scholar class, bourgeois class and other layabouts.” “We must change it now,” he ordered in July 1964. “Get rid of most gardeners.”
甚至连花草，毛也不容。一九六四年七月，他对“宫廷大总管”汪东兴说：“摆设盆花是旧社会留下来的东西，这是封建士大夫阶级、资产阶级公子哥儿提笼架鸟的人玩的。”“现在要改变。”“你们花窖要取消，大部分花工要减掉。”
What Mao had in mind was a completely arid society, devoid of civilization, deprived of representation of human feelings, inhabited by a herd with no sensibility, which would automatically obey his orders. He wanted the nation to be brain-dead in order to carry out his big purge—and to live in this state permanently. In this he was more extreme than Hitler or Stalin, as Hitler allowed apolitical entertainment, and Stalin preserved the classics. In fact, Mao criticized Stalin on this score; in February 1966, Mao said: “Stalin took over the so-called classics of Russia and Europe uncritically, and this caused grave consequences.”
毛要把中国变成一个文化大沙漠，这里没有文明，没有人性，没有温情，只有一群充满兽性的人头畜生，为他干活，作他血腥清洗的工具。在这一点上，毛比希特勒、斯大林更极端。希特勒尚且允许一些非政治性的艺术存在，斯大林保存了俄国的古典文化。毛还为此批评斯大林，一九六六年二月说：“他对俄国和欧洲的所谓经典著作却无批判地继承，后果很坏。”
IN THE YEARS 1962–65 Mao made some headway in turning every facet of life into something “political” and killing culture, but the result was far from satisfactory for him. He had to rely on the Party machine to execute his orders, and virtually everyone had reservations about his policies, all the way from the Politburo downward. Few welcomed a life without entertainment or color. Mao found that almost everyone was dragging their feet, and that recreations patently harmless to the regime, like the classics and flowers, continued to exist. He was angry and frustrated, but was unable to have his way.
毛泽东的扼杀文化不得人心。就像人不喜欢挨饿一样，没人愿意过没有娱乐、没有色彩的生活。毛的干部们从上到下给他来了个阳奉阴违，一些非政治性的、“无害”的娱乐活动和文艺形式继续存在，花草依然茂盛。一九六二到一九六五这几年中，毛暂时无可奈何。
He was more successful in one area, indoctrinating the population, for whom he created a role model: a safely dead soldier called Lei Feng. Lei Feng had most conveniently kept a diary in which he allegedly recorded how he was inspired by Mao to do good deeds, and swore that for Mao he was ready to “go up mountains of knives and down into seas of flames.” Total obedience to Mao, to be what the regime lauded as perfect “little cogs” in Mao's machine, was elevated to the ultimate virtue. This cult of impersonality, the necessary obverse of the cult of Mao's personality, was cloaked in a deceptive appeal to be selfless—for “our country” or “the people.”
但在这个期间，毛对全国人民的洗脑运动卓有成效。其中一个是“学习雷锋”。毛用死去的士兵雷锋做榜样，要大家都变成雷锋似的人。有一份雷锋日记，说雷锋如何一想到毛就去“做好事”，如何为了毛“上刀山、下火海，也心甘情愿。“听毛主席的话”，做“螺丝钉”，毛安到哪里就在哪里老老实实地干，被表彰为最崇高的理想。抹煞个人与个人崇拜相辅相成，完全无私与极端自私正好配套，前者是对中国人民的要求，后者属于毛泽东。前者为后者服务。
Apart from symbolizing total loyalty to Mao, soldier Lei Feng exemplified another vital point: the idea that hate was good, which was drilled into the population, especially the young. Lei Feng had reportedly written: “Like spring, I treat my comrades warmly … And to class enemies, I am cruel and ruthless like harsh winter.” Hatred was dressed up as something necessary if one loved the people.
As a particular hate figure, Mao built up Khrushchev, on the grounds that he practiced “revisionism.” The Chinese press was flooded with polemics demonizing the Soviet leader, which the population was force-fed at weekly indoctrination sessions. It was thus drilled into people's minds that Khrushchev and other “revisionists” were villains (like murderers in a normal society). Eventually, the other shoe would drop: Mao would condemn Liu Shao-chi as “China's Khrushchev,” and disobedient Party officials as “revisionists.”
雷锋还代表毛刻意想培植的一个观念：人人必须仇恨。雷锋日记里最有名的一首诗写道：“对待同志要像春天般的温暖……对待敌人要像严冬一样残酷无情。”仇恨的逻辑是：“对敌人的仁慈就是对人民的残忍。”
该仇恨谁呢？毛树立了一个靶子：赫鲁晓夫。原因？他搞修正主义。中国报纸上连篇累牍的是谴责赫鲁晓夫和修正主义的文章，在每周的“政治学习”中灌输给全国人民。这些遥远的敌人就这样在人们脑子里扎下了根。到毛整刘少奇的时候，他把“中国的赫鲁晓夫”这顶帽子戴到刘头上，而得罪了毛的中共干部都被说成是“搞修正主义”。
The first time Mao raised the specter of a Chinese Khrushchev was to his top echelon on 8 June 1964. Liu knew that Mao was driving at him, and that the tornado was about to strike. His options were limited. All he could do was try to entrench his own position to make it harder for Mao to get him. Then, in October, something happened in Moscow that gave Liu an opening.
毛第一次用“中国的赫鲁晓夫”这个字眼，是在一九六四年六月八日的中共高层会议上。刘少奇马上明白毛是针对他的，毛复仇的一天就要到了。除了束手待毙，刘唯一的出路是设法加强自己的地位，使毛不容易对他下手。这时搞的“四清”运动，就是刘少奇用撤换鱼肉村民的基层干部的办法，争取人心。不久，莫斯科出了一件事，给了刘少奇另一个机会。
ON 14 OCTOBER 1964, Khrushchev was ousted in a palace coup. Mao saw an opportunity to resuscitate Soviet assistance for his missile program, which had fallen far behind schedule. He found himself in the position of finally possessing the atomic bomb, but lacking the means to deliver it. For this, he needed foreign know-how, and he set his sights on improving relations with the new leadership in the Kremlin, now headed by Leonid Brezhnev. Within days, Chou was telling Soviet ambassador Chervonenko that it was Mao's “utmost wish” to have a better relationship. Chou requested an invitation to the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow on 7 November.
这年十月十四日，赫鲁晓夫在“宫廷政变”中下台。当时中国导弹在研制方面遇上了难以逾越的难关，毛急需苏联的技术，他想跟勃列日涅夫(Leonid Brezhnev)等苏联新领导人改善关系。几天之内，周恩来就对苏联驻华大使契尔沃年科说，毛“极希望”增加接触，有意派代表团去莫斯科祝贺“十月革命”节，请苏联发邀请。
The new Soviet leadership was also interested in finding out whether a rapprochement was possible, and made sure that Mao was the first to hear about Khrushchev's downfall, before it was made public. But the Kremlin quickly realized that the prospect was extremely dim as long as Mao remained in charge. Ambassador Chervonenko recalled what happened when he went to tell Mao. “It was about 11 pm when I entered Mao's residence.” After hearing the news, Mao thought for a moment or two, and then said: “Nice move you have made, but this is not enough” … After the meeting, Mao … saw me off. The car wouldn't start, so the driver took a bucket and went to the kitchen with Mao's bodyguard. The moon was shining on the lake. Mao was standing beside my stalled car: “There are still a few things that need fixing,” he said, “and your Plenum hasn't done them all.”
苏联新领导人也对重修旧好很感兴趣，把赫鲁晓夫下台的事在公开宣布前先通知了毛。但很快地，他们便意识到，只要毛在台上，改善关系的前景黯淡。契尔沃年科告诉我们，他是怎样得到这种印象的。”我到毛的住处大约是晚上十一点。毛听到消息后，沉吟片刻说：“你们做得好，但是还不够。”会见完毕毛送我出门。汽车发不动，我的司机拿了个桶跟毛的警卫到厨房去取水。毛站在熄火的汽车旁，月光闪闪地照在湖上。他说：“还有些事你们要改，你们的主席团还没都做到。””
Mao insisted that Moscow must repeal its Party program and, in effect, disown de-Stalinization. This was out of the question for the new Soviet leaders, and so it seems that they used Chou's visit to test the water to see whether there was a possibility of the CCP dumping Mao.
毛要苏联改变党纲，否定对斯大林的批判。这对苏联新领导人来说是完全不可能的。结果，在周恩来率团访苏时他们试探了一下，看中共能否搞掉毛。
At the reception in the Kremlin on 7 November, the big day, Chou and his delegation were walking round toasting old acquaintances when Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky approached Chou, bringing along Russia's top Chinese-language interpreter. Out of the blue, Malinovsky said to Chou: “We don't want any Mao, or any Khrushchev, to stand in the way of our relationship.” “I don't understand what you are talking about,” Chou replied, and walked away at once. Malinovsky then turned to Marshal Ho Lung, China's acting army chief: “We've got rid of our fool Khrushchev, now you get rid of yours, Mao. And then we can have friendly relations again.” Malinovsky used barrack-room language: “The marshal's uniform I am wearing was Stalin's dog-shit, and the marshal's uniform you are wearing is Mao Tse-tung's dog-shit …” Ho Lung argued with him, and then the Chinese delegation left the reception.
十一月七日，克里姆林宫举行的“十月革命”节招待会，周恩来和中国代表团走来走去向老相识们敬酒。苏联国防部长马利诺夫斯基(Rodion Malinovsky)带着苏联的主要中文翻译走到周恩来跟前，冷不防对周说：“俄国人民要幸福，中国人民也要幸福，我们不要任何毛泽东，不要任何赫鲁晓夫来妨碍我们的关系。”周恩来勃然变色，对马利诺夫斯基说：“你的话我不懂。”立刻转身走开。马利诺夫斯基又转向因林彪生病主持军委日常工作的贺龙元帅，说：“我们现在已经把赫鲁晓夫搞掉了，你们也应该效仿我们的榜样，把毛泽东也搞下台去。这样我们就能和好。”马利诺夫斯基还使用了粗野的语言：“我穿的元帅服是斯大林的狗屎，你穿的元帅服是毛泽东的狗屎。”贺龙跟他争执起来，随即中国代表团离开了宴会大厅。
Chou sat up all night composing a cable to Mao. The next morning, Brezhnev came with four senior colleagues (but not Malinovsky) to the Chinese delegation's residence, where Chou made a formal protest. The Russians apologized, saying that Malinovsky's words did not reflect their views, and that he was drunk. But, quite apart from the fact that Malinovsky was a man who could hold his liquor, such words could never be spoken lightly by the army chief of one country to the premier and an army chief of another country, particularly when the countries involved were totalitarian Russia and China. Moreover, the Soviet leadership did not censure Malinovsky, which they surely would have done had this been a genuine gaffe. All the evidence suggests that Malinovsky acted deliberately, in a way that could be disowned. A top Russian intelligence expert on China used a telling formulation to us: “We learned that we could not divide Chou and Mao.”
这天晚上，周恩来大半夜未眠，起草给毛的电文，报告事情经过。第二天，勃列日涅夫率领四位同事来到中共代表团驻地，周恩来正式提出抗议，要求他们澄清。勃列日涅夫道了歉，说马利诺夫斯基喝醉了，不代表苏共中央。可是，马利诺夫斯基酒量很大，就算是喝醉了说胡话，作为苏联国防部长，鼓动中国总理和军队负责人搞政变，苏联领导事后却没有处罚他。所有迹象表明，马利诺夫斯基的话是装醉故意说的，以试探周、贺。苏联当时对华主要情报官员在我们访问时回答：“我们了解到我们不可能把周恩来和毛泽东割开。”
This episode enormously stoked Mao's suspicions that there might be a vast plot against him involving senior colleagues in cahoots with the Russians. Nothing could be more dangerous for him than the Kremlin expressing a serious wish to oust him. Neither the challenge by Peng De-huai in 1959, nor that by Liu in 1962, had shaken his position. But if the Kremlin really wanted to get rid of him, that would be a different story. Interest on the part of Russia might well embolden some of his colleagues to take drastic steps. The distance from the border of Russia's satellite Outer Mongolia to Peking was only some 500 km, over mainly flat and open land, which Russian tanks could easily overrun, and China lacked effective anti-tank defenses. The very next month, December 1964, on Mao's instructions, the army drew up a plan to construct artificial mountains, each like a giant military fortress, on the North China plain, as obstacles to Russian tanks—a huge project that was abandoned as useless after several years and immense cost.
马利诺夫斯基事件使毛泽东疑心大起，怀疑中共高层有人跟苏联合伙要密谋推翻他。对毛来说，只要没有苏联插手，中共党内什么样的反对者他都能对付。彭德怀在一九五九年，刘少奇在一九六二年，两次都未能动摇他的地位。可如果克里姆林宫下决心搞掉他，和他的党内反对者里应外合，那就是另外一回事了。从外蒙古到北京只有五百公里远，一路坦荡平原，中国没有有效的反坦克武器，无法阻挡苏联坦克的推進。就在马利诺夫斯基事件发生的第二个月，根据毛的指示，中国军队开始在通向外蒙古的平原上堆筑形同庞大碉堡的“人造山”，以抵御苏联坦克。
这些人造山按设计每座高二十至四十公尺，正面宽二百五十至四百公尺，纵深一百二十至二百二十公尺。天文数字的钱投了進去，石头和土方从远方运来，在山里建立了钢筋水泥的工事。凡是见过这些山的人，包括美国前国防部长施莱辛格(James RSchlesinger)，都认为靠这几座孤零零的人造山来挡住苏联坦克大纵深、宽正面的進攻，根本不可能。后来这项工程不了了之。
Chou managed to retain Mao's favor, as Mao figured Chou was too shrewd to try anything rash. But Chou knew that a cloud of suspicion was hanging over his head. Before leaving Moscow, members of his entourage heard him say that he had visited Moscow ten times since the founding of Communist China, but that it was most unlikely that he would ever be returning. Indeed, this was his last visit—and none of Mao's colleagues ever visited Moscow as long as Mao lived.*
毛相信明智的周恩来不会干政变这种没有把握的事。周从此更是战战兢兢地避嫌。离开莫斯科的时候，他感慨万端地说，他以后将很难再来苏联了。的确，中共执政后他访问苏联十次，这是最后一次。这也是毛在世时最后一个中共高级领导对苏联的访问。就连跟苏联领导人在第三国会面也得回避。一九六九年九月，胡志明去世，周恩来不得不去参加葬礼，这就产生了会碰上苏联领导人的问题。为了跟苏联领导人错开，周恩来不顾越南人的反对，在葬礼前硬跑到河内去，向胡志明的遗体告别，然后匆匆飞走。胡志明葬礼举行时，中国只派了一个级别较低的代表团参加。
Mao was chary about anyone in his top circle going to Russia in case they schemed with the Russians to overthrow him. Even being present at the same occasion as high-level Russians in a third country—i.e., outside Mao's control—was to be avoided. In September 1969, Chou faced the possibility of bumping into some Soviet leader at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, so he rushed to Hanoi ahead of the funeral, ignoring Vietnamese protests that they were not ready for visitors. And Chou left well before the ceremony itself, to which China sent a second-level delegation.
In the forthcoming purge, any connection with Russia became a key issue, especially among the top echelon. Marshal Ho Lung and a huge number of his old subordinates were arrested and interrogated. Ho Lung himself died in detention in appalling conditions in 1969.
在文革中，任何跟苏联的关系都被当作“苏修特务”来严加审讯，尤其在中共高层。那位不幸被马利诺夫斯基挡住说话的贺龙元帅，更是毛泽东疑心的焦点。贺和大批部下被抓起来审问，贺本人于一九六九年悲惨地死在囚禁之中。
So did Deputy Defense Minister General Xu Guang-da, who was brutally tortured over a period of eighteen months, being interrogated no fewer than 416 times. He had the misfortune to be the only senior military figure to visit Russia after Malinovsky's remarks, and so was suspected of being a link between Mao's domestic foes and Moscow. Xu had gone to Russia in May 1965 because at the time there was still some nuclear cooperation with Russia. Immediately after his trip, Mao withdrew all the Chinese at the Russian nuclear center at Dubna, shutting off nuclear collaboration completely.
贺龙一案受株连的最高将领是国防部副部长、装甲兵司令许光达大将。在被关押的十八个月里，他受审四百一十六次，多次遭到严刑拷打，最后死在马桶上。许光达是在马利诺夫斯基事件后唯一去过苏联的高级将领。那是一九六五年五月，中、苏之间在原子技术合作方面藕断丝连，总得有人去。许去了以后，毛又怀疑他在克里姆林宫与自己的政敌之间穿针引线，马上撤回在苏联杜布纳原子研究所(Dubna nuclear centre)的全部中方人员，与苏联核技术的关系从此一刀两断。
Thanks to the Malinovsky episode, Mao had absolutely no relationship with Brezhnev. China's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated to their worst ever under Brezhnev, who remained in power for the rest of Mao's lifetime.
当马利诺夫斯基事件发生时，毛并没有叫周恩来马上回来。周按原计划继续跟苏联领导人和一队队外国代表团会见。十一月十四日，周回到北京，毛率领全体领导人到机场欢迎。这是给莫斯科递信号：中共的团结牢不可破。可是苏联人看出了破绽。在机场的苏联外交官观察说毛看上去气色糟透了，“好像要虚脱一般”。
But at the time of the Kremlin's heavy-handed feeler in November 1964, Mao did not order Chou to leave. Chou stayed on in Moscow, and held meetings with a host of foreign delegates, whom Mao was keen for him to see. He returned to Peking on 14 November, according to schedule. Mao turned up to greet him at the airport with his whole team. The message was for the Russians: that the Chinese leadership was united. But the Russians drew mixed inferences. Soviet diplomats at the airport observed that Mao did not look at all well—“close to prostration,” they thought.
THIS WAS AN exceptionally unsure time for Mao, and Liu Shao-chi exploited it. He made a bid to strengthen his position by having himself reconfirmed as state president. This would provide an opportunity for a huge burst of profile-building, as a sort of personality cult for himself. Reconfirmation of his tenure was long overdue. Mao had not allowed the body that “elected” the president, the National Assembly, to convene as it should have in 1963, because he only wanted it to meet when he was ready to purge Liu. But within weeks of Malinovsky's remarks about getting rid of Mao, Liu convened the Assembly on extraordinarily short notice, calculating that Mao would feel too insecure either to veto this move or to purge him. Mao saw what Liu was up to, and erupted. “Let's do the handover now,” he said sarcastically to Liu on 26 November: “You take over and be the chairman. You be Qinshihuang [the First Emperor] …”
这是毛最不安的时刻。刘少奇乘机巩固自己的地位。他的办法是召开全国人民代表大会，以再度当上国家主席，同时借助当选来造声势，树形象，搞一点对自己的个人崇拜。
Mao could not prevent the Assembly meeting. All he could do was to withhold his blessing by not calling a Party plenum beforehand to set the agenda—the only time such an omission ever happened during his reign. In the Politburo the day before the Assembly opened, Mao snapped at Liu repeatedly: “I just won't endorse [you].” At one point, he told Liu: “You're no good.”
上一届全国人大是一九五九年开的。本届按宪法应该在一九六三年开，但毛不发话。他想在整刘少奇的时机成熟时再开，一开就把刘搞掉。马利诺夫斯基事件发生后，在刘少奇的主持下，当月二十九日就做出了召开全国人大的决定，而且开幕时间定在十二月二十一日，还不到一个月的准备时间。刘算准了毛此时心中无底，不敢否决开会，也不敢否决当主席。毛看出了刘的用心，怒气冲冲地说：“现在就交班，你就做主席，做秦始皇。”
毛只拒绝在开人大之前照惯例召开中共中央全会，这在毛当权时绝无仅有，毛以此表示对刘的不认可。人大开幕的前一天，毛在政治局会议上以谈“四清”为名，借题发挥骂刘：“有那么多步骤，我就不赞成。”“你专搞老实人，不会办事。”“中国的秦始皇是谁？就是刘少奇。”
Outside the meeting room, Mao exploded to a couple of his devotees: “Someone is shitting on my head!” Then, on his seventy-first birthday, on 26 December, he took the most unusual step of inviting Liu for dinner. Mao almost never socialized with Liu or his other colleagues, except for being on the dance floor at the same time. Beforehand, Mao said to his daughter Li Na: “You are not coming today, because your father is going to curse the mother-fucker.” Mao sat at one table with a few favorites, while Liu was put at a separate table. There was not an iota of birthday atmosphere. While everyone else sat in frigid silence, Mao ranted on with accusations about “revisionism,” and “running an independent kingdom,” transparently directed at Liu.
会场外，毛对他熟悉的陶铸夫妇发作道：“有人就是往我的头上拉屎尿！”陶铸夫妇猜到他指的是刘少奇。几天后是毛的七十一岁生日，毛破例地请刘少奇赴宴。毛几乎从不请他的共产党同事吃饭，与他们的社交仅限于在跳舞会上。那天吃饭前，毛的女儿李讷听说爸爸要在人民大会堂请客，也要跟着去，毛对李讷说：“你今天不能去，爸爸我要骂娘。”席间毫无喜庆气氛，在满座鸦雀无声的紧张空气里，毛嬉笑怒骂，大讲“有人搞独立王国”，搞“修正主义”。稍知情的都明白他的锋芒所指。
No one said anything in support of Mao, not even the equivalent of “You're right, Boss”—except his secretary, Chen Bo-da. Mao so appreciated this that afterwards he summoned Chen, drowsy with sleeping pills, in the small hours of the night, and confided to him that he intended to get Liu, making Chen one of the first people to be told this explicitly. (Mao was soon to catapult Chen to No. 4 in the Party.)
可是，没有人顺着毛说话，没有人参加对刘的攻击，只有毛从前的秘书陈伯达除外。陈伯达看到毛对刘不满，在第二天的“全国工作会议”上发言，把毛的话从“理论”上加以发挥。毛对他的擂鼓助威感激有加，当夜把在安眠药力下昏昏沉沉的陈伯达找去面授机宜，说他要搞掉刘少奇。陈伯达成了最早知道毛意图的人。文革开始时，陈被毛提拔为中央文革小组组长、中共第四号人物，根源就在这里。
On 3 January 1965, Liu was reappointed president, to a blaze of publicity, quite unlike the occasion of his original appointment in 1959, when there had been little fanfare. This time there were rallies and parades, with his portrait carried alongside Mao's, and firecrackers, drums and gongs. Newspapers ran headlines like “Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu are both our most beloved leaders.” (The president is also called “chairman” in Chinese.) Liu plainly had many supporters rooting for him. He had earned a lot of credit with senior Party officials for extricating China from the famine. Even devoted Mao followers in the inner circle showed signs of switching allegiance. Most incredibly, the idea was mooted of hanging Liu's portrait on Tiananmen Gate—alone, without Mao's!—which Liu had to veto at once.
一九六五年一月三日，刘少奇再度当选国家主席。全国上下组织了欢庆活动，和他一九五九年首次当选时大不相同。街头敲锣打鼓的游行队伍拿着彩旗，舞着狮子，放着鞭炮，并排举着毛和刘的像。报纸上连篇累牍地报导：“毛主席刘主席都是我们最爱戴的领导人”。很明显，在中共高层，有相当多的人在暗暗为刘使劲。刘在制止饥荒上的功劳使他有了众多支持者，就连毛的亲信也觉得刘“行”，“有办法”， 跟他“感到对路”， 而同毛疏远。甚至还有人建议，刘当选时在天安门城楼挂刘的像，而不挂毛的！(当时毛的像只在节庆时才挂在天安门城楼上。)刘赶快否决了这个提议。
On the day Liu was being re-elected, his wife was summoned, for the first time ever, to a meeting in Mao's Suite 118 in the Great Hall. The Lius were very much in love, and Mao knew it. He chose this day to signal his intention to make them both suffer. When Liu walked in after the vote, he was taken aback when he saw his wife was present. Mao pounced, bellowing a long tirade. Mme Liu felt immense hatred radiating from Mao. She and Liu looked at each other in silence. Mao wanted Mme Liu to witness her husband being abused, and for Liu to register: I will make your wife pay too.
正在选举刘的当儿，刘夫人王光美被召到人民大会堂的“一一八”。刘当选后走進来，看见妻子在场，一愣。毛劈头盖脑辱骂了刘一顿，仇恨之意溢于言表。刘跟妻子僵坐在那里，默然对视。毛知道刘少奇夫妇相爱至深，他要王光美在场，看丈夫受辱，也是教刘明白他的妻子难逃厄运。
Yet, even after such an overt display of hostility, no colleague took Mao's side and denounced Liu. Most just expressed concern about the discord between “the two chairmen,” and urged Liu to adopt a more obsequious posture towards Mao. Liu eventually apologized to Mao for not being respectful enough. Mao's response was as menacing as it was arbitrary: “This is not a matter of respect or disrespect. This is a question of Marxism versus Revisionism.”
毛对刘的切齿痛恨都这么明显了，高层也没有谁站出来跟毛一起骂刘。相反地，人们为“两个主席之间的争执”表示焦急，无所适从，出来“劝架”，叫刘少奇要顾全大局，要谨慎，要尊重毛泽东。刘去找毛作“自我批评”， 又在政治局会议上检讨“对主席不够尊重”。毛话中有话地说：“这不是尊重不尊重的问题，而是马克思主义同修正主义的问题。”
Echoing Stalin's remark about Tito (“I will wag my little finger and there will be no more Tito”), Mao told Liu: “Who do you think you are? I can wag my little finger and there will be no more you!” But in fact, for now, there was a stand-off. Mao could not get Liu condemned just on his own say-so.
斯大林曾针对铁托说过：“我动一根小指头，世界上就没有铁托了。”学斯大林学到家的毛泽东也对刘少奇说：“你有什么了不起，我动一个小指头就可以把你打倒！” 但事实上，眼下毛要打倒刘少奇并不那么轻而易举。他还真有点扳不动刘呢。
AT THIS POINT Mao resorted to a potent symbolic gesture—a trip to the Jinggang Mountains, where he had set up his first base in 1927. Unlike his other trips, which were spur-of-the-moment, this one was publicized well in advance among his top circle, so all his colleagues knew he was going. Six years before, facing a rebellious Peng De-huai, Mao had threatened that if he were challenged he would “go up into the mountains and start guerrilla warfare.” Now he was actually going to the mountains, which made the message altogether louder, more actual and more powerful.
毛发出宣战的信号：上井冈山。六年前，当彭德怀起来反对他的政策时，毛曾威胁说：要是人们不跟他走，他就“上山打游击”。他这次真上山了，警告声分外响亮：我不是说说了事，说到做到！
A portable squat toilet was constructed. An advance team scouted the destination. “Class enemies” were detained and stashed well away from Mao's route. Duplicate cars were prepared, and heavy machine-guns positioned on commanding points. The Praetorian Guard lurked in plain clothes, their weapons concealed, like Hollywood gangsters', in musical instrument cases.
毛从来出行都是说走就走，这次不一样，上井冈山“酝酿”了好久，同事们都通知到了。蹲式马桶准备好了，派人沿途走了一遍，途中的“阶级敌人”关的关，送走的送走。
上路后，毛的座车预备了两套，以转移视线。随行的中央警卫团官兵身着便衣，像好莱坞电影里的帮会打手一样，把枪支藏在乐器盒子里。
Mao left Peking in late February 1965, moving slowly, feeling his way. En route, on 9 April, he learned of the death of a favorite retainer, the 63-year-old boss of Shanghai, Ke Qing-shi, of misdiagnosed pancreatitis. For such an invaluable acolyte to die by human error at this juncture was alarming, so Mao stayed put in Wuhan. There, he summoned his long-term accomplice, defense minister Marshal Lin Biao, for a tête-à-tête meeting on 22 April. The marshal, who had rescued Mao at the Conference of the Seven Thousand in January 1962, was in on Mao's plans to purge President Liu. Mao told him to keep a particularly tight grip on the army and a sharp lookout in case the president, who was overseeing things in the capital, should try to gain support among the military.
毛一九六五年二月底离开北京。他走走停停，观察刘少奇等的反应。四月九日在武汉时，消息传来，跟他最亲近的上海第一把手柯庆施，患胰腺炎被误诊，在四川成都死去。六十三岁的柯，偏偏在这个时刻死于医疗事故，不由毛不顿生疑窦。他在武汉住了下来，四月二十二日，把老搭档林彪召来单独长谈，交了打倒刘少奇的底。毛要林把军队牢牢掌握住，不要让在中央主事的刘插進手去。
On 19 May, Lin Biao made a spectacular démarche in line with Mao's request. On that day, in his capacity as president, Liu was receiving the participants at a high-level army meeting when the marshal turned up unexpectedly, having earlier declined the invitation on health grounds. At the end of the meeting, when the president announced that it had reached a satisfactory conclusion the marshal suddenly stood up and launched into a harangue that basically contradicted what Liu had said. He thus made it unmistakably clear to the top brass that he, not the president, was their boss, massively undermining Liu's authority.
五月十九日，刘少奇接见在北京召开的军委作战会议成员。林彪本来说身体不好不去参加接见，但临时忽然出现。会见结束，刘宣布散会时，林站起来说他还有话要讲。他批驳国家主席已经认可的与会者的发言，表明他才是他们的领导，刘少奇的话不算数。
While the marshal kept an eye on President Liu in Peking, Mao proceeded to his old outlaw stamping-ground on 21 May. He stayed there seven nights, going nowhere apart from short walks in the immediate vicinity of the guest house. A stop had been scheduled at his old residence, the Octagonal Pavilion, but as he got out of the car, Mao heard faint noises. These were actually hammers and chisels clanging from some masons at work on a distant slope, but here in the mountains noise traveled far. Just as his foot was touching the ground, Mao shrank back into the car, and ordered it to drive off at once.
有林彪在北京盯住刘，毛放心地于五月二十一日开始上井冈山。毛在山上住了七天，哪里也没去，就在宾馆的附近散散步。本来他打算去从前住过的八角楼看看，正迈脚出车时，猛然听见有响声。这是遥远的山坡上采石工人在砸铁钎，但山里声音传得远。毛马上把已踏在地上的一只脚缩回车里，要司机即刻开走。
Mao did not see any local people until minutes before his departure, when organized crowds were brought to stand outside the guest house, and he waved at them and had photographs taken. His presence had been kept secret until the last minute. During his stay, and for some time after he left, all communications with the outside world for the locals were cut off.
直到临离开井冈山前几分钟，毛才接见了一些当地人。他们被组织起来在宾馆外向毛欢呼，看着毛登车离去，到这时他们才知道毛在山上。从毛到来，到他走后相当一段时间里，井冈山与外界的联系和交通全部中断。
The guest house where Mao stayed, which had been built during the famine, was not up to his standards, so work on another soon began, to the usual specifications: one-story and totally bomb-proof. But Mao never returned. He had come for one purpose only: to make a threat.
毛住的宾馆是大跃進中为他修的，可毛不满意。他走后又动工照他通常的标准重建了一座别墅。只是毛再没回来过。
WHILE MAO WAS in the mountains, Liu was busy building up his own profile. On 27 May an article appeared in People's Daily, replete with vintage cult language:
毛在井冈山上时，刘少奇在北京努力加强自己的形象塑造。五月二十七日，《人民日报》头版出现了一篇文章，用的完全是“个人崇拜”的语言和口气：
“The hills were extraordinarily green, and the water was exceptionally blue … the scenery of the Ming Tombs Reservoir displayed unprecedented splendour.”
山格外的青，水分外的绿……十三陵水库的景色，呈现出从来没 有过的壮丽。
But instead of being just about Mao, it was about both Mao and Liu, and both of them were engaged in the quintessential Mao cult activity of swimming:
After 3 in the afternoon, two cars stopped … Two towering, kindly-looking men stepped out of the cars, and with firm steps walked towards the water.
下午三点多钟，两辆汽车在水库的西南岸停了下来。从车上步下 两位身材魁梧、和蔼可亲的人，迈着稳健的步伐，向水边走去。
… these were our most revered and beloved leaders, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu. The crowd immediately burst into loud cheers:
正在水库里游泳的首都高等院校学生和解放军战士，远远就认出 这是我们最敬爱的领袖毛主席和刘主席，人群中立刻响起一片欢呼 声：
“Chairman Mao has come swimming!”
“毛主席来游泳啦！”
“Chairman Liu has come swimming!”
“刘主席来游泳啦！”
The youth saw that Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu were glowing with tremendous health and spirits, and felt a surge of happiness through their bodies …
青年们看到毛主席和刘主席红光满面，精神焕发，只觉得一股幸福的暖流传遍全身。
Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu … swam forward shoulder to shoulder …
毛主席和刘主席拨开万顷碧波，肩并肩地向前游進。
But this was not a “news” report at all. The swim had actually taken place the previous year, on 16 June 1964. That it was resurrected suggests that the story was inserted to promote Liu's image, at a time when Mao's absence from Peking meant People's Daily did not have to clear it with Mao. For this and other acts of disobedience, Mao later visited ghastly punishment on his media chiefs.
游泳的事发生在一年前的六月十六日，不是什么新闻。这时突如其来把它作为特写发表在头版，显然是有意安排为刘作宣传，选择的时机是毛远在井冈山上，《人民日报》负责人可以推说无法请毛过目。后来这些负责人在文革中都被整得死去活来。
AFTER HIS TRIP to the Jinggang Mountains to make his threat, Mao did not act at once. It seems that the reason he held his fire was that he was waiting for a particular international event to take place. This was the second Afro-Asian summit, scheduled for June 1965 in Algiers. As president, Liu had had dealings with many heads of state who would be there, and to purge him just before the gathering would create a bad impression. The summit was crucial to Mao, who wanted to use it to establish a dominant role in the Third World. As he was not prepared to leave his home turf, for security reasons, he had to pull the strings from afar. His man for the job was Chou En-lai.
回北京之后，毛没有立即对刘少奇采取行动。他很可能是想等第二次亚非会议开完后再动作。会议定于六月在阿尔及利亚召开，刘少奇作为国家主席同很多亚非国家元首打过交道，在会议前夕清洗刘会给毛造成不良影响。毛对这次会议寄予了无限希望，打算通过它進一步确立自己在发展中国家的领袖地位。他派周恩来去完成这个任务。
The first Afro-Asian summit had taken place ten years before at Bandung in Indonesia, where Chou had had considerable success in wooing newly independent Third World countries. Since then, Peking's influence had grown substantially, thanks, not least, to its extravagant aid. Nehru, the star at Bandung, was dead, and meanwhile China had acquired the Bomb. Mao entertained the idea that at this second summit he could be seen as the patron—if Russia did not take part. In the preparations for the Algiers summit Mao's goal had been to keep the Russians out.
第一次亚非会议十年前在印尼的万隆举行。那次周恩来在新独立的发展中国家的领导人中留下了良好印象。自那以来，中国有了原子弹，毛泽东又不断慷慨撒钱收买人心。万隆会议的明星尼赫鲁已不在人世，毛唯一的担心是苏联参加，有苏联出场毛就唱不成主角了。中方花了大量精力游说发起国不邀请苏联。
To this end, Peking courted Indonesia's President Sukarno, as he was the man vetting the invitations, in his capacity as host of the first summit. China offered him lavish gifts, quite possibly including soldiers for a war he was waging against Malaysia. Top of the list of offers was to train Indonesian nuclear scientists, enabling Sukarno to announce that Indonesia would soon explode an atom bomb. China dangled the same lure of nuclear secrets in front of Egypt, another key Third World country, when in fact Mao had no intention of sharing his nuclear knowledge; when Nasser later asked Chou to deliver on his promise, Chou told him to be “self-reliant.”
印尼的苏加诺总统由于是万隆会议的东道主，有最后裁决谁被邀请的特权，毛不惜重金来笼络他，还提出派军队支援他打马来西亚。最使苏加诺倾心的是中国许诺为他训练制造原子弹的科学家。同样的许诺中国也对埃及等主要发展中国家做出。
结果苏联未被邀请。
其实毛无意与他人分享核技术，后来埃及总统纳赛尔要求周恩来履行诺言时，周叫他“自力更生”。
To buy votes for the Algiers summit, Mao committed China to its biggest-ever overseas project—a railway nearly 2,000 km long from landlocked Zambia across Tanzania to the Indian Ocean. Informed that Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere was interested in such a railway and could not get the West to put up the money, Chou said: “Chairman Mao said whatever the imperialists oppose, we support; the imperialists oppose this, so we sponsor it …” Mao was not concerned whether the railway was viable. When Nyerere expressed hesitation about accepting the offer, Chou pressed harder, claiming that Chinese railway-building materials and personnel would be going to waste if they were not used in Tanzania. The project cost about US$1 billion, which Mao dismissed as “No big deal.”
正是为了给毛“拉选票”，中国撒出了一笔巨款：修长达两千公里的坦赞铁路。坦桑尼亚总统尼雷尔为修建这条从内陆的坦桑尼亚经赞比亚(Zambia)通印度洋的铁路寻求资助，被西方拒绝。中方得知后说：“毛主席说了，帝国主义不干的事，我们干，我们帮助你们修。”这条铁路到底有多大用处，毛是不关心的。其实连尼雷尔本人对该不该修也犹豫不决，哪怕铁路由中国白送，钱、材料、人力都是中国出。周恩来还得说服尼雷尔，居然谎称中国修铁路的材料、人员都有余裕，如果不修坦赞铁路也就浪费了。这项工程耗费了中国十亿美金。毛轻飘飘地说：“没有什么了不起嘛。”
Ten days before the summit was due to open, Algeria's President Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown in a military coup. A short while before, Mao had called him “my dear brother.” Now he dropped Ben Bella like a hot potato, and ordered Chou to back the new military government and ensure the summit went ahead on schedule.
第二次亚非会议开幕前十天，东道国阿尔及利亚发生军事政变，本·贝拉(Ahmed Ben Bella)总统下台。毛曾竭力拉拢本·贝拉，嫌外交部写给本·贝拉的信“打官腔”， 亲自动笔，称本·贝拉是“亲爱的兄弟”，“我希望看到你。全中国人民准备热烈欢迎你。”本·贝拉一倒台，毛立马翻脸不认人，要周恩来宣布支持新领导人布迈丁(Houari Boumedienne)，按原计划开会。
Peking's diplomats started lobbying frantically, even though it was clear that the vast majority of governments due to attend favored a postponement. Even the very pro-Chinese Nyerere gave Peking's lobbyist a piece of his mind: “Chou En-lai is my most respected statesman. But I don't understand why he insists on the conference being held on schedule,” Ben Bella, Nyerere said, was an “anti-colonialist hero recognised all over Africa,” adding: “I must tell you [that China's lobbying] has damaged the reputation of China and Premier Chou himself.”
绝大部分亚非国家部不想此时去阿尔及利亚开会。中国外交官们四下活动，拚命想说服他们去，到处碰壁。尼雷尔总统坦率地对中国外交官说：周恩来总理是我最敬佩的政治家，但我很不理解周总理为何坚持如期在阿开会。本·贝拉是非洲公认的反帝、反殖斗争的英雄。他的被捕，无论从理智上或感情上，我都不能接受。尼雷尔说：中国政府的坚决态度和中国所進行的积极活动，超过了布迈丁政权，这已引起一些人的惊奇、怀疑，甚至不满，有损于中国和周总理本人的崇高声誉。
The summit was postponed. Peking's hustling boomeranged. Within weeks, Nasser, in many ways the decisive voice, was backing Russian participation. If the Russians attended, Mao would be unable to play the leading role. So the Chinese announced that they would not take part. The summit never convened.
会议延期了。在对中国怀疑日盛的情绪下，埃及等国提出邀请苏联参加。毛当不了老大了，中国转而宣布不参加。第二次亚非会议没开成。
AS HIS DREAM of playing the leader to Asian and African countries collapsed, in fury, Mao lashed out. Longing to score a victory somewhere, he went to the brink of war with India.
毛又气又急。他迫切希望能来点成功，以平衡挫折。正好这时印巴战争爆发。三年前，毛曾痛快淋漓地打败了印度，这次他想跟巴基斯坦左右夹攻印度，再来一场胜仗。巴基斯坦跟中国相当接近，是得到中国援助最多的非共产党国家之一。
Three years before he had trounced India satisfactorily. But now, in autumn 1965, he could not guarantee success, as India was much better prepared. So he resorted to parasitizing on someone else's conflict, always a risky undertaking. On 6 September, Pakistan got into a war with India. Over the previous years, Pakistan had grown much closer to China, and become one of the two biggest non-Communist recipients of Chinese aid.*
Pakistan's war with India seemed to Mao to offer a chance to score another victory over India, which would be forced to fight on two fronts if China intervened. He moved troops up to the border, and issued two ultimatums, demanding that India dismantle alleged outposts on some territory Peking claimed, within three days, by 22 September. When Delhi replied in a conciliatory vein, denying it had outposts there, but calling for a “joint investigation” and promising that if outposts were found, it “would not oppose dismantling them,” Peking answered thuggishly that “there is no need for investigation,” and that there just were outposts. Mao was bent on war.
毛把部队调到边界，发了两份最后通牒式的照会，限令印度政府在九月二十二日午夜前，拆除所有“侵略工事”。印度的答覆是和解的，说“虽然印度政府深信它的军队没有在西藏境内修筑工事”，它愿意“進行一次联合调查”，如果发现有，“不会反对拆毁它们。”中方的答覆是：“没有必要進行调查”，“印度方面确实有侵略工事设在中国境内”。毛把中国拉到战争边缘。
But the scheme collapsed when Pakistan suddenly accepted a UN call for a ceasefire before China's deadline had expired. The Pakistanis told Mao that the cost of continuing fighting was too high, both diplomatically and economically, but Mao pressed them to fight on, reportedly giving Pakistan's President Ayub Khan the message: “If there is a nuclear war, it is Peking and not Rawalpindi that will be a target.” When the Pakistanis declined to oblige, Mao was left out on a limb, and Peking had to climb down in public, lamely alleging that India had secretly dismantled its outposts—when in fact India had not stirred. Mao ended up deeply frustrated.
就在中方限期到期的前一天，巴基斯坦接受了联合国要印巴双方停火的决议，告诉毛，不停火无论外交上还是经济上代价都太大。毛极力劝他们打下去，可巴基斯坦不愿打。无奈之余，毛只好放弃了打印度的念头。没有巴基斯坦配合，毛难有把握单独取胜。上一次打败印度得益于出其不意，如今印度有了准备。为了体面地下台阶，中方宣布“印军偷偷摸摸平毁侵略工事狼狈逃窜”-- 其实印度什么也没做。
IMPATIENT FOR A SUCCESS, Mao tried to ignite violent insurrections wherever he could. In Thailand, the Communist Party fostered by Mao (and composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Chinese) now launched into armed insurgency, clashing for the first time with government forces on 7 August 1965, thenceforth known as “Gun-Firing Day.” It got nowhere.
在急于成功的心态下，毛到处发动“武装斗争”。在泰国，他培植起来的、以华侨为主的共产党，在八月七日首次与政府军交火。这一天从此被称为“开火日”，以失败告终。
The biggest—and most tragic—fiasco came in Indonesia. The Communist Party there, the PKI, was the largest in the non-Communist world, with some 3.5 million members, and had the kind of secret intimate relationship with Peking which the Chinese Communists had had with Stalin before they conquered China.† The head of the Japanese Communist Party at the time, Kenji Miyamoto, told us that Peking continually told the PKI, and the Japanese Party: “Whenever there is a chance to seize power, you must rise up in armed struggle.” In 1964, Miyamoto discussed this with Aidit. Whilst the Japanese Communists were cautious, Aidit, who had great faith in Mao, was very eager to swing into action. After the Algiers summit folded, in lashing-out mood, Mao set the PKI in motion to seize power.
最大的惨败发生在印尼。当时印尼共产党有三百五十万人，在非共产党国家中人数最多。斯大林把它划归毛管。*日本共产党总书记宫本显治对我们说，中共一直在鼓励印尼共和日共：“只要有夺权的机会，就奋起以武装斗争夺权。”宫本与艾地曾在一九六四年讨论过这个问题。日共的态度是谨慎，而艾地却信心十足，觉得只要毛看准了就有把握成功。
* 一九六三年九月，周恩来把印尼共领袖艾地召到广东温泉城市从化，与胡志明和老挝共产党负责人会晤，在战略上把印尼和印度支那联系起来。
In early August Aidit came to China, where he met Mao. Aidit then proceeded to Indonesia with a team of Chinese doctors, who within days reported that President Sukarno (who was pro-Peking) had terminal kidney problems, and did not have long to live; so if the PKI were going to act, now was the time.
亚非会议坍台后，八月，毛告诉印尼共夺权的时机到了。中方对艾地说，给亲华亲共的苏加诺总统看病的中国医生，诊断出总统的肾脏有严重问题，将不久于人世，机不可失，时不可待。
The plan was to decapitate the anti-Communist top brass of the army, over which President Sukarno held very limited sway. Peking had been pressing Sukarno to overhaul the army radically, and with Sukarno's support the PKI had been infiltrating the army with some success. The PKI believed, wildly over-optimistically, that it could secretly control over half the army, two-thirds of the airforce and one-third of the navy. According to the plan, once the generals were disposed of, Sukarno would step in and take over the army, while the Communists in the army kept the rank-and-file in line.
印尼共的夺权是夺军权。苏加诺总统不掌握军队，军队高层强烈反共。中国曾不断敦促苏加诺把军队拿过来，在苏加诺协助下，印尼共加紧渗透军队，以致过于乐观地相信它能秘密掌握陆军的一半、空军的三分之二、海军的三分之一。印尼共的夺权计划是：把反共的军队首领抓起来杀掉，然后苏加诺出面接管军队，军队里的共产党人则保证部队服从命令。
On 30 September a group of officers arrested and killed Indonesia's army chief and five other generals. Speaking shortly afterwards to Japanese Communist Party chief Miyamoto, Mao referred to this coup as “the Communist Party of Indonesia's … uprising.” But the PKI failed to cope with an unforeseen occurrence which derailed its whole plot. An informer had tipped off a then little-known general called Suharto, who was not on the arrest list. Thus prepared, Suharto waited for the arrests and killings of the other generals to be completed and then took immediate control of the army, unleashing a massacre of hundreds of thousands of Communists and sympathizers—and innocent people. Almost the entire PKI leadership was captured and executed. Only one member of the Politburo survived, Jusuf Adjitorop, who was in China at the time, and whom we met there, a disillusioned man, three decades later.
九月三十日，苏加诺总统警卫部队营长翁东(Untung)中校率人逮捕处死了印尼陆军司令和其他五个主要将领。毛在跟宫本显治的谈话中把这一事件称为“印尼共产党的武装起义”。可是，一个未曾预料到的变故使全盘计划土崩瓦解。密谋者中有一人偷偷把“九·三0”行动计划通知了陆军将领苏哈托(Suharto)。苏哈托本人不在处决的名单上，他做好准备，等逮捕处死完毕后，立即出面控制军队，在全国掀起血腥大屠杀，直杀了数十万共产党人、同情者和无辜平民。印尼共产党领导人几乎被一网打尽，上了断头台，只有一名政治局委员逃脱，尤索夫，阿吉托若夫(Jusuf Adjiorop)， 他当时在中国。三十年后他仍然在那里，我们见到他时，他已是一位灰心失望的老人。
President Sukarno was forced out, and General Suharto established a military dictatorship that was fiercely anti-Peking and hostile to the large ethnic Chinese community at home.
苏加诺总统被迫让位。苏哈托将军建立起一个反华、反共、迫害华侨的军事独裁政权。
Mao blamed the PKI for the failure. “The Indonesian party committed two errors,” he told the Japanese Communists. First, “they blindly believed in Sukarno, and overestimated the power of the Party in the army.” The second error, Mao said, was that the PKI “wavered without fighting it out.”* In fact, the slaughter unleashed by Suharto was so ferocious, and so instantaneous, that it had been impossible for the PKI to fight back. Mao and his men had never experienced anything like this at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, who was a kitten compared to Suharto. Mao, in any case, was to blame, as he had started the action for his own self-centered reasons. He just could not wait to have a victory after his pipedream of Afro-Asian leadership collapsed.
毛泽东把一败涂地的责任推在印尼共头上。日本共产党中央委员会向我们提供了毛同日共领导人的谈话记录，毛说：“印尼共产党犯了两个错误。第一，他们盲目相信苏加诺，过高估计了党在军队里的力量。第二，他们动摇了，没有打到底。” 其实，印尼共根本没有还手之力。苏哈托的大屠杀其残暴，其凶猛，其迅雷不及掩耳，是中共在蒋介石手里从来没有经历过的。跟苏哈托比起来，蒋介石对中共简直可以算得上“仁慈”。
By the end of 1965, Mao's global schemes had suffered one setback after another. In a dark and vehement state of mind, he turned to deal with his foes inside China.
一九六五年快要过去了，毛泽东在全球是失败连连。满腹挫折感的他，掉转头向国内的政敌猛扑过来。
*Except for a stop-over by Deng Xiao-ping en route to a Party congress in Romania in July 1965, which shows Mao's trust in Deng.
*In 1965 China began talking about transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan—or, more accurately, dangling the prospect. Pakistan had grown more and more useful to Mao as a staging post to the Middle East, and Peking aggressively backed Pakistan's ambitions over Kashmir, training Kashmiri guerrillas for what China presented as a “national liberation” war.
†In September 1963, Chou En-lai brought PKI chief Aidit to a secret summit at Conghua in South China with Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh and the head of the Laotian Communists, to coordinate military strategy in Indonesia with the war in Indochina. This summit placed Indonesia on a strategic par with Indochina, and linked developments in Indonesia with the much more advanced military conflict in Indochina.
*These parts of Mao's talks were withheld from the published version, and were made available to us by the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee.