PART TWO LONG MARCH TO SUPREMACY IN THE PARTY
5 HIJACKING A RED FORCE AND TAKING OVER BANDIT LAND
5 秋收暴动：拐走起义武装
(1927–28 AGE 33–34)
1927～1928 年 33～34 岁
AT THE TIME Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists in April 1927, Stalin had emerged as the No. 1 in the Kremlin and was personally dictating policy on China. His reaction to Chiang’s split was to order the CCP to form its own army without delay and occupy territory, with the long-term aim of conquering China with the gun.
一九二七年四月蒋介石“清共”开始时，斯大林刚成为克里姆林宫的头号人物，亲自制定对华政策。他要中共建立军队和根据地，以便最终用枪杆子征服中国。
The military option—the use of force to bring the Chinese Communists to power—had been Moscow’s favored approach ever since the Comintern was founded in 1919. As long as the Nationalists were in play, Moscow’s strategy had been for CCP members to infiltrate and subvert the Nationalist armed forces. Once the break came, Stalin ordered the Communists to pull out those units they were able to control, and “form some new corps.”
用枪杆子夺权，斯大林早在一九一九年共产国际成立时就为中共想到了。跟国民党合作时，莫斯科派中共党员打入国民党军队设法控制它。蒋介石“清共”后，斯大林命令中共马上从国民党军队里尽可能拉出队伍，“建立自己的新武装”。
Stalin sent a trusted fellow Georgian, Beso Lominadze, to China. Jan Berzin, the head of Russian military intelligence, the GRU, wrote to the commissar for war, Kliment Voroshilov, who chaired the China Commission in Moscow, that Russia’s top priority in China now was to establish a Red army. A huge secret military advice and support system for the Chinese Communists was set up in Russia. The GRU had men in all the main Chinese cities, providing arms, funds and medicine, in addition to intelligence that was often critical to the CCP’s survival. Moscow also sent top-level advisers to China to guide the Party’s military operations, while greatly expanding military training for CCP cadres in Russia.
斯大林派他的亲信老乡罗明纳兹(Beso Lominadze)来中国管事。苏军情报局局长伯金(Jan Berzin)给“中国委员会”主席伏罗希洛夫(K1iment Voroshilov)写信说，苏联在中国的首要任务是建立红军。主要城市都派有苏军情报局人员，负责给中共供应武器、资金、药品、情报。同时派来的还有军事顾问，在苏联国内也加紧了对中共人员的军事训练。
The immediate plan, devised in Moscow, was for the Communist units pulled out of the Nationalist army to move to the south coast to collect arms shipped in from Russia, and set up a base. At the same time, peasant uprisings were ordered in Hunan and three adjacent provinces where there had been militant peasant organizations, with the goal of taking power in these regions.
莫斯科的第一步计划，是把拉出的队伍带到南方海岸去接收苏联军火，然后在那里建立根据地。同时，莫斯科指示湖南和其他三个有农民协会的省举行暴动。
Mao agreed with the military approach. On 7 August 1927 he told an emergency Party meeting presided over by Lominadze: “power comes out of the barrel of the gun” (a saying that later acquired international fame). But within this broad design, Mao harbored his own agenda—to command both the gun and the Party. His plan was to build his own army, carve out his own territory, and deal with Moscow and Shanghai from a position of strength. To have his own fiefdom would safeguard his physical survival. He would of course remain in the Party, as its association with Russia was his only chance of achieving anything more than being a mere bandit.
毛泽东举双手赞成这条道路。他在罗明纳兹主持的“八七”紧急会议上说：“政权是由枪杆子中取得的。”这后来演变成他的名言“枪杆子里面出政权”。当时莫斯科刚撤掉了中共领袖陈独秀，把国民党分裂怪罪到陈头上，换上了同他们关系密切的年轻文人瞿秋白。刚当上政治局候补委员的毛，不要做这种任人想换就换，想撤就撤的“王”。他要有自己的枪杆子，建立自己的地盘，使自己处于实力地位，以便向莫斯科要权。有自己的领地也是安全生存的最好方式。
At this time, Professor Chen had just been dismissed as Party chief by Lominadze, and made the scapegoat for the Nationalist split. His replacement was a younger man called Chu Chiu-pai, whose main qualification was his closeness to the Russians. Mao was now promoted, from the Central Committee to the Politburo, though still as a second-level member.
It was now that Mao embarked on a series of steps that would take him to the top of the Communist ladder in the space of four years. As of summer 1927, he had no armed men at his service, and held no military command, so he set out to acquire an armed force by taking over troops that other Communists had built up.
但是，毛没有一杆枪，一个兵，莫斯科也没有派他搞军事。毛要拥有军队，必须靠别的手段。
AT THE TIME, the main force the Reds were able to pull out of the Nationalist army consisted of 20,000 troops stationed in and around Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province, about 250 km southeast of Wuhan and 300 km east of Changsha. These troops had nothing to do with Mao. On 1 August they mutinied, on Moscow’s instructions. The main organizer of the mutiny was Chou En-lai, the Party man designated to run the military, with immediate supervision from a Russian military adviser, Kumanin.* They then headed straight for Swatow (Shantou) on the coast, 600 km to the south, where the Russians were supposed to ship in arms.
一九二七年夏，中共能拉出的主要武装是驻扎南昌的一支两万人的军队。八月一日，在苏联顾问库马宁(M．F.Kumanin)的直接指挥下，中共负责军事的周恩来组 织这支队伍举行兵变。这就是“南昌起义”， 这天也成了中共的“建军节”。人们大多不知的是，用斯大林的话说，这个行动是“共产国际的主意，完完全全的共产国际的主意”。“起义”部队随即南下，向六百公里外的港口汕头挺進，去接收苏联人准备运来的武器。
Mao set out to lay his hands on some of these men. On their way to the coast they were scheduled to pass near South Hunan. In early August he proposed to the CCP leadership that he launch a peasant uprising in South Hunan, to establish what he called a big Red base, covering “at least five counties.” In fact, Mao had no intention of trying to start such a rising. He had never organized one, nor did he think it could be done. (The earlier peasant violence in Hunan had been carried out under the protection of the then radical government.) The sole purpose of the proposal was to set up his next request, which was for a large contingent of the mutineers to come to his aid on their way to the coast. Failing to realize that this Hunan initiative was only a ruse to angle for the troops, Shanghai approved Mao’s plan.
毛打算把这支部队的一部分抓到手。由于他们预计的行军路线接近湘南，毛便在八月初向中央建议，在即将举行的湖南秋收暴动中，他到湘南去搞，要中央从路过的南昌起义部队中给他一个团，称加上其他农军，他至少有占领五县以上的把握”。从毛后来的行为可以看出，他并不是真要去发动农民搞暴动，而是以暴动为藉口，希望从中央那里挖出一支武装带走。
The leaders of the Hunan “uprising” were scheduled to meet on 15 August at the Russian consulate in Changsha, to launch the action. But Mao did not turn up, although he was on the outskirts of the city. As he was in charge of the mission, the meeting had to be postponed to the following day, when again he failed to show up. He only finally appeared on the 18th, when he moved into the consulate, for the sake of security. To his angry and frustrated comrades, he offered the excuse that he had been conducting “investigations into the peasantry.”
不明就里的中央批准了毛的湘南暴动建议。湖南全省暴动的领导者们约定八月十五日在长沙苏联领事馆开会。开会那天独独毛没有来，尽管他三天前已回长沙，就住在杨开慧娘家。由于他是主要人物，会议只好改到第二天。据当时湖南省委给中央的报告：“到了十六日，到会的人部齐全，唯泽东一人未到。”十八日，毛才姗姗露面，大家很生气，他却说他去搞“农民调查”去了。
Mao concealed the true reason for his four-day absence—which was to give himself time to see how the mutineers were faring, and whether they would still be passing South Hunan and thus be available to him. If not, he had no intention of going to South Hunan.
毛迟到四天的原因不可告人：他要等一等，看南昌起义的部队是否仍有可能到湘南，要是不可能，他就不去湘南搞“暴动”了。
The mutineers had got off to a bad start. Within three days of leaving Nanchang, one-third of them had deserted; many others had died drinking dirty water from rice paddies in humid 30-plus centigrade temperatures. The survivors had already lost nearly half their ammunition. The dwindling ranks were struggling just to survive and make it to the coast, and the chances of any making a detour to help him were nil.
南昌起义的部队离开南昌三天，逃兵就去了三分之一，弹药也丢了一半。气温高达摄氏三十度，极度的闷热，士兵们没有水喝，只好喝田里的污水，成群地死去。队伍七零八落，只求挣扎着拚到汕头，不可能绕到湘南。
So when Mao finally joined his comrades at the Russian consulate, he demanded that the plans for an uprising in South Hunan be canceled, even though it had been his proposal in the first place. Instead, he insisted on attacking just Changsha, the provincial capital, arguing that they should “narrow down the uprising plan.”
于是，毛出现在苏联领事馆时，来了个一百八十度大转弯，坚决要求取消他自己提出的湘南暴动计划。毛的理由是，暴动应该缩小范围，应该集中精力打长沙。当时湖南省委给中央的报告说：“缩小范围的暴动计划，泽东持之最坚。”
The aim of this new plan was exactly the same as before—to lay his hands on some armed men. At this point the only Red forces anywhere near him were outside Changsha. They consisted of three groups: peasant activists with weapons seized from the police; unemployed miners and mine guards from the mine at Anyuan, which had closed down; and one army unit that had been stranded en route to join the Nanchang mutineers. Altogether, the force totaled several thousand. Mao’s point in advocating an attack on Changsha was that these forces would be deployed for action, and he could maneuver to become their boss.
就像他并不真要在湘南搞暴动一样，毛也无意打长沙。他提出“打”是因为该城附近有三支红色武装，他可以以打长沙为名，把它们带走。这三支武装，一支是原农运的活跃分子；一支是因安源煤矿倒闭而失业的矿工和矿警；还有一支是原驻武汉的部队，奉命去参加南昌起义而没赶上。一共数千人。
The ploy was successful. Mao’s proposal to go for Changsha was adopted, and he was put in control by being made head of a “Front Committee.” This made him the Party representative on the spot and thus the man with the final say, in the absence of higher authority. Mao had no military training, but he pitched hard for this job by staging a show of enthusiasm for Moscow’s orders in front of the two Russians at the meeting, who called the shots. “The latest Comintern order” about uprisings was so brilliant, Mao said, “it made me jump for joy three hundred times.”
毛如愿以偿地当上了指挥这些军队的“前委”书记，受湖南省委领导。毛没受过任何军事训练，让他当前敌指挥官，纯粹是因为他对莫斯科暴动夺权指示表现出超乎寻常的乐观和热情，而主持长沙决策会议的是两个苏联人。毛的积极可以在他八月二十日给中央的信里看到：“某同志 [苏联人]来湘，道及国际新训令，主张在中国立即实行工农兵苏维埃，闻之巨跃三丈。中国客观上早已到了一九一七年……我们此刻应有决心立即在粤、湘、鄂、赣四省建立工农兵政权。此政权既建设，必且迅速的取得全国的胜利。望中央无疑的接受国际训令，并且在湖南上实行。”
Mao’s next move was to prevent the troops actually going to Changsha, and instead have them muster at a place where he could abduct them. This place had to be far enough away from Changsha that other Party or Russian representatives could not easily reach it. There was no telephone or radio communication with these forces.
On 31 August, Mao left the Russian consulate, saying that he was going to join the troops. But he did not do this. Instead, he made his way to a town called Wenjiashi, 100 km east of Changsha, and there he stayed. On the launch day set for 11 September, Mao was not with any of the troops, but lying low in Wenjiashi. By the 14th, before the troops had got anywhere near Changsha or suffered serious defeats, he had ordered them to abandon the march on Changsha and converge on his location. As a result, the Party organization in Changsha had to abort the whole design on the 15th. The secretary of the Soviet consulate, Maier, referred to the retreat as “most despicable treachery and cowardice.” Moscow called the affair “a joke of an uprising.” It does not seem to have realized that Mao had set the whole thing up solely in order to snare the armed units.
八月三十一日，毛离开了苏联领事馆，说是到部队去。他并没有去。九月十一日是约好的起事日子，这天，毛一个人悄悄待在长沙一百公里外的文家市。按官方说法，毛率领三支部队中的一支，从铜鼓出发。而当时跟毛关系密切的何长工等人，都说毛根本没去铜鼓。十四日，三支队伍还没有到长沙，毛就传令要他们不去了，退兵改道。三支部队都到了文家市。 这一切完全出乎在长沙的湖南省委意料之外，他们只好在十五日取消整个暴动。苏联领事馆的书记马也尔(Maier)说，发生的这一切“可说是最可耻的背叛与临阵脱逃。”莫斯科称之为“暴动的玩笑”。他们似乎没有意识到，毛先前不遗余力地鼓吹“暴动”、打长沙，为的都是调兵 -- 调到自己手上。
The operation appears in history books as “the Autumn Harvest Uprising,” portrayed as a peasant uprising led by Mao. It is the founding moment of the international myth about Mao as a peasant leader, and one of the great deceptions of Mao’s career (to cover it up he was to spin an elaborate yarn to his American spokesman, Edgar Snow). Not only was the “uprising” not an authentic peasant undertaking, but Mao was not involved in any action* —and actually sabotaged it.
这场“暴动”就是史书上着名的“秋收起义”。全世界都以为这是毛泽东领导的农民起义，毛是农民起义领袖的神话也大半起源于此。毛一手制造了这个神话，对美国记者斯诺编了套有声有色的故事。事实上，这不是一次真正的农民起义，据湖南省委给中央的检讨说：这“纯是一个简单的军事行动。不但没有掀动农民夺取土地的革命狂潮，连取得农民对此次暴动的兴趣都没有”。更有甚者，毛拆了它的台。
But he got what he was after—control of an armed force, of some 1,500 men. Due south about 170 kilometers from Wenjiashi lay the Jinggang Mountain range, traditional bandit country. Mao had decided to make this his base of operations. The lack of proper roads meant that many of China’s mountain areas were largely out of reach of the authorities. This particular place had an added advantage: it straddled the border of two provinces, and so was on the very outer edge of both provinces’ control.
文家市远离长沙，在没有无线电联系的情况下，湖南省委和苏联人无法直接指挥。毛早已计划好了这支部队的目的地：南去一百七十公里的井冈山。井冈山位于湘赣边界，两省当局都鞭长莫及，历来是土匪、绿林好汉的出没之地。那里有两位山大王：袁文才，从前是学生；王佐，从前是裁缝。这两人手下有五百人马，占领着有十三万人口的宁冈县大部分，靠收租征税过活。毛如今要把他们的地盘拿过来作自己的根据地。
Mao had a link with a successful outlaw in the area, Yuan Wen-cai. Yuan and his partner Wang Zuo had an army of 500 men and controlled most of one county, Ninggang, which had a population of 130,000. They lived by collecting rents and taxes from the local population.
Mao anticipated problems getting the commanders of the force he had hijacked to go to the bandit country without explicit Party orders, so at Wenjiashi he first sought out a few men he knew already and secured their support, before he called a meeting of the commanders on 19 September. He arranged for his supporters to serve tea and cigarettes so that they could come into the room and keep an eye on things. The argument was fierce—the main commander demanded that they proceed with the old plan and go for Changsha. But Mao was the only Party leader present (the others and the Russians were 100 km away in Changsha), and he prevailed. The force set off for Jinggang Mountain. At first, Mao was such a stranger to the troops that some thought he was a local and tried to grab him to carry guns.
毛很清楚，他要带队伍進山，不是件轻而易举的事。没有党的明确指示，这样做无异于当土匪。毛担心一旦摊牌会危及性命，所以在文家市召集指挥官开会宣布决定前，先找到部队中几个从前熟悉的人，帮助压阵。找的人之一是何长工，何长工这个名字还是毛给他取的。何后来回忆说，毛要他跟另一位叫杨立三的在会场上保护他的安全，所以，“我和杨立三在会场上打杂呀、拿烟呀，我们两个人是你一進，我一出；我一出，他一進。”会上争得很厉害，指挥官们都不同意進山，但最后勉强服从了毛，因为毛是唯一在场的党的代表。
Mao was dressed like a country schoolteacher, in a long blue gown, with a homespun cotton scarf around his neck. Along the way, he talked to soldiers, assessing their condition and gauging their strength—“as if counting family treasure,” one soldier recalled.
部队向井冈山行進。一路上，毛穿着他钟爱的长衫，脖子上系条土布长巾，一副乡村教师的打扮。开始官兵不认识毛，有人以为他是老百姓，要拉他给他们扛枪。
When Mao first told the troops that they were about to become “Mountain Lords”—bandits—they were dumbfounded. This was not why they had joined a Communist revolution. But, speaking in the name of the Party, he assured them that they would be special bandits—part of an international revolution. Banditry was also their best chance, he argued: “Mountain Lords have never been wiped out, let alone us.”
当毛宣布部队是去上山做“大王”时，大家都惊呆了，他们参加革命不是为当土匪。但是毛以党的名义要他们放心，说他们是“红色的山大王”，世界革命的一部分，而且上山也是生存之路。
Still, many were depressed. They were exhausted, and malaria, suppurating legs and dysentery were rife. Whenever they stopped, they were swamped by their own thick stench, so foul it could be smelled a couple of kilometers away. Sick and wounded would lie down in the grass, and often never get up again. Many deserted. Knowing that he could not force his men to stay, Mao allowed those who wanted to leave to do so, without their guns. Two of the top commanders opted to leave, and went to Shanghai. Both of them later went over to the Nationalists. By the time he reached the outlaw land, Mao had only about 600 men left, having lost well over half his force in a couple of weeks. Most of those who stayed did so because they had no alternative. They became the nucleus from which Mao’s force grew—what he later called the “single spark that started a prairie fire.”
尽管如此，许多人仍满心疑虑。不少人作了逃兵。毛任想走的人离去，只不准带枪，他知道他不具备强留任何人的条件。两名最高指挥官都走了，去了上海中央，以后投向了国民党。部队着实筋疲力尽，打摆子，烂腿子，拉痢疾，宿营地里弥漫着强烈的腥臭味儿，有的人一躺在路边的草丛里就再也起不来了。两星期后队伍到达井冈山时，只剩下了六百人，跟着毛大半是因为没有别的出路。他们成为毛起家的班底，未来燎原烈焰的火星。
ARRIVING IN BANDIT COUNTRY at the beginning of October Mao’s first step was to visit Yuan, accompanied by only a few men, so as to reassure the bandit chief. Yuan had some armed men hidden nearby in case Mao brought troops. Finding Mao apparently no threat, Yuan had a pig slaughtered for a banquet, and they sat drinking tea and nibbling peanuts and melon seeds.
十月初，毛到了井冈山下，第一件事是去见袁文才(王佐在山里)。毛只带了几个人，以让袁放心。袁先在会见地点埋伏了二十多人，一见毛人不多，便迎了上去，一边叫人杀猪设宴款待毛。他请毛坐下，嗑瓜子，吃花生，喝茶谈话。
Mao got his foot in the door by pretending he was only pausing en route to the coast to join the Nanchang mutineers. A deal was struck. Mao could stay temporarily, and would feed his own troops by staging looting expeditions. But to start with, they would be looked after by the outlaws.
毛说他来此只是过路，要南下去找南昌起义的队伍。袁同意毛先住下，粮油暂时由他管。毛的队伍稍事休息后去周围的几个县打家劫舍，筹粮筹款。毛就这样把一只脚插進了井冈山。
By February 1928, four months later, Mao had become the master of his hosts. The finale of this takeover took place after Mao’s men captured the capital of Ninggang county from the government on 18 February, in what was, by the bandits’ standards, a sizable military victory. This was also the first battle that Mao was involved in commanding—watching through binoculars from a mountain opposite.
不到四个月，毛反客为主，把袁、王和他们的一帮人变成了手下的一个团。一九二八年二月十八日，毛的队伍攻下了宁冈县城。这是他第一次参加指挥作战，虽然只是在对面山上用望远镜观看。毛很少直接上前线。
Three days later, on the 21st, Mao held a public rally of an organized crowd of thousands of people to celebrate the victory. The climax was the killing of the county chief, who had just been captured. An eyewitness described the scene (in cautious language, as he was telling the story under Communist rule): “A fork-shaped wooden frame was driven into the ground … onto which Chang Kai-yang [the county chief] was tied. The whole place was ringed with ropes from one wooden pole to another for hanging slogans. People thrust their spears, suo-biao, into him and killed him that way … Commissar Mao spoke at the rally.” Mao had earlier expressed a special fondness for this weapon, suo-biao. Now, under his very eyes, it pierced the life out of the county chief.
三天后，毛召开“万人大会” 庆功，大会高潮是处死被俘的县长张开阳。目击者苏兰春描述说：“二月二十一日，在碧市洲上召开工农商学兵万人大会，会场里打好了刺杀张开阳的三叉木架，四面打好木桩，牵好绳，挂上标语，大家用梭镖把张开阳捅死了……毛委员在会上讲了话。” 毛曾在《湖南农民运动考察报告》中细述他对梭镖的由衷喜爱，现在他亲眼看着梭镖杀人。
Public execution rallies had become a feature of local life since Mao’s arrival, and he had demonstrated a penchant for slow killing. At one rally, staged to celebrate a looting expedition at the time of the Chinese New Year 1928, he had written couplets on sheets of red paper, which were pasted onto wooden pillars on both sides of the stage. They read:
自从毛来到井冈山，“万人大会”成了当地人生活的一部分，会上总有这类杀人场面。庆祝建立遂川县红色政权时，毛给大会写了副对联，红纸大字，贴在主席台两旁的木柱上。
Watch us kill the bad landlords today. Aren’t you afraid? It’s knife slicing upon knife.
一边是“想当年剥削工农，好就好，利中生利”； 一边是“看今日斩杀土劣，怕不怕，刀上加刀”。
Mao addressed the rally, and a local landlord, Kuo Wei-chien, was then put to death in line with the prescriptions of Mao’s poetry.
在毛讲话之后，“大劣绅”郭渭坚被“刀上加刀”地处死。
Mao did not invent public execution, but he added to this ghastly tradition a modern dimension, organized rallies, and in this way made killing compulsory viewing for a large part of the population. To be dragooned into a crowd, powerless to walk away, forced to watch people put to death in this bloody and agonizing way, hearing their screams, struck fear deep into those present.
当众行刑在中国是古已有之，并非毛的首创。但毛给这一残忍的传统之“锦”添上了现代的“花”，即组织大会看杀人，不去看不行。这样有组织地使用恐怖是一帮土匪望尘莫及的。袁、王自己也被吓住了。毛的人又远比他们能打仗。他们甘拜下风，让毛坐了山寨的第一把交椅。
The traditional bandits could not match Mao and his orchestrated terror, which frightened even them. Yuan and Zuo submitted to Mao’s authority; soon after this they allowed themselves and their men to be formed into a regiment under him. Mao had out-bandited the bandits.
AS SOON AS he had reached the bandit land, Mao had sent a messenger to Party headquarters in Changsha. Contact was established within days, in October 1927, by which time Shanghai had received reports about the events surrounding the Autumn Harvest Uprising. What could not have failed to emerge was that Mao had aborted the venture, and had then made off with the troops without authorization. Shanghai sent for Mao (along with others) to discuss the fiasco. Mao ignored the summons, and on 14 November he was expelled from his Party posts.
毛一到井冈山就派人去长沙跟湖南省委取得联系。毛远非像后来人们想像的那样住在深山老林，与世隔绝。他的住地跟外界畅通，关系几天工夫就接上了。那时上海的中央已收到一系列关于“秋收起义”的报告。他们不会看不出，是毛泽东拆了这次行动的台，又未经许可带走了部队。中央指定毛到上海开会。毛知道此行不妙，他也绝不愿意离开他的地盘，干脆装聋子。一九二七年十一月十四日，毛被开除出政治局及湖南省委。
The Party made a determined effort to get rid of him. On 31 December, Shanghai told Hunan that “the Centre” considered that “the … army led by comrade Mao Tse-tung … has committed extremely serious errors politically. The Centre orders [you] to dispatch a senior comrade there, with the Resolutions [expelling Mao] … to call a congress for army comrades … to reform the Party organization there.” Clearly anticipating trouble from Mao, the message added: “assign a brave and smart worker comrade to be the Party representative.”
中央要夺毛的权，十二月三十一日函告湖南省委：毛“在政治上确犯了极严重的错误”，湖南省委应当“派一负责同志前去召集军中同志大会讨论并由大会改造党的组织，在必要时，派一勇敢明白的工人同志主任党代表”。
The banner of the Party was critical to Mao, as he had little personal magnetism. His solution to the Party order was simple: prevent the news of his expulsion from ever reaching his men.
A week after Shanghai issued its order, the entire Hunan committee was conveniently—some might say suspiciously—arrested by the Nationalists. Mao’s troops never learned that the Party had withdrawn its mandate from him.
毛能指挥部队，是因为他代表党，没有党的权威队伍不会听他的。不知是碰巧还是阴谋，中央指示发出一星期后，湖南省委被国民党一网打尽。结果毛的队伍完全不知道党已经吊销了他的资格。
It was not until March 1928 that the first Party envoy was allowed to appear in Mao’s base, bringing the message that expelled him. But Mao outsmarted the Party by ensuring that the envoy could only deliver the message to a few hand-picked lackeys, and then pretending to submit by resigning his Party post, which he passed on to a stooge. He awarded himself a new title, Division Commander, and continued to control the army.
直到一九二八年三月党的第一位使者才進入井冈山，带来了中央决定，取消“前委”， 解除毛的党的职务。但是，毛“道高一尺，魔高一丈”， 他安排中央决议只传达给几个亲信，党的书记也派一个自己人去当，毛本人当“师长”，掌权的还是他。
THIS BANDIT COUNTRY made an ideal base, well supplied with food. The mountains, though rising to only 995 meters, were steep, and gave excellent security, being ringed by precipices, with dense forests of fir and bamboo that were permanently shrouded in mist, and teemed with monkeys, wild boar, tigers and all sorts of poisonous snakes. It was easy to defend, and to get out of in an emergency, as there were hidden byways leading out to two provinces—narrow mud paths buried under masses of vegetation, impossible for strangers to spot. For outlaws, it was a safe haven.
毛泽东的“山寨”是一块理想的根据地。平原上盛产大米、油茶，“一年耕而三年食”。山里杉竹茂密，四季浓雾缭绕，猴子、野猪，甚至老虎来来去去。井冈山最高峰才九百九十五公尺，却很陡峭，易守难攻，败也可以跑。浓浓的灌木隐蔽着只有猎人涉足的小径，潜向通往两个省的阳关大道。
Mao and his troops lived by staging looting sorties to neighboring counties, and sometimes farther afield. These forays were grandly called da tu-hao—literally, “smash landed tyrants.” In fact they were indiscriminate, classic bandit raids. Mao told his troops: “If the masses don’t understand what ‘landed tyrants’ means, you can tell them it means the moneyed, or ‘the rich.’ ” The term “the rich” was highly relative, and could mean a family with a couple of dozen liters of cooking oil, or a few hens. “Smash” covered a range of activities from plain robbery and ransom to killing.
毛和他的军队靠在四邻的县里打家劫舍为生，美其名曰“打土豪”。毛告诉队伍说：“群众听不懂“土豪”是什么意思，我们就用“财东”或“有钱人”来代替”。老井冈山战士范树德说，打土豪，“老话叫“吊羊”、“绑票”。”
These raids made frequent headlines in the press, and greatly raised Mao’s profile. It was now that he gained notoriety as a major bandit chief.
毛的活动常常是报上的新闻，他在全国出了名，以“毛匪”着称。 当地人恨他们。当年的红军李国斌回忆道：一次“打土豪”时，数百村民冲过来，“抓了我们四十余人，关押在祠堂里，对他们实行捆打吊，令女人用脚去踩，打了后用禾桶盖起来，上面压上大石头，使用各种毒刑。”
But his bandit activities garnered little support from the locals. One Red soldier recalled how hard it was to persuade the population to help them identify the rich, or to join in a raid, or even share the loot. Another described one night’s experience:
We usually surrounded the house of the landed tyrant, seizing him first and then starting to confiscate things. But this time as soon as we broke in, gongs sounded all of a sudden … and several hundred enemies [villagers] emerged … They seized over forty of our men, locked them up in the clan temple … beat them and trussed them up, the women stamping on them with their feet. Then grain barrels were put over them, with big stones on top. They were so badly tortured …
Although Mao claimed an ideological rationale—fighting the exploiting classes—the fact that his incursions were virtually indistinguishable from traditional bandit behavior remained a permanent source of discontent in his own ranks, particularly among the military commanders. In December 1927 the chief commander, Chen Hao, tried to take the troops away while on a looting expedition. Mao rushed to the scene with a posse of supporters, and had Chen arrested, and later executed in front of the entire force. Mao almost lost his army. In the space of the few months since he had snatched the force away, all its main officers had deserted him.
官兵们知道他们的生活方式跟土匪没多大区别，许多人都不情愿，尤其是军官。一九二七年十二月，主要军事指挥官陈浩在井冈山外的茶陵县企图把部队带走。毛闻讯率人追上，把陈浩抓起来，随后当众处死。对毛来说，这是一次极端严重的危机，他几乎失去了整个军队。在他拐走这支部队的短短几个月中，所有的军事指挥官都跟他决裂了。
As a means to curry favor with the troops, Mao set up “soldiers’committees” to satisfy their wish for a say in the proceeds of looting. At the same time, secret Party cells were formed, answering only to Mao as the Party boss. Even ranking military superiors did not know who was a member of the Party, which amounted to a secret organization. In this way Mao used the control mechanism of communism, as well as its name, to maintain his grip on the army.
But as his grip remained far from iron-clad, and he himself was certainly not popular, Mao could never relax his vigilance about his personal safety, and it was from now that he began to perfect the security measures that developed in later life into a truly awesome—if largely invisible—system. To begin with, he had about a hundred guards, and the number grew. He picked several houses in different places in bandit country, and had them fully rigged for security. The houses invariably had escape exits such as a hole in the wall, usually at the back, leading into the mountains. Later, on the Long March, even when he was on the move, most of his houses had one notable characteristic: a special exit leading to an emergency escape route.
毛时时担心自己的安危，开始逐步完善警卫措施。警卫从一百来人不断增加。他在不同的地方有好几处房子，都从安全角度仔细挑选。房子的后面可以逃遁，或有个后窗，或在后墙有洞，有小路通向山里。(以后长征途中，尽管宿营只是临时，毛的住处也部有安全出口。)
Mao lived in style. One residence, called the Octagonal Pavilion, was of great architectural distinction. The spacious main part, opening onto a large courtyard set beside a river, had a ceiling consisting of three layers of octagonal wooden panels that spiraled into a little glass roof, like a glass-topped pagoda. It had belonged to a local doctor, who was now moved to a corner of the courtyard but continued to practice—most convenient for Mao, as he was never quite free of some ailment or other.
毛在井冈山的主要住宅之一位于入山口茅坪，交通便利，一旦情况紧急随时可以撤進山里。这是一幢美丽的八角楼，宽大的正屋屋顶像一座高耸的八角形的三层木头宝塔，螺旋着旋上去，到顶尖是一丛采光的亮瓦。这个大宅子原属于当地的医生。
Another house that Mao occupied, in the big town of Longshi, was also a doctor’s, and also magnificent. It had a strange beauty that bespoke the former prosperity of the town. The enormous house was half a European masonry villa, with an elegant loggia above a row of Romanesque arches, and half a brick-and-timber Chinese mansion, with layers of upturned eaves and delicate latticed windows. The two parts were grafted together by an exquisite octagonal doorway.
另一处房子也是医生的，叫“刘德盛药店”，位于山下大镇碧市。这座大宅以奇异的美、无言地述说着井冈山昔日的辉煌。它一半是欧洲教堂式的石头建筑，一排罗马式的圆拱回廊；一半是中式楼房，瓦屋顶上筑着像蛇窜出似的檐角。中西两部由一道八角形的大门洞精美地连在一起。
Mao’s actual HQ in Longshi was a splendid two-story mansion set in 2,000 square meters of ground, once the best school for young men from three counties—until Mao came. The whole top floor was open on three sides and looked out onto a vista of rivers and clouds. It had been designed for the pupils to enjoy the breeze in the stifling days of summer. Mao’s occupation of this building was to set a pattern. Wherever he went, schools, clan temples and Catholic churches (often the sturdiest buildings in many parts of remote rural China) were commandeered. These were the only buildings large enough for meetings, apart from being the best. School classes, naturally, were shut down.
毛的司令部也在碧市，原是一所带两千平方公尺花园的书院，为方圆三县的最高学府。楼上三面完全敞开，天地云水一览无余，夏天学生在这里乘凉。毛所到之处，不仅学校关门，医生易址，祠堂、教堂也被征用。共产党最常见的活动开会，需要大地方。
During his entire stay in the outlaw land, which lasted fifteen months, Mao ventured into the mountains only three times, for a total period of less than a month. And when he did go, he was not exactly traveling rough. When he went to call on bandit chief Zuo, he stayed in a brilliantly white mansion known as the White House, formerly owned by a Cantonese timber merchant. He was entertained lavishly, with pigs and sheep slaughtered in his honor.
毛在井冈山住了十五个月，進山里只有三次，总共待了不到一个月。
The contours of Mao’s future lifestyle in power were already emerging. He had acquired a sizable personal staff, which included a manager, a cook, a cook’s help with the special duty of carrying water for Mao, a groom who looked after a small horse for his master, and secretaries. One errand boy’s “special task” was to keep him supplied with the right brand of cigarettes from Longshi. Another orderly collected newspapers and books whenever they took a town or looted a rich house.
他未来的生活方式此时已初具轮廓。他拥有众多的仆人，或称“勤杂人员”、“工作人员”。里面有司务长、伙夫，有专烧水挑水的，有马夫照管他的坐骑小黄马，有专门送信的，还有一位被毛授予“两大任务”，一是买烟，一是收集书籍、报纸。毛离不开新闻。
MAO ALSO ACQUIRED a wife—his third—almost as soon as he settled in outlaw country. A pretty young woman with large eyes, high cheekbones, an almond-shaped face and a willowy figure, Gui-yuan was just turning eighteen when she met Mao. She came from the rich county of Yongxin at the foot of the mountain, and her parents, who owned a teahouse, had given her the name Gui-yuan (Gui: osmanthus, and yuan: round) because she was born on an autumn evening when a round moon shone above a blossoming osmanthus tree. She had attended a missionary school run by two Finnish ladies, but was not content with being brought up as a lady. Her restless, fiery temperament rejected the traditional claustrophobic life prescribed for women, and made her yearn for a wider world, enjoyment, and some action. So, in the stirring atmosphere of the Northern Expedition army’s entry into her town in summer 1926, she joined the Communist Party. Soon she was making speeches in public, as a cheerleader welcoming the troops. At the age of only sixteen, she was appointed head of the Women’s Department in the new government for the whole county, starting her job by cutting off her own long hair, an act that was still revolutionary and eyebrow-raising.
来井冈山不久，毛有了新欢：他的第三任妻子贺子珍。那年贺子珍刚十八岁，瓜子脸，杏仁眼，身材苗条。她生在山下富庶的永新县，父亲家是永新的望族，曾广有产业，父亲本人捐过举人，当过县长，后来家道中落，开茶馆生活。子珍原名“桂圆”， 因为她出生的那天是秋夜，圆圆的月亮下盛开着桂花。她在一所由两个芬兰修女主持的教会学校读书，可是讨厌学校里“念不完的圣经，做不完的祈祷”，也不能忍受循规蹈矩的小城生活。她天性热情好动，心头好像燃烧着火。北伐军進入永新，打破了小城的一潭静水，她迷上了那热腾腾的气氛，加入了共产党。她当啦啦队欢迎北伐军，在大庭广众下演讲，才十六岁就当上了县妇女部长。她还带头剪掉了长长的秀发，留短发是革命的象征。
A year later, after Chiang Kai-shek’s split, Communists and activists were on the run, including her parents and younger sister, who had also joined the Party. Her elder brother, also a Communist, was thrown into prison, along with many others, but the outlaw Yuan was a friend of his, and helped to break him out of jail. Gui-yuan and her brother escaped with the outlaws, and she became best friends with Mrs. Yuan. Zuo, the other outlaw, who had three wives, gave her a Mauser pistol.
蒋介石“清共”后，共产党员和积极分子开始逃亡，她的父母和妹妹逃走了，哥哥被投入监狱。山大王袁文才是哥哥的朋友，突袭监狱把他救了出来。子珍和哥哥跟袁文才上了井冈山，她成了袁夫人的好友，王佐给了她一支毛瑟枪。
When Mao came, Yuan assigned her to act as his interpreter. Mao did not speak the local dialect, and he never learned it. Here, as in his later peregrinations, he had to communicate with the locals through an interpreter.
后来毛泽东来了，一眼看上了这个姑娘。袁文才也竭力促成，派她当毛的翻译。毛不会说当地方言。在长期转战生涯中，他常常用翻译。
Mao at once began to court her, and by the beginning of 1928 they were “married”—with no binding ceremony but a sumptuous banquet prepared by Mrs. Yuan. This was barely four months after Mao had left Kai-hui, the mother of his three sons, the previous August. He had written to her just once, mentioning that he had foot trouble. From the time of his new marriage, he abandoned his family.
一九二八年初，毛跟子珍“结婚”了。没有举行仪式，只有袁太太给他们摆了丰盛的宴席。这时毛离开杨开慧和他的三个儿子还不到四个月。别离后毛只给开慧写过一封信，说他患了脚疾，现在干脆遗弃了开慧。
Unlike Kai-hui, who was madly in love with him, Gui-yuan married Mao with reluctance. A beautiful woman in a crowd of men, she had many suitors and considered Mao, at thirty-four, “too old” and “not worthy” of her, as she told a close friend. Mao’s youngest brother, Tse-tan, handsome and lively, also fancied Gui-yuan. “My brother has a wife,” he said. “Better to be with me.” She chose the elder Mao because she felt the “need for protection politically in that environment,” as she later conceded.
开慧对毛的感情是狂热的爱，子珍只是相当勉强地嫁给了毛。一个俊俏女子在成千的男人中生活，自然有众多的仰慕者。子珍觉得三十四岁的毛“年纪太大”，她是“一朵鲜花插在牛粪上”。毛英俊活泼的弟弟泽覃是她的一个追求者，对她说：“我哥有嫂子，跟我吧。”子珍后来承认她选择毛是因为“一个女孩子在那个环境中需要一种政治上的保护”。
In a world of few women and a lot of sexually frustrated men, Mao’s relationship with Gui-yuan caused gossip. Mao was careful: he and Gui-yuan avoided appearing in public together. When the couple walked past the building that housed wounded soldiers, he would ask Gui-yuan to go separately.
毛跟子珍的关系在性生活得不到满足的男人世界里，引起了不少闲话。毛很谨慎，尽量避免跟子珍一同出现在人前。路过伤病员住院的地方，毛特别要和她分开走。
By the end of a year of marriage, Gui-yuan had resolved to leave Mao. She confided to a friend that she was unlucky to have married him and felt she had “made a big sacrifice” by doing so. When Mao decided to leave the outlaw land, in January 1929, she tried desperately to stay behind. Gui-yuan may well have been thinking about more than just leaving Mao. She had been swept into a maelstrom while still only in her teens, and now her desire to quit was so strong that she was prepared to risk capture by the Reds’ enemies. However, Mao ordered her to be taken along “at any cost.” She cried all the way, repeatedly falling behind, only to be fetched by Mao’s guards with his horse.
结婚不到一年，子珍已决心离开毛。她对朋友说跟毛结婚很“倒楣”，是“重大的牺牲”。一九二九年一月，毛要离开井冈山远走他乡时，子珍抓住这个机会要留下。她当时最好的朋友曾志说：“贺子珍死都不愿意下井冈山，她不愿意走。我们都要出发时，她也不走，她很倔，不肯走。”这样的坚持很可能既有个人的原因也有政治的因素，子珍想逃离的是毛代表的那种生活，她在十几岁时不自觉地被卷進去的生活。她想脱离这种生活的愿望之强烈，甚至不顾冒被国民党抓去的危险。毛命令无论如何要把她带上。“我就硬是把她拉走，”曾志说。“她一边走一边哭，总是掉队。她没来的时候，毛主席就叫他的马夫回去找她，去接她。”
MAO’S STANDING WITH the Party began to change in April 1928, when a large Red unit of thousands of men, the surviving Nanchang mutineers, the troops he had angled for right from the start, sought refuge in his base. They came to Mao as a defeated force whose much-depleted ranks had been routed on the south coast the previous October, when the Russians failed to deliver the promised arms. The remnants of the force had been rallied by a 41-year-old officer called Zhu De, a former professional soldier with the rank of brigadier, and something of a veteran among the mainly twentyish Reds. He had gone to Germany in his mid-thirties, and joined the Party before moving on to Russia for special military training. He was a cheerful man, and a soldier’s soldier, who mingled easily with the rank and file, eating and marching with them, carrying guns and backpacks like the rest, wearing straw sandals, a bamboo hat on his back. He was constantly to be found at the front.
一九二八年四月，毛还在井冈山时，南昌起义的幸存者在走投无路的情况下投奔他来了。这支部队头年十月历尽千辛万苦到达南海岸，没有看到任何苏联军火，却被打散，剩下的人聚集在四十一岁的朱德麾下。朱德是职业军人，曾在滇军中官至旅长。三十六岁那年他到德国留学，在那里参加了共产党，以后去苏联受军训。在一群二十来岁的红色青年中，他算是长者，很自然地受到尊敬。他脾气又好，忠厚宽容，风度朴实无华，像士兵一样脚蹬草鞋，身背竹笠，一块儿吃饭、行军、扛枪、背背包，打仗时总在前方，官兵们都爱戴他。
Mao had always coveted the Nanchang mutineers, and when he first arrived in outlaw territory had sent a message urging Zhu to join him, but Zhu had declined. Shanghai’s orders had been to launch uprisings in the southeast corner of Hunan around New Year 1928, and Zhu, as a loyal Party man, had followed orders. The uprisings failed abysmally, thanks to the sheer absurdity and brutality of Moscow’s tactics. According to a report at the time, the policy was to “kill every single one of the class enemies and burn and destroy their homes.” The slogan was “Burn, burn, burn! Kill, kill, kill!” Anyone unwilling to kill and burn was termed “running dog of the gentry [who] deserves to be killed.”
毛刚到井冈山时曾派人找过朱德，劝朱加入他的行列，朱谢绝了。当时党命令他在湘南组织暴动。暴动败得一塌糊涂，大半因为莫斯科的指示不仅残忍，而且是搬起石头砸自己的脚。当时的政策是：“杀尽阶级的敌人，焚毁敌人的巢穴”，“焚毁整个城市”，“豪绅的走狗都是在杀之列，我们并不顾恤”。暴动的口号是：“烧！烧！烧！杀！杀！杀！”
In line with this policy, Zhu’s men razed two whole towns, Chenzhou and Leiyang, to the ground.* The result was to foment a real uprising—against the Communists. One day, at a rally held to try to force peasants to do more burning and killing, the peasants revolted and killed the attending Communists. In village after village and town after town where Zhu’s men were active, rebellions sprang up against the Reds. Peasants slaughtered grassroots Party members, tore off the red neckerchiefs they had been ordered to wear, and donned white ones to demonstrate their allegiance to the Nationalists.
朱德的人也乱烧滥杀，把郴州、耒阳两个县城化为焦土。结果农民真的起来暴动了--反对共产党的暴动。根据当时的报告，在动员农民，焚尽湘粤大道五里内民房”的群众大会上，“到会的几千武装农民群众听到这项命令就在会场中反了，把郴县负责人杀得精光，郴县全县变了三分之二。其他永兴、耒阳的农民也动起来……后经调回前线的红军来镇压，才算把有形的反动隐藏下去。但这次死的人也就在千人以上不少了！”农民把他们在共产党统治下戴的红袖箍、红领巾扯下，打出白旗。
Once Nationalist troops began to apply pressure, Zhu had to run, and thousands of civilians went with him: the families of the activists who had done the burning and killing, who had nowhere else to go. This was what Moscow had intended: peasants must be coerced into doing things that left no way back into normal life. To “get them to join the revolution,” the Party had decreed, “there is only one way: use Red terror to prod them into doing things that leave them with no chance to make compromises later with the gentry and bourgeoisie.” One man from Leiyang recounted: “I had suppressed [i.e., killed] counter-revolutionaries, so I could not live peacefully now. I had to go all the way … So I burned my own house with my own hands … and left [with Zhu].”
国民党军队一攻来，朱德的队伍只好撤离，参加过杀人放火的农民和他们的家庭也不得不扶老携幼跟着走。当年耒阳的农军王紫峰回忆道：“我当过赤卫队长，镇压过反革命……只有坚决干到底，没有别的出路，所以我自己动手把[自己的]房子烧了”，跟朱德走了。这也是莫斯科的政策，切断这些农民的退路，“使他与豪绅资产阶级无妥协余地”，把他们逼上梁山。
After these people left, the cycle of revenge and retribution brought more casualties, among them a young woman who had been adopted by Mao’s mother, called Chrysanthemum Sister. She had followed Mao into the Party and married a Communist, and they had a young child. Although it seems she and her husband did not support the killings by the Reds, nevertheless her husband was executed after Zhu’s army left Leiyang, and his head exhibited in a wooden cage on the city wall. Chrysanthemum Sister was imprisoned. She wanted to recant, but her captors refused permission. She wrote to a relative that she was made to “suffer all the pains I had never imagined existed” and yearned for death: “I long to die and not go on being tortured … It would be such relief to leave this world. But my poor [baby], it’s so painful to think of him. I had so many plans about bringing him up. Never did I dream all this was going to happen … My baby must not blame me …” Chrysanthemum Sister was later executed.
共产党走，国民党来，复仇报冤，玉石俱焚。牺牲者中有毛的妹妹泽建，小名菊妹子，是过继到毛家的。毛把她带進党，她跟一个党员结了婚，生了个孩子。虽然她和丈夫并不赞成共产党的杀人政策，她的丈夫还是被国民党杀了头，头装在木笼子里，挂在城墙上示众。菊妹子也被处死。她在狱中写过一封信，说她希望“自首”， 但耒阳县坚决要杀她。她也就死了心，“甘愿受死刑。不愿受活刑了。”“快脱离人世就好了。”她只希望能见她的生母和孩子“浅生”一面： “唉，可怜的浅生，实令我痛心呵！以前如何的希望养育他呵！谁知弄到此地步咧。”她想要她的孩子理解她：“浅生小儿也万不能怪我。[我]今生从未闻见的苦情均受到了。”
Zhu came to Mao as a defeated man, while Mao could represent himself as the person who had in effect saved what was the largest detachment of Communist troops still functioning, at a time when other Red bases were crumbling. All the uprisings the Russians had ordered in the past months had ended in failure. The most famous Red base, Hailufeng, on the south coast, collapsed in late February 1928. During its two-month existence, the area, called “Little Moscow”—there was even a “Red Square,” with a gateway copied from the Kremlin—became a carnage ground under its leader Peng Pai, a man with a thirst for blood.* Over 10,000 people were butchered; “reactionary villages were razed wholesale to the ground.”
这个时期共产党烧杀最凶的地方是广东海陆丰，号称“小莫斯科”那里还修了“红场”， 入口是个俄式的花哨大门。领袖彭湃把此地变成了可怕的屠场。彭湃这样推祟列宁：“他的法律，是没有什么详细的，反动的就杀，他的工人农民，不用报告什么工会、农会、政府，直可把土豪、劣绅、地主、资本家杀却”。彭湃的演讲和政策充满了这样的语言：“准群众自由杀人。杀人是暴动顶重要的工作，宁可杀错，不要使其漏网”。“将这批豪绅地主剖腹割头，无论任何反动分子，都毫不客气的就地杀戮，直无丝毫的情感”。海陆丰存在的短短两个月中，一万多人被残酷处死，“反动的乡村有些全乡焚烧”。
These failed areas had carried out killing and burning on a much larger scale than Mao’s. Mao was not a fanatic. He would stop his men from burning down Catholic churches (which were often the best buildings in rural areas) and fine houses, telling them to keep them for their own use. Killing served its purposes, but it should not jeopardize his broader political interests.
这些苏联人指导的夺权掌权均以失败告终。毛泽东的井冈山几乎是硕果仅存。毛不是狂热分子，当部队要烧天主教堂和豪华大宅时，他制止他们，说与其烧掉不如留起来自己享受。杀人当然要杀，但别杀得连自己也站不住脚。
By the time Zhu De came to Mao, Moscow had begun to stop the “aimless and disorderly pogroms and killings” which it termed, with the Communist penchant for jargon, “blind-action-ism” and “killing-and-burning-ism.” Shanghai ordered killing to be more targeted. This was exactly what Mao had been doing. He emerged as shrewd and far-sighted, and this dealt him back into the game—and into the Party’s good graces. And Stalin’s too. Even Mao’s disobedience vis-à-vis the Party now had a plus side, as Stalin badly needed a winner—someone with initiative, not just a blind subordinate. Moscow’s ability to operate in China, already weakened by Chiang Kai-shek’s policy switch in spring 1927, had been further impaired after Russian diplomats were caught red-handed in an attempted putsch in Canton (known as “the Canton Commune”) in December 1927. Some missions, including the one in Changsha, were shut down, and Moscow lost diplomatic cover for many of its operatives.
朱德上井冈山的时候，莫斯科已决定停止乱烧乱杀的政策。它喜欢用“主义”这个词儿，给这一政策戴的帽子是“盲动主义”、“烧杀主义”。莫斯科说：“恐怖宜有系统。”这正跟毛的所为不谋而合。毛的精明使他重新获得莫斯科的青睐。尽管毛的自行其是曾使中央愤怒到把他撤掉，但此时斯大林亟需在中国有个不亦步亦趋的人，自己有主意，有能力，能让共产党成功。尤其是这时候，莫斯科难以对中共直接指挥。由于苏联使馆的人在企图夺权的“广州起义”中被当场抓获，中国当局关闭了一系列苏联领事馆，苏联人失去了用外交官身份在中国活动的机会。
As soon as Zhu De arrived, Mao acted to retrieve his Party mandate, writing to Shanghai on 2 May demanding to form a Special Committee headed by himself. Without waiting for a reply, he had it announced at a rally to celebrate the Mao–Zhu link-up that Mao was the Party commissar—and Zhu the commander—of what was to become known as “the Zhu–Mao Red Army.” Mao then held a “Party congress” with delegates appointed by himself, and just set up the Special Committee, with himself as its head.
毛此时没有任何党的职位。他曾累次写信给中央，要求成立一个由他领导的管辖井冈山一带的特别委员会，都未获明文批准。朱、毛会师后，毛又于五月二日再次给中央写信。不等中央答覆，毛就指定代表，召开“代表大会”， 自己当上了书记。
There was an extra reason why Mao required an urgent Party mandate. The contingent Zhu commanded was 4,000 strong, and far outnumbered Mao’s, which counted just over 1,000; moreover, half of Zhu’s men were proper soldiers, with battle experience. So Mao needed a Party mandate to secure his authority. To establish some martial credentials in the presence of Zhu’s army, Mao sported a pistol when he met them, one of the few times he was ever seen carrying one. He soon gave it back to a bodyguard. Mao believed in the gun, but he was not a battlefield man.
毛急于拥有党的职位，还因为朱德带上山四千多人，而他的兵力只有一千，不及朱的四分之一。要管住实力远大于他的朱德，毛需要党的名义。他也要显示自己是个军人，在会师时特意挎上手枪，这在他是极少见的。过后他就把枪还给了警卫员。这支军队不久便以“朱毛红军”着称。
While waiting for endorsement from Shanghai, Mao began to behave like a good Party member, accepting Party orders and regular inspectors, and filing long reports. Till now he had not bothered to find out how many Party members there were in his territory, and had given vague—and exaggerated—answers to an inspector: this county had “over 100,” that one “over 1,000.” Now Party committees started to function.
等待授权时，毛开始表现自己了。党的命令接受了，巡视员也让巡视了，还写长长的报告。党组织正经八百地活动了。毛到井冈山八个多月，还不知道他的辖区有多少党员，巡视员问起时，他的答覆是这个县有“千余”，那个县有“百余”。毛也还没進行过分田工作。理论上这是土地革命的中心，但讲求实际的毛觉得这事没什么必要，打家劫舍够维持统治就行。如今井冈山首次实行分田。
He also began to carry out land redistribution, central to the Communist program. He had not bothered to do this before, as it was irrelevant to how he ruled, which was simply by looting.
MEANWHILE, MAO’S LETTER demanding a Party post, which, like all other correspondence, was carried by special messenger, was sent on by Shanghai to Moscow. It reached Stalin on 26 June 1928, right in the middle of the CCP’s 6th Congress, then meeting in secret just outside Moscow. That this was the only time any foreign party held a congress in Russia speaks for the exceptional importance Stalin ascribed to China, as does the fact that the Russians arranged and paid for over 100 delegates to travel clandestinely from China.
毛要党授权的信，由秘密交通员揣着，从上海千里迢迢送到莫斯科，在六月二十六日递上了斯大林的办公桌。中共正在开“六大”，地点就在莫斯科郊外，是唯一一个在苏联召开的外国党代表大会。斯大林把一百多名中共代表极机密地，不远万里地，耗费巨资地运来莫斯科，足见他对中共的期待有多高。
Stalin’s line was delivered by Comintern chief Nikolai Bukharin in an address that spanned nine buttock-numbing hours. Mao was not among those present. He had already adopted a tyrant’s golden rule, one to which he stuck for the rest of his life: not to step out of his lair unless he absolutely had to.
斯大林的中国路线由共产国际主席布哈林(Nikolai Bukharin)向大会传达，一讲就是九个小时，让在座者屁股都坐麻木了。毛不在座。纵观他的一生，不到万不得已，他绝不离开他的地盘。
Moscow had reservations about Mao. Chou En-lai, the key figure at the Congress, said in his military report that Mao’s troops had “a partly bandit character,” meaning that Mao did not always toe the line. Yet, fundamentally, Mao was in favor with Moscow, and was cited at the Congress as a key fighting leader. The fact was that he was the most effective man in applying the Kremlin’s policy which, as Stalin reiterated to the Chinese Party leaders in person on 9 June, was to establish a Red Army. While in Russia, every delegate to the Congress received army training, and detailed military plans were drawn up. Stalin, the old bank-robber, got personally involved in the financing via a huge counterfeiting operation.
“六大”唱主角的周恩来作军事报告，说毛的队伍“有一些土匪性质”，意思是毛不大听指挥。苏联人对毛不放心，但是很看重他，称他为中共武装的主要领导人。确实，毛泽东是最成功地推行克里姆林宫战略的人。斯大林六月九日接见中共党领导人时说：战略就是组建红军。在苏联的“六大”代表都受到军训，具体的军事计划也制定出来。曾抢过银行的斯大林本人亲自负责给中共提供建军的假钞。
Mao fitted Stalin’s bill. He had an army—and a base—and was an old Party member. Moreover, he now had the highest profile, even if of a notorious kind, among all Chinese Communists. He was, as Stalin was later to say to the Yugoslavs, insubordinate, but a winner. And however disobedient he might be, Mao clearly needed the Party, and needed Moscow, and this made him essentially subject to control.
斯大林看好毛泽东。毛有军队，有根据地，又是老党员，在中国知名度也最高。当然，毛不听话。但正如斯大林后来对南斯拉夫共产党人说的，毛“不听话，但是个成事的人。”而且，不管他怎么不听话，斯大林有办法控制他：毛离不开党，离不开莫斯科，离开了，他只是土匪一个。
Mao’s demands were met in full. By November he had been told that he was in charge of the Zhu–Mao Red Army and its territory around the outlaw land. This was a key moment in his rise. He had faced down the Party—and Moscow itself.
于是，毛的要求完全被满足。十一月，中央通知到达，重新成立“前委”，由毛任书记，管辖朱毛红军。前委之下组织军事委员会，以朱德为书记。在毛泽东的上升史上，这是个历史性的时刻。毛与党离心离德，与莫斯科离心离德，结果党和莫斯科是要啥给啥，他大获全胜。
*This mutiny entered myth as a purely Chinese operation under the misleading name of “the Nanchang Uprising,” and 1 August was later designated the founding day of the Chinese Communist Army. But, as Stalin bluntly put it, the operation was “on the initiative of the Comintern, and only on its initiative.” These words were deleted from the published version of Stalin’s speech. The man in charge of delivering arms to the mutineers was Anastas Mikoyan.
*One of Mao’s closest subordinates confirmed that by the time Mao turned up, “the Autumn Harvest Uprising had failed.”
*One of the Russians in Shanghai told Moscow that “everything has been given over to fire and the sword and people were shot right and left.”
* He praised Lenin, not inappositely, with these words: “His law has no detail. It just kills all opposition. His workers and peasants can just kill off all the landed tyrants, bad gentry, landlords, capitalists, with no need to report to anyone …” The regime called on people to “disembowel and slice off heads … slaughter on the spot with no hesitation. Have absolutely not a shred of feeling …,” “kill, kill freely. To kill is the topmost important work in an uprising.” Children were praised for “automatically killing reactionaries.”