53 MAOISM FALLS FLAT ON THE WORLD STAGE
53 树不起来的“毛主义”
(1966–70 AGE 72–76)
1966～1970 年 72～76 岁
MAO'S ULTIMATE AMBITION was to dominate the world. In November 1968 he told the Australian Maoist leader Hill:
毛泽东在一九六八年十一月对澳大利亚毛主义党的领袖希尔说，
In my opinion, the world needs to be unified … In the past, many, including the Mongols, the Romans … Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and the British Empire, wanted to unify the world. Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union want to unify the world. Hitler wanted to unify the world … But they all failed. It seems to me that the possibility of unifying the world has not disappeared … In my view, the world can be unified.
他认为“这个世界需要统一”。“蒙古人、罗马人、亚历山大大帝、拿破仑、大英帝国，都想统一世界。今天的美国、苏联，也想统一世界。希待勒想统一世界，日本想统一太平洋地区。但是他们都失败了。照我看，统一世界的可能性并没有消失。”“我认为，这个世界是能够统一的。”
Mao clearly felt that he was the man for the job, as he dismissed America and Russia as possible unifiers, using arguments that rested solely on China's huge population. “But these two countries [America and Russia],” he went on, “have too small populations, and they will not have enough manpower if it is dispersed. Further, they are also afraid of fighting a nuclear war. They are not afraid of eliminating populations in other countries, but they are afraid of their own populations being eliminated.” It was hardly necessary to read between the lines to see that the ruler with the largest population—and the least fear of it being wiped out—was Mao himself. He saw China's role as follows: “In another five years, our country … will be in a better position … In another five years …”
毛显然认为这个角色非他莫属。他说美国、苏联都不行：“这两个国家人口太少，到处打起来人力就不敷分配。而且，它们都怕打核战争。他们不怕别的国家死人，可是怕自己的人口死掉。”哪个国家人口最多呢？哪个国家的领导人不怕自己的人民死掉呢？自然是中国，自然是毛泽东。他梦想着在不久的将来如愿以偿：“再过五年，我们的国家就有条件了”。
It was for the sake of this world ambition that Mao had embarked on his Superpower Program in 1953, insisting on breakneck speed, and taking hair-raising risks in the nuclear field. The most scary of these came on 27 October 1966, when a missile armed with an atomic warhead was fired 800 km across northwest China, over sizable towns—the only such test ever undertaken by any nation on earth, and with a missile known to be far from accurate, putting the lives of those in its flight path at risk. Three days beforehand, Mao told the man in charge to proceed, saying that he was prepared for the test to fail.
正是为了实现统治世界的野心，毛发展核武器不惜一切代价。一九六六年十月二十七日，中国在本土進行了一次携带核弹头的导弹试验。没有任何一个核国家敢这样做，因为稍有偏差就等于自己往自己人民头上扔下一颗原子弹。这枚核导弹在中国西北部穿行八百公里，飞行轨道下有人口稠密的城镇。这种类型的导弹在不携带核弹头的冷试验中，曾屡出差错。三天前，毛指示做这次试验时说：“这次可能打胜仗，也可能打败仗，失败了也不要紧。”他不在乎原子弹掉在自己人民头上。
Almost all those involved in the test felt that a catastrophe was likely. The people in the launch control room expected to die. The commander of the target zone was so nervous that he moved his HQ to the top of a mountain, comforting himself and his colleagues with the argument that if the missile went off course, they might be able to shield themselves from the atomic blast by scrambling down the opposite side of the mountain.
参加试验的人都准备一死。发射团的人写了遗书，交到毛的桌上。落弹区基地司令员把他的指挥部设在一座山顶上，他说：“一旦导弹出现偏差，如果落在前面，我们可隐蔽在山后：如果在山后爆炸，我们可隐蔽在山前。山顶成了我们進退依托的屏障。其实，这完全是一种自我安慰。”
As it happened, the test succeeded, an outcome that was attributed to Mao's “Thought,” summed up in the slogan “The spiritual atomic bomb detonating the material atomic bomb.” In fact the success was a fluke. Subsequent tests of the same missile failed, as it began gyrating wildly shortly after lift-off.*
幸好发射成功。这当然是“毛泽东思想的伟大胜利”。但成功是侥幸的。负责导弹研究的七机部一院副院长说：该导弹進入小批生产阶段时，“问题接踵而来。”“故障表现非常相似，都是在起飞不久即向前翻滚，所不同的只是时间早晚而已。
The whole missile program suffered from insuperable problems. The regime blamed sabotage, and scientists were put through hideous persecutions, including mock executions, to extract “confessions.” Many died violent deaths. In this climate, not surprisingly, Mao never possessed an intercontinental missile in his lifetime. The first successful launch of a Chinese ICBM took place only in 1980, years after his death.
其中的一枚刚起飞二十二秒，就向前翻滚在空中坠毁。”官方怀疑“阶级敌人破坏”，科学家有的被迫害致死。在这样的高压气候下，毫不奇怪，毛生前未能拥有他向往的洲际导弹。中国的第一枚洲际导弹是一九八0年发射成功的，那时毛已死了好几年。
一九六六年十月的那次成功，也许有个外来因素。纳粹德国的一名主要导弹专家皮尔兹(Wolfgang Pilz)当时秘密在中国工作，一位印度外交宫在北京看到他跟三名德国同事一起。皮尔兹来中国前曾在埃及主持核武器研制工作，但中国用高薪和更好的技术条件把他引诱了来。中国也曾努力引诱别的德国核专家，可是美国出更大的价钱把他们弄到美国去了。
But in October 1966, thanks to the one nuclear-armed missile landing on target, Mao assumed that he would soon be able to deliver the Bomb wherever he liked. On 11 December, a decision was made that China must possess the entire missile arsenal, including intercontinental missiles, within four years.
十月试验成功后，毛十分乐观。十二月十一日，周恩来在主管核武器制造的“中央专委”会上说：各种导弹，包括洲际导弹，要“全部在这四年内解决”。
Mao's optimism was given a big boost when China's first hydrogen bomb was detonated on 17 June 1967. Mao told its makers on 7 July: “Our new weaponry, missiles and atom bombs have gone really fast. We made our hydrogen bomb in just two years and eight months [since the first A-bomb]. Our speed has overtaken America, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. We are the No. 4 in the world.” Actually, much of this was due to assistance Russia had provided earlier (and which had only ended completely in 1965); without Soviet help, it would have been impossible to develop either the A- or the H-bomb nearly so soon.
一九六七年六月十七日，中国氢弹爆炸成功。毛更加乐观了。七月七日，他在接见参加试验人员时说：“新武器、导弹、原子弹搞得很快，两年零八个月出氢弹，我们发展速度超过了美国、英国、法国、苏联，现在世界上是第四位。”毛也许忘了，这样的发展速度很大程度上得益于苏联的帮助。
But Mao was not about to dwell on this aspect. His emphasis was rather on what he could do with the technology. Using the royal “we,” he declared to the Bomb-makers: “We are not only the political centre of the world revolution, we must become the centre of the world revolution militarily, and technologically. We must give them arms, Chinese arms engraved with our labels … We must openly support them. We must become the arsenal of the world revolution.”
雄心勃勃的毛对核试验人员说：“我们中国不仅是世界革命的政治中心，而且在军事上、技术上也要成为世界革命的中心，要给他们武器，就是刻了字的中国武器(除了一些特殊地区)，就是要公开地支持，要成为世界革命兵工厂。”
It was now, between October 1966 and summer 1967, with the nuclear program seemingly riding high, that Mao vastly expanded the worldwide promotion of his cult. In the year before, 1965, he had suffered some major setbacks. Now “to propagate Mao Tse-tung Thought” was made the “central task” of foreign policy. Peking proclaimed that “the world has entered the new era of Mao,” and sweated blood to make sure that the Little Red Book got into over 100 countries. Supposedly this was “an event of immense joy for the people of the world,” who “love Chairman Mao's books more than any other books,” and to whom the Little Red Book “is like the sweet rain to crops withering in a long drought, and the shining beacon to ships sailing in thick fog.” China's entire diplomatic and clandestine machine was thrown into attempts to induce adulation of Mao in foreign countries.
在这样一种趾高气扬的心态下，毛把对自己的个人崇拜在全世界推向高峰。“宣传毛泽东思想”成为中国外交政策的首要任务。官方自吹自擂地宣布“世界已進入毛泽东思想的新时代”，不惜血本地把小红书推销到一百多个国家去，声称“这是世界人民的大喜事”，“世界人民最爱读毛主席的书”，“喜得这红宝书，就像久早逢甘露，雾航见灯塔。”中国对外人员倾巢而出，逼着人家颂扬毛。
Burma was not atypical of the countries where Peking had a foothold. A hard-sell campaign pressured the sizeable ethnic Chinese minority to wave the Little Red Book, wear Mao badges, sing songs of Mao quotes and salute Mao's portrait. Regarding these practices as challenging its own authority, the Burmese government banned them in mid-1967. Peking then goaded ethnic Chinese to defy the ban and confront the government. The result was much bloodshed and many deaths, and severe retribution against ethnic Chinese.
缅甸是一个例子。中国外交官向华侨和缅甸国民散发小红书和毛像章，规定华侨学校的学生老师挥舞小红书、佩带毛像章、唱语录歌、向毛的肖像三呼万岁等等。缅甸政府认为这些举动是对它的权威的挑战，在一九六七年中下令禁止。毛生气了，要外交机构鼓励华侨公开抵抗缅甸政府的法令，流血死人在所不惜。这引起缅甸全面排华，祸及所有华侨。
Mao then unleashed the Burmese Communist Party, which was completely dependent on China for its survival, in a new wave of insurgency. On 7 July 1967, in the afterglow of the H-bomb test, he instructed in secret: “It is better that the Burmese government is against us. I hope they break off diplomatic relations with us, so we can more openly support the Burmese Communist Party.” Chou summoned the Burmese Communist officers being trained in China to the Great Hall of the People to inform them that they were to be sent home to start a war. They were accompanied to Burma by their Chinese wives, who had been selected in a distinctly unceremonious manner. Each Burmese man would go out into the street, with a Chinese officer, and pick a woman who caught his eye. If the woman and her family passed a security check, the authorities would work on her to marry the Burmese. Some women entered into marriage willingly, others were coerced.
毛让他扶植起来的缅甸共产党大打内战，推翻缅甸政府。一九六七年七月七日，他说：“缅甸政府反对我们更好，希望他同我们断交。这样我们可以更公开地支持缅甸共产党。”周恩来在人民大会堂召见在中共五十四军受训多年的缅共骨干，要他们“返回缅甸闹革命”。这批人的中国妻子随着他们去了缅甸。当初缅共骨干为了找妻子，在大街上到处看，看上哪位漂亮姑娘，由陪同的中国军官出面问女孩的单位住址，然后到她单位去進行政治审查，合格后单位领导找女孩谈话。女孩们有的受宠若惊，有的不情愿。对不情愿的要“做工作”，说这是“政治任务”，直到答应为止。
The insurgency was geared around promoting Mao. When a victory was won, it was celebrated with a Mao Thought propaganda team dancing, waving the Little Red Book, and chanting “Long live the great leader of the peoples of the world Chairman Mao!”
缅共的营地里挂着毛的像，每天要向毛的像敬礼，背毛语录。打了胜仗开庆祝会，对着台下的缅甸老百姓，宣传队唱的是“毛主席语录歌”，跳的是“忠字舞”，喊的是“世界人民的伟大领袖毛主席万岁，万岁，万万岁！”和在中国没什么区别。
To spread Maoism all over the world, secret training camps were set up in China. One was in the Western Hills just outside Peking, where many young people from the Third World and quite a few Westerners were instructed in the use of arms and explosives. Mao Thought was the unvarying and ineluctable staple of camp life.
中国国内建立了秘密营地，训练外国的毛主义者。其中一个在北京西山，内容包括如何使用武器炸药。“毛泽东思想”是每日必修课，雷打不动。
HOWEVER, ON HIS doorstep the Great Leader of World Revolution was faced with an uncomfortable reality. Two portions of Chinese territory remained under colonial rule: Macau under the Portuguese and Hong Kong under the British. And taking them back would have been easy, as both depended on China for water and food. Khrushchev had taunted Mao that he was living next door to “the colonialists' latrine.” After Mao accused him of climbing down in the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, Khrushchev had compared Mao's inaction over the two colonies unfavorably with Nehru's recent seizure of Portugal's colonies in India: “The odour coming from [Hong Kong and Macau] is by no means sweeter than that which was released by colonialism in Goa.” Mao had clearly felt that he had to explain himself to those he was claiming to champion, so he made rather a point of telling the Somali prime minister, somewhat defensively, that Hong Kong “is a special case and we are not planning to touch it. You may not understand this.”
在这位“世界革命人民的伟大领袖”的光环上，有一大污点：香港、澳门仍然是西方殖民地。要收回它们再容易不过，只要截断中国大陆供水供食品就行。当毛指责赫鲁晓夫“对美帝国主义实行投降主义”时，赫鲁晓夫曾反唇相讥，说印度的尼赫鲁刚刚收回了葡萄牙殖民地果阿(Goa)，港澳的“殖民主义者放的屁不会比果阿的更香吧？”赫鲁晓夫挖苦说，毛是住在“殖民主义者的厕所旁边”。香港、澳门于是便成了毛的一块心病。有一次他主动对从英国统治下独立的索马里总理舍马克(Abd-irashid Ali Shermarke)说：香港“是特殊情况，我们暂时不准备动它。这一点也许你们不了解。”
Mao chose not to recover Hong Kong and Macau for purely pragmatic reasons. Hong Kong was China's biggest source of hard currency, and a vital channel for acquiring technology and equipment from the West, which fell under a strict US embargo. Mao knew that Hong Kong would no longer be of use for his Superpower Program if it reverted to Peking's rule.
毛不愿收回港澳完全出于实用目的。香港是中国最大的外汇来源，是获得西方军工技术设备不可或缺的要道。中国要進口的都在美国禁运的单子上，大多得通过香港暗地做交易。毛只能把香港留在英国人手里，方针是“长期打算，充分利用。”
In order to do good business in Hong Kong, Peking had to disrupt Taiwan's intelligence network, which was helping the US identify Western companies breaking the embargo. Peking's methods had at times been drastic.
在香港有一大批台湾情报人员，他们所干的事之一是向美国政府提供西方公司破坏禁运的情报，使西方公司因为怕受到美国制裁而不敢放手作交易。这批人是毛的眼中钉。为了把台湾情报网除掉，毛政权不惜采取极端手段。一九五五年的“克什米尔公主号(Kashmir Princess)”事件就是一例。
In April 1955, Chou En-lai was due to go to Indonesia for the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, and Peking chartered an Indian airliner, the Kashmir Princess, to fly to Indonesia from Hong Kong. Taiwan agents apparently thought that the plane was going to carry Chou, and concocted a plan to place a bomb on board at the Hong Kong airport. Peking had all the details well in advance, but let the operation go ahead, without telling either Air India, or the British mission in Peking, or the Hong Kong government—or the passengers, eleven relatively low-level officials and journalists (in a plane that seated over 100). The plane blew up in mid-air, killing all the passengers and five of the eight Indian crew.
那年四月，周恩来要去印尼万隆开亚非会议，中国包租了印度航空公司的“克什米尔公主号”，可乘一百来人，从香港飞往印尼。台湾特务以为周恩来会乘这架专机，拟出一个在香港机场往飞机上放定时炸弹的计划。中国政府在三月就获悉这一计划，但是没有采取任何行动阻止它，没有告诉印度航空公司，没有告诉英国驻北京代办处，没有告诉香港当局，更没有告诉乘客 -- 十一名中共干部和外国记者。飞机在空中爆炸，这十一个人和五名机组人员做了牺牲品。
Peking immediately declared that Taiwan agents had planted a bomb, and Chou En-lai gave the British names of people Peking wanted expelled from Hong Kong. The British went along, and over the following year deported over forty key Nationalist agents on Chou's list, even though there was not enough evidence to charge any of them with an offense in court. This put a sizable part of Chiang's network in Hong Kong out of action, and it was after this that Peking secured a series of clandestine deals for its nuclear program via the colony; one purchase alone from Western Europe cost 150 tons of gold.
飞机刚一落海，中共马上宣布是台湾特务在飞机上放了炸弹。万隆归来后，周恩来向港英当局提供了一系列台湾特务名单，要求把他们驱逐出香港。英国政府人士怀疑：“这起事件完全可能是中国自己制造的，他们做得出来……即使不是自己制造，他们也只想利用它而不想制止它。”英国人以为制造这起事件的目的是“以牺牲自己人的生命，来做反对我们的宣传材料”。
为了与大陆保持良好关系，港英当局满足了周的要求，在一年中递解了四十多名台湾重要谍报人员出境，尽管没有任何立得住脚的证据证明这些人犯了什么法。蒋介石在香港的情报网几乎破坏殆尽。没有这些人从中阻挠，毛政权经香港跟西方秘密做成了好几笔为核工业服务的大生意，仅一笔就花了中国三百万两黄金。
When the Cultural Revolution started and Mao revved up his campaign to be the leader of the world revolution, he wanted to show the world that he was the true master of the colony, by making the British “go down on their knees” and publicly offer “unconditional surrender,” in the words of Chinese diplomats at internal meetings. The only way this could be achieved was to put the British in the wrong—and that needed a massacre of Chinese.
文革开始后，毛政权在香港也搞起了对毛个人崇拜的活动，受到港英当局的压制。毛感到有必要让全世界看见他才是香港真正的主人。一九六六年十二月，澳门葡萄牙军队对抗议的人群开怆，打死打伤二百多人。随后，葡澳总督被迫在毛的大肖像下当众认错道歉。毛想在香港重演这一幕，用香港左派的血，来迫使英国人低头。
So Peking seized on a labor dispute in May 1967, and urged Hong Kong radicals to escalate violence, especially to break the law in a confrontational manner. To spur them on, Peking hinted strongly and publicly that it might take the colony back before the lease expired in 1997, and activists there were given to understand that this was Peking's intention.
在一九六七年五月一场劳工纠纷后，毛政权鼓励香港左派搞暴力示威，以诱港英镇压，造成死伤。当有人被警方打死后，中国外交部马上向英国要求赔礼道歉。英国没有按中国说的办。
Mao's real line was the one he imparted to Chou En-lai, in secret: “Hong Kong remains the same”—i.e., it stays under British rule. Chou's assignment was to stir up enough violence to provoke reprisals, and then a kowtow, from the British, but not so much violence that it “might lead to us having to take Hong Kong back ahead of time,” which Chou privately made clear would be disastrous.
为了继续扩大事端，北京给香港左派打气，公开暗示会提前收回香港(《人民日报》六·三社论，周恩来六月二十四日讲话等)，使香港左派有恃无恐。在持续的暴力冲突中，又有数人死亡，但港英当局仍拒绝道歉。
In the riots that ensued, Hong Kong police killed some demonstrators; but the number of deaths fell short of a massacre and the colonial authorities refused to apologize. Peking then incited Hong Kong radicals to kill policemen. “Do to them [the police] as they have done to us,” urged People's Daily. “Those who kill must pay with their lives.” As the Hong Kong rioters were unable to kill policemen, Chou had to infiltrate soldiers into the colony. These men slipped across the border on 8 July, dressed in mufti, and shot dead five police. Chou expressed his satisfaction with the results, but vetoed any more such operations in case the situation evolved to a point where Peking's bluff might be openly called. Instead, Peking fostered an indiscriminate bombing campaign, and over the next two months there were about 160 bomb incidents, some fatal.
《人民日报》七月五日社论号召香港左派把目标对准警察：“要严厉制裁这些坏家伙，杀人要偿命，血债要用血来还。”七月八日，周恩来派中共士兵穿着便衣偷越边境，在当天的冲突中枪杀了五名警察。这次行动是外交部的人在中国境内的沙头角监督实施的。杀警察的目的是刺激警方报复，以造成更多的死伤，压港英当局认错。
港英当局寸步不让，对付办法是大肆逮捕香港左派。中方能做的，除了从北京发抗议，就是组织人在香港到处放“真假炸弹”。港英当局的回答是继续抓人。英国人在显示：我才是香港的主人。
毛的最大弱点是：他不能收回香港。用周恩来引他的话说：“香港还是那个样子。” 周解释说毛的意思是：香港现状不变。周还特别担心英国人会归还香港，几次在内部忧心忡忡地说：“搞不好，要搞出一个提前收回香港。”
英国人摸准了毛的底牌，将了毛一军。中方骑虎难下。八月二十日，周恩来不明智地批准了一份“最后通牒”，要港英当局四十八小时内释放被逮捕的十九名新闻记者。英国人置之不理。时间到了，毛下不了台，只得在北京進行报复。
But the British refused to resort to a massacre, and focused on methodically rounding up activists, quietly, at night. Mao's hope of getting Britain to kowtow collapsed. In frustration, he fell back on hooliganism on his own turf. On 22 August a crowd of over 10,000 torched the British Mission in Peking, trapping the staff inside and almost burning them alive, and subjecting women to gross sexual harassment.
八月二十二日，一万多暴民放火烧了英国驻华代办处，把英国外交官和他们的家人陷在里面几乎烧死，英国代办被粗暴地揪斗，英国妇女被流氓侮辱。
THE MISSIONS OF a score of other countries also found themselves on the receiving end of Mao's fury. In 1967, violent assaults were made on the Soviet embassy, followed by the embassies of Indonesia, India, Burma and Mongolia. These attacks had official sanction, with the Foreign Ministry telling the mobs which missions to assail, and how intensely. The “punishments” ranged from million-strong demonstrations besieging the missions, unfurling giant portraits of Mao, and blasting insults through loudhailers, to breaking in, setting fire to cars, manhandling diplomats and their spouses and terrorizing their children, while yelling slogans like “Beat to death, beat to death.”
这段时间，一连串其他国家驻华使馆、机构也同样成了毛泄愤的对象。遭到围攻打砸的有苏联、蒙古、印尼、印度、缅甸大使馆，都是官方批准的，由外交部告诉红卫兵谁可围，谁可攻，谁可砸。从百万人游行示威把使馆围得水泄不通，密密麻麻地贴满大字报、大标语，到在毛巨幅画像下用高音喇叭破口大骂；从砸家具烧汽车，到对外交官和夫人孩子推搡恫吓，一边喊：“打死他！打死他！”
This treatment was even meted out to North Korea, as Kim Il Sung had declined to submit to Mao's tutelage. Mao had over the years tried to subvert Kim, for which he had once been obliged to apologize. At the Moscow Communist summit in November 1957 he waylaid Kim to mend fences, to forestall Kim spilling the beans to other Communist leaders. According to an official Korean report that was relayed to a large meeting in Pyongyang, Mao “repeatedly expressed his apologies [to Kim] for the Chinese Communist Party's unjustified interference in the affairs of the Korean [Party].” Kim seized the chance to reduce Mao's clout in Korea by demanding the withdrawal of all the Chinese troops still there, to which Mao had to accede.
就连北朝鲜也未能幸免。金日成不服毛管，毛曾支持北朝鲜领导中的“延安派” 设法推翻他。金把这些人抓的抓，杀的杀，其余赶到中国。据北朝鲜官方文件，毛后来“再三为中共不正当地干涉朝鲜内政表示歉意”，按金的要求把留在北朝鲜的中国军队全部撤回。中苏分裂时，金又不站在毛一边。
Mao did not give up. In January 1967, his man in charge of clandestine missions abroad, Kang Sheng, told the Albanians: “Kim Il Sung should be overthrown, so that the situation in Korea can be changed.” Unable to fulfill this wish, Mao directed crowds to swamp the Korean embassy, denouncing “fat Kim.” Kim retaliated by renaming Mao Tse-tung Square in Pyongyang, closing the rooms commemorating China's role in the Korean War Museum, “re-sizing” the Russian and Chinese war memorials in Pyongyang, and drawing much closer to Russia.
毛怒上加怒。一九六七年一月，专管在国外搞颠覆的康生对阿尔巴尼亚领导人说：“金日成应该被推翻，这样朝鲜的局势就能改观。”在围攻使馆的浪潮中，红卫兵冲着北朝鲜大使馆高呼：“打倒金胖子”。金日成以牙还牙，给平壤的“毛泽东广场”改了名字，把朝鲜战争纪念馆中关于中国的部分全部关掉，跟苏联靠得更近。
By the end of September 1967, China had become embroiled in rows with most of the forty-eight countries with which it had diplomatic or semi-diplomatic relations. Many of these countries lowered their level of representation, and some closed their embassies. National Day that year saw only a sprinkling of foreign government delegates on Tiananmen.* Mao later blamed his debacles on “extreme leftists.” The truth is that China's foreign policy was never out of his hands.
到一九六七年九月底，中国同建交或半建交的四十八个国家中的近三十个都卷入了外交纷争，有的外交关系降格，有的关闭大使馆。“十一”国庆节的时候，天安门城楼上只有稀稀疏疏的几个外国人。毛后来说这段时间是“极左派当权”，都是他们的错。事实上，中国外交从来没有离开过毛泽东的掌握。
BY THE END of the 1960s, Mao's self-promotion had been going on for a decade, and had raised his profile sky-high in the outside world. In the West, many were mesmerized by him. The Little Red Book was taken up by intellectuals and students. Mao was termed a philosopher. The influential French writer Jean-Paul Sartre praised the “revolutionary violence” of Mao as “profoundly moral.”
推销毛主义在西方获得一些成功。小红书在知识分子和学生中一度走红，有人把毛当作“哲学家”。深具影力的法国作家萨特(Jean-Paul Sartre)甚至说毛的“革命暴力”是“道德”的，“道德”二字他还加了着重号。
However, it was apparent that this general fascination had not translated into substance. No Maoist party in the West—even the largest one, in Portugal—ever gained more than a minuscule following. Most Western “Maoists” were fantasists, or freeloaders, and had no appetite for sustained action, least of all if it was physically uncomfortable or dangerous. When large-scale student unrest erupted in Western Europe in 1968, Mao hailed this as “a new phenomenon in European history,” and sent European Maoists who had been trained in sabotage back home to exploit the situation. But they generated no action of significance.
可是，大多数“毛主义者”，不是对毛抱着不实际的幻想，就是喜欢标新立异，再不就是“吃毛饭”的。他们并不真听毛的话。毛主义党成员屈指可数。一九六八年西方学生闹事时，不少打着毛的旗帜，毛满怀希望地说这是“欧洲历史上的新气象”， 把在中国受训的西欧人派回去搞组织领导。结果一事无成。
Nor were Maoist groups making much headway in the Third World. Africa, once full of promise, had proved a thorough disappointment, as a jingle by a Chinese diplomat summed up:
Big, big tribalism,
Small, small nationalism,
Much, much imperialism,
Little, little Mao Tse-tung Thought.
African radicals rather astutely took Mao's money, as one Chinese diplomat put it, with a big smile, but his instructions with a deaf ear. Some years later, meeting one of the heads of state he had tried hardest to topple, Zaïre's President Mobutu, Mao admitted failure, in the guise of a rueful quip. His opening sally was: “Is that really you, Mobutu? I've spent a lot of money trying to have you overthrown—even killed. But here you are.” “We gave them money and arms, but they just couldn't fight. They just couldn't win. What can I do then?”
在亚非拉，毛派组织带来的也只有失望。在非洲，扎伊尔(Zaire)总统蒙博托(Joseph Mobutu)告诉我们，毛见到他时半开玩笑地对他说：“真是你吗？蒙博托？你知道我花了多少钱来推翻你啊，甚至要把你干掉。可你还是活着。”毛提起他曾资助的蒙博托的对手，说：“我们给他们钱和武器。就是他们不会打，打不赢啊，那我有啥办法啊！”
Mao had even less success in the Middle East. When the Six-Day War broke out between Israel and the Arab states in June 1967, Mao offered Nasser US$10 million and 150,000 tons of wheat, as well as military “volunteers,” if Nasser would take his advice “to fight to the end.” He sent Nasser a battle plan for a Mao-style “people's war,” telling him to “lure the enemy in deep,” by withdrawing into the Sinai Peninsula, even to Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. Nasser declined to follow the Maoist road, explaining to his distant adviser that Sinai “is a desert and we cannot conduct a people's liberation war in Sinai because there are no people there.” Peking withdrew its offers of aid, and tried to promote opposition against Nasser. But Mao built up no groups of disciples in the Middle East. When he and Chou died in 1976, among the 104 parties from 51 countries—many of them tiny groupings—listed as sending condolences, there was not one in the Arab world.
毛在中东也白费心血。在一九五六年的苏彝士运河危机中，他曾想扮演指导者的角色，十一月三日给埃及一份“反侵略战争的军事部署和战略方针”。可纳赛尔总统没当作一回事。纳赛尔的主要顾问赫克尔(Mohamed Hasanein Heikal)告诉我们，毛的建议被搁在一大堆来往电报的底层。毛提出派给埃及二十五万“志愿军”，纳赛尔没有接受。毛还向埃及提出：“我们可以给无代价的援助。”“你们能还就还，不能还就算了”， 如果埃及硬要还，“过了一百年以后再还吧。”中国赠给埃及两千万瑞士法郎的现金，并在中埃贸易上故意让中国吃亏，埃及得利。纳赛尔要的是军火，毛指示“无偿援助”。可是，中国只能出产步兵轻武器，埃及不需要。毛心有余而力不足。
一九六七年六月的“六日战争”中，毛又给纳赛尔寄了一份“人民战争”计划，要纳赛尔“诱敌深入”，退到西奈半岛，甚至退到另一个国家苏丹的首都喀土穆去。纳赛尔谢绝了，耐着性子解释说：“西奈是块沙漠，打不了人民战争，那里没有人民。” 毛一怒之下转过头来支持反纳赛尔的势力。可毛始终未能在中东建立起任何毛派组织。
One key factor behind this failure was Mao's insistence that foreign radicals had to take sides with him against Russia. This lost him many potential sympathizers—not least in Latin America. There, Mao had disbursed money and food to try to swing Cuba against Moscow. This largesse produced few returns. In 1964 a delegation of nine Latin American Communist parties, headed by Cuban Party chief Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, came to China to ask Mao to halt public polemics with Russia, and “factional activities,” i.e., trying to split Communist parties. An infuriated Mao told them that his fight with Russia “will go on for 10,000 years,” and abused Castro. When the delegate from Uruguay (pop. 3 million) tried to get a word in, Mao rounded on him, saying that he, Mao, was “speaking in the name of 650 million people” and how many people did he represent?
毛失败的原因之一是他硬要别人在他和苏联之间做出选择。拉丁美洲就是如此。他在古巴身上花了不少钱，要拉古巴反苏，但卡斯特罗不听他的。卡斯特罗在毛活着时从未访问过中国。一九六六年一月二日，他在群众大会上抨击中国，说中国在供应大米的问题上向古巴施加经济压力，以逼迫古巴跟着它走。一个月后，他進一步指责中国企图在古巴军队中策反。毛说卡斯特罗是“豺狼当道”。卡斯特罗说毛是“一堆大粪”。
Castro, who never visited China during Mao's lifetime, described Mao as “a shit,” and then went public in front of a large international audience, on 2 January 1966, accusing Peking of applying economic pressure to try to lever him away from Moscow. One month later, he charged Peking with resorting to “brutal reprisals,” in particular trying to subvert the Cuban army. Mao called Castro “a jackal and a wolf.”
Mao had placed high hopes on Castro's colleague Che Guevara. On Guevara's first visit to China in 1960, Mao demonstrated uncommon intimacy with him, holding his hand while talking eagerly to him, and fulsomely praising a pamphlet of his. Guevara had reciprocated, recommending copying Mao's methods in Cuba. And he had proved the closest in the Havana leadership to Mao's position during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. But in the end, Mao could not get Guevara to take his side against the Russians. When Guevara returned to China in 1965, just before going off to try to launch guerrilla ventures in Africa, and then Bolivia, Mao did not see him, and a request from Guevara in Bolivia for China's help to build a radio station that could broadcast worldwide was refused. When Guevara was killed in 1967, Peking privately expressed delight. Kang Sheng told Albania's defense minister in October 1968: “The revolution in Latin America is going very well, especially after the defeat of Guevara; revisionism is being unmasked …” (italics added).
毛把希望寄托在卡斯特罗的战友格瓦拉身上。格瓦拉一九六0年第一次访华时，毛对他异常亲密，拉着他的手问长问短，说他读过格瓦拉的文章，很赞赏他。格瓦拉也恭维毛，但毛最终未能拉住他一起反苏。一九六七年他被杀害后，康生对阿尔巴尼亚国防部长说：“拉丁美洲的革命進行得很不错，特别是在格瓦拉失败以后。”
During Mao's lifetime, there were no influential Maoist parties in Latin America. The only notable one, the “Shining Path” in Peru, was founded in 1980, four years after Mao's death.*
毛一生都没能看到一个像样的拉美毛派组织。秘鲁的毛派“光明之路”(Shining Path)，是在毛死后四年的一九八0年才成立的，领导人加日曼(Abimael Guzman)也自称“世界革命领袖”。成立那年，他们纪念毛的生日，在首都利马的街灯上吊着死狗，狗身上裹着标语，骂邓小平是“狗崽子”背叛了毛的路线。
ON HIS OWN doorstep in Asia, Mao's influence failed to spread, even against deadbeat regimes like that of Ne Win in Burma. But Mao's biggest setback was “losing” Vietnam. In the 1950s and early 1960s, China had been Hanoi's almost sole backer in its wars against first the French and then the Americans, ever since Stalin had allocated it to Mao in 1950. But the Vietnamese had developed suspicions about Mao from as early as 1954. That year, after he launched his Superpower Program, while doing everything to attract Russian assistance, Mao began trying to gain access to embargoed Western technology and equipment. One prime candidate for cracking the embargo was France.
即使是毛所在的亚洲，毛也处处受阻。最惨的是“失去”越共。越共是斯大林一九五0年划归毛“管”的，多年来毛出钱出人，帮越共先打法国，再战美国。但毛把越共当棋子使用，导致越共反目为仇。
At the time, France was bogged down in Indochina. Mao's plan was to make the Vietnamese intensify the war “to increase the internal problems of France” (as Chou put it), and then, when France was on the ropes, to step in and broker a settlement. The idea was that France would then reciprocate by acceding to Mao's embargo-breaking approaches.
一九五四年，毛军事工业化起步，需要从西方购买禁运物资。他把法国作为打破禁运的缺口。那时法国同越共在打仗。毛的计划是让越共扩大战争，“以增加法国内部的困难” (周恩来的话)，在法国人焦头烂额时，中国站出来帮法国跟越共达成协议，以换取法国在向中国出口战略物资问题上的通融。
四月，解决印度支那和朝鲜问题的日内瓦会议召开，周恩来率中国代表团参加。开会前一个多月，毛就已经决定要在会上达成停战协议。但是他没有向越共交底，而是给越共领导人印象，他支持他们一直打下去。当时越共在南方势力强大，在北边，奠边府战役正在進行。毛于四月四日指示中国驻越共军事总顾问韦国清转告越共*：“争取雨季前(五月初)结束奠边府战役，利用雨季休整补充。八月或九月开始向琅勃拉邦和越曾(万象)進攻，解放该两城”。这两个城市是老挝的双首都。毛要越共“积极准备本年冬季至迟明年初春开始向河内、海防地区進攻，争取一九五五年解放三角地区[红河三角洲]。”
Mao had been co-directing the war in Indochina. During the Korean War, he had halted large-scale offensives in Indochina to focus China's resources on Korea. In May 1953, when he decided to end the Korean War, he sent Chinese officers straight from Korea to Indochina. In October that year, the Chinese got hold of a copy of the French strategic plan, the Navarre Plan, named after the French commander, General Henri Navarre. China's chief military adviser to Vietnam, General Wei Guo-qing, carried this from Peking and delivered it to Ho Chi Minh in person. It was this vital intelligence coup that led to the decision by the Communist side to give battle at Dien Bien Phu, a French base in northwest Vietnam, where the Vietnamese, with massive Chinese military aid and advice, won a decisive victory in May 1954.
* 毛参与指挥越共的战争。朝鲜战争时，他缩小了越战的规模。一九五三年五月，他一决定在朝鲜停战，就把大批中国军官从朝鲜直接派去越南。打奠边府战役，中国起了关键作用。是中国搞到法国绝密的战略部署“纳尔瓦计划”(以法国将军纳尔瓦 Henri Navarre 命名)，由韦国清亲自交给胡志明。正是根据这份情报才决定打奠边府这场决战。一九五四年五月，在大量中国的军事援助和顾问临助下，决战大获全胜。
Dien Bien Phu was fought in the lead-up to, and during, the Geneva conference about Indochina (and Korea), which had opened on 26 April with Chou En-lai leading the Chinese delegation. Mao had decided well over a month before it opened that he “definitely must have a settlement,” but he did not inform the Vietnamese. The role he had in mind for them was to do the fighting, and escalate the war, at whatever cost, to create as big a crisis for Paris as possible. Mao wrote to chief military adviser Wei on 4 April, about an ostensible next stage: “Try to complete the Dien Bien Phu campaign by … early May … Begin attacking Luang Prabang and Vientiane in August or September and liberate them.” These were the twin capitals of Laos. Then, Mao went on: “actively make ready to attack Hanoi and Haiphong this coming winter and at the latest early spring next year, aiming to liberate the [Red River] Delta in 1955.” Mao specifically ordered Wei to discuss this plan with Vietnam's defense minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, to give the Vietnamese the impression that he would sponsor them to expand the war well into the following year—when in fact he had secretly decided on a ceasefire in the coming months.
越共五月七日攻下奠边府，法国政府六月十七日垮台。做交易的时刻到了。六月二十三日，周恩来在瑞士会见新任法国总理孟戴斯·弗朗斯(PierreMendes-France)，和他商定了停战方案。
The Vietnamese took Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, and the French government fell on 17 June. This was China's moment to step in. On the 23rd, Chou met the new French prime minister, Pierre Mendès-France, in Switzerland, without the Vietnamese, and worked out a deal.
Chou now put immense pressure on the Vietnamese Communists to settle for the terms he had negotiated with the French, which were far inferior to what the Vietnamese had hoped for. Vietnam's later leader Le Duan said that Chou threatened “that if the Vietnamese continued to fight they would have to fend for themselves. He would not help any longer and pressured us to stop fighting.” (These remarks incidentally reveal how dependent the Vietnamese were on the Chinese.) Ho Chi Minh told his negotiator, Pham Van Dong, to concede, which Dong did, in tears. Le Duan was sent to break the news to Communist forces in the south. “I travelled by wagon to the south,” he recalled. “Along the way, compatriots came out to greet me, for they thought we had won a victory. It was so painful.” Seeds of anger and suspicion towards Peking took root among the Vietnamese.
回转身周要越共接受这个方案。越共领导人不愿意签字。黎笋后来回忆说：周表示，“要是越南人还想继续打，只好自己管自己，他不会再帮忙，他压我们停战。” 越南战争没有中国就打不下去。胡志明要主持谈判的范文同总理签字，范流着眼泪签了。黎笋受命向越南南方的部队报告这个消息：“我坐着牛车到南方去，一路上，同胞们都来欢迎我，都以为我们打了大胜仗。真是太痛苦了。”越共对中共的不信任感从此而生。而法国着手放宽对中国的禁运。
Early in 1965 the new Brezhnev–Kosygin team in Moscow began stepping up military assistance to Hanoi, supplying the key heavy equipment it needed: anti-aircraft guns and ground-to-air missiles, some manned by Russians. Mao could not compete. So he tried to talk the Russians out of helping the Vietnamese. “The people of North Vietnam,” he told Russian premier Kosygin that February, “are fighting well without the help of the USSR … and they themselves will drive the Americans out.” “The Vietnamese can take care of themselves,” Mao said, adding (untruly) that “only a small number of people have been killed in the air raids, and it is not so terrible that some amount of people were killed …” Peking suggested that the Russians should take on the Americans elsewhere. Soviet ambassador Chervonenko was told that the best thing Russia could do was “exercise pressure on imperialist forces in a western direction”—i.e., in Europe.
多年来，中国可说是北越唯一的资助者。一九六五年初，苏联新上任的勃列日涅夫等人开始大量援越，提供打美国飞机最需要的高射炮、地对空导弹等重武器。毛怕苏联取代他做越共的保护人，劝苏联人不要管越南的事。他对苏联总理柯西金说：“北越人民没有苏联的帮助也打得很好……他们能靠自己的力量把美国人赶出去。”他还说：“越南人民自己能照顾自己，空袭炸死的人不多，而且死一些人也没有什么了不起。”中共领导人建议苏联“在西边其他地方对付美帝国主义”。
At the same time, Mao tried to compel Hanoi to break with Moscow. He wooed Ho Chi Minh, who had intimate ties with China, where he spent much time. The CCP found him a Chinese wife, but the marriage was vetoed by the Vietnamese leadership, ostensibly on the grounds that it would be better for their cause if their leader remained self-sacrificingly celibate.
毛也竭力想说动越共拒绝苏联援助。周恩来对范文同总理说：“没有苏联援助更好，我是不赞成苏联志愿人员去越南的，也不赞成苏联援越。”周甚至对胡志明说：苏联援越的目的“是改善美苏关系”。哪怕周恩来有三寸不烂之舌，这样的逻辑也实在欠缺说服力。
Ho and his colleagues were urged to reject Soviet assistance. “It will be better without Soviet aid,” Chou told Premier Pham Van Dong. “I do not support the idea of Soviet volunteers going to Vietnam, nor Soviet aid to Vietnam.” Chou even claimed to Ho that “The purpose of Soviet aid to Vietnam [is] … to improve Soviet–US relations.” Such arguments strained even Chou's silver tongue. Mao's only way to try to exert influence was to pour in more money, goods, and soldiers,* but he could not prevent Hanoi moving close to the Russians.
毛没有办法阻止越共接受苏援，更没有办法拉越共同苏联决裂。他想通过亲华的胡志明掌握越共。但胡在越共领导人中并非说一不二。胡经常住在中国，曾向中方表示想找一位中国夫人，中方也给他物色了一位。但越共否决了这一婚姻，说他们的领袖保持独身对事业更有利。毛要维持他对越共的影响，唯一的办法是多给钱，多给物资，多派士兵。*
* 从一九六五到一九六八年，中国向北越派出三十二万多人的军队，包括十五万多人的高炮部队，有的到一九七三年才回国。这些部队使北越得以腾出兵力到南越打仗，有的还有中国顾问随行。
Mao was equally powerless to dissuade it from opening talks with the US, which Hanoi announced on 3 April 1968. Arguing against this initiative, Chou even blamed Hanoi for the murder of US black civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. on 4 April. The assassination, he said, came “one day after your statement had been issued. Had your statement been issued one or two days later, the murder might have been stopped.” Claiming to represent “the world's people,” Chou went on to say: “So many people don't understand why [you] were so hurried in making this statement … It is the judgement of the world's people. In the eyes of the world's people, you have compromised twice.”
即使这样，越共也不买帐，未经毛同意就在一九六八年四月三日宣布同美国谈判。周恩来责备他们说：“好多人都不明白为什么你们要急急忙忙发表这个声明。…… 这是世界人民的看法。”周居然还把美国黑人领袖马丁 ·路德·金(Martin Luther King)于四月四日被害怪在越共头上，说，如果你们的声明晚一两天发表，暗杀也许根本就不会发生。”
Hanoi just ignored Peking, and started negotiating with the US in May. Mao then tried to muscle in, with Chou telling the Vietnamese that the Chinese had more experience at negotiating than Hanoi did. This cut no ice. Mao was hopping mad. In early October, Chou told the Vietnamese that a delegation due to visit China for more aid need not come, saying Chinese leaders would be too busy to receive them. But Mao soon had to backtrack and continue splashing out aid. The Great Teacher of the World's Revolutionary People could not afford not to play a part in the foremost revolutionary war on the planet.
谈判时，毛想插上一手。周对越共说，中国比越共更有谈判经验。越共不予理会。毛的报复是让周拒绝接待来要援助的越南党政代表团，理由是中国领导人“国内事忙”。但毛最终还是不得不继续向越共大把撒钱。要当世界革命领袖，他不能不站在打美国人的越共背后。
More galling to Mao was that he had to stand by helplessly while the Vietnamese expanded their own sphere of influence at his expense. In spite of massive sponsorship from China, the Red guerrillas in Laos chose Vietnam as their patron, and by September 1968 had asked the Chinese advisers there to “take home leave” permanently, a request the Chinese had to comply with. The Laotians and the Vietnamese both aligned themselves with Moscow.
越共不仅不听毛的，还在他的眼皮子底下发展自己的势力范围。尽管中国给老挝共产党人大量援助，老挝人还是选择了追随越共。一九六八年九月，老挝领导人几次委婉地请中国联络组组长“回国休假”，中方只得撤走。老挝同越共一样，与莫斯科越来越贴近。
AFTER A DECADE of unremitting machinations and expenditure to promote Maoism as a serious international alternative to Moscow, Mao had failed. It was still Moscow, not Peking, that the world saw as the chief anti-American force. Mao's tirades against Moscow for “helping the imperialists” were widely perceived as untrue, and listeners were frequently irritated, bored, even embarrassed. On at least one occasion, some Third World Communists simply asked the Chinese to shut up.
到六十年代末，世界“反美”领袖仍然是苏联，而不是毛。中共官员在大小场合喋喋不休地指责苏联给帝国主义帮忙，听众常常听得不耐烦，替他们脸红。不止一次，有人站起来叫中共的人闭嘴。美国官方也得出结论：毛主义在发展中国家不再构成威胁。毛清楚他的失败。一九六九年，他对中央文革小组说：“我们现在孤立了，没有人理我们了”。毛认为那些“毛主义”组织简直没用，削减了对它们的援助。
By the end of the 1960s, US officials considered that the Maoist model was no longer a threat in the Third World, a fact that Mao himself could see. He told his coterie in 1969: “Now we are isolated, nobody wants to have anything to do with us.” The foreign Maoists were useless, he said, and ordered their funding cut back.
Mao needed a solution. A chance cropped up when Cambodia's neutralist leader, Prince Sihanouk, was deposed on 18 March 1970 in a coup that was widely perceived to be CIA-inspired. Mao decided to back Sihanouk if the prince was willing to fight America. His calculation was that the Vietnam War could now be turned into a pan-Indochina war, and by being Sihanouk's sponsor, he could play a leading role in the whole of Indochina.
一九七0年三月十八日，柬埔寨发生政变。被推翻的西哈努克亲王坚信政变是美国中央情报局干的，决心同美国战斗到底。西哈努克在政变第二天从苏联到中国。毛请他留在中国。越南战争已由此变成整个印度支那的反美战争，印支三国之一的首脑西哈努克流亡中国，毛希望通过做西哈努克的靠山，树立起反美领袖的形象。
Not long before, in summer 1967, Mao had been plotting against Sihanouk. Peking, according to the prince, was “implicitly advocating my overthrow”—something that Chou En-lai later admitted was true, though he disowned responsibility, not very convincingly. In March 1968, Sihanouk had gone public about Peking's patronage of a then little-known rebel group in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge. “Below the surface,” he announced, the Communist nations were “playing a dirty game because the Khmer Reds are their offspring … The other day we seized a large quantity of arms of all sorts coming from China, in particular.”
But now, in March 1970, Mao latched on to Sihanouk. As it happened, the prince had been scheduled to visit China the day after the coup. The moment he stepped off the plane, Chou ascertained that he was determined to fight the US, and then declared total support for him. Chou contacted the Vietnamese at once, and proposed a pan-Indochina summit in Sihanouk's name. The summit, which was held in China the following month, boiled down to forming a joint Indochina command.
Since Sihanouk was so vital to Mao, the Chinese catered to his princely tastes, providing him with seven cooks and seven pastry-chefs, and flew foie gras in for him from Paris. They gave him special trains, and two planes for his foreign trips, one of which was just to carry his gifts and his luggage. Mao told Sihanouk: “Tell us what you need. Just ask. We can do more for you. It's nothing.” Mao waved away any question of repayment: “We're not arms merchants.” When Sihanouk protested about the burden on China, Mao replied: “I ask you to burden us still more.” Mao's Cambodian creature, Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, who was in China secretly at the time, was persuaded to give formal support to Sihanouk.
西哈努克留在中国后，中国给他提供了七个厨师、七个糕饼师傅，还从巴黎专门给他空运鹅肝。他有自己的专列，出国旅行时有两架飞机，一架载他的行李和礼品。毛对他说：“告诉我们你们需要什么，可以提出来。我们可以多为你做点事。没有什么了不起嘛。”西哈努克一提钱，抱歉给中国增加负担，毛就说：“我请你给我们多增加一点负担。”
But the Vietnamese did not let Mao take over, and the world continued to perceive Vietnam as the leading player in Indochina. Sihanouk's “return to power,” the London Times said, “depends on the goodwill of Hanoi.” US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger talked about “Hanoi's designs on Cambodia.”
秘密住在中国的“红色高棉”领导人波尔布特在中方压力下同西哈努克合作。中国曾支持“红色高棉”要推翻他。两年前的一九六八年三月，西哈努克公开指责北京“玩肮脏的把戏”，说“红色高棉是他们一手造出来的”。“就在前两天，我们才缴获了一大批各式武器，都是从中国运来的。”
Mao had tried to impress the Vietnamese by launching China's first satellite on the day the Indochina summit opened, which Chou presented as a “gift” to the summit and “a victory for us all.” But it made no difference to the Vietnamese, or to the world.
如今西哈努克成了毛的宝贝。毛以西哈努克的名义召开印支三国高峰会议，会议四月在广州举行。开幕时中国发射了第一颗人造卫星，向与会者和全世界显示实力。卫星绕着地球播放毛的颂歌《东方红》。毛接见放卫星的有功之臣时，乐得合不拢嘴，一再说：“了不起啊！了不起啊！”
The satellite was an ego-trip for Mao, as it orbited the globe warbling the Maoist anthem, “The East Is Red.” Mao was thrilled to bits about being hailed from space. On May Day on Tiananmen Gate he shook hands with each of the people who had worked on the satellite, with a big grin on his face, exclaiming “Amazing! Amazing!”; while they shouted slogans saying it had all been the product of Mao's Thought.
Boosted by the satellite, Mao made yet another effort to advertise himself to the world as the leader of the Indochina war. On 20 May he issued a statement titled “People of the world, unite, and defeat American aggressors and all their running dogs!” Next day, he ascended Tiananmen Gate and had the text declaimed to a crowd of half a million, with Sihanouk by his side. As the title made clear, Mao was issuing a command. But the presentation was as farcical as the document's pretensions. It was read out by Mao's then No. 2, Lin Biao, who had to be specially injected with a stimulant beforehand. Sihanouk noticed that before the rally Lin “seemed … to be somewhat intoxicated. He would periodically interrupt Mao, gesticulating and loudly launching himself into anti-U.S. tirades.” When Lin started reading the statement, the words that came out were: “I am going to issue a speech!—I am going to talk about Vietnam—Two Vietnams—Half a Vietnam—” When he got to the written text, he misread it at several places, saying “Pakistan” instead of “Palestine.”
毛然后以全球反美斗争领袖的口气发表“五·二0”声明，题目是：“全世界人民团结起来，打败美国侵略者及其一切走狗！”他登上天安门城楼，西哈努克站在身旁，由此时还得势的林彪面对五十万人宣读声明。 为了念这个声明，病恹恹的林彪打了一针兴奋剂。出场前，西哈努克注意到，林“看去好像轻飘飘有点管束不了自己，他不时打断毛，手舞足蹈，滔滔不绝地大声发表反美演说”。到他讲话时，林拖着长长的颤声说：“我要发表讲话！--我讲讲关于越南 -- 两个越南 -- 半个越南 --”这样颠三倒四了几句之后才言归正传，但还是把“巴勒斯坦”念成了“巴基斯坦”。
The statement condemned US president Richard Nixon by name. Nixon was incensed and, in a drunken rage, wanted ships moved into attack positions. Kissinger calmed him down by pointing out that Mao had “offered little to Hanoi except verbal encouragement.” Mao was ignored. In pique, he lashed out at Kissinger for failing to recognize him as a player, calling him “a stinking scholar,” “a university professor who does not know anything about diplomacy.” An exasperated and vexed Mao had this exchange with Vietnam's premier Dong:
声明点名谴责美国总统尼克松(Richard Nixon)。喝醉了酒的尼克松暴怒之余，下令调动军舰。但他很快镇定下来。国家安全顾问基辛格对他说，毛“除了口头上鼓励鼓励越南以外，拿不出什么东西”。美国人于是对毛的声明没有反应。即使在印支战争中，西方人看重的也是越南。伦敦《泰晤士报》(The Times)称：西哈努克“要想重返政坛得依靠越南”。基辛格开口闭口谈的都是“河内对柬埔寨的野心”。毛对西方不把他当回事大为光火，骂基辛格是“臭知识分子”，“大学教授根本不懂外交”。毛想了一个别的办法让自己处在世界的聚光灯下：把美国总统“钓”来中国。
MAO: Why have the Americans not made a fuss about the fact that more than 100,000 Chinese troops help you building railways, roads and airports although they knew about it?*
DONG: Of course, they are afraid.
MAO: They should have made a fuss about it. Also, their estimate of the number of Chinese troops in Vietnam is less than their real number.
The promotion of Maoism had reached the end of the road, in Indochina as in the world at large. Ever resourceful, Mao came up with a new scheme that would hoist him into the limelight: to get the president of the United States to come to China.
*The October 1966 success coincided with the presence in China of one of Hitler's top rocket experts, Wolfgang Pilz, who was spotted in Peking by an Indian diplomat that month, along with three German colleagues. Pilz had previously been supervising Egypt's missile program and had been lured away with offers of large sums of money and more exciting technical conditions. When China tried to attract other German scientists, the US offered them more money to entice them to America.
*Not surprisingly, when even committed friends could find themselves at risk. When the Albanian premier Mehmet Shehu and his colleague Ramiz Alia returned to Peking after traveling around the country, Mao greeted them by asking: “Did anyone hit you?”
*Its failed leader, Abimael Guzmán, called himself “Chairman of the World Revolution.” The year “Shining Path” was founded, it celebrated Mao's birthday by hanging dogs from lamp-posts in Lima wrapped in slogans excoriating the post-Mao leader Deng Xiao-ping, whom it regarded as having betrayed Mao's legacy, as “a son of a bitch.”
*China had over 320,000 soldiers in Vietnam during the years 1965–68, including more than 150,000 anti-aircraft troops, some of whom stayed into late 1973. The presence of these troops in North Vietnam allowed Hanoi to send many more of its own forces into the South, where some Chinese accompanied them. In 1965 a Chinese general was present to watch US forces landing at Danang, on the coast of South Vietnam.
*Chinese troops wore Chinese uniforms so the Americans would know they were there.