55 THE BOSS DENIES CHOU CANCER TREATMENT
55 周恩来的下场
(1972–74 AGE 78–80)
1972～1974 年 78～80 岁
IN MID-MAY 1972, shortly after Nixon's visit, it was discovered that Chou En-lai had cancer of the bladder. Under Mao, even a life-threatening illness was not just a medical matter. Mao controlled when and how his Politburo members could receive treatment. The doctors had to report first to Mao. They requested immediate surgery for Chou, stressing that the cancer was at an early stage, and that prompt action could cure it.
尼克松访华后不久的一九七二年五月中旬，例行尿检发现周恩来得了膀胱癌。政治局委员什么时候可以治病、如何治病，得由毛来决定。医生们要求及早检查治疗，必要时动手术，强调说癌症尚在早期，周本人还没有任何症状，有百分之八、九十的治愈率。
On 31 May, Mao decreed: “First: keep it secret, and don't tell the premier or [his wife]. Second: no examination. Third: no surgery …”
五月三十一日，毛批示了：“第一，要保密，不要告诉总理和邓大姐；第二，不要检查；第三，不要开刀”。最后第四条不是治病，而是：“加强营养和护理”。
Mao's pretexts for vetoing treatment were that Chou was “old” (he was seventy-four), had “heart trouble,” and that surgery was “useless.” But Mao himself was seventy-eight, and had worse heart problems, yet surgeons and anesthetists were on stand-by for him.
不许给周治病，毛的藉口是周“年纪大了”，“心脏不好”，“开刀没用”。可是毛本人七十八岁了，比周大四岁，心脏病严重得多，他的医疗组里却有准备手术的外科医生和麻醉师。
One reason Mao did not want Chou to go to a hospital and be treated was in order for Chou to be available to work around the clock to deal with foreign statesmen, who were queuing at the gate after Nixon's visit. Ever since the early 1940s, Chou had been Mao's essential diplomat. During the war against Japan he was stationed for years in Chiang Kai-shek's capital Chongqing, and, with his combination of charm, skill and attention to detail, had won the Communists many sympathizers among foreigners. When civil war started after the Japanese surrender, he ran rings around President Truman's envoy George Marshall, whose decisions contributed significantly to Mao's conquest of China. After the founding of Red China, Chou was the executor of Mao's foreign policy, and his greatest diplomatic asset. After his first three days of talks in 1971, Kissinger gushed about Chou's “heroic stature” in his report to Nixon:
毛不让周治疗的原因之一是，他要周一天二十四小时地为他工作，接待尼克松访华后川流不息前来觐见的外国政要。从四十年代初，周就是毛离不开的外交总管。抗战中，他多年住在蒋介石的陪都重庆，以他特有的魅力、才干和事必躬亲，在西方人里为中共争取了不少同情者。日本投降国共内战初起时，他把杜鲁门总统的特使马歇尔迷惑得晕头转向，使马歇尔无意中为毛征服中国立下了汗马功劳。中共掌权后，外交政策都是毛制定，周执行。一九七一年，跟周见了三天面，基辛格就情不自禁地给尼克松呈上这么一首对周的赞美诗：
my extensive discussions with Chou in particular, had all the flavor, texture, variety and delicacy of a Chinese banquet. Prepared from the long sweep of tradition and culture, meticulously cooked by hands of experience, and served in splendidly simple surroundings, our feast consisted of many courses, some sweet and some sour [etc., etc.] … and one went away, as after all good Chinese meals, very satisfied but not at all satiated.
我跟周的广泛交谈好似一席丰盛的中国大宴，色香味一应俱全，花样繁多，余香满口。这是数千年文化传统的结晶，由经历丰富的老手烹饪，享用的环境又不事雕琢，恰到好处。这一席有许多道菜，有的甜，有的酸……[等等，等等]席终时，就像所有中国美餐完毕一样，心满意足，而又意犹未竟。
Yet, though a star, Chou deferred slavishly to Mao in front of foreigners. In Mao's presence, Kissinger commented, Chou “seemed a secondary figure.” Japan's premier Tanaka went even further. “Chou is a nobody before Mao,” he said on returning from China in September 1972, when diplomatic relations were established (and Mao grandly waived all claims to war compensation). Chou's motto in dealing with Mao was: “Always act as if treading on thin ice.”
周恩来这颗在西方人面前璀璨的明星，一到毛泽东身边便收敛光彩，低声下气。基辛格注意到他如何马上“矮了一截”。日本首相田中角荣访华归来后说：“在毛面前，周完全不起眼。”
But entertaining visiting statesmen was not the sole, or even the principal reason why Mao vetoed surgery for Chou. Mao wanted Chou around in the short term, but he did not want him cured, as he did not want Chou, four years his junior, to outlive him. This was miserable reward for decades of service, which had involved a care for his master's health that reached far beyond the call of any duty. Chou had even tested some of Mao's medicines on himself, and tried out Mao's eye-drops—“to see whether this stings,” as he put it.
几十年来，周为毛服务是如履薄冰，鞠躬尽瘁。毛生了病，他像孝子般的关心，甚至先尝给毛用的药，先试验毛的眼药水，说是“看对眼睛有没有刺激”。但如今，周得了癌症，毛却不准他治。毛要的不仅是周马不停蹄地为他服务，更重要的，他要比他小四岁的周死在他前面。
ALTHOUGH DOCTORS WERE under orders not to tell Chou that he had cancer, he sensed it from the frequent urine tests they asked him to take, and the evasive way they behaved. He resorted to reading medical books himself. Mao knew that Chou was extremely anxious to have treatment, and seized the chance to exercise a bit of blackmail. Ever since Lin Biao had fled to his death the previous September, Mao had been wary about the amount of power Chou held in his hands, as Chou was running everything—Party, government and army. Mao decided to exploit Chou's anxiety to get him to do something that would weaken him to the maximum. He demanded that Chou make a detailed self-denunciation about his past “errors” in front of 300 top officials.
医生们奉命不得透露实情，但周从频繁验尿和医生躲躲闪闪的表情中猜到了。他嘴上不说，心里着急，自己查阅尿细胞学一类的医书。毛选择这个时候，要周对三百多名高层干部详细检讨所谓过去犯的“路线错误”。林彪摔死后，周成了第二号人物，党、政、军都归他管。毛要削弱周的地位，损害他的形象。
In addition, Mao ordered Chou to circulate to these 300 officials a highly self-incriminating document. Back in 1932, just after Chou had superseded Mao as Party boss of the Red state, Ruijin, a “recantation notice” had mysteriously appeared in the Shanghai press, bearing Chou's then pseudonym, and averring that its author condemned the Communist Party and was renouncing it. Chou had taken fright at this smear, in particular fearing that it might have been planted by Mao, and had cozied up to Mao. From then on Mao knew that he had an effective blackmail weapon. When the Cultural Revolution started, more than three decades later, Mao dangled it over Chou's head. Now, Mao dragged it out again.
毛又把一九三二年伪造的周脱党的(伍豪启事)翻出来，向这些高级干部公布。周当年就因害怕这份启事而一再顺从毛的意志。文革中，毛曾把它抖出来，以吓唬周。现在毛更把这件本来只有极少数人听说的事，扩散到整个高层，还发给各省存档。
Chou spent many days and nights composing the humiliating speech, which was so long that it took him three evenings to deliver. He was so harsh on himself, and so pathetic, that some of his listeners cringed with pain and embarrassment. At the end, he announced: “I have always thought, and will always think that I cannot be at the helm, and can only be an assistant.” This was a desperate attempt to pledge that he had no ambition to supplant Mao, and was no threat.
为写自我检讨，周恩来度过了辛苦的日日夜夜，每天胡子也不刮，饭也吃得很少，最后写得脸都浮肿了，两腿肿到膝盖以上，连鞋也穿不下。一九七二年六月十到十二日，他一连讲了三个晚上，开口闭口“补过赎罪”，损自己损得如此可怜，听众心里都为他感到痛苦。周说：“你们了解我的历史上的错误后，就会破除迷信……你们有权利要求我改好，如果还改不好而错误犯的又大，你们有权要求中央讨论，轻则警告，重则撤职”。最后，他特别声明：“我一直而且永远自认为，不能掌舵，只能当助手。”这是他在向毛保证，他没有取代毛的野心，请求毛放心。
In this period, Chou lived an extraordinary double life, unique in the annals of modern politics. Hidden from outside eyes both in China and abroad, he was a blackmailed slave, living in dread of untreated cancer and of being purged; for the world at large, he was a virtuoso who dazzled visiting statesmen, many of whom regarded him as the most impressive political figure they had dealt with and the most attractive man they had ever met.
这时的周过着一种现代政治史上独一无二的双重生活。公开场合里，他是个使世界政要眼花缭乱的外交高手，被不少人认为是平生所见的最富吸引力的政治人物。视线之外，他却是个低三下四的畏缩之辈。
Yet even after Chou did what was required of him, Mao still refused him treatment. At the beginning of 1973, Chou's urine contained a lot of blood, a sign that the tumor had worsened critically. It was only now that he was officially informed he had cancer. But when doctors pleaded to be allowed to conduct a full examination and give him treatment, Mao told them off through his chamberlain on 7 February, using words to the effect that Chou was quite old enough to die; adding: “What the hell do you want an examination for?”
一九七三年初，周的膀胱癌严重恶化，尿里出现大量肉眼看得见的血。只是此时毛的大总管汪东兴等人才正式把实情告诉周。当医生们请求全面检查治疗时，毛于二月七日透过汪东兴喝斥他们：“七老八十，做什么检查！”
Then, a week later, Chou performed a sterling service for Mao, which put the boss in a good mood. When Kissinger was in Peking that February and Mao pretended he wanted an alliance, Chou did an excellent job of making Mao's pretense plausible. Mao finally agreed to let him have treatment, after Chou had humbly requested it. But Mao set conditions: he ordered it done “in two stages,” authorizing only an examination, and specifying that the surgeons must leave the removal of any tumor to a “second stage.” When it came to keeping Chou from being cured, Mao's ingenuity and resourcefulness were infinite.
到了二月中旬，基辛格来北京，周帮着毛唬弄他，毛对周的表演称心如意。三月二日，周乘势恳求毛让他治病。毛好歹点了头，又打了个主意拖延治疗，命令医生只检查，不治疗，检查治疗要分“两步走”。
The chief surgeon realized that “there won't be a second stage,” and decided to risk Mao's displeasure and remove the cancer during the examination, which took place on 10 March.
主治医生意识到：“所谓分“两步走”仅是一种说法，实际并没有第二步。”他决心冒着惹怒毛的风险，在做膀胱镜检查时把癌症病灶灼掉。
Just beforehand, Mrs. Chou reminded the surgeons: “You do know that you must do it in two stages, don't you?” The chief surgeon asked: “But if I see a little lump during the examination … should I leave it there …?” and she agreed he could remove it.
镜检前，周夫人邓颖超对医生说：“你们知道吗，要分两步走。”主治医生说：“我们按照中央的指示办，只是，大姐，如果我在检查的时候看见有一块小石头，如果顺便拿出来，就不用再走第二步了。是否还要留着，再用一次麻醉，留到第二步？”邓颖超同意“顺便拿出来”。
When Chou regained consciousness and learned that the tumor had been removed, he adroitly performed a bit of Maoist theater and berated the doctors: “Weren't you told to do it in two stages?” But he was visibly delighted, and invited the medical team to a Peking duck dinner.
三月十日，周恩来终于在癌症发现十个月后第一次做了膀胱镜检查，医生把“小石头”也叫“顺便”烧掉了。周醒来以后听说癌细胞“烧掉了”，还装出毫不客气的样子，对医生说：“不是让你们分两步走吗？但大家都看得出他心里其实很欣慰。周高兴地请医疗组成员吃了一顿北京烤鸭。
The doctors had been nervous about how Mao would react to what they had done, and were relieved to receive a telephone message saying: “It's good that the doctors combined two stages into one.” Though the praise was hypocritical, it signaled that Mao had accepted their fait accompli. But it was not a full-scale operation.
医生们惴惴不安，不知毛会不会怪罪他们。不久，毛处打来电话，说：“主席的原话，医生们两步并一步走做得好，感谢他们。”生米煮成熟饭，毛乐得做好人，医生们也安了心。但这不是彻底的手术。
MAO'S BENIGN MOOD did not last long. On 22 June 1973, Brezhnev and Nixon signed an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. When Mao read a Foreign Ministry analysis which concluded that this showed that “the world is more than ever dominated by the two powers, the US and the USSR,” he flew into a monumental rage. Nixon's visit to Peking had raised Mao's hopes that (in Kissinger's words) “The bipolarity of the postwar period was over.” But Mao saw that it was not, and that he had not tipped the scales of world power after all. And in the meantime his dalliance with America had cost him his international image. “My reputation has gone bad in the last couple of years,” Mao told acolytes. “The only Marx in the world, the only beacon, is now in Europe. Over there [he meant Albania, which had come down hard on him over Nixon's visit], even their farts are considered fragrant and are treated as imperial edicts … And I have come to be regarded as a right-wing opportunist.”
毛在对美关系上的好心情没有持续多久。六月二十二日，尼克松与勃列日涅夫签订了《苏美防止核战争协定》。当毛看到外交部的分析文章，说这表示“美苏主宰世界的气氛更浓”时，他焦躁不已。尼克松访华曾激起他的幻想，用基辛格的话说，“战后两极世界的日子一去不复返了”， 毛也成了一极。如今他发现，世界仍是两极，他费尽心力仍未能与美苏平坐平起。而代价是他的反美形象一落千丈。毛对身边的王洪文、张春桥生气地说：“我这几年名声不好，世界上唯一的马克思、一盏明灯是在欧洲。那个地方，放个屁也是香的，奉为圣旨。你奈何得了我吗？敝人就是右倾机会主义。”
Mao took it out on Chou. He had bottled up much resentment against Chou over the whole business with America. Though Mao had masterminded the US president's visit and the end to Peking's diplomatic isolation, it was mostly Chou who seemed to get the credit. (There are some parallels with Nixon's jealousy towards Kissinger.)
周恩来成了毛的出气筒。跟美国打交道，明明是毛在运筹帷幄，但世界舆论却把功劳算在周恩来身上(尼克松对基辛格也有类似的嫉妒)。
On 4 July, Mao sent word to the Politburo that Chou was a “revisionist,” and Chou was condemned to one more round of self-abasement.
毛七月四日对政治局发话说周“搞修正主义”，周又再次卑躬屈膝地做检讨。
Barely was this crisis over when another, far worse one came crashing down on Chou's head. Kissinger returned to China in November (now as secretary of state), bringing a terminal blow to Mao's ambitions. Nine months before, Kissinger had promised that Washington would move towards full diplomatic relations “after the 1974 [mid-term] elections.” Now he said that the US “domestic situation” precluded severing relations with Taiwan “immediately”—which Peking had insisted on as a prerequisite for diplomatic relations. Mao was never to rule in Taiwan, or to have diplomatic recognition from America.
十一月，新任国务卿的基辛格再度访华，带来了更坏的消息。九个月前，基辛格曾许诺说：一九七四年期中选举后，华盛顿将着手与北京建交，可现在他说美国的“国内局势”不允许美国马上同台湾断交。毛至死未能得到台湾，也未能看到美国承认他的政权。
Worse still for Mao, his dreams of enjoying military might by courtesy of the USA came to nothing. All Kissinger could offer was an “early warning” system to detect Soviet missile launches. “I will have to study it,” Chou replied, but Kissinger heard no more. The proposal held no interest for Mao, as he did not really believe in a Russian attack. The Chinese stopped talking about a military alliance with America.*
对毛更大的打击是，在军事技术方面，基辛格只提出给一个能预测苏联导弹進攻的“预警”系统，还由美国人控制。周恩来说：“我们得研究研究。”从此基辛格再也没听到结果。毛看出，美国的东西不是那么好拿的。中方从此停止谈论与美国的联盟。基辛格后来对苏联驻美大使承认，他“过去把苏联肯定会進攻中国当作考虑政策的基点，是错误的”。
Mao blamed these setbacks on the Watergate scandal, which was then threatening Nixon's presidency, and made it impossible for Nixon to take any big risks. Mao spent some time talking to Kissinger about Watergate, saying that he was “not happy about it,” and could not understand what all the “farting” was about. And he railed tirelessly against Watergate to other foreign statesmen. To France's president Pompidou he said he could not understand what all “the fuss” was about. “What's wrong with having a tape recorder?” he asked Thailand's prime minister. “Do rulers not have the right to rule?” he would demand. In May 1974, when Nixon was on the ropes, Mao asked former British prime minister Heath: “Can you lend him a hand to help him through?”
毛把挫折归咎于“水门事件”(Watergate)。这桩丑闻使尼克松位子不稳，不敢采取冒风险的政策。毛对基辛格说：“你们国家为什么老闹那个什么屁“水门事件”？总而言之，这个事我们不高兴。”在外国来访政要面前，他总是大骂水门，对法国总统蓬皮杜说他不懂为什么这么“小题大做”？对泰国总理克立(Kukrit Pramoj)他反问道：“一个录音机有什么关系？”“难道统治者就不应该有权统治吗？”一九七四年五月，尼克松摇摇欲坠时，毛请英国前首相希思“帮他一个忙，教他渡过水门难关”。
Because of Watergate, Nixon was forced to resign on 9 August 1974. Less known is that Watergate also helped finish off Mao's dreams of becoming a superpower.
八月九日，尼克松因水门案被迫辞职。“水门事件”不仅使美国总统丢了位子，也叫毛泽东死了心，他的军事大国梦只能是个梦了。毛整八十岁了，重病缠身，心有余而力不足，终于无奈地承认了现实。
By now, Mao's Superpower Program was in seriously bad shape, despite two decades spent consuming a huge proportion of the nation's investment. The entire higher-tech end of the arsenal was producing defective and unusable equipment, and it desperately needed foreign input. With Russia now a lost cause, Mao had hoped that America would bestow the kiss of life. But Kissinger's November 1973 trip, conducted under the shadow of Watergate, closed this door. Mao was unable to come up with any new strategy. Ace schemer though he was, even he had reached the bottom of the barrel.
MAO WAS NOW EIGHTY, and very ill. He finally resigned himself to the reality that he could not become a superpower in his lifetime. He could not dominate the world, or any part of it other than China.*
Mao's disenchantment immediately became apparent to the Americans. Meetings were canceled by the Chinese side, and cooperation sagged. Sino-US relations became “substantially frozen,” Kissinger noted, and his next trips to China “either were downright chilly or were holding actions.” He did not see Mao for two years, and, unbeknownst to Kissinger, Mao was constantly bad-mouthing him to his close circle, and even to ex-British prime minister Heath in 1974: “I think Henry Kissinger is just a funny little man. He is shuddering all over with nerves every time he comes to see me.” On 21 October 1975, when Kissinger saw Mao again, to negotiate a visit by Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, he offered American military assistance, clearly expecting that Mao was still interested. But Mao brushed the offer away: “As for military aspects, we should not discuss that now.” When Ford visited China later that year, Mao was amicable, but uninvolved.
毛的失意很快就冲着美国人表现出来。会谈取消，合作停滞。基辛格看出，中美关系“在很大程度上冻结起来了”。他随后几次来中国，中方“不是冷若冰霜，就是拖时间”。毛两年没见他，背后不断说他的坏话。英国前首相希思记载毛对他说：“基辛格不过是个滑稽的小人物，他每次来见我都怕得要死。”一九七五年十月二十五日，基辛格再见到毛，谈判尼克松的继任者福特(Gerald Ford)总统访华事宜时，他重新提起美国的军事援助，以为毛还会感兴趣。但是毛说：“军事方面的问题，现在不谈。” 那年年底，福特访华，毛礼貌地接待他，但没什么热情。
MAO'S FURY AND disappointment were mainly vented on Chou. During Kissinger's watershed visit, in November 1973, the secretary of state noticed that Chou “seemed uncharacteristically tentative”; “the old bite and sparkle were missing.” As soon as Kissinger left, Chou's subordinates in the Foreign Ministry, including close associates who had worked with him for decades, were forced to attack him to his face for weeks on end, for alleged failings in dealing with the Americans. Chou's cancer had just returned, and he was passing large quantities of blood in the midst of these sessions. Mao kept himself informed about Chou's miserable state through two young female upstarts in the Foreign Ministry who enjoyed an intimate relationship with him: one was his niece, the other his English-language interpreter, Nancy Tang.
毛的失望和怒气主要发泄在周恩来身上。基辛格在那个分水岭式的一九七三年十一月的访问中，注意到周“一反常态，似乎踌躇拘谨，往常的犀利和才智焕发不见了”。基辛格一走，政治局就批周，外交部跟周共事几十年的人，对他兴师问罪，说他在跟美国人打交道中“犯了右倾错误”。这时周癌症复发，尿里又出现大量鲜血，在批他的会上，他时时还得离席去排血。周的惨状每天由外交部里两位与毛关系亲密的年轻女士描绘给毛听，一个是毛的侄女王海容，一个是毛的英文翻译唐闻生。毛批周的指示也由她们向政治局传达。
Mao also unleashed his wife, who accused Chou of “capitulating” to the Americans. When Chou tried to defend himself, she interrupted him: “You really are a blatherer!”
毛自然也用上了他的夫人。江青骂周“丧权辱国”，“投降主义”，”迫不及待”地要取代毛。当周起而为自己辩解时，江青不耐烦地打断他：“你这个人就是罗嗦！要谈实质性问题！”周说：“我不知道什么实质性问题。”江要他交代：“基辛格来访时有没有犯过卖国主义的错误！”
During these weeks of torment, Chou kept working. On 9 December he was present when Mao met Nepal's king and queen. After the royal couple left, Mao said to Chou with a smirk: “Premier, haven't you been having a tough time being done in?” “The premier is really pitiful. Done in so sorrily by these few hussies.” When Chou left, the “hussies”—Mao's niece and Nancy Tang—berated Mao: “How can you possibly say this about us?” Mao acted coquettish: “But it's true, it's all your doing!” He was having fun tormenting Chou.
周一边挨整，一边照常工作。十二月九日，他陪同毛接见尼泊尔国王、王后。据目击者说，贵宾们走后，毛笑着对周说：“总理啊，你挨整啦，听说他们整得你不亦乐乎啊！”“总理可怜啊，被这几个娘们整得好苦。”周离开后，那两个“娘们”--王海容、唐闻生--抱怨毛把责任推到她们身上：“你怎么能这么说话？”毛仍旧嘻嘻笑着说：“就是嘛，就是你们整的嘛。”毛显然很开心。
An official photograph was published of the meeting with the Nepalese, which shows Chou sitting on a hard chair normally reserved for a junior interpreter, on the edge of an arc of armchairs for the distinguished. This was more than petty humiliation. In the Communist world, placement was the most potent signal of a top leader's rise or fall. People began to avoid Chou's staff.
从那次接见后发表的照片上可以看出，周没坐通常坐的沙发，而是坐在一张为随从安排的椅子上(见下图对比图)。这样的设计不光是公开羞辱周。在共产党世界里，位子的排法预示领导人的升降。中南海里的工作人员，见到周的随员时都躲着走了。
Eventually, Mao passed the word that Chou was not to be hounded further. Having played with Chou's dignity and energy, Mao still wanted to have his services on call. Chou's last major contribution to Mao's foreign policy was to supervise the seizure from South Vietnam in January 1974, of the strategic Paracel (aka Xisha) Islands in the South China Sea, before they fell into the hands of Peking's Vietnamese “comrades.”
毛还要用周，发话说不要再整了。一九七四年一月，在周的直接负责下，中国从南越当局手里夺取了西沙群岛，赶在越共“战友”攻占南越之前，把这一片具有战略价值的海岛抢到手上。
At this time, Chou was losing so much blood that he needed twice-weekly transfusions. The blood often clogged his urethra so that he could not pass urine, and his doctors saw him jumping up and down and rolling from side to side in agony, trying to loosen the coagulated blood. Even in this state, he was still pursued. During one transfusion, a message came summoning him to a Politburo meeting at once. His physician asked for twenty minutes' grace to finish the transfusion. Minutes later, another note appeared under the door, this time from Chou's wife, saying: Please tell the premier to go. Chou showed only a flicker of anger as he said: Pull the needle out! As the doctors learned later, there was nothing urgent.
周病情越来越重，出血速度快过排血速度，血块堵住尿道口，使每次小便都是一场痛苦的挣扎。周不得不又跳又蹦，又翻又滚，想把堵在尿道口的血块撞开。因为失血太多，周每星期要输两次血。有一次正输着血，周微微睡着了，房门下边塞進来一张纸条，要他去开政治局会议。医生请求给周二十分钟的时间，让他输完血。可几分钟以后，又一张纸条塞進来，这回是邓颖超写的，要医生“叫醒总理去参加会议”。周只略带不悦地说：“马上拔掉针头，我起床开会去！”后来医生们听说，那次政治局会议并没有什么要紧的事非得周立刻出席不可。
The doctors' entreaty to Mao for proper surgery met with a brutal reply on 9 May 1974: “Operations are ruled out for now. Absolutely no room for argument.” Mao intended to let the tumor eat Chou to death unimpeded. Chou himself then practically begged, via the four top leaders designated by Mao to supervise his medical “care.” At this point, Mao reluctantly gave his consent: “Let him see Tun Razak and then we'll talk about it.” Razak, the Malaysian prime minister, was due at the end of the month, and Chou went into the hospital on 1 June—after he had signed the communiqué establishing diplomatic relations with Malaysia. It was only now that he was allowed his first proper operation, two years after his cancer had been diagnosed. This delay made sure that he died nineteen months later, and before Mao.
医生们要求给周做手术。一九七四年五月九日，张春桥传达的圣旨是：“目前手术不能考虑，这一条给你们堵死。”无奈的周找负责他医疗事宜的四位中共领导人，通过他们恳求毛。毛模棱两可地说：“见完拉扎克(Tun Razak)再说。”拉扎克是马来西亚总理，预计在五月底访华。周恩来在五月三十一日同他签订了中马建交公报，第二天，六月一日，住進了医院。在癌症发现两年之后，他第一次做了手术。这一延误使周死在毛泽东之前。
Mao only finally granted Chou surgery because he was feeling highly vulnerable himself, as a result of a deterioration in his own physical condition. He was nearly blind, and, of more concern to him, was beginning to lose control over parts of his body. In this state, he did not want to drive Chou into a corner and make him feel he had nothing to lose and might as well take extreme measures.
毛终于准许周做手术，原因是他自己病得厉害，眼睛快瞎了，身子不听使唤，走路要人扶。毛不想把周逼急了。
Just over a month after his operation, Chou received a startling piece of news: Mao was suffering from a rare and incurable disease, and had only two years to live. Chou decided not to pass on the information to Mao.
周手术一个多月后，得到惊人消息：毛得了一种罕见的不治之症，只有两年可活。周决定不把这个消息报告毛。
This knowledge transformed the Chou–Mao relationship. Chou now became a much bolder man.
毛有了死期了。知道了这一点，周恩来变了，对毛，他不那么害怕了
*Kissinger later said (to the Russian ambassador in Washington) that he “had been wrong in basing his concepts on the inevitability of a Soviet attack against China.”
*Mao could see that the whole process of technology transfer from the West was far too slow for him. The Rolls-Royce engine deal encouraged by Kissinger was not signed for another two years, and the first engines were not produced in China until well after Mao's death. The first significant high-technology agreement with the US, for fast computers, was only signed in October 1976, after Mao was dead. Mao could not impose his own timetable on democratic countries, or on modern industry.