6 SUBJUGATING THE RED ARMY SUPREMO
6 制服朱德
(1928–30 AGE 34–36)
1928～1930 年 34～36 岁
MAO RECEIVED Shanghai’s endorsement as head of the Zhu–Mao Army in November 1928, and at once began planning to leave the outlaw land with the army, to take over new domains and new armed forces. He was also leaving because the region was about to be attacked. In June that year, Chiang Kai-shek had defeated the Peking government and brought much of China under his control, setting up his capital in Nanjing. Chiang’s troops were on their way to Mao’s territory. Mao set off on 14 January 1929. The bulk of the Zhu–Mao Army, now some 3,000 strong, left with him, as did Zhu De, whom Shanghai had appointed military supremo of the army.
毛泽东一接到中央任命，就准备扩大地盘。国民党军队也要打来了。一九二八年六月，蒋介石打败了北京政府，统一了中国大部，建都南京，着手恢复秩序。一九二九年一月十四日，毛率领朱毛红军离开井冈山。朱毛红军经过一些变故，眼下有人马三千。
Fifteen months after his arrival, Mao left behind a depleted land. In his first experience of running a base he had shown that he had no economic strategy but looting, tantamount to “slash and burn.” A Party inspector wrote to Shanghai:
毛在井冈山住了十五个月，留下了一块千疮百孔的土地。中央巡视员杨开明向上海报告说，红军到来前，井冈山的农民“颇觉安居乐业，有天下太平的气象。有日出而作，日落而息，老死不相往来的神气”。
Before the Red Army came … there was quite an atmosphere of peaceful and happy existence … the peasants … had quite enough to live on … Since the Red Army came, things were totally changed. Because the Red Army’s sole income was robbing the rich … because even petty bourgeois, rich peasants and small pedlars were all treated as enemies, and because after great destruction, no attention was paid to construction or to the economic crisis, the countryside is totally bankrupt, and is collapsing by the day.
自从红军到达井冈山以后，情形就大大改变了。因为红军经济唯一的来源，全靠打土豪。又因对土地革命政策的错误，连小资产阶级富农小商也在被打倒之列。又以大破坏之后，没有注意到建设问题，没有注意到经济恐慌的危机，以致造成乡村全部的破产，日益激烈的崩溃。
Mao’s men had bled the place dry, and the locals loathed them. When he departed, he left behind his wounded and the civilian Communists. Those captured by the regular government army were lucky—they were merely machine-gunned to death. Those who fell into the hands of local forces were disemboweled, burned alive, or slashed slowly to death. Many hundreds were killed.
毛走后，国民党军队攻下了井冈山。朱毛红军走时留下的伤兵病员和地方干部，落在他们手里的被机关枪扫死。被反共复仇的民团捉住的，不是剖腹、烧死，就是活活割死。即使这样的残酷，据当时对中央的报告：“房子烧了，群众首领杀了。但是一般群众并不十分增加对反动派的仇恨。”
A report to Shanghai by the stay-behind Party committee revealed that the bitterness bequeathed by Mao’s regime was so intense that even the Nationalists “burning houses and killing ring-leaders did not generate hatred from the average masses for the reactionaries.” People were defecting when they could: those “under our Red power naturally do not dare to act reactionary,” the report stated. “But the masses outside [our control] are crossing over to the Nationalists en masse.” The report blamed the locals, saying that they “have always been no good.”
井冈山原来的山大王多是本地人，毛走时他们留下，大部分都活下来了。一九三0年三月，袁文才、王佐死在共产党手里。莫斯科秘密命令中共这样对付这些人：“与土匪或类似的团体结盟，仅在暴动前可以适用。暴动之后宜解除其武装并严厉的镇压他们……他们的首领应当作反革命的首领看待，即令他们帮助暴动亦应如此。这类首领均应完全歼除。”
The original outlaws, who were mostly locals and stayed behind, fared much better. Most of them survived—including the two chiefs, Yuan and Zuo. However, these two met their deaths a year later, in March 1930—at the hands of Communists who returned to the area. Moscow had ordered the CCP to double-cross those it termed “bandits”—in effect, to use them and then kill them. “Alliance with bandits and other similar groups is only applicable before an uprising,” stated one resolution. “Afterwards you must disarm them and severely suppress them … Their leaders must be regarded as leaders of counter-revolutionaries, even if they helped uprisings. And these leaders must all be completely eliminated.”
袁、王死后，余部逃進山里。奉命搜捕他们的红军李聚奎回忆说，他“亲眼看见当地群众对我们的行动很反感，而对王、袁的部队，则倍加爱护。”既在土匪又在共产党统治下生活过的井冈山人，显然更喜欢土匪。土匪带来的灾难跟共产党比是小巫见大巫。
Yuan and Zuo’s followers fled back into the depths of the mountains and became fiercely anti-Communist. A Red search unit reported that “the local population resented us, and did everything to protect the [outlaws].” Having lived under both the bandits and the Communists, the locals knew which they preferred.
THE JOURNEY out of the outlaw land, Mao loped along, cracking jokes to his entourage. He had cause to be cheerful. Shanghai and Moscow’s acceptance of his demands showed that he could get his way. Indeed, at that very moment, January 1929, in Moscow, GRU chief Jan Berzin and Stalin’s China apparatchik, Pavel Mif, were meeting to discuss how the Soviet army could give “practical help to Zhu–Mao,” whom Moscow was tracking closely. This is the first known occasion when Moscow was arranging military aid specifically for the Mao–Zhu force, now publicly described as “the most formidable among the Communists.”
毛泽东离开井冈山时，未曾有一眼回顾，一丝惆怅。他兴致勃勃，跨着大步，跟随从们开着玩笑。他有理由轻快，莫斯科已全盘接受了他的要求。他一离开井冈山，苏军情报局长伯金就跟中国事务负责人米夫(PavelMif)开会，讨论苏联怎样“给朱毛具体援助”。这是第一次有记载的莫斯科专门讨论给毛军援。毛已名声显赫，报上都说他是“共党中最巨者”。
Government forces were in hot pursuit, and Mao’s army had to fight pitched battles, in one of which Zhu De’s wife was captured. Later she was executed and her head stuck on a pole in Changsha. It was during this low point in Zhu’s fortunes that Mao mounted a power grab against him. Within two weeks of leaving the outlaw land, Mao had abolished Zhu De’s post as military supremo, awarded by Shanghai, and concentrated all power in his own hands. As the Red force was being attacked by the Nationalists, Zhu did not retaliate. He was no match for Mao in exploiting a crisis.
政府军在毛身后紧追不舍，一场鏖战中朱德的妻子被捕。她后来被杀，头由一根竹竿挑起，悬挂在长沙城上。在这样的险境中，毛却发动了针对朱德的权力斗争：离开井冈山不到两个星期，他取消了中央特别成立的以朱德为书记的军委，剥夺了朱德的军事指挥权，把一切权力都集中在自己手里。
Mao did not inform Shanghai about his seizure of power. Instead he wrote to tell Shanghai how glad he was to submit to Party orders. “How should the Red Army proceed?” he wrote. “We particularly thirst for instructions. Please could you send them winging my way?” “The resolutions of the 6th Congress are extremely correct. We accept them jumping for joy.” “In the future, we hope the Centre gives us a letter every month.” Mao was currying favor with Shanghai hoping that when they got wind of his coup against Zhu De, they would be better disposed towards him.
对中央，毛只字不提他夺了朱德的权。他写了一份又一份报告，字里行间透着自己如何像久旱盼甘霖一样渴望中央指示。三月二十日，他写道：“望中央将一般计划指示我们。红军应该怎样行动，尤盼飞速指示！”“六次大会的决议案非常正确，我们欢跃的接受。”四月五日，他又写道：“以后望中央每月有一信给我们，我们亦至少每月给中央一信报告。”毛是在讨好中央，希望他夺朱德权一事一旦被上海知道，会得到认可。
Still, Zhu De refrained from exposing Mao. Zhu had no craving for power, nor any gift for intrigue. And since reporting to Shanghai was the job of the chief, to write himself would amount to declaring war on Mao.
朱德没有反抗毛，也没有向中央告毛的状。他没有那么强的权力欲，也不擅长搞阴谋。朱德一时忍了下来。
In March, Mao had another lucky break, this time involving the Nationalists. Although a central government had been in place for nearly a year, Chiang Kai-shek faced powerful opponents, some of whom now started a war against him. Troops who were hot on Mao’s trail were pulled back to deal with the rebels. A delighted Mao informed Shanghai that the enemy, who had come within half a kilometer of his rearguard, had “suddenly turned back” and let him go.
三月，在对付国民党军队方面，毛的运气来了。尽管南京政府建立已近一年，但国民党内讧不断，有的政敌对蒋介石政府开战，追击毛的队伍被调去打政敌，放过了毛。毛兴奋地告诉上海说：“后卫距敌才一里……[敌]张旅忽然折回，盖湖南战事爆发”。
By this time Mao had entered the southeast coastal province of Fujian, where he managed to capture Tingzhou—a sizable city, but weakly defended. Located on a navigable river teeming with cargo boats, it was a wealthy place, with strong overseas links. Grand European buildings stood next door to ornate bazaars selling wares from all over Southeast Asia. Mao filled his coffers by robbing the rich. “Our supply is no problem,” he told Shanghai, “and morale is extremely high.”
毛得以轻松地拿下了闽西，包括首府汀州。这里的汀江航运繁忙，明清已出现了“上八百，下三千”的景象。四海商贾云集，欧洲大厦跟南洋小摊相映成趣。毛大打了一番“土豪”， 丰富了库藏。他告诉上海：“给养已不成问题，士气非常振发。”
The army acquired a uniform for the first time, from a factory that had been making them for the Nationalists. Up till then Red soldiers had been wearing clothes of all kinds and colors, sometimes even women’s dresses and Catholic priests’ vestments. (One Italian priest was particularly worried about the Reds taking his fascist shirt.) The Communists’ new uniform, gray, was like the Nationalist one, but had a red star on the cap, and red insignia.
红军没收了一个给国民党军队做军服的工厂，第一次穿上了整齐的军装。迄今为止，士兵们穿什么的都有，甚至有女人的裙装和天主教教士的神袍。新军装是灰色的，跟国民党一样，只是多了红帽徽、红领章。
The city’s defender, Brigadier Kuo, had been captured alive on Mao’s specific orders, and then killed. A rally was held at which his corpse was hung upside down from a chestnut tree by the dais where Mao made a speech, and the corpse was then paraded through the streets. To show that the old order had been supplanted, Mao also had the city hall razed to the ground.
守城的郭凤鸣旅长按毛的指示先被活捉，然后杀掉。尸体倒挂在一棵板栗树上，旁边站着毛，手指着尸体在万人大会上讲话。会后郭的尸体被抬着游街示众。作为与旧制度决裂的象征，市政府被一把火夷为平地。
He set up headquarters in a magnificent old-style villa overlooking the river. But in May his new haven was disturbed when a man called Liu An-gong arrived, sent by Shanghai to take up the No. 3 position in the Zhu–Mao Army. An-gong was fresh from Russia, where he had received military training. He was appalled by what Mao had done to Zhu De, and the way he was running the army. Mao, he charged, was “power-grabbing,” “dictatorial”—and was “forming his own system and disobeying the leadership.”
毛把指挥部设在一座俯瞰汀江的雕梁画栋的楼房里，日子过得十分惬意。不久，好日子被一名不速之客给搅乱了。来者叫刘安恭，刚从苏联受军训归国，上海派他来当朱毛红军的第三把手。刘安恭发现毛挤掉了朱德，非常愤慨，说毛“抓权”，“书记专政”，“家长制”，“自成体系”， “不服从中央”， 说朱德是“拥护中央派”， 而毛泽东是“反对中央派”。
Mao could no longer conceal his coup. On 1 June 1929, nearly four months after he had pushed Zhu De out, Mao wrote to Shanghai saying that “the Army” had “decided temporarily to suspend” Zhu’s post because “it found itself in a special situation.” He did his best to minimize the impact by tucking the information away as item 10 in his long 14-item report. The rest of the report was couched in a very obedient, even ingratiating tone, larded with professions of eagerness to receive Party instructions: “please … set up a special communications office,” he wrote, to make it possible to communicate directly with Shanghai, adding: “Here is opium worth 10,000 yuan as start-up funds for the office.” Mao was trying everything, even drug money, to coax Shanghai to endorse his seizure of power.
毛再也没办法对上海封锁消息了。六月一日，他第一次向中央报告，找藉口说：他离开井冈山后，“每日行军或作战，在一种特殊环境之下，应付这种环境感觉军委之重叠，遂决议军委暂时停止办公，把权力集中到前委”。但是，既然有理由，为什么在这之前他写的信中不向中央报告呢？毛自知理亏，想把这事遮掩过去，把这段话埋在有十四条小标题的洋洋长文的第十条中间，算是报告了，希望不引起上海的警觉。报告其他部分充满甜言蜜语：“最近得到中央及福建省委各种指示，真是意外的欣喜，惟江西省委三年来不曾有一个字给我们……这种情形太不好了，请中央确知江西省委千万改正这种状态。”“请福建省委负责在厦门设交通机关，专任前委与中央的传达，设立机关经费，付上价值一万元的烟土”。
With An-gong on his side—and the Red Army no longer being pursued by the Nationalists—Zhu De now stood up to Mao. And he had most of the troops behind him. Mao was extremely unpopular, as an official report later told Shanghai: “the mass as a whole was discontented with Mao.” “Many comrades felt really bitter about him” and “regarded him as dictatorial.” “He has a foul temper and likes to abuse people.” For the sake of balance, Zhu was also criticized, but for trivial things like “bragging,” and lacking decorum—“when he was in full flow, he would unconsciously roll his trousers up to his thighs, looking like a hooligan, with no dignity.”
但朱德起来反抗毛了。他有了刘安恭这个同盟，再加上部队大多数人也站在他这一边。毛不得人心。他后来自己多次说：“我很孤立，只有二十八团的林彪支持我。” 据陈毅给上海的报告，很多人说毛“太独裁，不民主，对党实行家长制，爱发脾气，会骂人”。对朱德也有些批评，但只是这样一些问题：“对士兵讲话时，动不动就说我们要扩大武装，可以打到南京去住洋房。讲到高兴时不自觉地把裤子拉到大腿上，有流氓习气，太不尊严。”
There was still a degree of democratic procedure among the Communists, and issues were frequently debated and voted on. Party representatives in the army met on 22 June and voted to dismiss Mao as Party boss of the army and reinstate Zhu as military supremo. Mao later described himself as having been “very isolated.” Before the vote he had threatened: “I have a squad, and I will fight!” But there was nothing he could do, as his followers were disarmed before the meeting.
六月二十二日，朱毛红军的党代表们在福建龙岩举行大会，辩论朱毛问题，并投票选举。会上毛泽东被选掉前委书记，由陈毅接任，朱德重获军事指挥权。毛曾威胁说：“若你们来武装解散前委，我有一个班的兵力，还可以抵挡。”他的对手也早有准备：他们在会前把毛所有的跟班缴了械。
Having lost control of his own force, Mao started jockeying to recover power. His plan was to take control of the region where he was, a newly occupied territory in Fujian near the southeast coast, complete with its own Red force. It was also the richest area the Communists had ever held, with a population of some 1.25 million. Mao told the new leadership of the army that now that he had been voted out, he wanted to go and “do some work with local civilians.” Nobody seems to have realized that this request was a cover to enable Mao to gatecrash on the local Reds and commandeer their Party organization.
毛马上开始打迂回战，要把失去的权力夺回来他计划先夺取闽西红色根据地地方政府“特委”的领导权。这块新开辟的根据地，是共产党所占土地中最富饶的，有一百二十五万人口和一支地方部队。毛对朱毛红军新领导说：既然被选掉，他不能留在红军里了，希望“到地方做些事”。没人意识到毛的动机。
Mao left HQ on a litter, with his wife and a few faithful followers. One of them remembered: “When we left … our horses were confiscated from us, so our entourage really looked rather crestfallen.” This bedraggled group headed for Jiaoyang, where Mao had got a local crony to call a congress. The Zhu–Mao Army had helped create the base, so Mao had clout, even though Shanghai had not assigned it to Mao, but to the Fujian Committee. Mao’s plan was to manipulate the congress and insert the followers who had left the army with him into the leading posts.
毛躺在担架上离开了红军总部，跟着他的有妻子贺子珍和几名亲信。其中一个后来回忆说：“我们离开部队由龙岩出发时，把我们的马也扣留了，那时我们一行人真有些灰溜溜的样子。”这一小队人直奔闽西特委所在地蛟洋。闽西根据地是朱毛红军打下来的，特委书记邓子恢是个听毛话的人，毛去之前就叫他准备召开闽西第一次党代表大会。毛的打算是利用这次大会建立新特委，用计谋把跟他前来的亲信安插到关键职位上。
毛没有任命权，闽西特委归福建省委领导。
By 10 July some fifty local delegates had gathered in Jiaoyang, having been notified that the congress was to open next day. Instead, Mao sent them away for a whole week to conduct “all sorts of investigations,”in the words of a report written immediately afterwards. When the conclave finally opened, Mao feigned illness, and further delayed the meeting. In fact he was not ill, his secretary later disclosed. The report complained that the congress “lasted too long” and operated in a “slack” style, being strung out for “as long as twenty days”—by which time government forces were closing in. At this point, the report continued, “news came that [Nationalist] troops were coming … so the Front Committee … changed the plan … and the congress … was closed …”
到七月十日，五十多名闽西代表聚集蛟洋，会议按通知第二天开幕。但第二天没有开幕。据会后闽西共产党人向中央的报告：毛叫他们去“从事各项调查”，“费去一礼拜之久”。终于开幕了，毛又用这个那个理由，使“会场上耗费时间太多”，“自十日起至二十九日止，延长二十天之久”。毛在拖时间，以使代表们在“选举新特委” 这项议程前不得不离开。果然，会还在不痛不痒地开着，国民党打来了，“大会不能继续下去，遂在二十九日以前闭幕了”，“会无结果而闭会”。
The delegates left without voting for the key posts. As soon as their backs were turned, Mao assigned these posts to his cronies, passing off his action as the decision of the congress. One of his men was made de facto head of the regional Red Army force. Mao’s followers were all from Hunan, and could not even speak the local dialect.
代表们前脚刚走，毛马上就指定了新特委，算成是代表大会“选举”产生。听话的邓子恢仍然居首，毛带来的人，一个当特委秘书长，一个当组织科长负责干部，一个控制地方部队。这几个人像毛一样是湖南人，都不会说当地话。
When the local Reds discovered that Mao had deprived them of control of their own region, they were outraged. In the following year they were to rebel against Mao, which led him to unleash a bloody purge.
当闽西共产党人发现毛把他的人强加在他们头上时，非常愤怒，当时就对中央说大会是“极大失败”，第二年一有机会时又起来反抗，引起了毛泽东在闽西的一场血腥清洗。
While the congress was still going on, the delegates had already shown that they feared and disliked Mao. The report said that when he was present “the delegates rarely spoke,” whereas in his absence “they began to debate passionately, and things improved tremendously.” Mao had no mandate over this civilian Party branch. That authority belonged to the Fujian Provincial Committee. The delegates had wanted this body to be represented at the congress, to protect them from Mao. However, the post-mortem noted, “our messenger was arrested, and our report was lost, so there was no one from the Provincial Committee to … guide the congress.” The post-mortem did not say whether anyone suspected foul play, but there was already a pattern of communications being suddenly broken at critical junctures for Mao.
还在开代表大会时，代表们已经表现出对毛的恐惧。给中央的报告说，会上“代表少发言。后来毛同志病了，大家争论极烈，得了很大進步”。代表们想要他们的上级福建省委派人来给他们做主，可是，蹊跷的是：“交通被捕，报告失落，致省委无人前来指导”。这种怪事已经不止一次发生，未来也将反覆出现：关键时刻，联络会按毛的需要莫名其妙地断掉。
Once he had seized control of this new territory, Mao set out to undermine Zhu De. An ally in this scheme was a man from Zhu’s staff called Lin Biao, a loner and a maverick in his early twenties, whom Mao had been cultivating ever since Lin had come to the outlaw land the year before.
一旦抓住闽西根据地，毛便着手跟朱德捣乱。他在朱德的队伍里有个同谋：林彪。林彪那时二十出头，是个孤傲不羁的人。
Lin Biao had three qualities that caught Mao’s eye. One was military talent. Lin had wanted to be an army man ever since childhood, and had relished life at the Nationalists’ Military Academy at Whampoa. He was well versed in military strategy, and had proved his flair in battle. His second quality was that he was unconventional. Unlike many other senior military men in the CCP, he had not been trained in the Soviet Union and was not steeped in Communist discipline. It was widely known in Zhu De’s ranks that Lin had kept loot, including gold rings, for himself, and had contracted gonorrhea. The third quality, and the one most welcome to Mao, was that Lin bore a grudge against Zhu, his superior, for having reprimanded him; this was something that Lin’s extreme sense of pride could not take.
他有三个特点吸引了毛。一是军事才能。林彪从小喜欢军事，后来上黄埔军校，在军旅生活中如鱼得水。他喜欢研究军事战略，在战场上屡显锋芒。二是他不守纪律。跟许多中共高层军事人员不同，他没在苏联受过训，没在严格的共产党纪律里熏陶过。部队里的人都知道，林手脚不干净，常私自留下缴获品，像金戒指等，还染过淋病。林的第三个特点是他的自尊心极强，绝对不能忍受批评。朱德作为上级批评过他，他对朱德怀恨在心。
As soon as Lin appeared, Mao sought him out and befriended him, winning his favor by inviting him to lecture to his own (Mao’s) troops, an honor he accorded no one else. From here on, Mao built a special relationship with Lin. Decades later he was to make him his defense minister and second in command. In this long-lasting crony relationship, Mao took great care to massage Lin’s vanity and to let him act above the rules, in return for which Mao was able to call repeatedly on Lin’s complicity.
林上井冈山后不久，毛就开始拉拢他，说的话都是顺耳舒服的，还单请林去演讲。毛、林从此建立了特殊关系。几十年中，毛小心注意不使林的自尊心受伤，让林凌驾于纪律之上。作为交换，在毛需要时，林总是十分配合。
Their first collaboration occurred at the end of July 1929, when the Nationalists attacked. As the military supremo, Zhu drew up the battle plan, which called for all units to rendezvous on 2 August. But come the day, the unit Lin commanded was nowhere to be seen. He had stayed behind, together with Mao and the Fujian unit that Mao had just collected. Together, the two of them had control over about half of the Red forces, then totalling upwards of 6,000, and Zhu had to fight with only half the men he expected. Nonetheless, his under-strength force acquitted itself well.
第一次搭档是对付朱德。一九二九年七月底，国民党军队進攻。作为军事指挥官，朱德制定了作战计划，令所有部队在八月二日集结。但时间到了，林彪却不见踪影，他跟毛和毛控制的闽西红军待在另外的地方。这两支部队合起来差不多占红军(当时有六千多人)的半数。
But if half the army refused to obey his orders, Zhu could not command it effectively. With the army gridlocked, loyal Party members and Red Army men looked to Shanghai to sort the problem out.
朱德只得率领一半的兵力反击国民党军。虽然朱德没受到太大损失，但半数红军不听命令，总不是个办法。在这种分裂的状况下，朱德指望中央给他拿主意。
AT THIS TIME, the mainstay of the Party leadership in Shanghai was Chou En-lai. The man who held the formal top post as general secretary, Hsiang Chung-fa, a sailor-dockworker, was a figurehead, appointed solely because of his proletarian background. But the real decision-makers were operatives sent by Moscow, who in those days were mainly non-Russians, mostly European Communists. The immediate bosses were a German called Gerhart Eisler (later Moscow’s intelligence chief in the US) and a Pole known as Rylsky. These agents controlled the Party budget, down to the slightest detail, as well as communications with Moscow. They made all policy decisions, and monitored their outcome. Moscow’s advisers supervised military activities. Their Chinese colleagues referred to them as mao-zi, “Hairy Ones,” as they had more body hair than the Chinese. “German Hairy,” “Polish Hairy,” “American Hairy,” etc., frequently cropped up in conversations among the Chinese. One probably stooped agent was known as “Hunchback Hairy.”
这时党的总书记是没什么能力的向忠发，莫斯科任命他纯粹是基于他出身“无产阶级”， 当过水手、码头工人。中共负实际责任的是周恩来，做决策的是莫斯科在上海的代表。这段时期代表们大都是欧洲和美国的共产党人。直接管事的，一个是德国人叫爱斯拉(Gerhan Eisler)， 以后做过驻美国的情报长官。另一个是波兰人，化名瑞尔斯基(Rylsky)。这些外国人执掌着中共的财政大权，一分一毫都由他们说了算。他们的中国同事管他们叫“毛子”， 因为他们身上的毛比中国人多。于是就有‘德国毛子”、“波兰毛子”、“美国毛子”等。有个背有点儿驼的人叫“驼背毛子”。
The “Hairies” gave orders through Chou En-lai, who later won international fame as prime minister for a quarter of a century under Mao. But the real Chou was not the suave diplomat foreigners saw, but a ruthless apparatchik, in thrall to his Communist faith. Throughout his life he served his Party with a dauntless lack of personal integrity.
这些“毛子”们透过周恩来发号施令。周后来以在外交舞台上风度翩翩而举世闻名，但真正的周是个强韧决绝、无情无义的执行者。他忠实地信仰共产主义，不惜扭曲个人人格。
Chou first encountered communism in Japan, where he arrived in 1917 as a nineteen-year-old student just as the Bolshevik Revolution broke out. He made his choice while studying in Western Europe, joining the Chinese Communist Party branch in France in 1921. There he became a fervent believer, and his dedication was reflected in his asceticism. Good-looking and attractive to women, he was far from indifferent to beauty himself. When he first arrived in France, he was constantly heard admiring its women. “What beautiful girls!… The women here [in Paris] are so attractive,” he wrote to a friend back home. Soon he acquired a sexy girlfriend, with whom he was very much in love, but once he converted to the Red faith he did what many missionaries had done: he chose a wife not based on love but on whether she could be a partner in the mission.
周最早接触共产主义是在日本，那是一九一七年“十月革命”后不久，十九岁的他在日本留学。二十三岁时他在法国入了党，成为狂热的信徒，表现之一就是奉行禁欲主义。他是个美男子，女人们为他倾倒，他本人对美女也远不是无动于衷。刚到法国时，他常常发出这样的赞叹：“多么漂亮的姑娘！”他给国内的朋友写信说：“巴黎是美丽的……妇女也是动人的……”很快他有了个美貌的女朋友，他非常爱她。
Many years later, in a rare moment of candor, Chou revealed to a niece how he had picked his wife. He mentioned the woman with whom he had been in love, and said: “When I decided to give my whole life to the revolution, I felt that she was not suited to be a lifelong partner.” He needed a spouse who would be as devoted as he was. “And so I chose your aunt,” he said, “and started writing to her. We established our relationship through correspondence.” He entered a loveless marriage at the age of twenty-seven, with a 21-year-old zealot called Deng Ying-chao, who was noticeably plain and ungainly.
许多年后，在一次少见的坦率谈话中，他告诉侄女：“当我决定献身革命时，我就觉得，作为革命的终身伴侣，她不合适。”周需要“能一辈子从事革命的人。”我就选择了你们的七妈，接着和她通起信来。我们是在通信中确定关系的。”就这样，二十七岁的周恩来与同样狂热而相貌平常的邓颖超定下了缺乏爱情的终身。
Tenacious and indefatigable, even impervious to cold, Chou was a good administrator and a brilliant organizer. Moscow spotted him, and gave him the crucial task of creating the Chinese Communist army. In 1924 he was sent back to China, where he soon became director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, the Nationalists’ officer-training base founded by the Russians. Chou’s secret responsibility was to plant Communist agents among the higher ranks, with a view to taking over part of the Nationalist army when the time came—which he did in the form of organizing the Nanchang Mutiny in August 1927, after Chiang broke with the CCP. By the time the mutineers were defeated on the south coast, Chou was delirious with malaria and kept yelling “Charge! Charge!” He was carried onto a small boat by colleagues, and escaped to Hong Kong through seas so violent they had to tie themselves to the mast to keep from being swept overboard.
莫斯科看中了周，给他极其重要的任务：负责创建中共军队。一九二四年他被派回国，在国民党的黄埔军校做政治部主任，秘密使命是在国民党军官里埋下红色代理人。一九二七年蒋介石清共后，周恩来组织了南昌起义。南昌起义的队伍在南海岸被打散时，周正害疟疾发高烧，不时处于昏迷状态，嘴里还在喊“冲啊！冲啊！” 几个同事把他抬上一叶扁舟，划往香港。风浪大，小船颠簸得厉害，他们用绳子把自己绑在桅杆上，两天一夜才靠了岸。
After that, he proceeded to Shanghai, where he ran the Party’s daily business from the beginning of 1928. He proved to be a genius at operating in clandestine conditions, as people who worked with him testify. That summer he went to Russia, where he met Stalin before the 6th CCP Congress convened there. He was the dominant figure at the congress, delivering no fewer than three key reports, as well as serving as the congress secretary. His domain was vast: he set up the Chinese KGB,* under Moscow’s guidance, and ran its assassination squad. But organizing the Chinese Red Army was his main job.
周从香港去了上海，负责中共的日常工作。搞地下工作，他如鱼得水，跟他工作过的人称他为“天才”， 说他脑袋后边都长着眼睛。一九二八年在莫斯科开中共“六大”时，他受到斯大林接见，在会上唱主角，一个人做了三个主要报告。中共的克格勃就是他在莫斯科指导下组建的，他本人亲自指挥暗杀队。
Among the qualities that made Chou an ideal apparatchik were discipline and unswerving obedience to Moscow’s line, as well as slavishness. He could absorb any amount of caning from his masters. In future years, as prime minister under Mao, he was willing to abase himself repeatedly, using such toe-curling language that his audiences would cringe with embarrassment.
莫斯科很有眼力。周恩来是一个难得的行政管理家、杰出的组织者，具有一丝不苟的严格纪律性，对莫斯科的指示奉若神明。奇怪的是，像他这么一个能干的人，天性里却似乎又有奴性，无论主子怎么鞭笞他，他都甘心领受。在未来的岁月里，遵毛之命，他不断对自己口诛笔伐，无限上纲，用词之严峻，使听众都为他难过。
He had already begun producing humiliating self-criticisms decades earlier. “I … would like the whole Party to see and condemn my errors,” he said in 1930, and pledged to criticize his “serious systematic errors” himself in the Party press. Once, at a meeting he attended, one of Moscow’s German envoys, perhaps spotting a streak of masochism in Chou, said: “As for Comrade En-lai, we of course should smack him on the bottom. But we don’t want to kick him out. We must reform him … and see if he corrects his mistakes.” Chou just sat there and took it.
其实在毛之前，周已经表现出这种性格。一九三0年他遵命做过一次详细的自我批判，“要全党来认识与指斥我的错误，我自己亦将在党报上批评我这一有系统的严重错误。”次年，在党的中央全会上，一个显然看出周性格中有受虐倾向的“毛子” 这样说周：“恩来同志自然应该打他的屁股，但也不是要他滚蛋，而是在工作中纠正他，看他是否在工作中改正他的错误。”周坐在一旁心甘情愿地听着。
Chou does not seem to have aspired to be No. 1; he was not a program-setter, and seems to have needed orders from above. He could also be long-winded. One of his subordinates in the 1920s remembered: “Once he started talking, he could not stop. What he said was clear, but not punchy … he would talk as if teaching elementary school children.” He could talk for seven or eight hours non-stop, boring his listeners so thoroughly that they would doze off.
无怪乎周没有做头号人物的野心。他自知没有制定纲领的才能，似乎需要有人给他发命令。这段时期曾在他手下工作的王凡西回忆周的弱点说：“在组织部的会议上，恩来的发言永远要占去全部时间的十分之九。周恩来是一个非常杰出的行政家，事务处理上简直有天才，说话的才能也显然属于第一流的；但和他共事一长久，有一点使我很奇怪，就是他一开口却不能自休。话说得有条理，却不能集中要点；有层次，却诸多反覆。一些原极浅近的事理，同时听话的对象又只限于部里的五个干部(有时再加上他的太太邓颖超)，他却会像对小学生教书似的，分析了又分析，解释了再解释，把一个报告往往拖长到七八个钟头，使听者倦极欲睡。”
Chou’s loyalty, combined with undoubted ability, was the main reason Moscow picked him to be chief Party leader from 1928, so it fell to him to deal with the dispute in the Zhu–Mao Army. On Moscow’s instructions, he wrote to the army on 21 August 1929, giving Mao full backing and rejecting all the criticisms. Mao, he insisted, was “absolutely not patriarchal.” Mao’s abolition of Zhu De’s post was judged correct. An-gong, the Party envoy who had spoken up against Mao, was recalled. He was soon killed in battle.
周恩来直接处理朱毛问题。根据莫斯科驻华代表的指示，他一九二九年八月二十一日给朱毛红军发命令全力支持毛泽东，说毛“绝对不是家长制”，擅自解散中央指定的军委也是对的：“用不着再组织军委”，毛应当官复原职，刘安恭批评毛批评错了。刘被召回上海，不久死在战场。
Even though Mao had broken all the rules, Shanghai endorsed him. Mao was insubordinate, but a winner. His ambition demonstrated the kind of lust for power essential to conquer China, especially when the Communist forces numbered mere thousands, up against millions on the Nationalist side.
毛泽东破坏党的纪律，党却给他撑腰，这是什么原因？说到底，正是毛的权力欲使斯大林对他另眼相看。在中国这样一个大国里，以中共的区区几千人要夺权，没有不惜一切的炙热的权力欲是无法成功的。
There were two added factors that came into play in Mao’s favor at this moment. Two thousand kilometers north of his location the Russians controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, which cut 1,500 km through northeast China from Siberia to Vladivostok. Along with this, Moscow had inherited from the Tsars by far the largest foreign concession in China, occupying well over 1,000 square kilometers. Communist Russia had initially promised to give up its extraterritorial privileges, but it never kept its promise,* and the Chinese seized the railway in summer 1929.
眼下斯大林也需要毛。那时正值“中东路”事件，中国政府收回了控制在苏联人手里的，横跨中国东北一千五百多公里的铁路。这条铁路跟它沿线的土地当时是外国在中国的最大租界。莫斯科大为恼怒，组成了一支“特别远东军”，一度曾入侵到东北境内一百二十五公里的地方。斯大林掂量着“占领哈尔滨、成立革命政府”的可能性，要中共里应外合，在中国内地给蒋介石政府制造麻烦。
Moscow formed a Special Far East Army, headed by its former chief military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal Blyukher, and prepared to invade Manchuria. Stalin also mooted organizing an uprising in Manchuria to occupy Harbin, the major city in northern Manchuria, “and establish a revolutionary government.” With characteristic brutality, Stalin listed one aim, almost casually, in brackets, as: “(massacre the landowners …).” In November Russian troops invaded, moving 125 km into Manchuria.
Moscow wanted the Chinese Communists to create some diversionary military pressure. It ordered the CCP to “mobilise the whole Party and the population to be ready to defend the Soviet Union with arms.” It was in this context of protecting Russia’s state interests that Mao’s drive assumed urgent importance. Chou’s letter reinstating Mao enjoined: “your first and foremost task is to develop your guerrilla area … and expand the Red Army …” On 9 October the Soviet Politburo, with Stalin present, named “the regions of Mao Tse-tung” (no mention of Zhu) as the key area for expanding partisan warfare in connection with the Manchuria railway crisis.
周恩来写给朱毛红军的关于毛的信，一开头就讲中东路问题，要朱毛红军发展游击区域，扩大红军，“准备武装保护苏联”。十月九日，有斯大林出席的苏共政治局会议特别提到“毛泽东活动的地区”，称之为发展游击战、帮助解决中东路问题的重要地区。斯大林没提朱德。
Moscow had another pressing reason to single out Mao, and this was to do with Trotsky, Stalin’s bête noire, whom he had just exiled. Trotsky had a small, but dedicated, following in China, and Professor Chen Tu-hsiu, the former head of the CCP, cast as the scapegoat by Moscow two years before, was showing signs of tilting towards Trotskyism. Chen also spoke out against the CCP supporting Russia over the railway—a stance, he said, that “only makes people assume that we dance to the tune of roubles.”
莫斯科支持毛还有个原因。斯大林的头号政敌是托洛茨基(Leon Trotsky)，斯大林流放了他，但仍害怕他的影响力。托洛茨基在中国有一小群狂热追随者，正在争取陈独秀的支持。斯大林担心陈独秀会壮大“托派”的声势，担心跟陈有老关系的毛会跟陈走。这一系列的考虑使莫斯科决定为毛撑腰。苏联的媒体此时醒目地宣传毛，《真理报》(Pravda)在“中东路”事件关键的几个月里报导毛不下四次，称他为“领袖”——用的字眼跟用在斯大林头上的一样。没有任何其他的中共领导人享此殊荣，包括党的总书记在内。
Stalin was worried that Chen might throw his considerable prestige behind the Trotskyists. Moscow’s agents in Shanghai were concerned that Mao, to whom Chen had once been a mentor, might side with him.
周恩来写给朱毛红军的关于毛的信，一开头就讲中东路问题，要朱毛红军发展游击区域，扩大红军，“准备武装保护苏联”。十月九日，有斯大林出席的苏共政治局会议特别提到“毛泽东活动的地区”，称之为发展游击战、帮助解决中东路问题的重要地区。斯大林没提朱德。
For all these reasons, the Russians backed Mao, and promoted him with zeal in their media. During the critical months of the Manchuria crisis there were no fewer than four items about Mao in the Soviet Party’s key organ, Pravda, which was soon describing him as the “leader” (yozhd—the same word as used for Stalin). No other Chinese Communist was ever so lavishly acclaimed—not even Mao’s nominal superiors, like the Party general secretary.
When Chou’s instructions to reinstate Mao reached them, Zhu De and his colleagues bowed to Shanghai’s edict, and forwarded the letter to Mao. At the time, Mao was staying in a picturesque village some distance away, in an elegant two-story villa with a palm tree in the courtyard. He had been taking his ease, consuming plenty of milk (a rarity for the Chinese), as well as a kilo of beef stewed into soup every day, with a whole chicken on top. He would describe how fit he was, applying his characteristic yardstick: “I can eat a lot and shit a lot.”
周恩来起用毛的信递到了朱德手里，朱德服从了，派人把信送给毛。毛住在山清水秀的村子六家坡，一幢两层的小楼，天井里长着一株热带风情的棕榈。他每天享用营养丰富的牛奶，一公斤牛肉炖汤，外带一只母鸡。他形容自己是“吃的多也拉的多”。
The letter elated Mao. Far from earning him a reprimand, his violation of Party rules and sabotage of his colleagues had brought him only reward. In triumph, he lingered in the village for over a month, waiting for the pressure from Shanghai to pile on Zhu De to kowtow.
毛收到周恩来的信，却没有即刻回到朱毛红军去。他在六家坡又待了一个多月，给朱德施加压力。
At the time, Mao had his wife, Gui-yuan, staying with him, as well as a couple of acolytes. He did not talk politics with the women, preferring to relax with them. After dinner the two couples would walk to a little bridge to enjoy the twilight over a brook lush with water-grass. When darkness fell, peasants would light pine torches at the water’s edge. Shoals of fish would converge on the beacons, and the peasants would catch them with nets, or even bare-handed. Fish heads were Mao’s favorite morsel, and were said to enhance the brain. During the day he sat by his window reading English out loud in his heavy Hunan accent, to the amusement of his friends. This stumbling performance, without really striving to progress, was a kind of relaxation for Mao.
跟毛住在一起的有贺子珍和一对忠实于他的夫妇：曾志和她的丈夫。毛跟年轻的妻子们不谈政治。两对夫妻在黄昏薄暮里沿着水草漂漂的小溪散步闲聊，从弯弯的小桥上看农民点着火把在溪里捉鱼，有的用网捞，有的用手抓。有时他们送给毛几条。毛爱吃鱼头，说鱼头能增强他的脑子。白天，毛常坐在窗前旁若无人地大声念英文，充满湖南腔，惹得朋友们发笑。念英文而不求长進，是毛放松心情的一种方式。
Zhu De and his colleagues “wrote again and again urging comrade Mao to return,” as they reported to an obviously anxious Shanghai. But Mao stayed put until late November, when Zhu sent troops to escort him back formally, as a show of submission.
朱德和同事们着了急，“迭函去催毛同志回前委”。但毛就是不回来。十一月底，朱德只好正式派部队去恭迎毛，毛这才上路。
On 28 November Mao wrote Shanghai a letter that delighted Chou En-lai with its “very positive” spirit and declaration that Mao “completely accepts the Centre’s instructions.” But Mao’s main act of deference was reserved for Moscow. He condemned his old mentor Professor Chen as “anti-revolution,” and proposed a “propaganda drive” against him. A point was made of denouncing Trotsky by name. The troops were given daily pep talks on “armed support for the Soviet Union.”
毛马上给上海写信。周恩来如释重负，称毛“来信很积极”，“完全接受中央的指示”。毛不失时机地向莫斯科明确表态，跟“托派”划清界线，称陈独秀为“反对革命的分子”，提议“普遍地宣传”反陈。他主持作出反对托洛茨基的决议案。部队每天出操都要喊“武装保卫苏联”。
Having subjugated Zhu, Mao kept him on as a figurehead, and let the army continue to be called the Zhu–Mao Army. This way, Mao both satisfied Moscow and Shanghai, which specifically ordered “unity,” and exploited Zhu’s high prestige among the troops. Zhu went on performing as a front-man for Mao for almost half a century until the two men died within weeks of each other in 1976. Yet sometimes Zhu gave vent to his anger and frustration. In February 1931 he grumbled to military leaders that he was “just a plaything in Mao’s hands, he had no power, Mao just toyed with him.” This was reported to Moscow, but the Russians did not lift a finger to restrain Mao.
毛留下朱德当名义上的最高军事长官，部队也继续叫朱毛红军，既满足了莫斯科希望团结的要求，又得以利用朱德在部队的声望为自己服务。朱德被压服了，相当长的一段时间，他经常发脾气。俄罗斯档案记载一九三一年二月，他对军事指挥官们发作说，他不过是“毛手里的玩物，没有任何权，毛只是要他”。莫斯科没有伸出一根指头管管毛。朱在毛手下就这样干了一辈子，直至两人在一九七六年先后去世。
MAO’S RETURN TO COMMAND was announced to a big meeting of army delegates gathered in the town of Gutian in December 1929. To forestall dissent, he employed a ruse. He knew that what the soldiers hated most was the practice of executing deserters. According to a contemporary report to Shanghai, “every time before setting off, a few deserters would be executed and placed along the road as a warning to others.” Incidentally, this demonstrates how hard it was to keep people in the Red Army, contrary to oft-recycled claims. The fact was that even executions did not always work, as the report continued: “But we still can’t stop deserters.”
一九二九年十二月，毛回到红军的消息在福建古田向全军党代表大会宣布。毛怕官兵反对他，耍了个小小的花招。他知道士兵最痛恨的是枪毙逃兵。当时给上海的报告说：“每次出发差不多都要枪毙些逃兵，摆在路上示众，但逃兵仍然无法遏止。” 在古田毛泽东提议通过一项决议，不枪毙逃兵。”这使他大得人心。谁知几个月后古田会议的决议发表，这一条失踪了。毛已经坐稳了位子，这条决议也就束之高阁，逃兵呢，仍然被枪毙。
At Gutian, Mao made much of introducing a resolution to abolish the practice. This move was tremendously popular with the soldiers. But a few months later, when the Gutian resolutions were circulated, this item was not among them. Once Mao had established himself, it disappeared. Deserters continued to be executed.
Having inveigled the delegates at Gutian into looking more favorably on him by showing specious tolerance towards the issue of desertion, Mao was able to get what he really wanted: resolutions to condemn whatever stood between him and absolute power, notably the authority of the professional military. Mao was not a professional army man. Zhu was. So Mao invented a Soviet-style pejorative tag, “purely military viewpoint,” to lay down the line that it was wrong to place too high a value on military professionalism. He loathed the convention of voting even more, as it was a free vote that had turfed him out of office. So he labeled holding a vote as “ultra-democracy,” and abolished the practice.
毛利用提出这条决议带来的好感，使其他决议获得通过，扫除他与绝对权力之间的障碍。一是职业军人的权威。朱德是职业军人，而毛不是，于是毛批判“单纯军事观点”， 以破除这一权威。二是选举，对毛更不利，他就是被选掉的。他谴责这为“极端民主化”，取消了选举。
Mao was addicted to comfort, while Zhu lived like an ordinary soldier. Aversion to privilege was particularly strong in the army because many had originally been attracted to join by the lure of equality, which was the Party’s main appeal. To quell any protests about privilege, Mao now invented the term “absolute egalitarianism” to designate an offense, adding the word “absolute” to make it harder for opponents to disagree. It was from this time on that privilege was formally endorsed as an inalienable part of Chinese communism.
红军要求平等的呼声格外高，共产党的主要号召力就是平等。但毛喜欢舒适，生活难免不特殊。在井冈山时曾流行一句顺口溜，讽刺毛不跟士兵一道挑粮上山：朱老总挑米上坳，毛泽东在后方“打炮”。毛发明了“绝对平均主义”这顶帽子，来压制这种声音。自古田起，特权在中共党内成为理所当然。
As 1930 dawned, Mao, having just turned thirty-six, could look back on the previous year with considerable satisfaction. The Party had handed him the biggest Red Army outside the Soviet bloc after he had broken all the rules. Moscow and Shanghai were palpably bribing him, which meant they needed him. Now he could further exploit the leverage this gave him.
离开古田，刚满三十六岁的毛泽东志得意满，在马背上哼成一首词。“路隘林深苔滑”， 是行军的写照。“今日向何方？”他问道。他已计划好了答案：这就去兼并其他红军。
“Where do I go now?” asked Mao, as he set off on horseback humming a poem along mossy woodland paths. Mao knew exactly where he was going: to carry out more takeovers.
*Like its Russian counterpart, it changed names many times, and we shall call this apparatus “the Chinese KGB.”
*Comintern chief Bukharin called the railway zone “our revolutionary forefinger pointed into China,” and it was serving as a major base for Russian funding and sponsorship of Chinese Communists.