54 NIXON: THE RED-BAITER BAITED
54 尼克松上鈎
(1970–73 AGE 76–79)
1970～1973 年 76～79 岁
WHEN HE FOUNDED his regime in 1949, Mao had deliberately made it impossible for the USA to recognize it, mainly so as to reassure Stalin, hoping that this would encourage Stalin to build up China's military machine. After Stalin died in 1953, Mao began seeking relations with America, in order to gain access to Western technology for his Superpower Program. But memories of fighting the Chinese in the Korean War were too recent, and Washington snubbed Peking. Though the two countries established a diplomatic channel for discussing specific issues, overall, relations remained frozen. Mao hewed to an aggressively anti-US posture, and in 1960, when he was promoting Maoism, he made this bellicosity his hallmark, setting himself apart from the Kremlin, which he accused of going soft on America.
毛刚掌权时，为了让斯大林放心的帮他建设军事大国，他没有同美国建立外交关系。斯大林死后，毛希望建交了，但由于朝鲜战争，美国不愿理睬中国。虽然两国开始了大使级谈判，整个关系仍处在冻结状态。毛选择了剑拔弩张的反美姿态，把它作为“毛主义”的标记。
In 1969, the new US president, Nixon, publicly voiced interest in improving relations with China. Mao did not respond. Establishing a relationship with Washington would jeopardize his identity and image as a revolutionary leader. It was only in June 1970, after his anti-American manifesto of 20 May had flopped, and when it was inescapably clear that Maoism was getting nowhere in the world, that Mao decided to invite Nixon to China. The motive was not to have a reconciliation with America, but to relaunch himself on the international stage.
一九六九年，新上任的美国总统尼克松为了抗衡苏联，结束越战，公开表示有意与中国改善关系。毛没有接话，跟美国和解会使他的“反帝领袖”形象受到损害。一九七0年“五·二0”反美声明石沉大海后，毛才决定主动邀请尼克松来中国。毛并非要同美国和好，而是想向全世界显示，尼克松有求于他，找上门来，他代表世界反帝力量和美国对谈。
Mao did not want to be seen as courting the US president, and he went to considerable lengths to make the invitation deniable. In November, Chou sent a message through the Romanians, who had good relations with both China and America, saying that Nixon would be welcome in Peking. The invitation reached the White House on 11 January 1971. As Mao had feared might happen, Nixon “noted on it that we should not appear too eager to respond,” according to Kissinger. When Kissinger replied to Peking, on 29 January, he made “no reference to a Presidential visit,” regarding the idea as “premature and potentially embarrassing.”
十一月，周恩来通过跟中美双方关系都不错的罗马尼亚发出讯息，说欢迎尼克松来北京。这个邀请于一九七一年一月十一日抵达白宫。尼克松在上面批道：“我们不能表现得太积极”。基辛格后来说，他一月二十九日覆信时，“没有提总统访问的事”，“现在还谈不到这一步，谈这事可能引起麻烦”。
Mao was not deterred. He soon found another way to tempt Nixon to China.
毛继续等待机会。
On 21 March, a Chinese table tennis team arrived in Japan for the world championships—one of the first sports teams to travel abroad since the start of the Cultural Revolution five years before. China was good at table tennis, and Mao personally authorized the trip. So as not to appear too outlandish, the players were exempted from having to wave the Little Red Book.
三月二十一日，中国乒乓球队到日本参加世界锦标赛。这是文革以来首次出国的体育团体之一，由毛亲自批准。为了不显得离奇，球员们经特许不必挥舞小红书。
They were given precise instructions on how to behave with the Americans: no shaking hands; no initiating conversation. But on 4 April, an American player, Glenn Cowan, got on the Chinese bus, and the Chinese men's champion Zhuang Ze-dong decided to talk to him. Photographs of the two shaking hands were front-page news in the Japanese papers. When Mao was informed, his eyes lit up and he called Zhuang “a good diplomat.”
但他们有严格规定：不和美国队员握手，不与美国人主动交谈。四月四日那天，美国球员科恩(Glenn Cowan)偶然上了中国代表团的大巴士。世界冠军庄则栋看见大家都用不安、怀疑、冷漠的眼光注视着他，车上没有一个中国人和他说话搭讪，便走过去同他说了几句话。这两名运动员握手的照片登时成了日本报纸的头条新闻。当毛的护士兼助手吴旭君把登在《参考》上的这条消息念给毛听时，毛眼睛一亮，笑着赞许说：“这个庄则栋，不但球打得好，还会办外交。”
Nonetheless, when the American team expressed a desire to visit China, after other foreign teams had been invited, Mao endorsed a Foreign Ministry recommendation to turn down the request.
这时，美国球队表示希望访华，中国外交部按照既定政策决定不邀请。毛批准了外交部的报告。
But he was clearly uneasy with this decision, and staff noticed that he seemed preoccupied for the rest of the day. That night at eleven o'clock he took a large dose of sleeping pills, and then had dinner with his female nurse-cum-assistant, Wu Xu-jun. Mao sometimes invited one or two members of his staff to dine with him. He seldom dined with his wife at this stage, and almost never with colleagues. His routine was to take sleeping pills before dinner, so he would fall asleep right after the meal, which he ate sitting on the edge of his bed. The pills were so powerful they would sometimes hit him while he was chewing, and his staff would have to pick food out of his mouth, so he never had fish for dinner, because of the bones. This time, Wu recalled,
毛显然对自己的决定不满意，整天都心事重重。那天晚上十一点多钟，他先吃了安眠药，再由吴旭君陪同吃晚饭。毛的习惯是同身边一两个工作人员一道吃饭，晚饭前吃安眠药，吃完就睡觉。毛的安眠药药力极强，有时他吃着饭就发作了，一头栽在桌子上，工作人员需要从他嘴里把没咽下去的饭菜掏出来。为此毛晚饭不吃鱼，怕鱼刺。吴旭君回忆道：
after he finished eating, he slumped on the table … But suddenly he spoke, mumbling, and it took me a long time to work out that he wanted me to telephone the Foreign Ministry … “Invite the American team to China.” …
吃完饭时，由于安眠药的作用，他已经困极了，趴在桌子上似乎要昏昏入睡了。但他突然说话，嘟嘟哝哝的，我听了半天才听清他要让我给外交部的王海容打电话，声音低沉而含糊地说：“邀请美国队访华。”……
I was dumbstruck. I thought: this is just the opposite of what he had authorised during the day!
我一下子楞了。我想，这跟白天退走的批件意思正相反呀！……
Mao's standing orders were that:
毛平时曾交代过，
his “words after taking sleeping pills don't count.” Did they count now?
他“吃过安眠药以后讲的话不算数”。现在他说的算不算数呢？我当时很为难……
I was really in a dilemma … I must make him say it again.
过了一小会儿，毛抬起头来使劲睁开眼睛对我说：“小吴，你还坐在那里吃呀，我让你办的事你怎么不去办？”
… I pretended nothing was happening and went on eating … After a little while, Mao lifted his head and tried very hard to open his eyes and said to me:
毛平时一般都叫我“护士长”，只有谈正经事或十分严肃时才叫我小吴”。
“Little Wu … Why don't you go and do what I asked you to do?”
我故意大声地问： “主席，你刚才和我说什么呀？我尽顾吃饭了，没听清楚，你再说一遍。”
Mao … only called me “Little Wu” when he was very serious.
于是，毛又一宇一句、断断续续、慢慢吞吞地把刚才讲过的话重复了一遍。……
I asked deliberately in a loud voice: “Chairman, what did you say to me? I was eating and didn't hear you clearly. Please say it again.” So Mao repeated, word for word, haltingly, what he had said.
“你都吃过安眠药了，你说的话算数吗？”我急着追问。
Wu then checked with Mao about the pills rule:
毛向我一挥手说： “算！赶快办，要来不及了。”
“You've taken sleeping pills. Do your words count?”
Mao waved at me: “Yes they do! Do it quickly. Otherwise there won't be time.”
Mao kept himself awake until Wu returned with the news that she had done what he asked.
毛一直硬撑着等吴办妥了这件事才安然睡去。
Mao's change of mind changed his fortunes. The invitation, the first ever from Red China to an American group, caused a sensation. The fact that it was a sports team helped capture the world's imagination. Chou En-lai switched on his charm, and his totalitarian regime's meticulously orchestrated theater, to produce what Kissinger called “a dazzling welcome” for the Ping-Pong team. Glowing and fascinated reports littered the American and major Western press day after day. Mao the old newspaperman had hit exactly the right button. “Nixon,” wrote one commentator, “was truly amazed at how the story jumped off the sports pages and onto the front page.” With one move, Mao had created the climate in which a visit to China would be a political asset for Nixon in the runup to the 1972 presidential election.
毛的这一决策在西方造成了轰动性的效应。中美敌对多年，破天荒突然邀请美国团体，而且请的是体育团体，人人都感兴趣。美国人来了以后，魅力十足的周恩来使出浑身解数，让他们感到“令人眩目的欢迎”(基辛格的话)。美国报纸天天充满兴奋激动的报导。一位评论员写道：“尼克松目瞪口呆地眼看着这条新闻从体育版跃上头版。”毛就这样制造了诱惑尼克松访华的环境。在这样的舆论气氛中访华，对尼克松在政治上有百利而无一弊，尤其是第二年就要大选。
“Nixon was excited to the point of euphoria,” Kissinger wrote, and “now wanted to skip the emissary stage lest it take the glow off his own journey.” By the end of May it was settled, in secret, that Nixon was going.
周恩来不失时机地在四月二十一日再邀尼克松访华，尼克松马上在二十九日表示同意。据基辛格说：“尼克松简直兴奋得不能自己，甚至想不先派打前站的去中国，生怕这会减少他访问的光彩。”
MAO HAD NOT only got Nixon, he had managed to conceal that this had been his objective. Nixon was coming thinking that he was the keener of the two. So when Kissinger made his first, secret, visit in July 1971 to pave the way for the president, he bore many and weighty gifts, and asked for nothing in return. The most startling offer concerned Taiwan, to which the US was bound by a mutual defense treaty. Nixon offered to drop Washington's old ally, promising to accord full diplomatic recognition to Peking by January 1975, provided he was re-elected in 1972.
毛不仅钓来了尼克松，还钓来了喜出望外的见面礼。基辛格七月秘密来华为尼克松访问铺路时，主动提出，要是尼克松一九七二年再度当选总统，就在一九七五年一月之前承认北京，全面接受北京的条件，把台湾一脚踢开。尽管美国跟台湾有共同防御条约，周恩来对基辛格说起台湾来好像这个岛子已经正北京的口袋里了。基辛格只做了个软弱无力的姿态：“我们希望台湾问题能和平解决。”他没有要周答应不使用武力。*
By the end of the trip Chou was talking as if Peking pocketing Taiwan was a matter of course. It was only at this point that Kissinger made a feeble gesture: “We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.” But he did not press Chou for a promise not to use force.*
* 基辛格这次访华的档案直到二00二年才解密。在这之前他写的回忆录里，基辛格声称那一行“只是略略提到台湾问题”。档案解密后问起他时，他承认：“我那样说是非常不幸的，我很后悔。”
As part of the recognition package, Nixon offered to get Peking into the UN straight away: “you would get the China seat now,” Kissinger told Chou when proposing this behind-the-scenes fix, adding that “the President wanted me to discuss this matter with you before we adopted a position.”
尼克松还提出帮中国马上進入联合国。基辛格说：“你们现在就可以占据中国席位，总统要我先跟你们讨论这个问题，我们然后再决定公开的政策。”
And there was more, including an offer to tell the Chinese everything about America's dealings with Russia. Kissinger: “Specially, I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiations we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks].” A few months later Kissinger told the Chinese: “we tell you about our conversations with the Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversations with you.”
基辛格的礼品盒里装的不止这些。他提出要把美国同苏联打交道的内容都报告中国，说：“你们想知道我们跟苏联谈些什么，我们就告诉你们什么，特别是限制战略武器的谈判。”几个月后，基辛格对中国使者说：“我们告诉你们我们跟苏联人谈些什么，可是不告诉苏联人我们跟你们谈些什么。”洛克菲勒(Nelson Rockefeller) 副总统在听到美国告诉了中国什么情报时，简直“惊呆了”。情报之一是苏联军队集结中国边境的情况。
Along with this came top-level intelligence. Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller was reported as being “almost mesmerised at hearing … the amount of sensitive information that we had made available to the Chinese.” The intelligence included information about Soviet troop deployments on China's border.
Kissinger also made two commitments on Indochina: to pull out all US forces, mentioning a twelve-month deadline; and to abandon the South Vietnamese regime, promising to withdraw “unilaterally” even if there were no negotiations—and that US troops would not return. “After a peace is made,” Kissinger said, “we will be 10,000 miles away, and [Hanoi] will still be there.”
在印度支那问题上，基辛格做出两项重大承诺。一是十二个月内撤出所有美国军队，二是抛弃南越政权。他说：“一旦和平到来，我们将在一万英里之外，河内仍在越南。”意思是，越南将是越共的天下。
Kissinger even made a promise that “most, if not all, American troops” would be out of Korea before the end of Nixon's next term, without even trying to extract any guarantee that Mao would not support another Communist invasion of South Korea.
基辛格甚至主动许诺在尼克松的下一任期内把“大部分”乃至全部美国军队，撤出南朝鲜，对共产党国家是否会再度入侵南朝鲜只字不提。
Mao was being given a lot, and on a platter. Kissinger specifically said that he was not asking China to stop giving aid to Vietnam, and Mao was not even requested to soften his bellicose anti-American tone, either in the world at large or during the meetings. The minutes show that Chou was hectoring (“you should answer that question … you must answer that question”), and constantly referring to “your oppression, your subversion, and your intervention.” He in effect suggested that Nixon must make more and more concessions for the privilege of coming to China, and being allowed to recognize Peking. Kissinger did not ask for reciprocal concessions. Chou's outlandish claim that China was not “aggressive”—“because of our new [Communist] system,” no less—went unchallenged. And Chou's reference to American “cruelties” in Vietnam earned no reproof about Mao's cruelties in China. On a different occasion, when North Vietnam's negotiator had obliquely criticized the Nixon administration, Kissinger had shot back: “You are the representative of one of the most tyrannical governments on this planet …” Now, Kissinger described Chou's presentation as “very moving.”
这些见面礼是不要回报的。基辛格强调说他不要求中国停止援越，连希望毛政权少骂点美国也没提。从会谈纪要可以看出，周恩来用的是对敌的口气：“你应当回答这个问题”，“你必须答覆那个问题”，“你们的压迫，你们的颠覆，你们的干涉”。基辛格不但不为美国辩护，连周说的中国因为是共产主义国家，所以不会侵略别国这样一个可笑的逻辑也接受了。基辛格在跟越共谈判时，对方稍微提了提美国政府的不是，基辛格一口给他顶回去：“你有什么资格说我，你代表的是这个星球上最暴戾的政权之一。”可是周说美国在越南“残酷”时，基辛格没问一句：“你们对自己的人民呢？”对周的声讨，基辛格的事后感觉是“非常动人”。
When Mao heard the report of the first day's talks, his ego soared, and he remarked to his top diplomats that America was “changing from monkey to man, not quite man yet, the tail is still there … but it is no longer a monkey, it's a chimpanzee, and its tail is not very long.” “America should start its life anew,” he proclaimed, expanding on his Darwinian approach, viewing America as a slowly evolving lower primate. “This is evolution!” Chou, for his part, compared Nixon to a loose woman “tarting herself up and offering herself at the door.” It was now, during this first Kissinger visit, that Mao drew the conclusion that Nixon could be manipulated, and that Peking could get a lot out of America without having to modify its tyranny, or its anti-American ranting.
第一天谈判完，毛一听汇报，自大心理立刻膨胀起来。他对外交官们大剌剌地说美国是“猴子变人还没变过来，还留着尾巴”，“它已不是猴子，是猿，尾巴不长。”“这是進化嘛！”周呢，形容尼克松是“梳妆打扮，送上门来”。毛看出，他可以从尼克松那里得到他想要的东西，无须付出代价，既用不着收敛暴政，也没必要降低反美调子。
IMMEDIATELY AFTER KISSINGER'S secret visit, it was announced that Nixon had been invited to China and had accepted. Kissinger returned to Peking in October 1971 to prepare for the president's visit. His second trip coincided with the annual UN vote on China's seat, which Taiwan held, and the public presence in Peking of the president's top adviser turned the tide. On 25 October, Peking displaced Taipei in the UN, giving Mao a seat, and a veto, on the Security Council.
基辛格秘密来访之后，尼克松即将访华的消息向全世界公开了。一九七一年十月，基辛格再度来华为总统做准备。那正是联合国每年一度辩论中国席位之时。美国是台湾的主要保护人，国家安全顾问自己都在北京，等于为中国开了绿灯。十月二十五日，北京取代台北進入联合国，接管安理会的否决权。
This was just over a month after the flight and death of Lin Biao. The news that there had been a plot to kill him had left Mao in a state of deep depression. Taiwan's defeat and Nixon's coming visit lifted his spirits immeasurably. Laughing broadly and joking, he talked for nearly three hours in full flow to his top diplomats. Looking at the UN vote, he declared that: “Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Canada, Italy—they have all become Red Guards …”
这时距林彪出逃刚一个月，毛还沉陷在沮丧之中。進入联合国和尼克松来访这两桩大事驱散了阴霾，使毛情绪高涨。对着聚集在他周围的外交官们，他又说又笑，兴致勃勃地一连讲了近三个小时。他拿起联合国提案表决表，一边指，一边说：“英国、法国、荷兰、比利时、加拿大、意大利，都当了红卫兵……”
Before China's delegates left for the UN, Mao made a point of reminding them that they must continue to treat the USA as Public Enemy No. 1, and fiercely denounce it “by name, an absolute must.” He wanted to make his debut on the world stage as the anti-American champion, using the UN as a new platform.
毛当即指示去联合国的代表团，继续把美国当作头号敌人谴责：“要旗帜鲜明”， “要点他们的名，不点不行”。以反美领袖的姿态登上世界讲坛的一天到了。
Nine days before Nixon was scheduled to arrive in China on 21 February 1972, Mao passed out, and came very close to death. The prospect of Nixon's imminent arrival helped to restore him. New shoes and clothes were made for him, as his body had become swollen. The sitting-room where he was to receive Nixon had been converted into a makeshift ward, with a large bed and medical facilities. Staff moved some of these out of the room, and screened off the bed and the other medical equipment. The vast room was lined with old books, which impressed the Americans, who did not know that many were loot from brutal house raids in the not-so-distant past.
尼克松到来的九天前，毛突然休克，差一点死去。尼克松就要来了，这给了他迅速恢复的精神激励。他那时身体肿胀，特别做了新衣新鞋。因为治病需要大量的医疗设备，这时毛睡在建在游泳池之上的大会客厅里。要在这里见尼克松了，医疗设备被挪到大厅一角，连床在内用屏风隔开。会客厅四壁都是书架，摆满了旧书，使美国人为毛的学识赞叹不止。
On the morning when Nixon arrived, Mao was tremendously excited, and kept checking on the president's progress. As soon as he heard that Nixon had reached the guest house, the Imperial Fishing Villa, Mao said he wanted to see him, straightaway. Nixon was getting ready to take a shower, when Chou, behaving “slightly impatiently,” Kissinger noted, hustled them to be on their way.
尼克松到达的那天早上，毛急不可耐地不断询问美国总统到了哪里。听说尼克松到了钓鱼台住地，毛马上要见他，一刻也不愿意等。尼克松正准备淋浴，据基辛格说，周恩来“有点不耐烦”地催促他上路。
During the relatively brief 65-minute meeting (the only one between Nixon and Mao on this trip), Mao parried every attempt to engage him in serious issues. This was not because he had been ill, but because he did not want to leave a record of his positions in the hands of the Americans. Nothing must damage his claim to be the global anti-American leader.* He had invited Nixon to Peking to promote that claim, not to waive it. So when Nixon proposed discussing “current issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea,” Mao acted as if he were above such lesser chores. “Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place,” he said, conveying an impression of lofty detachment. “They should be discussed with the Premier,” adding that: “All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much.” Then he cut the Americans short by saying: “As a suggestion, may I suggest you do a little less briefing?” When Nixon persisted in talking about finding “common ground” and building a “world structure,” Mao ignored him, turned to Chou to ask what time it was, and said: “Haven't we talked enough now?”
在这场一共六十五分钟的会见中，尼克松努力要跟毛讨论世界大事，而毛总是把话题扯开，顾左右而言他。毛不想有把柄落在美国人手上。为了严密控制会谈纪录，中方拒绝美国翻译在场。对这一违背外交惯例的要求，尼克松未表示异议就接受了。当尼克松建议讨论“台湾、越南、朝鲜这类当今大事”时，毛不屑地说：“这些问题不是在我这里谈的问题，这些问题应该同周总理去谈。这些麻烦事我不想管。”“我可不可以建议你少听点汇报？”当尼克松继续按自己的思路谈“找到共同点来建立一个世界结构”时，毛答也不答，转头问周恩来：“现在几点了？”接着说：“吹到这里差不多了吧？”
Mao was especially careful not to pay Nixon any compliments, while Nixon and Kissinger both flattered Mao fulsomely. Nixon told Mao: “The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.” Mao returned no thanks and made only one, condescending, comment on Nixon: “Your book, Six Crises, is not a bad book.”
毛特别注意不说赞赏尼克松的话。尼克松、基辛格一个劲地奉承他，比方尼克松说：“主席的著作推动了一个民族，改变了世界。”毛只以居高临下的口气说过尼克松一句好话：“你的《六次危机》(Six Crises)写得不错。”
Instead, Mao used banter to put Nixon and Kissinger down, exploring how much they would swallow. When Nixon said: “I have read the Chairman's poems and speeches, and I knewhe was a professional philosopher,” Mao turned away to look at Kissinger, and started this exchange.
尼克松又说：“我读过主席的诗词和讲话，我知道主席是个哲学家。”毛没理他，反而把话题扯到基辛格身上。
MAO: He is a doctor of philosophy?
毛：他不是个哲学博士吗？
NIXON: He is a doctor of brains.
尼：他是个大脑博士。
MAO: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?
毛：今天叫他来当主讲人怎么样？
Mao kept disrupting his exchanges with Nixon to make remarks like: “We two must not monopolise the whole show. It won't do if we don't let Dr. Kissinger have a say.” This transgressed both protocol and common politeness, and was definitely slighting Nixon. Mao would never have dared to talk this way to Stalin. But, having upgraded Kissinger at Nixon's expense, Mao did not really invite Kissinger's views. He merely engaged in repartee about Kissinger using “pretty girls as a cover.”
尼克松讲话时，毛不时打断他，说：“我们两人不能垄断整出戏嘛，不让基辛格博士发言是不行的。”等到基辛格加入進来，毛又并没有真要听他的意见，而是在跟基辛格瞎扯，谈什么“用漂亮姑娘做掩护”。
Mao clearly felt he could push Nixon quite far. At the end of the visit there was to be a joint communiqué. Mao dictated one in which he could denounce America. “Aren't they talking peace, security … and what not?” he said to Chou. “We will do the opposite and talk revolution, talk liberating the oppressed nations and people all over the world …” So the communiqué took the form of each side stating its own position. The Chinese used their space for a tirade against America (though not by name). The American side did not say one word critical of Mao's regime, going no further than a vague and much qualified platitude about supporting “individual freedom.”*
毛对尼克松的无礼，是对美国总统的试探。毛得出结论：跟尼克松打交道可以得寸進尺。访华结束时中美要发一个联合公报，毛要在公报里谴责美国。他对他的外交官说：“他们不是讲什么和平、安全、不谋求霸权吗？我们就要讲革命，讲解放全世界被压迫民族和被压迫人民”。公报于是采取了一个独特的方式：“各说各的”。中方的是火药味十足的不点名的反美宣传，而美国方面只有一句不痛不痒的影射中国的话，说它支持“个人自由”。
毛政权对人民的压制美国人不是看不见，随同尼克松来访的政治评论家巴克列(William Buckley)就发现不管美国人走到哪里，一个老百姓也见不到。他问中国官员：“你们的人民都到哪儿去了？”官员答道：“人民？什么人民？”巴克列反唇相讥说：“中华人民共和国里面的人民！”
IN SPITE OF all his efforts to come across as the champion of anti-Americanism, Mao caught a lot of flak from his old allies. The fiercest came from Albania, which mattered to Mao because it was the only Eastern European regime he had detached from Russia's orbit. Albania's dictator, Hoxha, penned Mao a nineteen-page letter expressing his fury over what he called “this shitty business.” Actually, Hoxha cunningly used rhetoric to extract colossal amounts of extra aid, basically saying: You are consorting with the enemy, but you can buy our silence for more money. Mao paid up.
毛虽然谨慎地要保持反美旗手的形象，还是受到从前盟友们的攻击。最激烈的是阿尔巴尼亚，霍查给毛写了封长达十九页的信，称毛跟美国来往是“肮脏事”。毛再愤怒，也不能跟他翻脸。阿国虽小，毕竟是毛从苏联阵营拉出的唯一东欧国家。为了堵霍查的嘴，毛只有多给钱。
The biggest problem was Vietnam, which counted far more than Albania internationally. The Vietnamese were worried that Mao was trying to use them as a bargaining chip with the US. When Chou went to Hanoi immediately after Kissinger's first visit, to explain Peking's move, he got an earful from North Vietnam's leader. “Vietnam is our country,” Le Duan protested; “you have no right to discuss the question of Vietnam with the United States.” After Nixon's visit, Chou returned to Hanoi, and got an even worse reception. Prince Sihanouk was there at the time, having decamped from Peking in indignation during Nixon's stay in China. He has left a rare picture of a flustered Chou, who, he records, “looked worn and still appeared heated by the discussion he just had with his North Vietnamese ‘comrades.' He seemed irritated,” and “not himself.” Mao tried to salvage some influence by pouring in even more aid, which rose to unprecedented levels from 1971, peaking in 1974.
最令毛头疼的还是越共。基辛格第一次访华前脚走，后脚周恩来就作为安抚使节去了河内。越共领导人疑心毛要用他们跟美国做交易，给了周好一顿教训。黎笋说：“越南是我们的国家，你们没有权利跟美国讨论越南问题。”尼克松访华后，周恩来再去河内。西哈努克亲王这时也在那里，他因尼克松的到来而愤然离开北京。西哈努克描绘刚跟越共领导人谈判完的周恩来，说，周“看上去疲惫不堪，还在为他的北越“同志”指责他的那些话气得不知所措，跟他通常的样子判若两人。”为了继续拉住越共，毛别无他法，也只有像对阿尔巴尼亚一样多给钱。中国援越款项从一九七一年上升到前所未有的高度，最高峰是一九七四年。
All these bribes to keep old allies quiet meant a tighter squeeze on the Chinese population. Nor did its extra burdens stop there. As more and more countries recognized Peking in the wake of Nixon's visit, the number of states to which China sent aid jumped from 31 prior to 1970 to 66. On tiny and immeasurably more prosperous Malta (pop. c. 300,000), Mao lavished no less than US$25 million in April 1972. Its prime minister, Dom Mintoff, returned from China sporting a Mao badge.
对这些国际“盟友”的贿赂等于对中国老百姓的加剧掠夺。受贿的还不只是盟友。尼克松访华后，随着越来越多的国家承认中国，中国向越来越多的国家提供经济援助。一九七0年之前，受援国是三十一个，之后突增到六十六个。人口只有三十万的欧洲国家马尔他(Malta)，生活水准远远高过中国，居然一九七二年四月一次就从中国拿到两千五百万美元的援助。以什么做交换呢？马尔他总理明托夫(Dom Mintoff) 回国时佩戴着一枚毛像章。
Mao often had to pay over the odds to buy himself back into favor with states he had earlier tried to subvert. One former target, President Mobutu of Zaïre, told us how generously he was funded by Mao, who—unlike the IMF and the World Bank—let him defer loans indefinitely, or repay them in worthless Zaïrean currency. In the years 1971–75, foreign aid took up a staggering average of 5.88 percent of China's entire expenditure, peaking at 6.92 percent in 1973—by far the highest percentage in the world, and at least seventy times the US level.
一九七一到一九七五年间，中国平均每年外援占国家财政总支出的百分之五点八八，全世界绝无仅有。
While Mao dished out money and food, and built expensive underground railway systems, shipyards and infrastructure for countries far richer than China, most of the 900 million Chinese hovered just above survival levels. In many areas, peasants recall that the hungriest years after the Great Famine of 1958–61 were those from 1973 to Mao's death in 1976—the years immediately after Nixon's visit.
而中国人大多在挨饿。对毛的老根据地陕北一带的农民来说，一九七三到一九七六年--尼克松访华后到毛去世的几年 -- 是除了大饥荒外最饥饿的日子。
Nixon has often been credited with opening the door to China. Inasmuch as a number of Western statesmen and businessmen, plus some press and tourists, were able to enter China, he did increase the Western presence in China. But he did not open the door of—much less from—China, and the increased Western presence did not have any appreciable impact on Chinese society while Mao was alive. Mao made sure that for the vast majority of its population, China remained a tightly sealed prison. The only people who benefited at all from the rapprochement were a small elite. Some of these were allowed to see relatives from abroad—under heavy supervision. And a tiny number could lay hands on the half-dozen or so contemporary Western books translated in classified editions, one of which was Nixon's own Six Crises. From 1973 some foreign-language students were sent abroad, but the very few who were lucky enough to be allowed out had to be politically ultra-reliable, and lived and worked under the closest surveillance, forbidden even to step out of their residence unescorted.
人们常说尼克松访华打开了中国的大门。但实际上，只有少数几个西方人能進来，中国老百姓出不去，祖国依然像个铁桶般的监狱。沾尼克松光的中国人微乎其微。这些享有特权的人，有的经过严格的政治审查后送到西方去学语言，有的辗转看到几本刚翻译的外文书，包括尼克松的《六次危机》，有的在严密监视下见见来访的海外亲戚。未经许可跟外国人交谈可能招来大祸。毛政权的控制措施严厉到什么程度，可以从尼克松访华期间一件“小事”看出。总统要去上海一天，那正值春节，成千上万上山下乡的知识青年回沪探亲。为了预防不测，他们被全部勒令返回农村。
The population as a whole remained rigidly quarantined from the few foreigners allowed into China, who were subject to rigorous control. Any unauthorized conversation with them could bring catastrophe to the locals involved. The lengths to which the regime would go were extraordinary. For Nixon's one-day visit to Shanghai, which coincided with Chinese New Year, the traditional occasion for family reunions (like Christmas), thousands of rusticated youths who were visiting their families were expelled back to their villages of exile, as a precaution against the extremely remote possibility of any of them trying to complain to the president.
The real beneficiaries of Nixon's visit were Mao himself, and his regime. For his own electoral ends, Nixon de-demonized Mao for mainstream opinion in the West. Briefing White House staff on his return, Nixon spoke of the “dedication” of Mao's cynical coterie, whom Kissinger called “a group of monks … who have … kept their revolutionary purity.” Nixon's men asserted, falsely, that “under Mao the lives of the Chinese masses have been greatly improved.” Nixon's favorite evangelist, Billy Graham, lauded Mao's virtues to British businessmen. Kissinger suggested that Mao's callous crew would “challenge us in a moral way.” The result was an image of Mao a whole lot further from the truth than the one that Nixon himself had helped purvey as a fierce anti-Communist in the 1950s.
尼克松访华的受益者是毛泽东和他的政权。尼克松为了自身的利益，为了大选，在西方给毛正名。尼克松大谈毛等人“对事业的忠诚”，基辛格称他们为“清教徒式的、保持了革命纯洁性的一组人”，说“他们将在道德上向我们提出挑战”。睁着眼睛说瞎话的尼克松部下说：“在毛的领导下，中国人民的生活得到了极大的改善。”尼克松最喜欢的福音派传教士格兰姆(Billy Graham)也赞美毛的“美德”。毛一跃而在西方主流社会成了诱惑力十足的人物。
Mao became not merely a credible international figure, but one with incomparable allure. World statesmen beat a path to his door. A meeting with Mao was, and sometimes still is, regarded as the highlight of many a career, and life. When the call came for Mexico's president Luis Echeverria, his entourage literally fought to join the audience group. The Australian ambassador told us that he did not dare go to the toilet, even though his bladder was bursting, in case the privileged few should suddenly leave without him. Japan's prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, on the other hand, relieved himself at Mao's place. Mao escorted him to the lavatory, and waited for him outside the door.
好奇的全球政要纷纷前来见毛。墨西哥总统埃切维利亚(Luis Echeverria)去和毛会面时，随行人员争着要跟他去，都快打起来了。政要们事先不知道能否见到毛，到了中国，得随时听从召唤。毛什么时候方便，什么时候心血来潮，就什么时候召唤。政要们哪怕饭吃到一半也得放下饭碗。澳大利亚大使告诉我们，尽管他的尿快憋不住了也不敢上厕所，怕召唤突然来了他被丢下。日本首相田中倒是上了厕所 -- 是在毛的住处。毛陪他到厕所门口，并站在那里等他。加拿大总理特鲁多其实并没有要求见毛，正开着会，周恩来突如其来地宣布休会，催他起身，又不告诉他是去见毛。
Statesmen put up with slights that they would never have condoned from other leaders. Not only were they not told in advance if they would see Mao, they were summoned peremptorily at the moment most convenient to the chairman, whatever they were doing, even in the middle of a meal. Canada's prime minister Pierre Trudeau, who had not even asked to see Mao, suddenly found himself being bossed about by Chou—“Well, we have to adjourn now. I have other business and so do you”—without even telling him what for.
When Mao met foreigners, he flaunted his cynical and dictatorial views. “Napoleon's methods were the best,” he told France's president Georges Pompidou: “He dissolved all the assemblies and simply appointed those who were to govern with him.” When former British prime minister Edward Heath expressed surprise that Stalin's portrait was still hanging in Tiananmen Square and brought up the fact that Stalin had slaughtered millions of people, Mao gave a dismissive flip of the hand to signal how little he cared, and answered: “But he is there because he was a Marxist.” Mao even managed to infect Western leaders with his own jargon. After Australian premier Gough Whitlam showed some uncertainty about the right answer to a question about Darwin, he wrote Mao what he calls in his memoirs “a self-criticism.” As recently as 1997, when much more was known about Mao, Kissinger described him as a “philosopher,” and claimed that Mao's goal was a “quest for egalitarian virtue.”
毛在西方政要面前毫无顾忌地宣扬专制独裁。他对法国总统蓬皮杜(Georges Pompidou)说：“拿破仑的办法最好，解散国会，谁治理国家由他来指定。”英国前首相希思(Edward Heath)对毛说他很吃惊，怎么天安门广场上还有斯大林的像，斯大林杀了数百万人。毛一摆手表示杀人不算什么，说：“他是个伟大的马克思主义者嘛。” 毛在西方政要心目中是个充满哲理的人。澳大利亚总理惠特拉姆(Gough Whitlam)对毛提出的一个关于达尔文的问题，未能圆满答覆，事后学着毛的语言给毛写信说，他要做“自我批评”。到一九九七年了，世人对毛已有相当了解了，基辛格还称毛为“哲学家”，声称毛的目标是“追求平等”。
Mao liked giving audiences to star-struck visitors, and continued to do so until his dying days, when oxygen tubing lay on his side table, concealed by a book or a newspaper. For him these audiences represented global glory.
毛喜欢接见外国政要，见他们一直见到临终。身体糟到透不过气来，就在旁边小桌上的报纸或书底下，放一根输氧管，静静地往他喷氧气。接见意味着他在世界舞台上继续放光。
NIXON'S VISIT ALSO opened up for Mao the possibility of laying his hands on advanced Western military technology and equipment. “The only objective of these relations,” he told the North Korean dictator Kim, “is to obtain developed technology.”
尼克松的来访给毛打开一道门，使他感到有可能从美国得到些先進军事技术和设备。他对北朝鲜的金日成直言不讳地说：“搞这些关系只有一个目的，就是为了获得发达技术。”
Mao knew that he could only achieve his goal if America considered him an ally. To offer a plausible explanation for this shift from his long-standing anti-American posture, Mao claimed that he lived in fear of a Russian attack and desperately needed protection. Having laid the groundwork from the time of Kissinger's first visit, Mao spoke explicitly about a military alliance in February 1973. “The Soviet Union dominated our conversations,” Kissinger reported to Nixon; as he put it in his memoirs, he was given to understand that “China's conflict with the Soviet Union was both ineradicable and beyond its capacity to manage by itself.” Mao then told Kissinger: “we should draw a horizontal line [sc., alliance]—the US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Europe.”* All the places Mao cited except China were American allies.
要达到这个目的，毛非得让美国把他看作盟友才行。可是做盟友跟他一向摆出的反美姿态反差太大，怎么才能让美国人接受呢？毛的策略是竭力渲染“苏联威胁”， 让美国人感觉，毛认为苏联入侵中国已迫在眉睫，不得不和美国联盟。从基辛格第一次访华，毛就开始吹风，到基辛格一九七三年二月来时，毛干脆直接提出建立联盟。毛对基辛格说：“我们应当搞一条横线 -- 美国、日本，中国、巴基斯坦、伊朗、土耳其和欧洲。”这些国家除中国之外都是美国的盟友。据
To make the idea more attractive, Mao and Chou said that China would like the alliance to be led by America. Kissinger recorded that Chou “called on us to take the lead in organising an anti-Soviet coalition.”
基辛格记载：周恩来“呼吁我们牵头组织一个反苏联盟”，中方希望这个联盟“由美国领导”。
基辛格果然中计，在给尼克松的汇报里说：“苏联问题成了我们全部谈话的中心”。“中苏冲突是不可能消除的，中国光靠自己的能力无法与苏联对抗。”基辛格对他小圈子里的人说：“什么二十五年双方的误解啊，这都是瞎话。中国人要的是打起仗来我们帮他。”基辛格向中方担保：“我们会把对中国的入侵看作是对美国国家安全的威胁。”
Mao was not that frightened of a Soviet strike. Although he genuinely feared it, as he had shown in the 1969 scare, it had become obvious to him since then that the chances of such an event were extremely remote. The way he angled for American military secrets followed a pattern similar to his past approach with Moscow. Twice, in 1954 and 1958, he had exploited the fear of America using atom bombs in his staged confrontations with Taiwan to get Khrushchev to help him; in the first instance, to build his own Bomb, and in the second, to extract a deal that almost gave him an across-the-board modern arsenal. Now he was using the specter of war again to conjure a similar prize out of America.
夸张“苏联威胁”为的是骗取美国的宝贝。这一手法在毛不是什么新鲜事。一九五四、一九五八年，他两次掀起台湾海峡危机，利用美国扔原子弹的威胁，从赫鲁晓夫那里获取使中国核武器工业起步和发展的关键性援助。如今毛又喊起“狼来了”。
At one point in February 1973, Mao revealed a glimpse of what he really thought about the “Soviet threat.” When Kissinger promised that the US would come to China's rescue “if the Soviet Union overruns China,” Mao, who had earlier evoked this scenario himself, replied, laughing: “How will that happen? How could that be?… do you think they would feel good if they were bogged down in China?” Seeing that Kissinger was a little nonplussed, Mao quickly checked this line of reasoning, and reverted to crying wolf.
To persuade the US to think that he really wanted them as an ally, Mao hinted that he and Washington shared a mutual enemy: Hanoi. Kissinger came away feeling that “in Indochina, American and Chinese interests were nearly parallel. A united Communist Vietnam dominant in Indochina was a strategic nightmare for China …” Mao's position not only double-crossed the Vietnamese, it was also a huge betrayal of the Chinese people, who had been starved of essentials for decades so as to aid the Vietnamese—against “US imperialism.”
为了让美国人相信他们真可能与中国结盟，毛给他们提供了另一个理由，即他们有一个共同的敌人：越共。基辛格带着这样的印象离去：“在印度支那，美国和中国的利益几乎是平行的。统一的，在印度支那起主导作用的共产党越南，对中国是个战略梦魇。”这么说，毛用中国老百姓多年忍饥挨饿挤出的钱，扶持的不是“同志加兄弟”，而是敌人？
Mao added a personal touch to soften up Kissinger, by alluding to Kissinger's success with women. “There were some rumours that said that you were about to collapse. (laughter),” the meeting record runs. “And women folk seated here were all dissatisfied with that. (laughter, especially pronounced among the women) They said if the Doctor [Kissinger] is going to collapse, we would be out of work.” “Do you want our Chinese women? We can give you ten million. (laughter, particularly among the women).”
毛还顺着基辛格的爱好奉承他的桃花运。会议记录里毛说：“有谣言说你快不行了？(笑声)在座的妇女可都不满意啊。(笑声，妇女笑得特别响)她们说要是博士不行了，我们就没事干了。”“你要不要我们中国妇女？我们可以给你一千万。(笑声，特别是妇女的笑声。)”
A few weeks later, on 16 March, Nixon wrote Mao a secret letter, stating that the territorial integrity of China was a “fundamental element” of US foreign policy, in language which suggested a commitment to come to China's defense militarily if it was attacked. The Chinese wanted to know exactly what this meant.
一九七三年三月十六日，尼克松给毛写了封绝密的信，声明维护中国领土完整是美国外交政策的“基础部分”，许诺中国一旦受到攻击美国将使用武力保卫中国。
Kissinger told the Chinese on 6 July that he had set up “a very secret group of four or five of the best officers I can find” to study what the US could do. Among scenarios considered was airlifting American nuclear artillery shells and battlefield nuclear missiles to Chinese forces in the event of war. The only practical option, the group recommended, was to ferry American tactical bombers into China loaded with nuclear weapons, and launch nuclear attacks on Soviet forces from Chinese airfields. This opened up the prospect of US nuclear weapons being stationed on Chinese soil.
基辛格设立了一个极其秘密的小组，由四、五个他称为“最好的军官”组成，专门研究美国能为中国做些什么。考虑的方案包括一旦开战向中国军队空运美国核炮弹，战场核导弹等。小组认为唯一可行的方案，是把载核武器的美国战术轰炸机运到中国，从中国机场对苏联军队发动核打击。美国人居然在考虑运核武器到中国土地上来了。
To his close circle on 19 July, Kissinger spelled out how the White House was thinking: “All this talk about 25 years of mutual estrangement was crap. What the Chinese wanted was support in a military contingency.”* The memo reveals that Kissinger was well aware that he and Nixon were contemplating doing something almost unimaginable: “We might not be able to pull it off, but at least [Kissinger] and the President understood this. Alex Eckstein and other chowder-headed liberals loved China but if you asked them about military actions in a contingency they'd have 600 heart attacks.”
基辛格、尼克松明白他们考虑干的是一件在美国难以想像的事。基辛格说：“哪怕是像艾力克斯·艾克斯坦(Alex Eckstein)那样的喜欢中国的自由派呆子们，要是你跟他们说跟中国配合打仗，他们也准会发六百次心脏病。”
Nixon and Kissinger knew that Mao had his eye on military know-how, and they agreed to fix substantial acquisitions for him. On 6 July, Kissinger told Mao's envoy:
美国之外，尼克松、基辛格尽量帮助毛获得西欧军事技术。基辛格七月六日对毛的使节黄镇说：
I have talked to the French Foreign Minister about our interest in strengthening the PRC [Communist China]. We will do what we can to encourage our allies to speed up requests they receive from you on items for Chinese defense.
我已经跟法国外交部长说了，我们有意要加强中华人民共和国的武装能力。我们会尽全力鼓励我们的盟友加快满足你们提交的国防订货单。
In particular, you have asked for some Rolls-Royce [engine] technology. Under existing regulations we have to oppose this, but we have worked out a procedure with the British where they will go ahead anyway. We will take a formal position in opposition, but only that. Don't be confused by what we do publicly …
尤其是，你们要劳斯莱斯[Rolls-Royce，军用航空引擎]技术。根据现有的法规，我们不得不反对出售这项技术。但是我们已经跟英国人商量了个程序，使他们可以卖给你们。我们会要正式反对这笔交易，但仅此而已，别把我们公开的姿态当真。
This decision was vital for China's aircraft industry, which was entirely military-oriented—and decrepit. In April 1972 Chou had warned the Albanians not to try to fly their Chinese-made MiG-19s. Six months later, a plane supplied to another country exploded in mid-air, after which all shipments of arms overseas were halted. Chou told Third World heads of state that he could not satisfy their pressing requests for Chinese helicopters, as they were unsafe.
引擎是飞机的心脏，这项决定解决了中国军用飞机的“心脏病”问题。西方技术或许还给陷入困境的中国导弹事业注射了一剂强心针。负责导弹工业的七机部是同劳斯莱斯公司谈判的主要对手。基辛格也暗地里鼓励英国、法国把严格禁运的核反应堆技术卖给中国。
Access to Western technology revolutionized China's aircraft industry, and may also have boosted its flagging missile program, as rocket chiefs were deeply involved in the Rolls-Royce negotiations. In addition, Kissinger secretly encouraged Britain and France to sell strictly prohibited nuclear reactor technology to China. Mao had made a lot of headway towards getting what had always been his core objective.
The Russians were alarmed by Mao's overtures towards the Americans. In June 1973 Brezhnev warned Nixon and Kissinger that (as Kissinger paraphrased it to China's liaison): “if military arrangements were made between the US and the PRC, this would have the most serious consequences and would lead the Soviets to take drastic measures.” This conversation with Brezhnev, which concerned US national security, was promptly related to Mao's envoy, who was present at the Western White House during Nixon's talks with Brezhnev, but not to America's allies—or to the US government itself. “We have told no one in our government of this conversation,” Kissinger confided to Mao's envoy. “It must be kept totally secret.”
苏联人对这一切略有所闻。勃列日涅夫在一九七三年六月警告尼克松、基辛格说：“如果中美之间形成了军事关系，这将带来极严重的后果，将迫使苏联不得不采取激烈的措施。”这番事关美国国家安全的话，基辛格没有报告美国政府，反倒马上通报给中国使节黄镇，黄镇人就待在尼、勃会谈的洛杉矶以南的“西部白宫”。基辛格对他说：“这次谈话我们没有告诉我们政府里的任何一人，你得绝对保密。”
One ostensible purpose of Nixon's journey to Peking had been to lessen the danger of war with Russia. Thanks to Mao, this danger had if anything increased.
尼克松访华据说是为了减小同苏联打仗的危险。因为有了毛泽东，这个危险非但没有减小，反而增大了。
*The records of Kissinger's 1971 visits were held back until 2002. In his memoirs Kissinger claimed Taiwan was “mentioned only briefly.” When confronted with the record in 2002, he said: “The way I expressed it was very unfortunate and I regret it.”
*Mao made doubly sure of controlling the record by not allowing an American interpreter to be present. Nixon caved in to this diktat without demur.
*This was not because the stifling repression was not visible. The political commentator William Buckley noticed how people had been cleared away everywhere they went. “Where are the people?” he asked a Chinese official. “What people?” the official replied. To which Buckley retorted: “The People, as in the People's Republic of China!”
*In the published minutes in English, which had been supplied by the Chinese, there is no mention of “China,” but the word is in the Chinese record.
*Kissinger had made a sounding about how much the Chinese really wanted an alliance by suggesting “Chinese military help” against India during the Bangladesh crisis in December 1971.